U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

+ + + + +

VIRTUAL BRIEFING

+ + + + +

FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 2021

+ + + + +

The Commission convened via

teleconference at 12:00 p.m. EDT, Norma Cantu,

Chair, presiding.

PRESENT:

NORMA V. CANTU, Chair

J. CHRISTIAN ADAMS, Commissioner

STEPHEN GILCHRIST, Commissioner

GAIL HERIOT, Commissioner

PETER N. KIRSANOW, Commissioner

DAVID KLADNEY, Commissioner

MICHAEL YAKI, Commissioner

MAURO MORALES, Staff Director

DAVID GANZ, General Counsel

STAFF PRESENT:

NICK BAIR

PAMELA DUNSTON, Chief ASCD

GERALD FOSTEN

ALFREDA GREENE

JULIE GRIECO

MICHELE RAMEY

ANGELIA RORISON

MARIK XAVIER-BRIER

COMMISSIONER ASSISTANTS PRESENT:

ALEC DUELL

JOHN MASHBURN

CARISSA MULDER

AMY ROYCE

JUANA SILVERIO

THOMAS SIMUEL

IRENA VIDULOVIC

A G E N D A

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY CHAIR
NORMA V. CANTU AND COMMISSIONERS
DAVID KLADNEY AND MICHAEL YAKI
II. PANEL 1
Introduction of Panel Members
David Bibo, Acting Assoc. Administrator,
Response & Recovery, FEMA
Tony Robinson, Region 6 Administrator, FEMA1
Glenn Sklar, Principal Deputy Inspector
General, DHS OIG
Stephen Begg, Deputy Inspector General,
HUD OIG2
Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security &
Justice, USGAO
Tevi Troy, Author, BPC Senior Fellow,
& Former HHS Deputy Secretary3
Jo Linda Johnson, Director, Office of
Equal Rights, FEMA4
III. BREAK8
TIL DANIEL O
IV. PANEL 2
Kira Romero-Craft, Director, Southwest Region,
LatinoJustice PRLDEF8
Andrés Gallegos, Chairman, National Council
on Disability8 Nicole Roy, Project Coordinator,
Salvation Army
Charley Willison, Postdoctoral Fellow,
Harvard Medical School9
marvaru meurear sumour
V. CLOSING REMARKS BY CHAIR NORMA V. CANTU12
VI AD TOTION MEDITING 12

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(12:02 p.m.)
3	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioners virtually
4	present at this briefing in addition to me are
5	Commissioner Adams, Commissioner Gilchrist,
6	Commissioner Heriot, Commissioner Kirsanow,
7	Commissioner Kladney and Commissioner Yaki. A quorum
8	of Commissioners is present. I note for the record
9	that the Staff Director and the court reporter are
10	present.
11	I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY CHAIR NORMA V. CANTU AND
12	COMMISSIONERS DAVID KLADNEY
13	AND MICHAEL YAKI
14	I look forward to our briefing today and
15	note that the Commission business meeting scheduled
16	for this afternoon following this briefing has been
17	cancelled so we do not have a further meeting for the
18	Commissioners to attend.
19	My name is Norma Cantu, and I am Chair.
20	And I wish to welcome everyone to this briefing on
21	the civil rights in the federal response to Hurricane
22	Maria and Harvey.
23	The Commission undertook this project
24	knowing full well that the Congress was already
25	reviewing the federal responses to natural disasters.

1	However, we'll be looking at the response through a
2	civil rights lens
3	The Commission will review Federal
4	Emergency Management Agency, FEMA, in its role in
5	disaster preparedness and response. We'll be looking
6	to evaluate efforts by FEMA to comply with the Robert
7	T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act along
8	with other federal civil rights laws and policies.
9	And our Commission will compare the
10	significant hurricane systems to Hurricanes Harvey
11	and Maria.
12	Commissioners will hear from subject
13	matter experts such as government officials,
14	academics, advocates and impacted persons.
15	First, we will begin with a few
16	housekeeping items. I share deep thanks to the
17	Commission's staff who researched and brought today's
18	briefing into being including the teams who have
19	worked on logistics, which this virtual environment
20	presents a whole host of additional challenges. And
21	I thank Staff Director Morales for his leadership.
22	I caution all speakers, including our
23	Commissioners, to refrain from speaking over each
24	other for the ease of the transcription by the court
25	reporter.

1 I will need to cue Additionally, 2 staff behind the scenes for the appropriate video and 3 audio support. So occasionally, you'll hear a phone 4 ringing and that's probably for me and not for you. 5 So please wait to speak until I've called upon you. During the briefing, each panelist will 6 7 have seven minutes to speak, and you'll see on the 8 top of your gallery screen you'll see the seven 9 minutes counting down. 10 The panelists after they speak, then the 11 Commissioners will have opportunity an to 12 questions within the allotted period of time. 13 Now that depends upon how long the folks 14 take to present. It depends upon how many questions 15 would urge folks to get your most people ask. I important question out first because I'm doing some 16 17 math here and 11 panelists times 7 minutes each, 18 that's already an hour and a half there. 19 So we're going to finish on time. 20 will strictly enforce the time allotment given to each panelist to present his and her statement. 21 22 unless we didn't receive your testimony until today, 23 you can assume that we have read your statements. 24 you don't need to use some of your precious time to 25 read that to us as part of your opening remarks.

1	please focus your remarks on the topic of today's
2	briefing.
3	For my fellow Commissioners, I know they
4	are cognizant of the interest of each one of us to
5	ask questions. So please be brief in asking your
6	questions so we can move quickly and efficiently move
7	through today's schedule.
8	I will step in to move it along if
9	necessary. And, panelists, please note that I ensure
10	that we will have enough time. The 7 minute thing,
11	in addition to the clock, you'll see me waving and
12	trying to get your attention. That means you're
13	getting close to your time limit.
14	Now I'm going to call on two of our
15	Commissioners, Commissioner Kladney and Commissioner
16	Yaki. I promised them a whole two minutes each for
17	their opening statements. And I know they're going
18	to do their best if I can please call first on
19	Commissioner Kladney.
20	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you very
21	much, Madam Chair. Good morning. Commissioner
22	Adegbile, a co-sponsor of this project, will be
23	unable to attend the briefing today because of an
24	unavoidable family issue.
25	As a co-sponsor of this project with

1	Commissioner Yaki, Commissioner Adegbile would like
2	to thank our fellow Commissioners, their special
3	assistants and legal interns for their work on this
4	project. A lot goes into these briefings.
5	Also, the newly appointed leader of our
6	Office of Civil Rights Evaluation, Marik Xavier-Brier
7	was a great help on this. And by the way,
8	congratulations, Marik, we look forward to your
9	leadership.
10	Commissioner Adegbile also wishes to
11	thank Julie Grieco of OCRE for her hard work in
12	researching and preparing this issue for this
13	briefing.
14	Of course, he thanks his special
15	assistant Irena Vidulovic and legal intern, Alana
16	Thomas, and Communications Director Ang Rorison.
17	Finally, we would not be holding this
18	briefing if it wasn't for the great coordination and
19	logistics work of Ms. Pam Dunston and her staff. She
20	is there all the time when this Commission asks her
21	to make briefings happen in our office, in the field
22	or online.
23	Thank you, Ms. Dunston, and thank you the
24	entire staff of the Commission.
25	On a personal note, I would like to thank

1 my very special assistant, Amy Royce, who is always 2 prepared for this briefing in excellent fashion and 3 our new legal intern, Clara Malkin, who is following 4 in Amy's footsteps. Great job. These hurricanes dealt a serious blow to 5 millions of Americans, which many are still suffering 6 7 the consequences today. The questions need to be 8 asked if the government response was sufficient 9 enough for the United States to be proud of its civil 10 rights record or if there were civil rights failures 11 that resulted in more harm than what the hurricanes 12 levied on our citizens. 13 Adeabile Commissioner thanks the 14 witnesses and participants for attending 15 participating in today's briefing. Thank you, Madam 16 Chair. 17 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Are you waiting for 18 -- may I go? I'm Commissioner Michael Yaki. And in 19 2017, as I was watching the response for Hurricane 20 couldn't help but be reminded of Ι 21 response to Hurricane Katrina over 10 years before 22 and the images that we saw of the people who were 23 stranded, of the Ninth Ward being devastated. 24 And on a personal note, I am someone who, like many millions of Americans, survived a natural 25

1	disaster.
2	I rode through the Loma Prieta earthquake
3	in 1989 in the San Francisco Bay area. And I was
4	fortunate in many ways. I was fortunate because my
5	home was not damaged. I was also fortunate because
6	I had a couple advantages other people did not.
7	I had a law degree. I had a copy of the
8	Stafford Act, and I worked for a member of Congress.
9	And in that role, we worked to help the thousands
10	upon thousands of people who were needing assistance
11	after the quake.
12	And it gave me a newfound appreciation
13	and understanding and quite frankly a very skeptical
14	eye of our nation's federal response efforts in the
15	wake of a disaster.
16	And to that end, I began advising other
17	offices throughout the time I worked in Congress on
18	how to respond to disasters and how to work with FEMA.
19	And it's, quite rankly, a little shocking to see
20	that many years later not too many things have
21	changed.
22	And, in fact, in our mission as members
23	of the Commission on Civil Rights to note that there
24	may be a disproportionate impact of the federal
25	response with regard to its treatment of people of

1	color to the disabled is something that I find
2	shocking today.
3	And I hope that the panelists today will
4	focus on that. I don't need to see, you know, five
5	paragraphs of statistics about how we're
6	investigating fraud and abuse. I want to know what
7	the Southeast Texas Regional Planning Commission was
8	doing with CDBG-DR funds with regard to how it was
9	being allocated or if it was being allocated in a way
10	that favored one population over another on the basis
11	of color.
12	I want to know why the amount of aid that
13	gets distributed disproportionately favors one group
14	over another. I would just note that for the record
15	that on the information that we were provided
16	already, it appears that people in Hurricane Harvey
17	received \$1,600 more per person than anyone in
18	Hurricane Maria im Puerto Rico.
19	These are the hard questions we need to
20	ask and we need answers. And I'm thankful for
21	everyone who has helped put this together. I look
22	forward to your testimony and let's proceed.
23	II. PANEL 1 - INTRODUCTION OF PANELISTS
24	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Commissioner
25	Yaki. Let me know introduce the seven people on the
	NEALD FOLKS

1	first panel.
2	Our first speaker this morning is David
3	Bibo, Acting Associate Administrator, Response and
4	Recovery, FEMA.
5	Our second speaker is Tony Robinson,
6	Region 6 Administrator, FEMA.
7	Our third speaker is Glenn Sklar,
8	Principal Deputy Inspector General, Department of
9	Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General.
10	Our fourth speaker is Stephen Begg,
11	Deputy Inspector General, Housing and Urbar
12	Development, Office of the Inspector General.
13	Our fifth speaker is Chris Currie,
14	Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
15	Government Accountability Office.
16	Our sixth speaker is Tevi Troy, author,
17	BPC senior fellow and former Health and Humar
18	Services Deputy Secretary.
19	Our seventh and final speaker on Panel 1
20	is Jo Linda Johnson, Director, Office of Equal
21	Rights, FEMA.
22	And please note the countdown clock at
23	the top. And you may begin, Mr. Bibo. Please
24	proceed.
25	DAVID BIBO

1	MR. B BO: Madam Chair, thank you for the
2	opportunity to join the U.S. Commission on Civil
3	Rights proceedings today. I very much appreciate the
4	chance to talk about our work with Hurricane Harvey
5	and Maria as well as our work going forward.
6	I first joined FEMA in 2009 and have
7	served as a member of the Senior Executive Service
8	here at FEMA since 2012.
9	During the 2017 hurricane season, I was
10	the acting head of policy for FEMA. In that position,
11	I helped lead the Agency through a number of policy
12	challenges related to the response and recovery
13	efforts in the delivery of federal disaster
14	assistance following the devastations that Hurricane
15	Harvey and Hurricane Maria brought to Texas and
16	Puerto Rico, respectively.
17	At the time, I was also involved in
18	FEMA's efforts to enhance disaster assistance for
19	Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, including
20	language that was included in the 2018 Bipartisan
21	Budget Act.
22	This language that Congress passed and
23	the President signed has and continues to give us
24	greater flexibility in providing funding toward
25	restoring Puerto Rico's infrastructure and with that

1 of the U.S. Virgin Islands. 2 Specilfically, it allows us to restore 3 certain disaster damaged facilities infrastructure without regard to the pre-disaster 5 condition of that infrastructure, which is something that we normall₩ are not able to do under 6 7 authorities in the Stafford Act. 8 Further, it also allows us to restore the 9 function of the | facilities and infrastructure to 10 industry standards without regard to whether the 11 entire system of infrastructure was actually damaged 12 by the disaster, another important factor in helping 13 to enhance and bolster Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin 14 Islands recovery from Hurricanes Irma and Maria. 15 Since January of 2020, I have served as 16 FEMA's Acting Associate Administrator for Response 17 In this role, I am responsible for and Recovery. 18 leading our response, recovery, logistics and field 19 operations functions nationwide in support of our 10 20 Regional Administrators who are distributed across 21 the country. 22 The historic 2017 hurricane season and 23 wildfire activity I'm sure you will recall certainly 24 demonstrated how vital the local, state, Tribal, 25 territorial and federal partnership is in delivering

1 disaster assistance to the American people. 2 Harvey, Irma and Maria were three major 3 landfalling hurricanes that affected the continental 4 and outside of the continental United States 5 relatively quick succession affecting 15 percent of the United States population or roughly 47 million 6 7 And, as we know, the effects of Hurricane 8 Rico's infrastructure on Puerlto 9 significant, and we continue several years on to work 10 with the government of Puerto Rico as we do in Texas 11 and elsewhere to facilitate the recovery. 12 And I think it's important to recall that 13 following Maria in Puerto Rico, every airport and 14 port were closed. Only 5 percent of the population 15 had access to cell phone service and 3.7 million 16 residents were without electricity. 17 The challenges that a community faces in 18 advance of a disaster, before a disaster whether it's 19 poverty, housing constraints, fragility of 20 infrastructure are unfortunately all exacerbated by 21 disaster and that makes the response effort and 22 recovery effort all the more challenging. 23 FEMA along with our partners across the 24 Federal Government in support of the states and the 25 territories continue to provide historic levels of

1	support to not only the government of Puerto Rico,
2	the U.S. Virgin Islands, for Maria and Irma but also
3	to Texas and Florida from Harvey and Irma.
4	In the Puerto Rico case, this includes
5	the award of the three largest recovery grants in
6	FEMA's history to rebuild large portions of Puerto
7	Rico's infrastructure, particularly the power grid,
8	the water system and school facilities.
9	Here on the mainland, as you all know,
10	Hurricane Harvey posed historic challenges for the
11	Houston area in the aftermath of the storm. More
12	than 42,000 people required sheltering assistance,
13	which was a substantial mission that I'm sure Tony
14	will talk more about.
15	We've come a long way in the recovery
16	operations from Harvey and Maria. The recovery has
17	continued to this day. We know that we have more to
18	do, and FEMA remains committed even as we prepare for
19	what may come next.
20	I think it's important to know that the
21	Biden administration priorities inform very much the
22	FEMA Administrator's priorities, particularly around
23	promoting equity and addressing the effects of
24	climate change.
25	Climate change is making disasters more

1	frequent, more intense, and we're seeing greater
2	destruction. And we know we must all work together
3	to address these challenges head-on through risk
4	reduction projects to build more resilient
5	communities and that we must consider equity and
6	socially vulnerable populations in all that we do.
7	At FEMA we are continuously reviewing our
8	program delivery, our decision-making, and our
9	responses to improve our support that we provide to
10	disaster survivors.
11	We look forward to working and continuing
12	to work with our partners who are also represented
13	here on the panel today and look forward to the
14	feedback and the questions from the Commissioners to
15	help drive forward the FEMA Administrator and the
16	broader administration's commitment to promoting
17	equity in everything that we do.
18	I look forward to the questions from the
19	panel, Madam Chair. Thank you.
20	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Mr. Bibo. And
21	now we will hear from Mr. Robinson. Please proceed.
22	TONY ROBINSON
23	MR. ROBINSON: Good afternoon, Chair
24	Cantu and distinguished members of the Commission.
25	My name is Tony Robinson. I am the Regional
	NEAL P. GROSS

1	Administrator of FEMA Federal Emergency Management
2	Region 6 office in Denton, Texas, which is
3	responsible for the states of Arkansas, Louisiana,
4	New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and the 68 Tribal Nations
5	that are within that geographic area.
6	I've been with FEMA since 1987 and served
7	as the Regional Administrator in Region 6 since 2013.
8	Our regional office is located in Denton, Texas, and
9	we have geographic based offices in Baton Rouge, New
10	Orleans, Austin and Houston with FEMA integration
11	team members co-located in state offices in Arkansas,
12	Oklahoma and New Mexico with the purpose to build
13	partnerships and capabilities with the emergency
14	management community.
15	We also have Tribal liaisons located in
16	New Mexico and Oklahoma where 61 of our Tribal
17	partners are located with the intent to closely
18	collaborate with our Tribal Nations and to place our
19	workforce closer to the communities that they serve.
20	I'm particularly proud of the regional
21	workforce and that includes people who have chosen to
22	work at FEMA after personally being impacted by
23	disasters themselves.
24	Region 6 has seen some of our nation's
25	largest disasters and our team has responded to many

1	notable disasters, including a very busy 2020
2	hurricane season, which included five storms
3	impacting Louisiana, and Southwest Louisiana being
4	significantly impacted by Hurricanes Laura and Delta,
5	which made landfall within 12 miles of each other.
6	Our disaster work is in addition to our
7	constantly evolving steady state mission that
8	requires our team to tackle new challenges on a
9	regular basis, including most recently the extensive
10	COVID-19 work that was related to supply chain
11	issues, personnel support and vaccine distribution.
12	In 2020, the Region awarded \$18 billion
13	in grant funding to assist our partners in building
14	capabilities for disaster recovery.
15	That gives you some background on FEMA
16	Region 6. And now I will just give you some specifics
17	on Hurricane Harvey.
18	Hurricane Harvey made landfall near
19	Rockport, Texas, as a Category 4 storm with its peak
20	intensity on August 25, with the storm remaining
21	inland for several days, finally departing the state
22	on August 30.
23	In addition to wind and storm surge along
24	the Texas coast, heavy rainfall and widespread flash
25	flooding directly impacted 6.7 million people across

1	an area approximately 41,500 square miles, including
2	our nation's fourth largest city, the City of
3	Houston, as well as many small and medium-sized
4	communities along the coast and deep into the
5	interior of Texas
6	During the storm, the highest rainfall
7	total amount as reported was just a little over 62
8	inches in the rain gauge outside of Houston. In total
9	41 counties were designated for FEMA's Individual
10	Assistance program and 53 counties for the Public
11	Assistance program.
12	We also had 91,000 flood insurance claims
13	that were filed during this period with \$8.8 billion
14	being paid out for those claims.
15	A cornerstone of our response to
16	recovery approach is to place our staff and services
17	in the areas with the greatest need. For each of
18	these communities, we took the following actions.
19	We opened more than 100 disaster recovery
20	centers across the impacted area, using both fixed
21	and mobile sites. These DRCs saw more than 200,000
22	visitors.
23	We deployed dozens of disaster survivor
24	assistance teams who canvassed shelters, visited hard
25	hit neighborhoods, and contacted more than 500,000

1	survivors.
2	Additionally, our staff participated in
3	more than 400 community events to assist and engage
4	survivors throughout the recovery.
5	We understand that communities cannot
6	fully recover from a disaster if the population does
7	not return. So we do our utmost to keep survivors as
8	close to home as possible while they recover. And
9	this was true in our immediate Harvey recovery as
10	well.
11	The volume of applications for this
12	disaster was one of the highest in FEMA's history.
13	In total, we provided more than \$1.6 million in grant
14	funding for more than 373,000 individuals and
15	households through the Individual and Household
16	Program.
17	Additionally, \$121 million in financial
18	assistance to applicants was provided for immediate
19	and critical needs because they were displaced with
20	no primary dwelling.
21	Housing assistance after disasters can be
22	extremely challenging. And for a disaster of the
23	magnitude of Hurricane Harvey, these challenges were
24	multiplied.
25	We work very closely with our states.

1	And the lessons learned from the 2016 floods in
2	Louisiana, we partnered with the State of Texas to
3	deliver some new and innovative programs.
4	So in addition to some of our traditional
5	programs, like congregate and non-congregate
6	sheltering, traditional sheltering assistance, home
7	repairs, lodging and special repairs, there were two
8	innovative programs which were the shelter and
9	temporary emergency power programs, which Texas
10	called PREPS, Partial Repair and Essential Power for
11	Sheltering, and then permanent housing construction,
12	which was a new program that was direct housing
13	assistance limited to home repair.
14	In addition, we used a geographically
15	dispersed model for case management, assigning
16	specific impacted counties between the Texas Health
17	and Human Service Commission and the National
18	Volunteer Organizations active in disasters. And
19	this helped us better serve our disaster survivors.
20	The site and scope of Hurricane Harvey's
21	impact would have been challenging in a normal year.
22	But the subsequent disasters, as Mr. Bibo mentioned,
23	really placed considerable strain on our FEMA
24	resources.
25	I am extremely proud of the FEMA staff

1	and our partners with the Texas Division of Emergency
2	Management along with our local, state, Tribal and
3	non-governmental organizations and our private sector
4	resources. Disasters are a whole of community
5	business and that certainly worked in the State of
6	Texas.
7	There are always lessons that we can
8	learn from disasters. From our previous work, we
9	implemented some of those things we learned in
10	Louisiana, and we are committed to improving in
11	meaningful ways every day.
12	Our work recovering from Hurricane Harvey
13	is not yet complete. But we've already begun to
14	establish a great deal in supporting our partners
15	along the long-term recovery efforts.
16	Today we've obligated over \$2.4 billion
17	for Public Assistance in more than 19,000
18	projects. There are only 509 projects that remain
19	open in Hurricane Harvey.
20	In total, the FEMA Stafford Act Program
21	provided over \$4 billion of assistance. And that's
22	from our Individual Assistance, Public Assistance and
23	Hazard Mitigation Program. And we temporarily housed
24	over 19,000 survivors in this disaster.
25	We remain committed to working with our

1	federal, state and local partners to make our nation
2	more resilient and to learn from the challenges we
3	faced during Hurricanes Harvey and Maria and
4	subsequent disasters, including the COVID-19
5	pandemic, to ensure that all citizens have equal
6	access to our programs in compliance with our
7	nation's civil rights laws and policies.
8	Thank you for the opportunity to be part
9	of this public briefing. And I look forward to
10	answering your questions. Thank you.
11	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
12	We'll now hear from Mr. Sklar.
13	GLENN SKLAR
14	MR. SKLAR: Good afternoon, Madam
15	Commissioner and Commissioners. I'm Glenn Sklar, the
16	Principal Deputy Inspector General at Homeland
17	Security.
18	Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
19	our oversight work today, specifically, our oversight
20	of FEMA's disaster response and recovery efforts in
21	Hurricanes Harvey and Maria.
22	Our office plays a unique and critical
23	role in the oversight of disaster management. We
24	ensure disaster programs are operating in an
25	effective and efficient manner and that public funds

1	are spent in accordance with regulations.
2	We are well aware of the hardships of
3	multiple hurricanes stacked in a tight window in late
4	2017 placed on FEMA. We acknowledge the efforts of
5	dedicated FEMA employees and contractors who
6	persevered through these difficult circumstances,
7	work that was often accomplished far away from home.
8	With that said, we found many
9	opportunities for improved performance in the future.
10	Effective intervention from FEMA can mean
11	the difference between life and death for some
12	disaster survivors. With those stakes on the line,
13	we do not shy away from issuing top recommendations
14	for improvement.
15	Our oversight team was on the ground less
16	than two months after Hurricane Maria hit Puerto
17	Rico. Our teams spoke with multiple individuals who
18	noted serious problems with the distribution of meals
19	and water, such as containers arriving that were
20	supposed to be filled with food and water but were
21	either half empty from carrying unrelated goods.
22	FEMA ost visibility of about 38 percent
23	of its commodity shipments to Puerto Rico worth an
24	estimated \$257 million.
25	Overall, we conducted 10 audits related

1	to our oversight obligations, and we published
2	corresponding reports between May 2019 and June 2021.
3	Audit topics included acquisition
4	contracting and controls, distribution of
5	commodities, oversight of grants, management of
6	disaster assistance funds and oversight of the IT
7	environment.
8	Specifically, we noted shortcomings in
9	FEMA's acquisition and contracting controls. For
10	example, FEMA inappropriately awarded two contracts
11	to supply roof tarps and plastic sheeting to disaster
12	survivors in Puerto Rico. Within a month, FEMA had
13	cancelled both contracts because the contractor did
14	not deliver those tarps and sheeting.
15	In addition, FEMA's Public Assistance
16	grants to the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority,
17	PREPA, and PREPA's subsequent contracts with two
18	contractors to fix the electrical grid did not fully
19	comply with federal laws and regulations as well as
20	program assistance guidelines.
21	This led to potentially ineligible
22	contract costs and FEMA reimbursing PREPA more than
23	\$852 million for contract costs without confirming
24	PREPA provided proper oversight for the contract.
25	Another electrical grid contract that we

1	reviewed was billing at a rate of \$616 per hour for
2	a senior accountant.
3	Additionally, deficiencies in FEMA's
4	management of commodity distribution in Puerto Rico
5	led to lost visibility of commodities and delayed
6	shipments.
7	For example, water deliveries had an
8	average shipping delay of 71 days. And food items,
9	average shipping delays of 59 days.
10	Of the approximately 97 million liters of
11	water FEMA shipped to Puerto Rico between September
12	2017 and April 2018, only 36 million liters reached
13	their final destination for distribution.
14	During the same period, only 24 million
15	of 53 million shipped meals reached their final
16	destination for distribution.
17	Further, FEMA's oversight of its IT
18	environment to support response in recovery efforts
19	was inadequate. FEMA's legacy IT systems were not
20	integrated and did not have the functionality needed
21	to keep pace with high volume processing.
22	Looking forward, DHS OIG has six ongoing
23	audits and reviews related to both disaster and
24	pandemic oversight to be initiated based on our
25	observations during visits to these disaster sites

1	and our post-disaster analysis. We look forward to
2	publishing those reports.
3	Our criminal investigators also
4	investigated fraud and abuse related to these
5	disasters. Since April 2017, we have initiated 249
6	investigations related to Hurricanes Harvey and
7	Maria.
8	We have activated or leveraged resources
9	aimed at combating criminality and procurement, grand
10	fraud, disaster application benefit fraud, identity
11	theft, impersonation of FEMA or law enforcement
12	officials, and DHS employee misconduct.
13	For example, we investigated the \$1.8
14	billion electrical power contract in Puerto Rico, and
15	this resulted in the indictments of a former FEMA
16	senior executive, a second former FEMA employee and
17	the former president of an electrical company.
18	In conclusion, FEMA faced tremendous
19	challenges meeting mission requirements because of
20	the catastrophic nature of Hurricanes Maria and
21	Harvey in multiple concurrent nationwide disasters.
22	We hope that our testimony today has
23	provided the Commissioners with a holistic view of
24	our oversight work of FEMA's responses to these
25	disasters.

1	I welcome any questions. Thank you.
2	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Mr. Sklar. Mr.
3	Begg, we will now hear from you.
4	STEPHEN BEGG
5	MR. BEGG: Thank you, Madam Commissioner,
6	distinguished Commissioners and Commission staff.
7	Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this
8	briefing.
9	As the Deputy Inspector General for the
10	U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, it
11	is my pleasure to discuss our office's work related
12	to HUD's disaster recovery programs and Hurricanes
13	Harvey and Maria.
14	HUD's disaster programs are designed to
15	assist individuals and communities in long-term
16	recovery from disasters and in mitigating the
17	potential effects of future disasters.
18	In recent years, disasters and federal
19	spending on them have increased exponentially, and we
20	expect them to continue increasing.
21	Since 1992, Congress has appropriated
22	over \$89 billion of grant funds through HUD's
23	disaster programs. A substantial portion of that
24	amount, approximately \$30 billion, has been
25	appropriated to assist Texas and Puerto Rico in the

1	aftermath of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria.
2	The Office of Inspector General provides
3	independent comprehensive oversight of HUD's disaster
4	programs through audits, evaluations, reviews and
5	investigations.
6	For several years, we have identified the
7	administration of disaster recovery assistance as a
8	top management challenge for HUD. We focus a
9	significant portion of our oversight portfolio or
10	promoting effectiveness, the economy, and efficiency
11	in HUD's disaster programs as well as preventing
12	fraud, waste and abuse in them.
13	Our office appreciates this opportunity
14	to highlight several interrelated themes from our
15	work and to emphasize to the Commission our support
16	for codification of HUD's disaster programs.
17	We believe that creating permanent
18	program requirements through codification will help
19	disaster grant funds reach the individuals and
20	communities in need more quickly, and the
21	codification will generate more effective outcomes in
22	HUD's disaster programs.
23	Currently, HUD establishes its disaster
24	program requirements through notices in the Federal
25	Register rather than through its regulations. Each

1 time Congress appropriates money for a disaster, HUD 2 generates a Federal Register notice specific to that 3 funding stream. 4 This process can quickly become 5 complicated for grantees as they may need to examine 6 multiple notices to understand the requirements 7 related to a disaster. For example, in February 2017, Texas had 8 9 six open grants and was required to file 48 different 10 Federal Register notices to administer them. 11 identified that many of the 12 requirements in these notices are the same across 13 grants and disasters. In 2018, we recommended that 14 codify these requirements in regulation 15 provide consistency and clarity for grantees. Doing 16 so would reduce delays in grantee's planning efforts 17 and allow them to build programs that could be 18 executed efficiently in future disasters. 19 In April 2021, we again recommended that 20 HUD codify its disaster programs after we found that 21 HUD's extensive negotiations with the Office of 22 Management and Budget about new program requirements 23 significantly delayed the release of Federal Register 24 notices for Puerto Rico, Texas and other grantees 25 receiving disaster mitigation funding.

1	Establishing a permanent set of
2	requirements would reduce uncertainty early in the
3	grant life cycle and help grantees build capacity to
4	administer grants more quickly.
5	We have consistently identified that
6	disaster grantee struggles with staffing, procurement
7	and implementing strong internal controls early in
8	the process.
9	We found these capacity issues existed
10	for HUD grantees in Texas and Puerto Rico and that
11	the unprecedented amount of grant funds they were
12	initially charged with administering was a
13	significant factor in their struggle to establish
14	capacity.
15	We have also found that lack of clarity
16	in program requirements generates delays and
17	ineffectiveness later in the grant life cycle.
18	In our 2020 report on HUD's top
19	management challenges, we highlighted our concern
20	with a significant number of disaster recovery
21	grantees that HUD has designated as slow spenders.
22	We are currently conducting work to
23	examine how HUD monitors these grantees and assists
24	them in improving the timings of their activities.
25	Our other recent reviews have highlighted

1	that standard requirements would help grantees better
2	deliver core recovery functions like rebuilding and
3	rehabilitating homes.
4	In addition to the longstanding
5	challenges in these programs, we recently surveyed
6	HUD disaster grantees and found that the COVID-19
7	pandemic caused many aspects of their recovery
8	activities and operations to slow down or stop
9	entirely.
10	Grantees struggled during the pandemic to
11	communicate with their partners and advanced
12	construction projects due to health and safety
13	restrictions in many jurisdictions.
14	As grantees continue grappling with these
15	challenges and our communities face increased threats
16	from disasters, our office will continue using our
17	oversight toolkit to help HUD achieve its strategic
18	objective to support effectiveness and accountability
19	in long-term disaster recovery.
20	We believe that codification of HUD
21	programs is an important first step in fulfilling
22	that objective.
23	Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
24	our work with you today. I look forward to your
25	questions and to continue providing information to

1	the Commission that may further your important work.
2	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. We will next
3	hear from Chris Currie. Please proceed.
4	CHRIS CURRIE
5	MR. CURRIE: Okay. Thank you very much.
6	I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
7	I'd like to start by discussing just
8	federal disaster assistance in the U.S. and what the
9	future is going to look like first.
10	There are at least 29 federal agencies,
11	including FEMA, that provide disaster aid to
12	individual citizens and also to states, territories,
13	Indian Tribes and other local governments.
14	Just to give you a sense of the scale,
15	since 2005, the federal government spent over \$500
16	billion, that's over half a trillion dollars on
17	disaster assistance and aid.
18	And while Harvey and Maria are certainly
19	huge catastrophic events, they get a lot of
20	attention, the U.S. is experiencing more and more
21	severe weather every day due to climate change.
22	Thunderstorms are causing massive flooding in places
23	that don't typically see this, places like West
24	Virginia, Tennessee, Nebraska.
25	Wildfires are changing from localized

1	rural events in the past to state, region-wide
2	events, and sometimes now urban catastrophes.
3	From 2016 to 2018 alone, 5.6 million
4	people applied to FEMA for assistance and that
5	doesn't even include other federal agencies. That's
6	just FEMA. It s important to understand these
7	statistics because the federal government is bearing
8	more and more of the burden for these increasing
9	disasters and costs.
10	We found that most states, territories,
11	localities and Tribes, they don't have a rainy day
12	fund to pay for disasters. They rely on the federal
13	government. And the picture is worse for our
14	citizens.
15	Many have no emergency funds to pay
16	unexpected bills et alone to prepare for disasters.
17	Many are also very underinsured. This means that
18	more and more people will rely on federal help after
19	disasters.
20	And before I talk about some of our
21	findings, I do want to say that we get to observe the
22	dedicated staff from FEMA and other agencies every
23	day in our work. They work long and hard hours to
24	serve our citizens and communities.
25	They're also committed to improvement

1	when we identify challenges and weaknesses as well.
2	And on that note, our work has identified a number of
3	challenges across federal disaster programs, all of
4	which were used during Hurricane Harvey and Maria and
5	every other major disaster.
6	A key theme that has emerged is that
7	individual citizens or states, localities or
8	territorial or Tribal governments with fewer
9	resources, capacity and experience, not surprisingly
10	face greater challenges navigating federal programs
11	and assistance.
12	Our work has also shown areas where
13	changes could help vulnerable populations. For
14	example, after the 2017 disasters, we found that
15	elderly survivors and the disabled face challenges in
16	registering for and obtaining assistance.
17	For example, at the time there was no way
18	for survivors to indicate a disability need when they
19	registered with FEMA. We have recommended they do
20	that. FEMA has since taken action to address that.
21	The groups also face challenges obtaining
22	supplies because they couldn't reach centralized
23	distribution centers. That was also a problem.
24	We also found that some components of
25	FEMA's Individual Assistance enrollment process may

1 difficult for vulnerable unintentionally make it 2 populations to obtain assistance. 3 Multiple steps in this process can be 4 can be highly technical, confusing, can be time 5 consuming to navigate, requiring the survivor to This lands 6 follow-up with incomplete information. 7 harder on those with less education and jobs where 8 they can't sit at a computer all day or be on the 9 going back and forth with the federal 10 government. 11 We have recommended that FEMA look at 12 these components in their process for opportunities 13 streamline it where possible and that 14 encourage further participation and better outcomes 15 for vulnerable populations. 16 Another major theme is that state and 17 local resources are а huge factor 18 effectiveness of preparedness response and recovery 19 efforts. And the also dictate the amount of federal 20 help that's going to be needed along the way. 21 For example, in Puerto Rico, the Virgin 22 Islands and we can't forget the Pacific Territories 23 that were hit really hard in 2018, serious fiscal 24 constraints, years of depleted tax bases and large 25 populations and poverty led to lack of planning and

1	preparedness for major disasters over the years.
2	The result was that FEMA and other
3	agencies had to step in to more directly help not
4	surprisingly.
5	This also severely affects the long-term
6	recovery and the long-term outcome, which is
7	extremely important for understanding how communities
8	and people get back on their feet in the future.
9	We reported that Puerto Rico's fiscal
10	constraints have made it very difficult to fund and
11	start large infrastructure repairs after Maria, even
12	under, you know, when there's been a lot of federal
13	help.
14	This is in stark contrast to other states
15	like Texas, Florida, California, that can provide the
16	upfront funding to jumpstart recovery because they're
17	able to secure debt or, you know, move other funds in
18	their budgets to start paying for these projects
19	whereas Puerto Rico and others are solely reliant on
20	federal funds, which in some cases don't actually
21	come until years after the disaster.
22	For example, on January 21, Puerto Rico
23	had spent we just reported this -they had spent
24	\$158 million to start, you know, long-term rebuilding
25	projects, like, schools, the power grid, the water

1	systems. You know, this is out of \$23.8 billion at
2	that time that FEMA had obligated.
3	This just shows you that while the funds
4	were obligated, meaning they were ready to start, the
5	upfront funding is not there to start some of these
6	projects because they're reimbursed later.
7	Tribal governments face similar
8	challenges. When we surveyed Tribes, they struggled
9	to build and maintain emergency management resources.
10	This also makes it difficult for them to navigate
11	complicated disaster programs across numerous
12	agencies like FEMA, HUD, SBA and many others.
13	In closing really quick, the GAO has a
14	lot of work going on right now on how the federal
15	government, not just in the disaster area but across
16	the federal government, is assessing equity in their
17	programs and how they're implementing the President's
18	recent Executive Order on equity.
19	One thing that is emerging is that
20	collecting better data is really key to this process
21	so you can start assessing these programs.
22	This is a new lens that we're looking at
23	these programs through in many cases. And so it's
24	going to require a number of steps to get to the point
25	where we can make good conclusions about what reforms

1	might be needed.
2	So thank you for the opportunity to be
3	here, and I look forward to the discussion.
4	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Mr. Currie. We
5	will now hear from Mr. Troy. Proceed.
6	TEVI TROY
7	DR. TROY: Thank you. Thank you for
8	inviting my testimony and thank you to Mr. Currie for
9	very interesting testimony. I learned a lot from
10	that, and I appreciate it.
11	I'm a former Deputy Secretary of Health
12	and Human Services and White House aide. While I was
13	in government, I was involved in the response to three
14	disasters, 9/11, Katrina and the 2008 economic
15	collapse. I also helped prepare for other pandemics.
16	My time in government, coupled with my
17	background as a presidential historian, led me to
18	write the book, Shall We Wake the President? Two
19	Centuries of Disaster Management From the Oval
20	Office, which is a look at presidential response to
21	disaster and an examination of how to better handle
22	it.
23	I learned in writing the book that over
24	the course of our history, the federal government has
25	become increasingly involved in dealing with

1 As this involvement has increased, so has disasters. 2 the American people's expectations regarding federal 3 disaster response 4 In addition, the scope of disasters 5 covered by the government keeps increasing and has 6 steadily done so over the last century. Whereas 7 weather disasters were once local problems, they are 8 now national issues. And the federal government is 9 increasingly expected to prevent them from happening, 10 rescue people while they are happening and make 11 people whole after they happen. 12 Along this increased with scope 13 disasters covered is an increase in presidential 14 involvement, which is my area of expertise. 15 see this by looking at how Presidents have dealt with 16 five major weather-based disasters, 1889 Johnstown 17 floods, 1927 Mississippi floods, 1969's Hurricane 18 Camille, 1992's Hurricane Andrew and 2005's Hurricane 19 Katrina, all of which I elaborate on in my written 20 testimony. And these illustrate the growth of 21 federal involvement over our history. 22 This background is crucial in looking at 23 the federal response to 2017 Hurricanes Harvey and 24 Maria, the subject of today's hearing. 25 Let's look at Harvey first. Having lived

1 the government's ineffective response to 2 Katrina, Ι was encouraged by what the 3 government, and particularly FEMA, seemed to have 4 learned in the intervening period. 5 result of Harvey and in response to 6 Harvey, things selemed well coordinated. FEMA worked 7 well with state and local officials, pre-deployed key 8 resources and personnel in advance and adopted new 9 approaches. 10 Τо identify how to get resources 11 rescuers where they need to go, FEMA now tracks 12 Facebook and Twitter to identify people and places in 13 need of assistance. 14 In addition, FEMA operation centers are 15 hiah tech multi-screen environments aivina 16 emergency managers far more real-time information 17 than we had in previous disasters. 18 Another improvement we saw during Harvey 19 was in the integration of volunteers. Government 20 does not have enough personnel to help everyone who 21 These limitations make outside assistance needs it. 22 Volunteer assistance is not just about invaluable. 23 the Red Cross anymore. FEMA's website lists about a 24 professional volunteer organizations dozen to

cooperate with during disasters.

25

1 these improvements, the question 2 arises of why the Harvey response was a success while 3 the subsequent Maria response was seen as subpar. 4 One obvious reason is the challenge of 5 response off the mainland. Getting resources to an Island is just much harder without 6 7 the interstate highway system. As a FEMA official 8 told me at the time, to say it's logistically 9 challenging is an understatement. 10 This challenge was compounded by the 11 devastation on the island. Maria's first responders 12 in Puerto Rico were also her victims and many were 13 unavailable to the response effort. 14 The result is that FEMA faced both its 15 normal job of transporting supplies but also the 16 typically local responsibility of distributing them 17 to the public. 18 In addition, it's harder for residents 19 themselves to evacuate when planes and boats are the 20 only avenues of escape. We often sees lines of cars 21 on Interstate 95 headed north from Florida before 22 Such an escape route was not available hurricanes. 23 to Puerto Ricans before Maria. This hurdle also made 24 that much harder for Good Samaritans on the it 25 mainland to come to their assistance, which they did

1	in great numbers in Harvey.
2	A second difference for the difference in
3	response stemmed from the challenge of coping with
4	serial disasters, which is something that has been
5	mentioned earlier
6	While post-Katrina reforms improved
7	FEMA's surge capacity, its ability to handle more
8	than one disaster at a time, FEMA, like any government
9	agency, has limited resources. Its appropriations
10	run out quickly requiring the less than nimble
11	Congress to provide disaster funding. And FEMA
12	personnel, who do heroic work, are only human and
13	subject to exhaustion when faced with constant
14	deployments and redeployments over a short period.
15	Third, Maria was so powerful that it
16	devastated the island's power and communications
17	infrastructure. This put FEMA at an immediate
18	disadvantage in its response efforts.
19	Finally, and this is outside the FEMA
20	purview, is the issue of presidential focus. The
21	White House seemed ready for Harvey but less ready
22	for a state of continuing hurricanes over an entire
23	month.
24	The lesson here is that presidential
25	leadership is about continued effort in the face of

1 ongoing challenges.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I would now like to make some suggestions for how to improve our hurricane response going forward. As much as we laud our technological progress, for good reason, the fact remains that there is little that government officials can do in the short-term and even the long-term to prevent or minimize the physical impact of catastrophic weather events.

As a result of the President and federal government need to ensure they do not overpromise and make sure that they meet the properly calibrated promises that they do issue. Even this is not easy.

The federal government is million employees, bureaucracy with 2 President impossible dontrol. Obama to once recounted a warning he had received from Defense Secretary Robert Gates: "Somewhere, somehow, somebody in the federal government is screwing up."

Nothing can ensure the absence of mistakes, but smart leadership can better prepare officials for crises. Presidents should make sure that senior officials engage in preparation drills early in their administration and continue to do periodically throughout.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	The President also needs realistic budget
2	numbers. The government spends a staggering amount
3	of money on disasters, which is not budgeted properly
4	for that spending.
5	According to the Center for American
6	Progress' Daniel Weiss and Jackie Weidman, the U.S.
7	government spent \$136 billion on disaster relief
8	between 2011 and 2013, about \$400 per U.S. household.
9	This spending takes place among 29 departments. The
10	U.S. Department of Agriculture alone has 19 disaster
11	related programs.
12	Another problem is the degree to which
13	disaster funding is improvised. The federal
14	government does have an annual disaster contingency
15	fund for about \$29 billion. It actually spent \$136
16	billion, as I said, from 2011 to 2015.
17	This improvisational approach harms the
18	attempts at responsible budgeting but also harms the
19	affected communities imposing additional burdens on
20	communities in need. It is also inefficient.
21	Each pureaucracy for which disaster money
22	is directed spends money in the process of directing
23	said funds. At the end of the process, less money
24	ends up in the hands of the victims than taxpayers
25	directed on their behalf.

1	These suggestions should in no way take
2	away from the tremendous job that our disaster
3	response officials do. The career officials in the
4	U.S. government who deal with disaster are dedicated
5	and skilled professionals. No one can prevent or
6	eliminate the consequence of disasters, but we should
7	appreciate the good work of these individuals and
8	strive for improvements that will make their jobs
9	easier going forward.
10	Thanks again for inviting me to testify.
11	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Dr. Troy. At
12	this point, we are now going to hear from Ms. Johnson.
12	Dlagge progest
13	Please proceed.
14	JO LINDA JOHNSON
	JO LINDA JOHNSON
14	
14 15 16	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank
14 15 16	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff.
14151617	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff.
14 15 16 17 18	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff. Thank you for your interest and the important work of the Federal Emergency Management
141516171819	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff. Thank you for your interest and the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff. Thank you for your interest and the important work of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It's my pleasure to join this briefing today
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff. Thank you for your interest and the important work of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It's my pleasure to join this briefing today together with my colleagues to address the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	JO LINDA JOHNSON MS. JOHNSON: Thank you so much and thank you for having me and good afternoon, everyone, Chair Cantu, Commissioners and Commission staff. Thank you for your interest and the important work of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It's my pleasure to join this briefing today together with my colleagues to address the Commission's questions.

1	part because of the 2017 hurricane season.
2	In the summer of 2017, I was with another
3	DHS component leading their civil rights function.
4	That season overwhelmed the country as noted by Mr.
5	Sklar. And when FEMA sought volunteers from its
6	sister agencies within DHS, I volunteered and was
7	deployed to assist on the ground.
8	I spent six weeks observing firsthand the
9	powerful help FEMA provides to people and to
10	communities. I also saw firsthand the limitations of
11	FEMA programs. I was compelled to join as a result
12	of this and join the effort to see how I might assist
13	the 20,000 plus dedicated professionals who are
14	working across FEMA.
15	Mr. Bibo and Mr. Robinson described the
16	scope and size of responding to disasters as well as
17	the significant efforts that were put in in the wake
18	of Harvey and Maria.
19	Mr. Currie described the scope and size
20	of responding to disasters generally. And I agree
21	with Mr. Troy. I learned a tremendous amount from
22	his opening statement.
23	He also described the significant
24	improvements that FEMA has made and continues to make
25	with every new lesson learned.

1	In our statement, we have provided the
2	Commission detailed information on civil rights
3	concerns raised from Harvey and Maria as well as the
4	subsequent outcomes. I welcome questions related to
5	this information and appreciate the opportunity to
6	hear your concerns. And I look forward to the
7	discussion. Thank you.
8	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you and the gift of
9	time is greatly appreciated because I've got
10	Commissioners who really do have questions.
11	I'm going to ask Commissioners, would you
12	please just ask one or two of the panelists rather
13	than ask all seven to respond to your questions.
14	I'm going to allow Commissioner Yaki to
15	go first and stick to the two rule because I would
16	like to have possibly a second round.
17	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much,
18	Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. This
19	is directed at acting Associate Director Bibo or
20	possibly Ms. Johnson as well.
21	As a general observation, and I think I
22	foreshadowed this in my preparatory remarks, this is
23	not an oversight hearing about how FEMA responded to
24	Harvey and Maria. This is an oversight hearing about
25	the civil rights implications of what that response

1 was.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And im at least two different studies of the data from the actual response by FEMA to Harvey and to Maria, one study said that if you were in a higher proportion neighborhood with of Black residents, the chances of you getting an inspection was diminished and that when you finally did get an inspection, there was an 11 percent denial without explanation rate wersus for white neighborhoods that And in addition, there was also a had a .4 percent. disparity in the amount of money awarded in the amount of 5 to 10 percent difference.

Another study showed that blocks with significant numbers of non-white residents who had lower credit scores and lower income also had much lower approval rates and, again, much lower amounts of money given, which is kind of contrary exactly to what it is we're trying to do.

I'd like to get your response to those two studies and what you believe of the data and what the agency has done as a result of this.

MR. BIBO: Commissioner, thank you for the question and let me start by saying that for the first time in my service at FEMA, we have an administration and an administrator who has made

1	promoting equitable delivery of disaster assistance
2	one of the Agency s top priorities, and I think it's
3	just important to note that at the outset.
4	So we are aware of a number of studies
5	that associate FEMA assistance with inequitable
6	outcomes for disaster survivors. The Commission, I'm
7	sure, is aware of recent reports in newspapers,
8	national level newspapers, that have shined a
9	spotlight on this and shined a spotlight again on
10	studies that would suggest that FEMA may provide less
11	assistance to survivors of different demographics.
12	We take these studies seriously. We take
13	seriously the findings, and we are digging into this.
14	As an Agency, we have made it a priority to do so.
15	We have launched an equity review of the Individual
16	Assistance Program, which is precisely the program,
17	Commissioner Yaki that you're referring to in your
18	remarks from a moment ago.
19	And, as I say that, I think it's also
20	important to reaffirm that there are a number of
21	specific factors that figure into the delivery of
22	disaster assistance to individuals.
23	Every circumstance is different even
24	though there are commonalities among them. Until you
25	really dig in and look at a one-to-one comparison and

1	understand the specifics, it is difficult to
2	generalize.
3	And one of the reasons it is difficult to
4	generalize is because up to this point, and we are
5	working very aggressively on this right now, we have
6	not gathered demographic data for our Individual
7	Assistance applicants.
8	And so we have an obstruction in that
9	regard because we need to have that data in order to
10	do analysis ourse ves and to be able to track equity
11	and delivery of the assistance that we provide.
12	That is one of a number of initiatives
13	that we have underway to strengthen our ability to
14	evaluate and them act on the equitable delivery of
15	disaster assistance.
16	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Are you saying that
17	until now, despite Katrina, despite everything, there
18	has been no systemic effort to attempt to
19	disaggregate the data, even to a consumer survey, to
20	understand exactly why some people may or may not
21	have qualified and whether or not there were any
22	factors in that that would be, let's say, problematic
23	in terms of a federal civil rights perspective?
24	MR. BIBO: Well, we do extensive consumer
25	surveys of disaster survivors following disasters on

1 But our gathering of demographic a range of topics. 2 data has not been part and parcel of the Individual 3 Assistance Program. We are taking steps now to make 4 that part of what we do as a matter of course. 5 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Okay. Thank you. 6 Madam Chair, one additional question under your two 7 question rule. For those three who are watching, 8 FEMA is more than just individual response. 9 also community response as well through something 10 called the Public Assistance program, something that 11 I am very familiar with when I was working on behalf 12 of the City and County of San Francisco when I was an 13 aid to a member of Congress. 14 The duestion I have is actually for, I 15 think, Mr. Robinson, who is the Regional 16 Administrator. And, Mr. Robinson, thank you for the 17 I have worked very closely with work that you do 18 Region 9 administrator throughout that entire period 19 of time and found him to be a dedicated public servant 20 as you are and working under difficult conditions at 21 best. 22 One of the things I wanted to ask of you 23 as someone who is more on the ground as it were, is 24 to what extent are you allowed or are you permitted 25 do you have authority to interact with local

1 entities to whom you give grants whether it's the 2 CDBG-DR or what have you? And I m specifically thinking about the 3 4 articles that have come out about the initial plans 5 by the Government Land Office of Texas with regard to the distribution of funds for home buybacks 6 7 hazard mitigation where the amount of money, 8 example, in Taylor's Landing worked out to something 9 -- a community, by the way, that has absolutely no to 10 very little Black residents -- worked out to around 11 \$69,000 per capita, per individual, and Port Arthur, 12 which is a very large Black population, that the 13 distribution of these Public Assistance funds worked 14 out to about \$84 per capita. 15 you heard about that and did you 16 have anything to do -- did you have any reaction to 17 And more importantly, does FEMA have any 18 jurisdiction with which to ask a guestion of a grantee 19 why are you doing it that way and what criteria are 20 you using and is it impermissible under federal civil 21 rights laws? 22 MR. ROBINSON: Commissioner, thanks for 23 And so FEMA does not authority over the question. 24 the CDBG-R program. That is a Housing and Urban 25 Development grant program that is administered by

1	that agency.
2	We have a the Stafford Act has a
3	mitigation grant program. And we work very closely
4	with the state who is the grantee but also have
5	project managers who work with the local applicants
6	as they put together their application packages and
7	stuff.
8	The same thing under the FEMA Public
9	Assistance program. We have program delivery
10	managers who work very closely with our state
11	counterparts who work very closely with the local
12	governments as they look at rebuilding.
13	And so in Harvey what we looked at very
14	closely was what needed to be rebuilt and how we build
15	that more resilient, implementing current codes and
16	standards for current flood plain regulations but
17	working in the field with our program delivery
18	managers as well as our state counterparts to help
19	local governments recover.
20	CHAIR CANTUS: Thank you. Can I have Mr.
21	Kladney? Commissioner?
22	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you, Madam
23	Chair. Ms. Johnson, I'm interested in FEMA and how
24	they treat disabled people. And so my question here
25	may sound complicated because I'm only allowed a

1	coupie.
2	But FEMA has failed to develop assistance
3	for disabled people that are power dependent, at
4	least before Maria and Harvey, people who needed
5	personal assistance, had service animals, bariatric
6	equipment excuse me, I also have a phone mess in
7	my room and more importantly people with mental
8	health conditions like autism and support for people
9	with cognitive and intellectual disabilities.
10	It is my understanding many of these
11	people were sent to long-term care facilities when in
12	fact they could have been in shelters with non-
13	disabled people.
14	And I understand you have a training
15	program called a Disability Integration Cadre. This
16	is on your website. It calls for integration
17	specialists and advisors who provide services at
18	evacuation centers.
19	One, I was wondering if you could provide
20	us with a copy of the training program for providing
21	these services that existed immediately prior to
22	Harvey and Maria and a copy that you currently have
23	after Harvey and Maria.
24	But I would also like to know what's been
25	done since these hurricanes to change this and comply

l	more with Olmstead?
2	MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Commissioner
3	Kladney, for your question. I appreciate that. It
4	would be my pleasure to tell you a little bit more
5	about FEMA's Office of Disability Integration and
6	Coordination. We refer to that as ODIC.
7	ODIC is an office whose primary mission
8	is to ensure that individuals with disabilities, and
9	the concerns and needs of individuals with
10	disabilities and communities, are integrated into a
11	response to a disaster.
12	And so the Office of Disability
13	Integration and Coordination work hand-in-hand with
14	our FEMA programs in response and in recovery to build
15	in the appropriate responses and the appropriate
16	considerations into those programs.
17	ODIC also works with in addition to
18	FEMA programs and FEMA personnel, they also work with
19	our SLTT recipients to ensure that they have
20	adequately considered the needs of individuals with
21	disabilities.
22	As you noted, there have been concerns
23	raised in several states about the sheltering of
24	individuals with disabilities in long-term care
25	facilities as opposed to in general population

1	shelters with the rest of their community.
2	When those issues come up, we work
3	directly with those states, with those localities to
4	ensure that the communities of individuals with
5	disabilities are getting exactly what they need.
6	I'd be happy to take back your request
7	for the training materials. And we can certainly
8	provide that to the Commission after this meeting.
9	MEMBER KLADNEY: I think really what I'm
10	looking for is an answer as to what's been
11	specifically done since then to make sure that
12	disabled people are allowed to stay with their
13	communities. I never get those answers, and I was
14	wondering if you could provide that to me.
15	MS. JOHNSON: Yes, sir. And I certainly
16	want to provide you with a clear answer.
17	Unfortunately, the answer, like most things in
18	disaster response, is actually quite complicated.
19	FEMA is limited to working when a
20	disaster strikes, in a particular location. We are
21	limited in working with the states within their own
22	rules and their own regulations. And in different
23	states, there are different regulations for
24	sheltering, for example.
25	Where that legislation is problematic

1	from a federal perspective, that is where my office,
2	the Office of Equal Rights, gets involved with the
3	state, with our partners in ORR to ensure that we're
4	doing right by those communities.
5	It varies from location to location
6	unfortunately. So it is not a simple answer.
7	However, I am happy to follow-up with you on the
8	particulars of our response in Harvey and Maria.
9	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you. And I
10	have a question for Mr. Currie. Regarding the
11	insurance and funding, isn't it true that local
12	governments under nsure their facilities knowing that
13	the federal government will come in and pay in the
14	future? Shouldn't Congress require these local
15	governments to insure up to a fair market value?
16	MR. CURRIE: That's a great point. We've
17	never said in a study that that's definitively the
18	case. However, it's pretty hard to argue that it's
19	not - with the hundreds of billions of dollars
20	provided in Public Assistance funding, a lot of that
21	going to repair public buildings, city hall, you
22	know, recreation centers, things like that.
23	The question would be why would a state
24	or local government insure those facilities if they
25	knew the federal government was going to pay for it?

1	So I think that's a very valid point.
2	In regard to Congress taking action or
3	that, you know, certainly I don't know that would be
4	in the federal purview because I don't know that they
5	could require states or localities.
6	I mean, they would look at the Stafford
7	Act and, you know, make amendments to what would or
8	would not be covered in terms of public facilities to
9	maybe try to encourage additional insurance.
10	But, you know, the other challenge in
11	this area has been the same has been true in flood
12	insurance is that a lot of insurance, you know, the
13	insurance markets won't support that because it's
14	just not just actuarially sound. The risk is too
15	high. So the federal government has to step in in
16	those cases and basically be the insurer.
17	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you. Thank
18	you, Madam Chair.
19	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. Commissioner
20	Gilchrist, you've got your hand up?
21	COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: Yes. Thank you,
22	Madam Chair, and let me thank all of the panelists
23	for your testimony here today.
24	My question is directed to Mr. Currie.
25	Mr. Currie, in May of 2021, the President announced

1	that FEMA would be receiving a billion dollars for
2	building what's classified as resilient communities
3	and a portion of that apparently is to be targeted to
4	disadvantaged communities. Is that right?
5	MR. CURRIE: That's my understanding.
6	COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: And so I'm just
7	help me understand a little bit about what may be
8	some of those activities that could potentially be
9	targeted and more specifically your thoughts about
10	how that should be rolled out.
11	MR. CURRIE: Yes, sir. Great question.
12	Well, the building resilient infrastructure
13	communities of - the BRIC program is a new grant
14	that is basically designed to be awarded
15	competitively across the country to help state and
16	local communities address those areas of highest
17	risk.
18	So the idea is you don't have to wait for
19	a disaster to happen to get federal funding to rebuild
20	in a more resilient way. We can be more proactive
21	and hopefully avoid a lot of the damage and disruption
22	in the community in the future.
23	I am aware of the announcement that a
24	portion of that funding will be directed, you know,
25	to vulnerable populations. I don't know that the

1 specifics have been spelled out. Mr. Bibo may know 2 that more. But I will say this. That I think it's 3 going to be really interesting to see, you know, what 4 criteria are used to make those determinations. 5 talked this in about my One of the challenges that communities 6 statement. 7 with fewer resources and more vulnerable populations, 8 less educated, more low income, you know, they don't 9 necessarily have the same capacity and resources, you 10 know, to bring in the help to manage some of these 11 programs. 12 So, you know, the question I would have 13 you know, how are these communities going to 14 develop their plans for these funds because they have 15 to justify how they're going to use this funding and 16 technical provide assessments and risk-based 17 decision-making and things like that. 18 So I think that's something that needs to 19 be addressed on the front end, you know, how do we 20 make sure that, you know, a lower income county or 21 community can compete with a highly resourced, you 22 know, county or community that has a tremendous 23 amount of experience with these types of programs? 24 COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: I applaud you in 25 that regard. And certainly that would be coming out.

1 Mr. Bibo, would you like to comment on that as well? 2 MR. BIBO: Commissioner, while the BRIC 3 program is not im my area of responsibility, I am 4 familiar with the fact that as part of the scoring 5 criteria for BRI¢ funding proposals, 15 percent of the qualitative soring criteria considers the extent 6 7 which socially vulnerable populations to 8 included in consideration for the application. There 9 is also additional technical scoring criteria. 10 While I'm not certain how the mitigation 11 program intends $t \nmid 1$ apply that, I can tell you that in 12 our recent efforts around vaccination efforts where 13 we placed federally run Community Vaccination Centers in selected communities across the country, we used 14 15 the CDC Social Vulnerability Index to help guide us 16 with the placement of those vaccination centers so 17 that we could reach socially vulnerable populations as readily and accessibly as possible. So I'm happy 18 19 to follow up with the program officials to get you 20 some additional imformation for the record. 21 COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: Please, that 22 would be helpful. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 23 CHAIR CANTU: I'm going to call 24 My question has to do with farmers of color mvself. 25 and to let you that this is a family story. When my

1 months survived four old, she the was 2 hurricane in South Texas. 3 Her mom and dad and her older sister 4 spent the night in a chicken coop. That was the 5 highest piece of property they had, the highest 6 structure that they could take shelter in. 7 So given that low income farmers of color 8 and people in rural areas, you know, have fewer 9 resources and challenges in terms of communication 10 accessibility, I'm going to ask Mr. Bibo what FEMA is 11 doing directed at the rural areas and programs or 12 data broken out by rurals. 13 Yes, Madam Chair. MR. BIBO: Thank you 14 for the question. And the answer is yes. 15 deploy to disasters, we will organize when we 16 ourselves in a way that gives FEMA field leaders 17 fbr responsibility а certain geographic 18 particularly in the significant incidents that we're 19 talking about today and others that you will have 20 heard of. 21 this does is it puts a division 22 supervisor or branch director you may hear us refer 23 to them as in the position of understanding the 24 geographic they serving area that are 25 understanding the population that they are serving

1 and understandind how to reach the population that 2 they are serving. 3 This is something that we have gotten a 4 lot better on in recent years given the greater 5 ownership to our field leaders in how they reach populations that they are responsible for, whether 6 7 it's different language approaches or if it's a 8 population that relies more on receiving information 9 via radio than television, if it's a population that 10 is more likely to come in person to apply for disaster 11 assistance rather than to pick up the phone or to go 12 It's really working hard to try and on the Internet. 13 meet people where they are. 14 I'll give you a recent example, in Lake 15 Charles, Louisiana, which is an area that has been affected over the last year by multiple disasters, 16 17 including two tropical cyclones and a recent spate of 18 severe storms and happens to have a lower vaccination 19 rate than we are all striving for with respect to 20 COVID-19. 21 So partnership with the State of 22 Louisiana, FEMA Region 6, Tony Robinson's 23 recovery service center to а 24 accessible information to disaster survivors cutting 25 across all of these disasters and provided

1	opportunity to be vaccinated at the same site. Not
2	a thing that people were coming to the site
3	specifically to do, but were taking an opportunity in
4	an under-vaccinated community to make it available.
5	And, you know, 14 percent of those who have shown up
6	at the site have availed themselves of a vaccine which
7	is, you know, a positive story.
8	But inderstanding the local community
9	we're serving, trying to meet them where they are in
10	how we communicate, what we communicate and the
11	services that we offer is something that we have
12	gotten a lot better in recent years.
13	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. I mean, just ar
14	anecdotally, we've lost a lot of nurses in areas that
15	are rural, and they moved into the urban center, what
16	is now a sizable population, for the rural is going
17	to be the margin of the future.
18	Commissioners? Okay. I'm going to
19	someone
20	COMMISSIONER YAKI: I saw Commissioner
21	Adams. And then I raised my hand but Commissioner
22	Adams
23	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. Thank you for
24	that. I'm glad you're helping with that.
25	Commissioner Adams and then I'll come back with

1	Commissioner Yaki.
2	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Madam Chair. Thank
3	you, Commissioner Yaki. My first question is for Mr.
4	Bibo. Since you ve been at FEMA in 2009, have you
5	had the opportunity to hear or otherwise see
6	firsthand or have any interaction or awareness of any
7	racially discriminatory policies being discussed or
8	people even saying stupid things related to the
9	distribution of aid in your experience there?
10	MR. BIBO: No, Commissioner, I have not.
11	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Okay. My next
12	question is for Mr. Sklar. Could you translate
13	something for me? You used a term I was unfamiliar
14	with, lost visibility of its commodity shipments.
15	What does that mean?
16	MR. SKLAR: So FEMA actually has some
17	really nice processes and procedures to track
18	commodities from point to point, for example, from
19	the continental United States to Puerto Rico. And
20	they have things like GPS transponders that you can
21	attach to a container.
22	And there are actually seals that they
23	placed on containers so that when it reaches the
24	destination, you can then download that information
25	and know exactly what's in that giant container and

1	if it reached target.
2	But what we found in our review was that
3	not all transponders were functional and that in the
4	case of Hurricane Maria that the seals were broken
5	before the supplies even left the United States.
6	In other words, the contractor just
7	opened up the shipping packages and repacked
8	everything, broke the seal. And then once it got to
9	Puerto Rico, there was no visibility as to what items
10	had made it to target.
11	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Do you eventually
12	turn it over to somebody in Puerto Rico?
13	MR. SKLAR: A lot of these shipments were
14	destined for municipalities in particular areas. So
15	a lot of things get pushed down to smaller and smaller
16	shipments. It was really important to know what
17	actually made it over in the first place.
18	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Has your office ever
19	investigated or are aware of any deliberate
20	disparities, racial disparities in FEMA disaster aid
21	allocation?
22	MR. SKLAR: I'm not aware of any work in
23	that area. But we are certainly aware of the media
24	stories and really appreciated the discussion today.
25	One of the first things we would ask for

1	likely if we were to do such a job or audit review
2	would be to ask for the data. So maybe it just shows
3	how critical it is to capture that data as we go
4	along.
5	One final point on data. We did do quite
6	a bit of work on looking at the IT systems that were
7	in place. And it is our sincere hope, and I think
8	FEMA is responding, that they do allocate more money
9	to automation and IT for data capture so when folks
10	do arrive onsite that they can share information
11	amongst themselves and with other individuals and
12	other law enforcement agencies. But the data is
13	absolutely imperative here.
14	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Thank you. That's
15	all I have.
16	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioner Yaki?
17	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much,
18	Madam Chair. So I want to talk about and I'm not
19	too sure if this should go to Mr. Currie or Mr. Sklar
20	or Mr. Bibo, but one of the issues that is important
21	toward being effective in both the response and the
22	recovery is the ability to reach affected
23	populations.
24	And I'd like to understand what FEMA's
25	policy is or has it had a policy with regard to the

1	issue of language and cultural competency of its
2	responders, of its recovery to individuals or the
3	people who go knocking door to door verifying aid
4	requests, the whole chain of disaster response from
5	the federal government.
6	To what extent, for example, when you saw
7	these hurricanes headed toward landfall in Texas and
8	when you saw this going toward Puerto Rico, to what
9	extent, for example, did that mobilize or should it
10	mobilize much more in the way of Spanish speakers in
11	terms of understanding what cultural or other issues
12	may be involved in trying to reach these populations
13	in terms of making sure that they responded
14	correctly?
15	We all know that there are many
16	populations especially, like if you're a DREAMer,
17	for example, or if you're a parent of a DREAMer, you
18	might be not willing to sort of answer the door if
19	someone is knocking on it.
20	How does FEMA or how has FEMA or has FEMA
21	ever responded in that way or prepared in that way
22	with regard to - for Latinx populations that are
23	going to be targeted by a natural disaster like a
24	hurricane?
25	MR. BIBO: Commissioner, I think it's

appropriate for me to start with that question if I can. I would first say that the quantity of personnel that we had who were fluent in Spanish as we approached a very significant incident, particularly in Puerto Rico, was a limitation for us. We did not have as many personnel that were fluent in Spanish as would have been helpful in delivering the assistance that we needed to deliver at speed.

And thankfully we're in a very different position today. We have now still more than 700 people that are FEMA employees in Puerto Rico, most of whom were hired locally in Puerto Rico after the storm, which is something that we can do quite quickly and do in many disasters that we face. And it helps us not only with language competency locally but also with local knowledge and, again, going back to the point of meeting people where they are.

We now find ourselves in a position where we have a solid core of Spanish speakers, which is, I would say, the most frequent language that is of greatest consequence in the disaster environment facing, but it's not the only. And so we have to rely on a range of other tools, contractors, for instance, to resolve other shortfalls. But I'll say

1	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Just a quick
2	question, just to interject very quickly. That's
3	great. How about the materials themselves, the
4	applications, the website, things like that? Is
5	there a language option in there as well?
6	MR. BIBO: Yes. And this is, again,
7	another place where we've come a long way. We have
8	paid close attention to the languages that are in
9	play in a particular area that we are working.
10	I will tell you for instance this
11	morning, right after the press release announcing the
12	President's declaration of an emergency for Florida
13	for the building collapse in Miami-Dade went out in
14	English. It went out in Spanish immediately
15	thereafter. That is common practice now.
16	The federally run Community Vaccination
17	Centers and those that we provided guidance to around
18	the country that we provided funding for, we also
19	provided guidance about language access and placing
20	signage in multiple languages as well as American
21	sign language interpretation service availability.
22	So we've really come a long way with
23	this. We take it very seriously.
24	COMMISSIONER YAKI: And at the disaster
25	assistance centers themselves, I know most of its

1 done online now. remember the analog era where 2 people got to stand in line and actually submit their 3 applications. 4 But the extent that there are still 5 people on the ground, how about the contractors, for 6 example, the people who go and verify the claims for 7 individuals and housing programs? Is there a way to assign and ensure that if the household is Spanish 8 9 speaking that the send a Spanish speaking contractor 10 to them as well? 11 Commissioner, if I could, I MR. BIBO: 12 would like to ask Ms. Johnson to say a word because 13 this is a part of what she has been leading as well 14 across the Agency, if that's appropriate. 15 Thank you, JOHNSON: Absolutely. MS. sir. Commissionet, I would say two things in response 16 17 If we have information ahead of time about the household that we are encountering, whether it's 18 19 a language, a limited English proficient household, 20 whether it's an individual who, harkening it back to 21 Commissioner Kladney's question about individuals 22 with disabilities, if it's a household that has 23 someone who is deaf, then we'll need a sign language 24 interpreter. Whatever the actual language needs, the 25 communication needs are, if we have that information

1	ahead of time, the answer to your question is yes.
2	We can provide the assistance that is needed the first
3	time they encounter FEMA personnel.
4	In reality, however, we often do not have
5	that information ahead of time. And that's where we
6	can use technology to assist our contractors in the
7	field.
8	So we have at FEMA a robust language
9	access plan that is on our website. Mr. Bibo
10	mentioned our successes in the Community Vaccination
11	Centers and the language access that was provided in
12	those Community Vaccination Centers.
13	One of the ways we did that is with a
14	language line, where we provided information in over
15	180 languages based on an individual who walks in the
16	door, we can get someone on the phone in their
17	language very quickly.
18	We can also do that, use technology to
19	provide sign language interpreters on the ground
20	immediately in front of an individual. So hopefully,
21	that addresses your question.
22	MR. BIBO: Commissioner, if I may just
23	add one additional item that I think will be
24	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Sure.
25	MR. BIBO: of interest to the

1	Commission. For the first time in FEMA's history,
2	with the vaccination mission that the President
3	launched on January 20, we convened in FEMA's
4	National Response Coordination Center a Civil Rights
5	Advisory Group that was led by Ms. Johnson and helped
6	promote and drive several of the initiatives that
7	you've heard referenced here today with respect to
8	promoting equity and access for socially vulnerable
9	populations in that vaccination mission, including
10	deploying Civil Rights Advisors to FEMA's 10 regional
11	administrators who are operationalizing a number of
12	those programs.
13	And so Ms. Johnson led that civil rights
14	advisory group. And I just wanted to note that for
15	the Commission's benefit.
16	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you, Mr. Bibo.
17	MR. ROBINSON: Hey, Dave, if I can add,
18	this is part of the region's pre-planning for known
19	threats and hazards and part of our damage assessment
20	process. We collect that data as well so that as we
21	build our teams to send to the field, we take that
22	into consideration as well.
23	CHAIR CANTU: I'm going to turn to David,
24	but it is not a new problem that people need services
25	and language accessibility in order to receive those

1	services. A friend of mind filed a lawsuit on behalf
2	of Spanish speaking farmers in Texas and the defense
3	was they were being foreclosed upon and all of the
4	notices were in English.
5	And their defense was, well, we didn't
6	know where to find notices that had already been
7	translated. And it turned out in discovery that the
8	notices had been translated in Puerto Rico and just
9	the agencies that were foreclosing didn't know that.
10	And so this was a problem more than 10
11	years ago. And that you're working on it now is
12	wonderful, and I really thank you, Ms. Johnson, for
13	saying that and for doing what you're doing. But
14	it's an older problem, and it has roots in decision-
15	making that impacted very heavily on people who are
16	a minority.
17	So I m going to call on David, on
18	Commissioner Kladney. I'm going to give the last
19	word to Commissioner Gilchrist and then we're going
20	to take a 10 minute break. So please be brief with
21	us, okay?
22	And the contractors are counting on me to
23	be able to put this in a format that the public can
24	view it. Commissioner Kladney?
25	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Ms. Johnson, I've

1	thought about the answer to one of my questions, and
2	you said that the local government seemed to have
3	different laws that seemed to block you from
4	providing disabled people the ability to be in the
5	regular shelter with non-disabled people.
6	Was that your answer? Did I understand
7	that right?
8	MS. JOHNSON: To clarify, Commissioner
9	Kladney, it's not that they block FEMA. It's that
10	they can make it more of a challenge in that we have
11	to intervene.
12	I'm going to get this phrase wrong, and
13	I want to give my colleagues a chance to correct me.
14	But emergency management with FEMA is locally
15	executed.
16	And it's important to remember that at
17	all times. FEMA is not necessarily on the ground
18	with states, localities, Tribes and territories
19	making decisions in the first moments that decisions
20	are made.
21	And when decisions are made that are
22	counter to civil rights requirements, and I know all
23	of you know this as civil rights practitioners,
24	decisions get made and we, as civil rights attorneys,
25	have to come back and undo those at times

1	So there may be decisions that are made
2	by states that are contrary to federal law. When
3	federal funds are in place, we need to bring them
4	into compliance and that sometimes takes time. It
5	doesn't always happen in the initial moment.
6	And just, again, Commissioner Kladney, to
7	clarify, the trigger is when federal funds come into
8	play. A state is free to respond to a disaster as it
9	sees fit if it does not invite the Federal Government
10	in. So it's a different question.
11	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So do you well,
12	when you train the local emergency management people,
13	don't you train them on Olmstead? Don't you tell
14	them it's a requirement? Don't you tell them how
15	they're supposed to react?
16	MS. JOHNSON: Absolutely.
17	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So they still
18	violate it, and you still fund?
19	MS. JOHNSON: So what we fund and how we
20	respond varies from disaster to disaster and how a
21	state, a locality, a Tribe or a territory responds
22	without federal funds versus when there is a
23	presidentially declared disaster and FEMA is
24	involved. Those are not always the same.
25	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: And I have

1	questions for Mr. Sklar and Mr. Begg. I was
2	wondering, Mr. Sklar, you said you were going to
3	publish some post-audits that you've done regarding
4	Maria and Harvey. Is that correct, for a report?
5	MR. SKLAR: So just to clarify, so we did
6	complete 10 audits, and those are all posted on our
7	website. But I can certainly make them available,
8	point the Commission to all of those.
9	There are six additional products in
10	process and some begin to cross over into COVID as
11	well as we begin to look at the COVID response and
12	FEMA's work on that.
13	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you. And
14	for both of you, I was wondering if you were satisfied
15	with the actions taken from FEMA and the responses to
16	your reports and recommendations that were made as a
17	result of the hurricanes and also their civil rights
18	compliance?
19	MR. SKLAR: I can try to answer first. I
20	would say generally FEMA has been cooperative and
21	certainly trying to meet the spirit of the
22	recommendations that we have laid out.
23	But I can't report that all of the
24	recommendations have been implemented yet and some
25	are still under discussion. But for the most part,

1	FEMA has expressed interest in cooperating and making
2	necessary changes, and we really appreciate that.
3	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Which ones do you
4	think are the most important ones that are
5	outstanding?
6	MR. SKLAR: One of the biggest problems
7	we saw was the lack of advanced contracts in place.
8	I think that could have prevented a lot of problems
9	in some of these hurricane situations. In other
10	words, you actually do contracts beforehand and you
11	may never use them but they're there and ready to go.
12	But when you don't have those, you're in
13	a situation where you're just scrambling and that was
14	pretty apparent. So I think that's pretty important.
15	And we also think it's really important
16	to have much better tracking of all items from point
17	to point. And there are a lot of issues that go with
18	that tracking that can make things better.
19	And finally, again, the IT suggestions
20	are real. Just imagine hundreds of people pouring
21	into a disaster response site and not having laptops,
22	not having access to a network, and coming back and
23	going out to a neighborhood and not being able to
24	input what neighborhood they were just at because
25	they can't get on the system. And that would go to

1	your racial disparities.
2	And you need that data. So we really
3	need a good IT backbone at FEMA. It helps everybody.
4	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you. Mr.
5	Begg
6	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioners, we're going
7	to start the next panel in five minutes. So I'm
8	sorry, Commissioner Kirsanow, I'm sorry, Commissioner
9	Kladney.
10	We need to stay on schedule. We were
11	queued up to start. We're going to take a five minute
12	break. And then please come back in five minutes
13	because the next panel is ready to go.
14	And so I thank everyone who has spoken.
15	And I really appreciate the specific questions that
16	the Commissioners posed.
17	You are free to supplement the record
18	later. We will keep the record open for 30 days. So
19	if you've got more information, panelists, we look
20	forward to hearing from you.
21	See you all in five minutes.
22	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
23	went off the record at 1:38 p.m. and resumed at 1:44
24	p.m.)
25	CHAIR CANTU: Welcome back to the US

1	Commission on Civil Rights. We have our second panel
2	on the issues of federal responses to Hurricanes
3	Maria and Harvey. So we'll and protections
4	following a natural disaster.
5	Let me briefly introduce the panelists in
6	the order in which they will speak. Our first
7	panelist is Kira Romero-Craft, Director of the
8	Southeast Region for LatinoJustice, PRLDEF,
9	LatinoJustice.
10	Our second panelist is Andres Gallegos,
11	Chairman, National Council on Disability. Our third
12	panelist is Nicole Roy, Project Project
13	Coordinator, Salvation Army. Our fourth panelist is
14	Charley Willison, Postdoctoral Fellow. Dr. Willison
15	is at the Harvard Medical School.
16	So Ms. Romero, Craft, please proceed.
17	We've got a timer no? Not set up in the corner.
18	I will time you for seven minutes, and on that
19	countdown, you'll see me waving hands when you're
20	close to the end. So Ms. Romero-Craft, you're the
21	first one. Please proceed.
22	KIRA ROMERO-CRAFT, DIRECTOR, SOUTHEAST REGION
23	LATINO JUSTICE, PRLDEF
24	MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: Thank you very much.

1 Thank you all, Chair Cantu and members of the US 2 Commission on Civil Rights. My name is Kira Romero-3 Craft, and I serve as the Director of the Southeast 4 Region for Latin Justice PRLDEF, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. 5 6 Latino Justice is a human and civil rights 7 organization dedicated to defending the rights of all 8 Latinos, including Puerto Ricans, and is anchored in 9 the experience of the Puerto Rico diaspora since our 10 Today we continue to address the civil inception. 11 and constitutional rights of Puerto Rican and Latino 12 communities. 13 Thank you for the opportunity to testify 14 before you in the place of Juan Cartagena about the 15 ongoing issues related to Hurricane Maria, including 16 the effect on migration and the difficulties evacuees 17 face, the disparities and inequalities associated 18 with relief, and the continuing rebuilding efforts in 19 the struggles that persist still today, almost four 20 years later. 21 I have been working with impacted Puerto 22 Rican evacuees since 2017 and have experienced 23 firsthand the complaints of discrimination suffered 24 by Puerto Ricans fleeing disaster. But also have

1 witnessed the lasting trauma associated with such a 2 disaster. 3 175,000 people fled Puerto Rico 4 within one year of Hurricane Maria, and instead of being welcomed with sympathy and safety, they were 5 met with additional hardships, lack of stability, and 6 7 abject disregard for the long-term rebuilding efforts 8 required to provide equity to Puerto Ricans living on 9 the island. 10 Under the Stafford Act, Puerto Rico and 11 the US Virgin Islands are covered with the same 12 protections and forces applicable to the States, as 13 the Act prohibits discrimination in the provision of 14 disaster assistance to jurisdictions like the colony 15 of Puerto Rico. And yet, it is clear from multiple 16 reports, news articles, government and 17 conducted that Puerto Rico received disparate 18 treatment, and to their detriment. 19 The Government Accountability Office has 20 found that FEMA's response to Hurricane Maria in 21 Puerto Rico alone represents the largest and longest 22 single response in the Agency's history. FEMA itself 23 reported in its after-action report of 2018 that the 24 pre-hurricane planning assumptions were severely

1	underestimated, when looking at actual damage, and
2	required significantly more assistance than expected.
3	Not only did FEMA not adequately predict
4	or prepare for a storm such as one like Hurricane
5	Maria in response, FEMA lacked the necessary
6	personnel needed to handle the storms. And even when
7	FEMA sent staff, not as many staff deployed at one
8	time, and the staff (audio interference) disparate
9	treatment with lack of funding.
10	While states affected by Hurricanes
11	Harvey and Irma awarded nearly one billion in aid to
12	survivors within two months post-landfall, survivors
13	of Hurricane Maria on the island did not get awarded
14	the same amount of funding until nearly four months
15	after landfall.
16	Despite the blatant failures by FEMA, it
17	must be understood that Puerto Rico's financial
18	crisis created a different and more complex situation
19	that FEMA was prepared for. The response to Maria
20	required a reimbursement program, with local agencies
21	providing the initial funding for the work and
22	seeking reimbursements afterwards.
23	Yet these municipalities and the island
24	overall is crippled by debt that restricted this

1 program, which made the program ineffective in the the scale of devastation caused by 2 face of 3 hurricane to the island's infrastructure. 4 As such, of the 23.8 billion allocated, 5 Puerto Rico has only spent 158 million for long-term 6 rebuilding projects. While our written testimony did not include assertions of discrimination claims made 7 8 outside of our lawsuit, Ascencio v. FEMA, the case 9 that we filed, we'd like to amend the statement and 10 assert that housing discrimination and wrongful 11 ejection did occur. 12 On February 2019, news reports noted that 13 of the 1.1 million claims made by Puerto Ricans living 14 on the island for assistance for FEMA, less than half 15 were approved because FEMA either denied requests for 16 repair outright, or demanded onerous and expensive alternative documentation. 17 18 And in Florida, we dealt with survivors 19 who were wrongfully ejected from hotels receiving TSA 20 funding, as well as those seeking lease or rental 21 opportunities being charged application fees 22 that were non-existent. For individuals 23 fleeing disaster without resources, the impact of 24 lack of affordable housing and housing instability

1 cannot be understated.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2 emphasize Ιn dlosing, we that the 3 aftermath and the response to two different disasters 4 two different jurisdictions varied in immensely. Stafford Act along with 5 the 6 discrimination mandates does not make such 7 distinction. We submit that the White House made 8 those distinctions repeatedly.

It is impossible to ignore that there's still work to be done in Puerto Rico. By plane you can see blue tarps that serve as roofs for those individuals who have yet to recover. These blue tarps also serve as stark reminders of the work that needs to be done. Darkness covered the entire island when Hurricanes Irma and Maria hit in September 2017, with only the stars to light the night.

Citizens awaited for answers about when power would return. Some of our fellow citizens waited in the dark for an entire year in the longest blackout in American history. And almost four years later, they still remain in the dark, metaphorically and also literally, with the crippled infrastructure and the fear of an impending storm with stronger force looming in the distance.

1	We must bring Puerto Rico out of the
2	years of darkness and provide the support that is due
3	to Puerto Ricans. Thank you very much for your time
4	and attention and the opportunity to speak on behalf
5	of impacted Puerto Rican evacuees and the fight for
6	equality today.
7	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Ms. Romero-
8	Craft. Mr. Gallegos, we'll hear from you now. Please
9	proceed.
10	ANDRES GALLEGOS, CHAIRMAN,
11	NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES
12	MR. GALLEGOS: Chair Cantu,
13	Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.
14	Thank you for the invitation to participate in this
15	briefing. I refer you to my written testimony, which
16	provides background to the issues that I will
17	highlight here.
18	The federal local response, both in
19	Puerto Rico and Houston, failed people with
20	disabilities, with deadly consequences. People with
21	disabilities were not included in emergency planning
22	and were excluded from accessing much of the disaster
23	relief provided im their aftermath.
24	In addition, there was a notable

1	disparate federal response to Hurricane Maria as
2	compared to the federal response to Hurricane Harvey.
3	Since the post-Katrina Emergency
4	Management Reform Act of 2006 required the National
5	Council on Disability and FEMA to work close with
6	each other to improve the outcomes of persons with
7	disabilities before, during, and after major
8	disasters. NCD has served as a liaison with the
9	disability community and FEMA.
10	My comments here are informed by meetings
11	and discussions with the disabilities community. In
12	fact, in May 2018 the National Council on Disability
13	went to Houston to hear firsthand from the disability
14	community. And we went to Puerto Rico in May 2019 to
15	do the same.
16	While today's briefing focuses on
17	discrete aspects of FEMA's response to these natural
18	disasters, as it pertains to Puerto Rico, I think
19	it's important that we understand the plight of
20	people with disabilities residing on the Island
21	before September 2017.
22	Now, that's important to better
23	understand why they were so vulnerable to the effects
24	of the hurricane and why greater efforts to address

1	their needs and recovery was required. Look, we're
2	talking about the needs of approximately 687,000
3	people representing 21.7% of the island's population.
4	People with disabilities were vulnerable
5	to the effects of the hurricane, which was very
6	predictable, given the shaky infrastructure
7	supporting their needs prior to the hurricane.
8	Please note that their vulnerability was not
9	predictable because of the existence of the
10	disabilities. Rather, because of the environmental,
11	societal, and political infrastructure on the island.
12	There was significant economic
13	vulnerability, given the island's economic condition
14	and its disparate treatment in federal benefit
15	programs. The island's economic posture was bleak.
16	It filed for the equivalent of federal bankruptcy
17	protection in May 2017. More than 45% of the island's
18	population lived below the federal poverty level.
19	That's more than three times the US national poverty
20	rate.
21	In 2017, the poverty rate was 48% among
22	working-age people with disabilities. Residents of
23	Puerto Rico are ineligible for the Supplemental
24	Security Income SSI program, arguably the single most

1 important safety net program for people 2 disabilities in the United States. 3 Instead, they received benefits under its 4 predecessor program, the Aid to Aged, Blind and 5 Disabled Program, AABD. AABD, however, is not a 6 substitute for SSI. It provides significantly lower 7 benefits. The rate of maximum monthly SSI benefit is 8 \$741, compared to \$75 under AABD. 9 Moreover, there was significant food 10 insecurity. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 11 Program, SNAP, is available in all 50 states, DC, 12 Guam, and the Virgin Islands, but not in Puerto Rico. 13 Instead, Puerto Rico receives a block grant to fund 14 its own nutritional assistance program, NAP. SNAP 15 benefits are larger than NAP benefits. The criteria 16 to qualify for SNAP are lower than that of NAP. 17 The healthcare system also faced 18 challenges, mainly because underfunded. it was 19 Unlike the 50 states and DC, Medicaid spending in 20 Puerto Rico had been subject to the statutory annual 21 The scope of the island's Medicaid program cap. 22 itself was severely limited. It does not cover home 23 health services, hospice services, medical equipment, 24 and supplies, or mursing facility services.

1 All of the foregoing contributed to a low degree of resiliency in the ability of Puerto Rican 2 residents to, with this relief, to respond to the 3 4 effects of the hurricane. Thus, when Puerto Rico was hit by Hurricane Maria, the effects were magnified 5 for its residents with disabilities. 6 7 As reported by the Puerto Rico Disability Community Relief | Network, there was only one fully 8 9 accessible centralized shelter for people 10 disabilities. 11 Schools used for shelters in the 12 municipalities were physically accessible, they had 13 ramp for wheelchair access, but did not have 14 sleeping accessible areas, accessible showers, 15 assistance, medical supplies, medical alternate 16 power, or sign Language interpreters. 17 equipped to address the needs of persons with 18 intellectual or developmental disabilities. 19 reported by the Partnership 20 Inclusive Disaster Strategies in its May 2018 after-21 action report, people with disabilities were turned 22 away from both general and special needs shelters. 23 Among the reasons included power dependence, the need 24 for personal assistance services, service animals,

1 mental health conditions, and the need for support due to cognitive | br intellectual disabilities. 2 3 disaster survivors with disabilities also did not 4 have equal access to the FEMA application process. In closing, by failing to ensure access 5 6 to disaster relief services, FEMA violated the rights quaranteed to individuals with disabilities under the 7 federal non-discrimination laws. 8 was clearly noted on October 25, 9 That 10 2017, when the US House of Representatives Committee 11 on Homeland Security wrote to the Homeland Security' 12 Acting Secretary and FEMA's Acting Administrator, 13 requesting answers as to why the civil rights of 14 people with disabilities were not protected during 15 the response to Hurricane Maria. 16 The letter accused both of playing hot 17 potato with their responsibilities to protect the 18 civil rights of disaster survivors, pointing out that 19 people with disabilities were paying the price. 20 exact price is unknown. 21 According to the 2018 George Washington 22 University Study, Hurricane Maria resulted in the 23 death of 2,975 people. How many were people with 24 disabilities is not exactly known. Disability is not

1	a mortality data point captured in the United States
2	or in Puerto Rico
3	Thank you again for the opportunity to
4	brief the Commission.
5	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, Mr. Gallegos.
6	Our third panelist, Nicole Roy, would you would
7	you please proceed.
8	NICOLE ROY, PROJECT COORDINATOR
9	SALVATION ARMY
10	MS. ROY: Good afternoon today to
11	everybody, and thank you for the honor of being
12	invited to this panel. I have the great honor of
13	serving as the Project Coordinator for the Salvation
14	Army long-term recovery here in Puerto Rico. I came
15	as a volunteer and was supposed to stay two weeks,
16	and I never left.
17	The injustice that I saw here and also
18	the need was profound. I had volunteered in many
19	other disasters across primarily the US and had seen
20	a much more interactive role, a much more cohesive
21	role with municipalities and across the local
22	entities. Some of that was missing. Logistically
23	things were delayed here as well.
24	When we first started to become an

1	organization that was looking at doing a long-term
2	recovery effort here in Puerto Rico, we had set
3	boundaries and had already had a set denomination of
4	funds. We had to escalate that seeing the need and
5	trying to reach the need.
6	We have now at this point done direct
7	services of over 30 million. That isn't product,
8	that is direct service to a person that is tangible.
9	We have had over 31,400 clients. Those are not
10	individuals, that s a family entity.
11	So the need was profound. The gap areas
12	that we were seeing on the boots, feet on the boots
13	on the ground here were a concern for us. We saw
14	many people denied for generators that had medical
15	needs, disabilities that needed extenuating
16	assistance or in-person visits. They could not reach
17	the DRCs at the time. Eventually turned into CRCs.
18	They could not access anything online,
19	and that was a large-scale confusion here on the
20	island. You had people that were not able to read or
21	write, so some of the process was difficult for them.
22	We had to walk them through things and do even re-
23	applications after they were denied.
24	But the cultural insensitivity here also

1 was prevalent in the fact that when homes were being 2 assessed, unforturately they were being understood as this a family home, an entity that has been passed 3 4 There was a lot of cultural confusion with how down. 5 to proceed as this is not the United States, this is 6 Puerto Rico. 7 And unfortunately many people got left behind in that and we had to really help. 8 9 lucky for free legal assistance that partnered with 10 We were lucky for those that were willing to 11 come out and do assessments. And again, this was something that there was a disconnect with an outside 12 13 force and with FEMA, with a actual survivor. 14 Ι want to talk about what actually 15 happened with the one true survivor that needed the 16 help then and thete. The blackout was something that 17 needed to be addressed as far as those with 18 disabilities and severe needs. The mental health, we 19 had the highest mount of suicide ideation in this 20 Things that were not being addressed. timeframe. 21 All DRCs and CRCs were in downtown areas 22 of the 78 municipalities, and unfortunately that was 23 not something that was accessible to most people. 24 That was a large logistical concern. The two smaller

1 islands off of Puerto Rico, Culebra and Viegues, were 2 delayed significantly in services and were not able 3 to be treated on equal services as the main island of 4 Puerto Rico. Viegues still is very much behind in what 5 they are able to provide their people in forms of 6 7 recovery methods. Where mainland Puerto Rico recovered signifiantly faster, you have rural areas, 8 9 specifically pocketed rural areas that were more than 10 a year delayed, as well as Viegues, which is a 11 population of almost ten thousand people that are 12 survivors as well 13 I talk about the human nature of the 14 delays and the logistical issues that I see and the 15 lack of cohesion with the local entities of the 78 16 municipalities and the local NGOs. I feel like this 17 has improved in some capacity. I can talk because I 18 live here island and lived through on the 19 earthquakes. 20 There was improvement, there was measures 21 met with full logistics, trying to be legal, 22 language, cultural modifications. And that was 23 something that aided in the efforts being faster. I 24 still am very grateful that you are all looking into

1	this now and that you are willing to hear what
2	everybody has to say. This is how we learn and
3	improve. And I'm very thankful and honored to be
4	asked to be on this.
5	And I also indicate everything on the
6	written statement as well. Thank you.
7	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, thank you. We
8	would like to hear from you now, please proceed.
9	CHARLEY WILLISON,
10	POSTDOCTORAL FELLOW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
11	DR WILLISON: Thank you, Commissioners,
12	for inviting me to participate.
13	CHAIR CANTU: Dr. Willison.
14	DR. WILLISON: No problem, thank you so
15	much. Thank you, Commissioners, for inviting me to
16	participate in today's discussion. My focus is on
17	the federal responses to Hurricanes Maria and Harvey
18	and considerations for improving equity in future
19	federal disaster responses. I will also include
20	Hurricane Irma in Florida in my comments as a relevant
21	comparison point.
22	The outcomes and choices governments make
23	in disaster responses are increasingly important as
24	we face the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and

1 anthropogenic climate change that increases 2 likelihood of public health disasters. Racial or 3 ethnic minority group members and low income 4 individuals are the most at-risk of adverse health and economic consequences during disasters. 5 6 Recognizing these risks and addressing 7 accessibility barriers during federal aid 8 deliberations will help the federal government 9 prepare for future disasters and reduce the risk of 10 exacerbating inequities in future disaster responses. 11 In 2017, the federal government responded 12 larger scale and much more quickly across 13 measures of federal money and staffing to Hurricanes 14 Harvey and Irma in Texas and Florida, compared with 15 Maria Rico. Hurricane in Puerto The 16 Administration of ten argued that the delay of money 17 and goods to Puerto Rico was based on geographic limitations. 18 19 disaster appropriation funding to 20 Puerto Rico took over four months after landfall to 21 reach a comparable amount of money received by 22 Florida and Texas in half the amount of time. 23 additional two months to distribute critical aid is 24 likely not explained by geography but likely a

1 product of congressional negotiations seeking 2 demonstrate that Huerto Rico had no sufficient assets 3 to deploy and required financial assistance. 4 Similarly, federal staffing rates in Puerto Rico reached comparable levels in three times 5 6 the amount of time as Texas, and thirty times the amount of time as Irma in Florida. 7 The magnitude of explain 8 this variation seems difficult to by 9 geography. 10 The variation in the responses was not 11 commensurate with storm severity and need after 12 landfall in the case of Puerto Rico compared with 13 Texas and Florida. Hurricanes Harvey and Irma made 14 landfall as category 4 hurricanes, and Maria hit 15 Puerto Rico as a high-end category 4. Maria caused 16 more damage in Puerto Rico than Irma in Florida or 17 Harvey in Texas. 18 considering the mortality rates as When 19 a measure of need or severity from the disasters, the 20 mortality rates resulting from Hurricane Maria were 21 more than 30 times greater than that of Harvey or 22 Ιf disaster responses vary in 23 effectiveness across communities, health equity is 24 affected.

1	Representation in debates over disaster
2	aid influence accessibility of requests for aid.
3	Research conducted by my colleagues and I in 2021
4	analyzes federal congressional aid deliberations as
5	measured in congressional floor debates over funding
6	and disaster aid relief for the 2017 hurricanes for
7	six months after landfall.
8	We find bipartisan participation in floor
9	debates over aid to both Texas and Florida. However,
10	mostly Democrat participation for Puerto Rico.
11	Overall, deliberation and participation in debate was
12	strongly related to whether or not a state or a
13	district was at risk of natural disasters itself.
14	Nearly 30% of all states in the United
15	States did not participate in any aid debate
16	regarding supplemental appropriations for the 2017
17	hurricanes during the time period. Our results
18	suggest that the deaths of thousands of Americans may
19	not be enough to mobilize congressional participation
20	in disaster aid deliberations. And that legislators
21	may be more incentivized to participate in debates if
22	they perceive disaster risks to their districts.
23	This may exacerbate disparities where
24	some states have more advocacy for disaster aid in

1	considering the disaster relief fund and supplemental
2	appropriations compared to other states. These
3	disparities are exacerbated by existing political
4	structures. Puer o Ricans are American citizens, but
5	Puerto Rice lacks congressional representation.
6	Puerto Rico is one of five US
7	territories. The territories are granted
8	congressional delegates, one for each territory, and
9	only in the House, with no voting power on the floor
10	of Congress. Previous scholarship demonstrates that
11	the delegate presence on the floor as opposed to
12	voting membership obscures territorial interests in
13	broader congressional deliberations.
14	Puerto Rico has been a US colony without
14 15	Puerto Rico has been a US colony without independent political status or integrated
15	independent political status or integrated
15 16	independent political status or integrated representation and political power in the United
15 16 17	independent political status or integrated representation and political power in the United States since 1898. As a result of these institutional
15 16 17 18	independent political status or integrated representation and political power in the United States since 1898. As a result of these institutional constraints and colonial status, Puerto Rico faces
15 16 17 18 19	independent political status or integrated representation and political power in the United States since 1898. As a result of these institutional constraints and colonial status, Puerto Rico faces accessibility barriers to federal aid debates.
15 16 17 18 19 20	independent political status or integrated representation and political power in the United States since 1898. As a result of these institutional constraints and colonial status, Puerto Rico faces accessibility barriers to federal aid debates. According Puerto Rico greater voting
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	independent political status or integrated representation and political power in the United States since 1898. As a result of these institutional constraints and colonial status, Puerto Rico faces accessibility barriers to federal aid debates. According Puerto Rico greater voting power would likely reduce future barriers of requests

1	Commissioners. If I can offer an apology that I cut
2	off the two of the Commissioners in the first
3	offer to them an opportunity to be first in this
4	panel.
5	Dr. Gilchrist.
6	COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: Thank you, Madam
7	Chair. Just a brief question to Dr. Willison. So
8	thank you all for your testimony.
9	Are you familiar with the Oversight and
10	Management Board of Puerto Rico?
11	DR. WILLISON: I am, though this is not
12	my area of expertise, so I may defer to some other
13	panelists on this.
14	COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: Okay, well, I'll
15	certainly yield to the other panelists as well. I
16	was just curious to know if any of panelists felt
17	like this particular board had any involvement as it
18	relates to the assistance that was necessary to get
19	to the residents of Puerto Rico, if in fact this board
20	had any impact on that, positively or negatively.
21	DR WILLISON: I can say, based on some
22	of my previous research, that the Board and the
23	constraints placed on Puerto Rico in terms of the aid
24	that it was able to receive based on the rules of the

1	Board did affect aid considerations.
2	For example, and again, I'm sure that
3	other panelists can speak to this as well, there were
4	three supplemental appropriations in Congress in the
5	first six months after landfall of the hurricanes.
6	And while Harvey and Irma received supplemental
7	appropriations without conditions, Puerto Rico did
8	receive far more conditions. For example, in the
9	form of loans as opposed to relief, as a result of
10	these constraints through PROMESA and its territorial
11	status.
12	Something else to consider is that the
13	island had, prior to the hurricane, over \$70 billion
14	in debt, but does not receive the same bankruptcy
15	protections as states. And so this was something
16	else where Puerto Rico, which surprisingly enough had
17	to demonstrate need for aid, even though it already
18	faced a much more compromised infrastructure and
19	economic standing prior to the hurricanes, compared
20	to US states.
21	COMMISSIONER GILCHRIST: Thank you very
22	much for your comments. Any other panelists weigh in
23	on that? Thank you, Madam Chair.
24	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. Commissioner

1	Kirsanow.
2	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam
3	Chair, no questions.
4	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you, sir, appreciate
5	you. Would anyone else? I see Commissioner Adams.
6	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Thank you, Madam
7	Chair. My question is for Dr. Willison. Are you
8	aware of the number in your study that was allocated
9	to Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria, the amount of
10	money, federal money?
11	DR. WILLISON: Yes, I do have those
12	numbers, and this is also in my written testimony as
13	well. And I can pull up specific numbers if you're
14	
15	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Does the number 27
16	billion sound about right?
17	DR. WILLISON: I don't have that in front
18	of me. Could you give me more specifics about
19	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Well, I'll represent
20	my understanding is that it's \$27 billion. Do you
21	think that amount was inadequate?
22	DR. WILLISON: So this is something that
23	I can't speak to myself in terms of the amount. But
24	what I can address is the disparities in the amount

1	of aid that was received between different
2	jurisdictions and at different time points.
3	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Well, if you're
4	commenting on disparities, I'm curious as to what
5	would have been the better amount.
6	DR. WILLISON: So I while I can't
7	I'm not a risk assessor, but what I can say, and my
8	written testimony demonstrates this, when we're
9	talking about disparities, we would assume that since
10	Puerto Rico had the same faced the same amount of
11	storm damage as Harvey and Irma and faced
12	incomparable mortality rates, that Puerto Rico would
13	have, during the timeframe, received similar amounts
14	of federal spending. And it did not.
15	During while it has received more aid
16	over the years, if we look at the initial six months
17	after landfall, congressional aid was delayed. And
18	I can pull up these time points if you'd like. And
19	it also did not receive as much aid as quickly.
20	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Right, but you don't
21	have an answer as to what would have been adequate.
22	DR. WILLISON: I what would have been
23	adequate would be to have Puerto Rico receive the
24	same amount of federal aid as Harvey and Irma at the

1	same time point.
2	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Okay.
3	DR. WILLISON: And possibly more, again,
4	because of the limited infrastructure in Puerto Rico
5	and the severe mortality that we know came out of the
6	hurricane.
7	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Okay, I'm confused
8	because Harvey, they received \$2 billion versus 27.
9	Are you basing your assessment that they didn't
10	receive enough on per capita reasons?
11	DR. WILLISON: So again, I apologize, I
12	don't have these numbers directly in front of me.
13	But from my study and in my written testimony, when
14	we were looking at the initial congressional
15	allocation, so this is in 2017, and when we're looking
16	at the FEMA aid that was distributed to families and
17	individuals, Puerto Rico did not receive as much as
18	Harvey and Irma at the same time points. And it was
19	delayed by periods of months.
20	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: Last question for
21	you. You talked about status as a territory. Under
22	the constitution of course territories are not
23	states. And there have been a number of status
24	plebiscites in Puerto Rico over the years.

1	Do you think the amount of aid that would
2	have come to after Harvey, that Puerto Rico would
3	have been better off under independence, or under
4	something like free association, or under the status
5	quo?
6	DR. WILLISON: That is a very good
7	question. What I can speak to is concerns with
8	statehood and how this works in Congress. So we know
9	that Congress plays a really big role in regards to
10	disaster aid because of the disaster relief fund.
11	Congress assesses annual appropriations to the
12	disaster relief fund, as well makes quick
13	supplemental appropriations when it's needed during
14	major disaster events.
15	And this is where representation really
16	comes into play, right. And this can be both as an
17	accountability mechanism if disaster aid is not
18	allocated as quickly as needed. Or it can also just
19	be an initial request.
20	And so when we're looking at who at
21	congressional members and when they spoke on behalf
22	of need to different communities, Maria, discussions
23	of aid to Maria and advocacy for aid for Maria was
24	substantially lower than congressional advocating for

1	aid to Harvey and Irma in Florida.
2	And so granting representation and
3	specifically voting status to Puerto Rico would like
4	make a big difference in these debate considerations.
5	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: And I'm sorry, I'm
6	not sure you understood my question, and that may be
7	my fault. Had Puerto Rico chosen independence
8	decades ago, would they have been better off or worse
9	or the same after Harvey?
10	DR. WILLISON: That is a great question,
11	and I don't think I can speak to that. I think that
12	would be a tough assessment to make. But it's
13	definitely a very important consideration, and an
14	ongoing debate in Puerto Rico. And there are camps
15	in both sides about whether independence or statehood
16	is important for the island. And that is something
17	I can't comment on, but perhaps some of the other
18	panelists can.
19	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioner, you're asking
20	a legal question of a medical doctor, so if you would
21	rephrase it to where her expertise would be of use to
22	you, I'd suggest that.
23	DR. WILLISON: And to clarify
24	COMMISSIONER ADAMS: I don't have

1	anything else, thanks a lot.
2	DR. WILLISON: I'm not a medical doctor,
3	I'm a social scientist. But yes, I do not have
4	expertise in this area specifically, and I don't want
5	to speak out of my area of expertise. So thank you
6	so much.
7	CHAIR CANTU: I apologize. I promoted
8	you. Commissioner Kladney has his hand up. And let
9	me ask Commissioner Kirsanow, questions?
10	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: No, thank you.
11	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. Appreciate you
12	very much, again. Commissioner Kladney, I know
13	you've got questions.
14	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I've always got
15	questions, everybody gets tired of me asking
16	questions. Chairman Gallegos, are you familiar with
17	1812(f) waivers?
18	MR. GALLEGOS: I am not.
19	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Okay. Is there a
20	tracking system for individuals who are separated
21	from their friends and family, disabled people are
22	sent to places like hospitals? We talked about that
23	on the earlier panel. Is there a tracking system
24	that FEMA uses or local communities use?

1	MR. GALLEGOS: You're saying in Puerto
2	Rico, or in general?
3	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Well, either in
4	Puerto Rico or in Houston during the
5	MR. GALLEGOS: Well, in Puerto Rico it's
6	my understanding there is no tracking system. And
7	that was part of the problem, because the island's
8	government didn't even know where people with
9	disabilities resided. There wasn't a single source
10	of data where they could go to identify where these
11	people were, where they were concentrated, or how to
12	get them to a single, centralized, accessible
13	shelter.
14	So the absence of accounting for people
15	just on the island like attributed greatly to the
16	disparities that they faced during the hurricane.
17	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: And I was
18	wondering if you could comment on Ms. Johnson's
19	response to my question regarding Olmstead and its
20	relationship and application to local entities in
21	disaster relief.
22	MR. GALLEGOS: So I apologize, I didn't
23	hear her response if that was in a prior session.
24	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Ms. Roy, could you

1	describe the issues surrounding access for disabled
2	folks in Puerto Rico? I understand they only had one
3	facility that was able to take disabled people. And
4	then there were many more that had to be flown
5	stateside for care because of inability to provide
6	all sorts of different access and applications and
7	services in Puerto Rico. Could you expand on that?
8	MS. ROY: Yes, hi, good afternoon. Many
9	of the hospitals were incapacitated, so they could
10	not even perform regular duties during this time. If
11	they were not able to come to the metropolitan area,
12	which logistically was very difficult, some areas
13	like in Mirovis and Orocovis in the centralized area
14	of Puerto Rico were blocked off by mudslides,
15	rockslide formations, and the rivers over-flooding.
16	And the same with Utuado.
17	So many people couldn't be reached. They
18	couldn't even be identified by GPS coordinates, it
19	was very difficult. They had points coming in by
20	helicopter. When it was able to be an extraction,
21	they were brought, again, like I said either to the
22	metropolitan area or to Florida. The difficulties
23	and the delays in that process were difficult.
24	And if I can speak to what the previous

1	chairman had said, the municipalities had not
2	previously identified those that would be in need in
3	a time of a disaster, and that caused many delays,
4	additional ramifications of death and additional
5	illnesses.
6	But also the scrambling of NGOs here on
7	the ground to try to coordinate with local first
8	responders to try to get to those people without
9	having logistical coordinations. So the delayed
10	timing was difficult and yes, they did send them out
11	of the Puerto Rico area.
12	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: At the time the
13	hurricane made landfall, had FEMA or anyone else,
14	local entities or anything like that, pre-set
15	supplies in anticipation of a disaster?
16	MS. ROY: There was some, and it was
17	mostly concentrated in the metropolitan area. But
18	there were some sent to be prepared. Unfortunately,
19	those items were not sent to the smaller islands off
20	of Puerto Rico and to rural areas that then were
21	isolated.
22	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Were they
23	adequate?
24	MS. ROY: No.

1	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Did they use open
2	captioning in Puerto Rico during the hurricane, the
3	open captioning of the TV where you can't shut it off
4	and the scroll goes along the bottom?
5	MS. ROY: I don't remember, I'm sorry.
6	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you.
7	MS. ROY: I'm so sorry, I apologize.
8	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I have nothing at
9	this time further, Madam Chair.
10	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. Commissioner
11	Yaki.
12	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much,
13	Madam Chairman. First, I want to make a brief point.
14	One agency we didn't hear from was the Small Business
15	Administration, which has a substantial presence in
16	terms of economic injury disaster loans to homeowners
17	and to small businesses, and I think it'd be I
18	think we need to make sure that we send these
19	interrogatories to them as well.
20	Secondly, to the point that was being
21	made earlier, we can debate what the status of Puerto
22	Rico could be in the future or had it been changed
23	somewhere, but these are American citizens.
24	And the fact is that when you look at the

1 relief aid to Hawaii in 1992 after Hurricane Iniki, 2 you did not see these congressional hearings going on 3 because the federal response to Hawaii, which is represented by two United States Senators and two 4 members of Congress, was like that. 5 6 Secondly, on that score, the amount of 7 American mobilization of the military to aid Haiti 8 after their horrific quake compared to Puerto Rico 9 was better. So we can get into that as well, but not 10 at this time. 11 I do want to ask, though, a question of 12 Ms. Romero-Craft, and that is -- this is a question 13 I asked earlier to the folks at FEMA, and that is to 14 what extent, you know, do they or did they or have 15 they or will they, look at, for example, 16 population that is about to be hit by a hurricane and 17 prepare accordingly in terms of language, in terms of 18 cultural and linguistic competency? 19 And did you -- and is that something that 20 you think that FEMA should be involved in for the 21 future in terms of how they deal with disaster 22 I mean, obviously there are going to be 23 some that happen and they can't deal with it because 24 But hurricanes you can track. it happened. So I

1 just wanted to alk you opinion, what your thoughts 2 are on that. 3 MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: Yes, thank you so 4 much, Commissioner, for that question. I think that, as Chair Cantu said earlier, this language access is 5 6 not a new issue, it's an issue that we've been dealing 7 with for years and years. 8 will say directly But. from our 9 experiences of working with folks who had 10 displaced who were receiving TSA that 11 Florida, in Georgia, and beyond, they had great 12 difficulties when they would call to try to update 13 their applications, to try to submit documents. 14 You can imagine that these people did not 15 have access to computers, so they were trying to do 16 those that did have smartphones would try to access 17 the programming via their smartphones. And it was 18 not user-friendly. A lot of times the way that the 19 information was represented on their phone was not 20 the way that it was being stored or captured via the 21 programming through the FEMA program. 22 In addition, when folks would call that 23 were Spanish language-dominant only, they were met 24 oftentimes with folks who could not speak Spanish who

1 were not bilingual. They did not have access to a 2 language line that could provide translation 3 assistance. 4 And so our hope and our suggestion would 5 be that yes, absolutely, in the face of what is 6 promising to be an active hurricane season, that FEMA 7 does prepare with adequate language assistance, with bilingual workers. 8 And I understand that they train 9 folks in advance and then they deploy them as 10 necessary. Hopefully, that won't be the case this 11 hurricane season. 12 But as someone who lives in a state that 13 is -- that frequently faces these disasters but is 14 much better equipped than Puerto Rico or the other 15 islands that were impacted by Hurricane Maria, that 16 accordingly and prepare are readv 17 materials, as well as language assistance that is 18 vitally necessary 19 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Thank you very much. 20 Madam Chair, just indulge me for a second. One thing 21 I did note that I wanted to point out that goes into 22 the area of understanding who it is you're about to 23 serve is that I noted in the IG report that some of 24 the food that was being sent was high carbohydrate,

1	high sugar, non-nutritious stuff to an island that
2	has a disproportionate number of folks who suffer
3	from hypertension, obesity, and diabetes.
4	I mean, these are the kinds of things
5	that FEMA needs to get a handle on. Because you don't
6	send a bunch of sugary snacks as a way to help people
7	who are living under abject conditions.
8	CHAIR CANTU: I appreciate that comment.
9	I also want to share with folks that the US Department
10	of Justice has the responsibility to coordinate among
11	the federal agencies a uniform and consistent way of
12	enforcing civil rights as to civil rights like Title
13	IX, it applies to civil rights like the Americans
14	with Disabilities Act.
15	And that has been the case, again, for a
16	long time. It's not a new set of circumstances that
17	we shouldn't be seeing disparities in how US citizens
18	are being treated under the Civil Rights Act.
19	The other thing I want to share with folk
20	is the effect on young people that their schools have
21	been turned into emergency shelters. And does that
22	disproportionately affect kids with disabilities and
23	kids with communication and lack of access to
24	computers at home in order to make up the deficits

1 because they can't use their schools, sometimes for 2 months, sometimes for years. 3 And again, it's not a new problem. I had 4 the honor of representing the Secretary of Education at a global conference, and the ministers of the 5 education from the Gulf and the Caribbean talked 6 7 about losing their school facilities for a very long 8 time after each storm and not having the resources to 9 help kids make lost education the up the 10 opportunities. 11 any of you anything to respond to Have 12 that specific problem of young people and how this 13 impacts them after a disaster? 14 Yes, if it's okay. MS. ROY: The island 15 didm't have school for Viegues 11 16 afterwards, none of their facilities. They have nine schools on that island and they were not equipped to 17 18 handle this. They all had damages -- the Salvation 19 Army, we put solar and water cisterns on them. 20 didn't have running water. This is something that's 21 inexcusable. 22 Out of ours, and I'm looking this up to 23 make sure that it's the most accurate, one of nine 24 children suffered from depression during that time.

1	That's our staff from our case management.
2	That is a high level of concern, not just
3	with having the education be, you know, something
4	that is on the back burner, but the depression ratio
5	in that equation, what that does to a child, thinking
6	that they are not as important as a mainlander.
7	Thinking that, we'll, we're United States citizen,
8	but how come no one's coming to help us. These are
9	things that were discussed by young children. That
10	is something that is concerning.
11	And just in that ratio context of the
12	school not being opened and them being properly
13	addressed with their needs. That was something that
14	parents also came to us individually and said how can
15	I help to nurture my child.
16	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you.
17	MS. ROY: Thank you.
18	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioners,
19	Commissioner Kladney.
20	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: One more question,
21	Madam Chair. I was wondering, I'll address this to
22	Ms. Romero-Craft, what do you estimate or can you
23	estimate the breakdown between homes that were
24	destroyed as a direct result of the hurricane itself

1	or those lost due to an inadequate response to the
2	hurricane and damage done to those homes?
3	MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: That is an excellent
4	question, and I would say I could not give you ar
5	estimate on that.
6	But I will say that our work directly
7	with a nonprofit organization, Ayuda Legal Huracan
8	Maria, really highlighted the plight of Puerto Ricans
9	as it relates to homeownership and the different
10	property designations that you can have in Puerto
11	Rico, where, as the other panelists have shared,
12	people could have an ancestral home, something has
13	been passed down, but if they didn't have the proper
14	documentation to show FEMA, then they were denied
15	funding to get the housing repaired.
16	So I think that that is a key area where
17	we would recommend that FEMA do follow up and that
18	work closely with the government of Puerto Rico to
19	define all of those different property designations.
20	And then accordingly provide funding to get those
21	houses repaired.
22	I cannot tell you the number of folks who
23	either abandoned homes or who had to flee because
24	they knew that they were not going to get that

1	they were denied FEMA funding and the home that they
2	had lived in for generations was not going to get
3	replaced or fixed. And had to then leave to the
4	mainland.
5	I can tell you specifically about what
6	happened in Florida and Georgia. Florida
7	specifically, the lack of affordable housing in the
8	state is at a crisis level.
9	So when you're having folks from Puerto
10	Rico come who have been designated for Section 8
11	housing in Puerto Rico on the island, and then come
12	to Florida and be put on waiting lists that were years
13	and years long, you find yourself with a housing
14	crisis that really is untenable. And I think you can
15	trace a lot of that to homelessness, children being
16	displaced even in schools here in the state of
17	Florida.
18	And so this has sort of a negative
19	cascading effect that needs to be addressed. And I
20	believe still can be addressed, by working closely
21	with the government of Puerto Rico and making sure
22	that FEMA addresses the differences in Puerto Rican
23	property law that impact how people may apply for and
24	receive funding to get the housing situation

1	addressed.
2	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So what you're
3	saying is the houses that people abandoned never were
4	fixed, is that correct?
5	MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: That's correct. Or if
6	they are fixed, as I've mentioned, they have blue
7	tarps they're fixed inadequately. The huge fear
8	is that there's another natural disaster that happens
9	in Puerto Rico, another hurricane or certainly
10	anotheran earthquake that may, you know.
11	Unfortunately, we ve seen hurricanes and earthquakes
12	in Puerto Rico very recently.
13	And I think, you know, you the issue
14	that they have with the electrical grid in Puerto
15	Rico is constant and current. It is happening now.
16	People are experiencing blackouts on a weekly basis
17	even. So there are issues that need to be addressed
18	urgently but that we aren't talking about.
19	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I have one last
20	question. You said in your initial response that you
21	can't tell me the number of homes that were abandoned
22	or destroyed subsequent to the earthquake for lack of
23	response. When you say that do you mean that there's
24	a lot?

1	I meam, if you can't tell me the amount,
2	okay, that's fine But I'm trying to get a picture
3	of a little, moderate, a lot. Do you know what I'm
4	saying?
5	MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: Absolutely, and you
6	know, I can certainly follow up with that. We have
7	partners on the ground that I would be happy to
8	provide additional information to the Commission so
9	that they can review this.
10	But we have folks that were working
11	directly with impacted families. That was not work
12	that we were doing because it needs to be specific to
13	the island, but we can certainly follow up with that.
14	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: If you can find
15	out that
16	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioner,
17	Commissioner, I have Commissioner Kirsanow waving his
18	hand very patiently.
19	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I would just like
20	to tell that witness that she should take that
21	information and provide it to the same place she sent
22	her statement. Thank you, Madam Chair.
23	CHAIR CANTU: Thank you. Commissioner
24	Kirsanow.

1	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Yes, thank you,
2	Madam Chair, and thanks to all the panelists. This
3	has been very informative.
4	Do any of you have specific evidence that
5	the disparities in the provision of services or
6	funding by FEMA was the result of any racial animus
7	or invidious discrimination? Anybody can respond.
8	Thank you.
9	MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: I'm sorry
10	Commissioner, I can say that we have received reports
11	from individuals that did feel that the lack of
12	response on an individual basis from certain
13	officials that were they were working with were as
14	a result. We filed our litigation as against FEMA
15	because we believe the proof is in the data.
16	We still have some outstanding Freedom of
17	Information Act requests to FEMA. And so, you know,
18	our point is you can also ignore what the President
19	said, what President Trump said, in the face of this
20	natural disaster and the treatment of Puerto Ricans.
21	And the treatment of Puerto Ricans that we are
22	discussing today that we are talking about really
23	shows that there was certainly a difference of
24	treatment of Puer o Ricans as opposed to other states

1	that were found in similar circumstances.
2	So we do believe that there was some
3	racial animus as it relates to how Puerto Rico was
4	treated.
5	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: What was that
6	evidence that those individuals provided that caused
7	them to feel that there was racial discrimination or
8	animus?
9	MS. ROMERO-CRAFT: Well, in terms of
10	folks that were calling in, we had some individuals
11	who reported to us that they were told that they
12	needed to speak English in light of not having
13	bilingual folks able to assist them over the phone.
14	You know, in terms of folks who had
15	problems receiving not only TSA but other types of
16	assistance to fix their homes, we had similar turn-
17	away in terms of folks being told, you know, you don't
18	have the necessary paperwork, and not understanding
19	the cultural linguistic differences that provide, you
20	know, that create obstacles for folks to get the aid
21	that they need.
22	And you can speak to any Puerto Rican
23	about what they saw, what they viewed in terms of
24	what President Trump said, his action, and his

1	behavior. And it starts from that point. And so you
2	know, we would submit that that is certainly
3	something that is tied to the response that was
4	was had in Puerto Rico.
5	As well as the reimbursement program that
6	FEMA did install as it relates to major projects in
7	Puerto Rico. Knowing the fact that the US Government
8	understands the financial difficulties of Puerto Rico
9	is facing, to have a reimbursement program is
10	laughable, quite honestly.
11	Because if you have a commonwealth
12	territory that does not have funding to initiate
13	these programs to ask for reimbursement, then what
14	are you anticipating in terms of major public
15	infrastructure programs?
16	So I think that those all point to, for
17	our from our perspective sort of the abject failure
18	of the US Government to respond to the needs of Puerto
19	Rico and Puerto Ricans.
20	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you.
21	CHAIR CANTU: We're getting close on
22	time, so just I will put a finger and say I will
23	follow up myself and ask for further information from
24	this panel on this point. Because I'm very interested

1	in what you all have eye witnessed and what you all
2	have heard from eyewitnesses with regards from
3	departures from policy, departures from practice,
4	unequal treatment.
5	I want to follow up. That was a very
6	interesting question and I do want to do the rest in
7	writing just to save the rest of us time in today's
8	panel. But I will let I will let you answer,
9	Charley Willison.
10	DR. WILLISON: Thank you. This is just
11	a broader point about disparities in disaster
12	responses overall.
13	I just want to emphasize that we do know,
14	there's a lot of scholarship on this point, that
15	communities of color and low income communities and
16	low income communities of color do are much more
17	at risk of adverse health and economic consequences
18	from natural disasters and from other public health
19	emergencies because of centuries of political and
20	socioeconomic oppression that have led to wealth
21	disparities, right.
22	So these communities are already more at
23	risk, creating racial disparities. And then we also
24	do know too that when looking at disaster

1	allocations, that low income communities and
2	communities of color do also receive less allocation
3	of sufficient aid or of aid in general. And there's
4	a lot of scholarship on this as well that I'm happy
5	to share with the community.
6	And so while we in thinking about
7	implicit or explicit bias, even in the absence of
8	that evidence, there is a lot of evidence of direct
9	racial disparities in aid allocation.
10	CLOSING REMARKS, CHAIR NORMA V. CANTU
11	CHAIR CANTU: Commissioners, we're going
12	to end on time. Does that sound right? Okay, so
13	this brings us to the end of the briefing portion of
14	our meeting. I'd like to take this opportunity to
15	thank all our panelists. This has been tremendously
16	informative.
17	And on behalf of the entire Commission,
18	I wish to thank all of the panelists for sharing their
19	time and their expertise with us.
20	I also way to personally thank the
21	Commission staff for their efforts they made in the
22	last few months to pull this virtual briefing
23	together. I know personally it's a lot harder to do
24	it virtually than it is to do it in person face to

1	face, so thank you. And I want to thank the staff in
2	advance for their effort to distill this information
3	presented in the briefing and to incorporate it into
4	the report. So I m really grateful for all this hard
5	work.
6	The record for this briefing will remain
7	open for the next 30 days. If panelists or members
8	of the public would like to submit materials, they
9	can mail to the US Commission on Civil Rights, Office
10	of General Counsel, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
11	Suite 1150, Washington, DC, 20425.
12	There is an email address that I'd like
13	to say it slowly, and that is Femabriefing@usccr.gov .
14	And those materials need to be sent by email or posted
15	no later than July 26, 2021. So I will repeat the
16	email one more time, <u>femabriefing@usccr.gov.</u>
17	Thank you all, thank you, Commissioners.
18	Thank you, staff. I'll do a hook 'em horns because
19	I'm a Texan.
20	COMMISSIONER YAKI: No, no, that's not
21	what I am getting at Madam Chair, point of order.
22	CHAIR CANTU: Yes, please.
23	COMMISSIONER YAKI: I just wanted to ask
24	leave of the Commission to allow Commissioner

1	Adegbile to submit his opening statement probably at
2	some point during the time, but to give a timeline,
3	given the circumstances right now. I know that he
4	very much wanted to be a part of this as a co-sponsor
5	of this with me, and I wanted to make sure that he
6	had leave to give to provide a written statement
7	for the record.
8	CHAIR CANTU: With no objection, that is
9	an excellent excellent idea. Any other any
10	other processes? Going once, going twice?
11	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
12	went off the record at 2:43 p.m.)
13	