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ROUTE 128: BOSTON'S ROAD TO SEGREGATION

—A joint report of the Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, prepared for the information and consideration of the Commission. This report will be considered by the Commission, and the Commission will make public its reaction. In the meantime, the findings and recommendations of this report should not be attributed to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, but only to its Massachusetts Advisory Committee and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

January 1975

ROUTE 128: BOSTON'S ROAD TO
SEGREGATION

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Advisory Committee to the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights and the
Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination.

ATTRIBUTION:

The findings and recommendations contained in this report are those of the Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD).

This report has been prepared by the State Advisory Committee and the MCAD for submission to the Commission and will be considered by the Commission in formulating its recommendations to the President and the Congress.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MASSACHUSETTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS

JANUARY 1975

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Sirs and Madam:

The Massachusetts Advisory Committee, pursuant to its responsibility to advise the Commission about civil rights problems in this State, submits this report on minority access to Boston suburban communities.

This report is the result of effective cooperation between a State civil rights agency (the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination) and a Federal civil rights advisory committee. The report reviews housing, land use, employment, and transportation practices in the Boston metropolitan area as they impinge upon the opportunities of minority group persons in the inner city. It focuses upon the newer suburbs, particularly those where housing and industrial parks have been developed since the construction of Route 128.

The report details the extent of racial exclusion in Boston suburbs and examines the policies and practices of Federal, State and local government, and those of private employers, the housing industry and private citizens.

It concludes that Federal and State fair housing laws have failed to open the suburbs to minority group citizens. As a result, Boston's black and Puerto Rican populations remain in those sections of the city with the greatest proportion of deteriorating and dilapidated housing. While we conclude that the New England town structure, with its multiplicity of independent and uncoordinated jurisdictions, is a part of the problem, we place the major blame on suburban, public officials

and the local residents of suburban towns, who for the most part have sought to maintain the status quo and to preserve the "character" of their communities. We conclude that State housing policies have not effectively challenged the practices of suburban communities and have not resulted in a sound, coordinated land use program. Likewise, the Federal Government, although providing much of the financial basis for suburban growth, has failed to make real its prohibitions against segregation and discrimination.

The report concludes that Federal and State fair employment laws have failed to desegregate suburban employment and that inner-city employment opportunities for blacks and persons of Spanish speaking background are decreasing. Suburban employers, suburban government, and the lack of effective action by the State have contributed to this situation. The report also concludes that the transportation system in the suburbs has been developed in a manner which has burdened minorities, although it was not reviewed in detail.

The report recommends that Federal and State Government subsidies to suburban communities be made contingent upon those communities developing nondiscriminatory housing, employment, and land use policies. The report recommends that local constraints over housing and land use be regulated by the State in the interest of all the citizens of the region. We call for an effective State planning body, machinery to regulate land transactions, and the creation of one or more metropolitan development corporations with broad powers to acquire and develop land. We call for regional housing authorities and an effective State financial assistance program.

The report also recommends that the State develop a system to coordinate jobs and housing; that the practices of suburban industrial development commissions be controlled in the interest of the region; and that suburban employers who receive Federal and State funds be required to take affirmative measures to insure the availability of jobs to inner-city residents. We recommend that inner-city highway construction be halted until such time as the State develops a comprehensive plan to link inner-city residents with suburban opportunities.

Both the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the Massachusetts Advisory Committee request that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights carefully review this report and lend its support to the report's conclusions and recommendations.

Sincerely,

/s/

Julius Bernstein
Acting Chairperson
Massachusetts Advisory Committee

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Advisory Committee and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination wish to thank Patricia A. Morse for the preparation of this report. Assistance was provided by John J. Ahearn, George Coblyn, Della Gilson, Norman W. Huggins, and Frances Werner on the staff of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and Velories Figures, Alfred Hong, and Jacques E. Wilmore, regional director, Northeastern Regional Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

A debt of gratitude is owed to the many persons, too numerous to mention, who consented to interviews and offered their advice and counsel.

Final edit and review was conducted in the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. by editor Laura Chin, assisted by Rudella Vinson, Bruce Newman, and Mary Frances Newman, under the direction of Charles A. Ericksen, chief editor. Preparation of all State Advisory Committee reports is supervised by Isaiah T. Creswell, Jr., Assistant Staff Director for Field Operations.

THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

The United States Commission on Civil Rights, created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, is an independent, bipartisan agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government. By the terms of the Act, as amended, the Commission is charged with the following duties pertaining to denials of the equal protection of the laws based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin: investigation of individual discriminatory denials of the right to vote; study of legal developments with respect to denials of the equal protection of the law; appraisal of the laws and policies of the United States with respect to denials of equal protection of the law; maintenance of a national clearinghouse for information respecting denials of equal protection of the law; and investigation of patterns or practices of fraud or discrimination in the conduct of Federal elections. The Commission is also required to submit reports to the President and the Congress at such times as the Commission, the Congress, or the President shall deem desirable.

THE STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEES

An Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights has been established in each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia pursuant to section 105(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 as amended. The Advisory Committees are made up of responsible persons who serve without compensation. Their functions under their mandate from the Commission are to: advise the Commission of all relevant information concerning their respective States on matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission; advise the Commission on matters of mutual concern in the preparation of reports of the Commission to the President and the Congress; receive reports, suggestions, and recommendations from individuals, public and private organizations, and public officials upon matters pertinent to inquiries conducted by the State Advisory Committee; initiate and forward advice and recommendations to the Commission upon matters in which the Commission shall request the assistance of the State Advisory Committee; and attend, as observers, any open hearing or conference which the Commission may hold within the State.

THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), a State agency, administers and enforces laws against discrimination in employment, education, places of public accommodations, and in public and private housing.

The MCAD was created with the enactment of the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practice Law in 1946. Through amendments, discrimination on the basis of sex and age were added. In 1950, legislation to eliminate discrimination in public housing and places of public accommodation was passed. At that time, the name of the agency was changed from Fair Employment Practices Commission to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. In 1956, the administration of the Fair Educational Practices Law, which was passed in 1949 and had been administered by the State Department of Education, was transferred to the jurisdiction of the MCAD.

Some private housing -- chiefly apartment houses and houses in developments -- was covered by legislation enacted in 1957 and 1959. The first inclusive state housing law in the country, covering all housing accommodations, whether apartment houses, houses in developments or private homes, with the exception of owner-occupied, two-family houses, was passed in 1963. Commercial space was added to the laws against discrimination in 1965.

In addition, the Commission has the power to initiate a complaint when it has reason to believe that discrimination has been practiced; subpoena witnesses; apply to the courts for an injunction in housing or employment cases when in the opinion of the investigating commissioner such action is warranted; award compensatory damages to a complainant; and request punitive measures by the court in contempt proceedings for failure of a party to comply with a Commission order.

The law has always provided for an educational program. It empowers the Commission to appoint "representative citizens" to serve on councils to assist the Commission in its educational work. These council members serve without financial compensation.

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PREFACE

Statement of Glendora M. Putnam, Chairman, Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), and Julius Bernstein, Acting Chairperson, Massachusetts Advisory Committee, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

This report is the result of effective cooperation between a State civil rights agency and a Federal civil rights advisory committee. We have joined together to tackle one of the most important and most impervious problems confronting America today -- the increasing physical and psychological separation of our people on the basis of race.

In 1968, the Kerner Commission report warned that this Nation was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white -- separate and unequal."

"Route 128: Boston's Road to Segregation" documents how far we have travelled down the road to separation in this metropolitan area. In releasing this report, we hope that we will aid in blocking further expansion of the road to segregation and that the recommendations of this report will constitute a series of steps in a program to make equal opportunity in the city and in the suburbs a reality for all of our citizens.

Although this report is based largely on public hearings and research completed in 1970 and 1971, the basic conditions described, the conclusions reported, and the steps recommended are just as applicable today. Rather than dating the report, the time interval has underscored our findings and emphasized the need for our recommendations.

While many changes have occurred in the Greater Boston Area since the original research for this report, the racial separation and the racial discrimination which it documents have not diminished. The issue of suburban development as it affects minority rights and opportunities remains virtually unchanged.

This report documents the "road to segregation" in the suburbs. Recent events in the city of Boston have taught us what awaits us at the end of that road. We in Boston and citizens across this country have witnessed the bitter fruit of segregation--misunderstanding, hatred, and violence. Housing discrimination in the suburbs has restricted minorities to the inner city. Housing discrimination in the city has limited minorities to certain sections of the city. The discriminatory policies of the Boston School Committee have combined with these factors to produce a segregated school system which now resists reform and redemption. White resistance to court-ordered desegregation of Boston's schools has resulted in the eruption of violence and racial hostility and has brought national disgrace to a city which once prided itself on its leadership in civil and human rights. Boston has become for the 1970's what Mississippi represented in the 1960's -- the major battleground for human rights. But just as Mississippi eventually bowed to the Constitution and to human dignity, Boston will do the same.

At the end of the 1960's, it was not uncommon for leaders in the Greater Boston academic community to assert that greater racial integration in Boston's suburbs would occur. More recent census data have shown this not to be the case. At the end of the 1960's, it was also suggested by some experts that discrimination in sales and rental of housing was of diminishing importance in shaping residential patterns. No evidence exists that such discrimination has declined anywhere in the Greater Boston Area. If anything, the records of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Boston Regional Office of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) show that discriminatory housing practices are on the rise throughout the area and are of a more complex and comprehensive nature than was previously evident.

This report is being made available at a time when two new developments are apparent. First, the new Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is about to become effective. This Act, in the new federalism mold, consolidates a wide range of former Federal programs and restricts Federal involvement in local planning and development to a bare minimum. Local cities and towns will now receive Federal funds for housing and community development with very few strings attached. The major burden of reversing the trend toward increased racial segregation will fall on the individual cities and suburbs--the level at which civil rights enforcement is at its weakest.

Local control over Federal funds will be greater under the new Housing and Community Development Act than ever before; and Federal monitoring of local compliance with the requirements of civil rights laws and the requirements of sound regional planning will be largely after the fact.

As our report indicates, the suburban response to demands for equal opportunity for minorities has largely been a non-response. The report concludes that:

In suburban area public officials of narrow outlook and parochial interests control access to housing in such a way as to exclude most black and Spanish speaking families from their communities.

The report further concludes that officials, for the most part, reflect the attitudes of their constituencies. It states:

In an effort to maintain the status quo and preserve the 'character' of their communities, local residents of suburban areas have sought to restrict the housing supply and exclude outsiders from the economic, environmental, educational, and social benefits related to land use.

Based on our findings, the implications of the new Federal policy bode ill for the development of equal opportunity in Boston's suburbs.

The second development is the election of a new State administration. Given the new Federal policy of telling each city and suburban community to "do your own thing," it is left to the State to insure that they will "do the right thing." The incoming State administration, therefore, has a new and vitally important responsibility and challenge -- to effectively fill the gap which Federal policy has left, to enact legislation and develop programs and policies to insure that Federal and State funds will not be used by each community in a parochial and selfish manner without regard for the impact upon inner-city residents and the region as a whole. Clearly, unless the State acts swiftly, forcefully, and effectively, suburban residential patterns of segregation are likely to be firmly established in a manner which cannot be changed for generations.

We think that this issue is one of the most important to confront the incoming administration. We hope that this report will point out the seriousness of the problem as the almost daily events in Boston point out the results of not dealing with the problem. And we hope that Governor Dukakis' administration will meet the problem head on. In that process, we pledge our support.

INTRODUCTION

This report is concerned with white enclaves rather than black ghettos. It reflects the growing awareness that the future of an urban area's minority population depends to a large degree on the decisions made and actions taken in the suburban communities where the white majority reside. It reflects, too, the recognition that the Boston metropolitan area is as deeply affected by racial division as any other large northern metropolis. This division depends not only on the numbers of minority citizens concentrated in the urban core but also on the extent of the minority vacuum in the suburbs. This report is not intended to divert attention from serious problems within the central city. Rather, it focuses on the role of the suburbs in exacerbating some of these problems.

From the standpoint of many minority group leaders, the need for improved minority employment opportunities is so desperate, and the need for adequate urban housing so obvious that suburban housing, at this point in time, seems to have no relevance. The maintenance of racially segregated housing outside the central city is largely due to two population movements (minority immigration and white outmigration) and rising land and construction costs. In this context, suburban housing is less important to minorities than relief from slum conditions and unemployment.

Access to suburban housing is not on the same scale of urgency as are some other minority needs. Suburban housing can have little meaning to a minority family unless suburban

jobs and improved transportation are also made available. However, the need to change the segregated character of suburban housing is critical to the white community. It is the white community which must change. And it is in the area of housing that whites must directly face the fundamental issues of racial equality. No strategy for improving the minority employment situation or for improving minority urban housing can succeed unless there are changes in suburban housing development.

Three basic aspects of suburban development are discussed in relation to the status of minorities--housing, employment, and transportation. Suburban housing patterns represent collective decisions about the shape of the society, what needs are public or private, and who is to live where. The decisions which shape the suburban housing market are different from those which determine the job market. Every time a town meeting votes a zoning change or approves a school bond issue, it makes a social statement far more pervasive in its impact than that of a board of directors establishing employment policy. As residential separation of racial groups becomes more fixed, it is unlikely that the decisions made in the suburbs will be responsive to the needs of minorities.

Suburban housing patterns warrant special consideration because they exemplify the complexity and subtlety of the subordination of blacks. The continued development of suburban housing in a direction which excludes minority groups illustrates a practical failure of constitutional guarantees. When minority citizens, limited to urban residence, have no standing to challenge the zoning restrictions or limitations on housing construction passed at suburban town meetings, there is a major flaw in the concept of equal protection. Those who wish to maintain segregated housing no longer have to rely on crude overt acts or restrictive covenants; they can now rely on a panoply of deterrents, ranging from the history of past insults, which discourage minority citizens from seeking suburban housing, to the present thoughtlessness of white suburbanites which prevents measures from being taken to promote racial inclusion.

Suburban housing patterns are important because in examining the factors which operate as obstacles to the inclusion of minority families in suburban housing, we must re-examine the issues of poverty and race. In so doing, we must

point out a familiar device which was once used by slave owners to rationalize slavery and has evolved through the years to serve as a disguise for many discriminatory policies. It is a form of reasoning which uses the deficiencies of those who have been victimized by discrimination as a justification for its continuation. Low income, for example, is clearly an obstacle to the movement of many minority families into suburban housing. But it would be a mistake to focus on minority income as if it were a defect of those who are now restricted to residence in the inner city while failing to examine the barriers to low-income families already residing in the suburbs.

The Boston area has, over the past 20 years, been a bellwether for certain national trends in suburban growth. The first highspeed circumferential highway, Route 128, once known as "the golden road," was completed around the outskirts of Boston in 1952. Throughout the 1950's and most of the 1960's, new employment and housing grew at an unprecedented rate throughout the Route 128 belt. In the 1970's, the area along the golden road is showing signs of tarnish, due in part to changes in national economic conditions and their effects on 128's electronic industry. But a new 88-mile-long circumferential highway, Route 495, approximately 18 miles beyond Route 128, presents a vast land area for further suburban expansion. How rapidly industry will grow along Route 495 is, at the moment, a matter of conjecture. The tremendous surge of development which took place along the Route 128 perimeter may never be duplicated. However, industrial parks are already occupied at major intersections, and housing development is visibly increasing in a number of Route 495 towns.


Boston's suburban boom occurred slightly ahead of that which had been experienced outside many northern cities. Boston, however, was slightly behind as a receiving point for the large number of blacks migrating north after World War II. A rapid increase in the number of Puerto Rican and other groups of Spanish speaking background has been a feature only of the Boston area's most recent history. While the major black migration into the Boston area occurred almost simultaneously with the rapid buildup of the 128 suburbs, neither the indigenous black population of Boston nor the incoming blacks participated in the expanded housing and employment market beyond the city.

By the early 1960's, more than 80 percent of the Boston metropolitan area's white population was distributed throughout the suburbs. More than 80 percent of its black population was clustered in central areas of the city. With the exception of a few isolated groupings of minorities in the older suburbs and the city of Cambridge, which has had a sizeable black community for more than a century, Boston's suburbs are more than 98 percent white. (See following page for map of Greater Boston Area.)

The first three chapters of this report provide general background information on the suburbs, the black minority in the city of Boston, and suburban development in the Boston area. Limitations on available data require us to treat other minorities, especially those of Spanish speaking background, far less adequately than we would like, but their presence in the city of Boston should be kept in mind. The remainder of the report consists primarily of data presented at hearings held in the city of Boston and in two groups of suburbs in 1970.¹ Testimony at the hearings in Boston, Needham, and Marlborough, June 1-4, 1970, was provided by public officials of the local communities, organizations, private citizens, representatives of the State government, and professionals in fields related to metropolitan growth.

The final sections of the report describe some of the relationships between State and Federal agencies and suburban development and offer recommendations for change. This report is by no means exhaustive, and the recommendations for change are not elaborate. It does, however, contain sufficient information to confirm the Boston area's conformity to the national pattern of racial exclusion in the suburbs and to document the need for change.


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1. Extensive testimony from officials and citizens of two groups of suburbs was taken in preference to testimony randomly selected from the suburbs as a whole. The two groups of suburbs chosen were selected to represent areas affected by the advent of the circumferential highways. Needham, Westwood, and Dover were taken to illustrate the response in the Route 128 area. Marlborough, Hudson, Westborough, Northborough, Southborough, and Sudbury were taken to illustrate the response to Route 495. Other suburbs might have been substituted but there is no strong reason to believe that the communities selected are atypical.






GREATER BOSTON AREA

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
PLANNING ASSISTANCE

SCALE IN MILES



LEGEND

-  INNER SUBURBAN SECTIONS
-  OUTER SUBURBAN SECTIONS
-  CITY OF BOSTON

It is not surprising that problems of employment and conversion, which directly affect the lives of so many residents of Boston's suburban area, should subsume other problems which seem more remote. Yet it would be a disservice, in the long run, to all of the region's citizens--city dwellers and suburbanites alike--should we neglect or gloss over racial discrimination. It is no less real in the suburbs, although its victims live far away. They live far away because of it.

CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENT OF SEGREGATION IN THE BOSTON AREA

Boston's Suburbs: 1970

More than a century ago the parts of the city now referred to as central areas, were places which Warner, in his classic study of urban development, called the "streetcar suburbs."² These pockmarked areas with burnt-out abandoned buildings were once the residential goal of many inner-city families. They now contain much of the minority population in the Boston area.

Today the Boston area is one of the most compactly settled in the United States. The degree of population density within its relatively small land area makes it almost surprising that so much of the historic, rural character of communities, which are now essentially commuter towns, has been retained. Within a few minutes drive from downtown Boston, it is still possible to find wide fields and large orchards or pine woods. Suburban sprawl around the margins of Boston is not yet what it has become in many metropolitan areas. Both the compactness of the region and its long history of settlement make it difficult to define "suburban" in the Boston context in a way that would be comparable to other metropolitan areas of similar size.

2. Sam Bass Warner, Jr., "Streetcar Suburbs: The Consequences," in The City in American Life, ed. Paul Kramer and Frederick Holborn (New York, 1970).

The popular understanding of the term "suburban" refers primarily to residential commuter towns or "bedroom communities." The technical definition of suburban, as used by the Bureau of the Census, refers to any community within the standard metropolitan statistical area outside the central city. Cities such as Cambridge, Somerville, and Chelsea are technically suburbs of Boston, but they are more densely populated than Boston, Chicago, or Philadelphia.³

A number of the inner suburbs might well have become part of the city proper if the town of Brookline had voted to be annexed in 1873. The Brookline vote to remain separate and the period of economic recession after 1873 halted Boston's annexation of outlying areas. Separate political and administrative agencies now differentiate these communities from the city, but urban processes with respect to housing, industry, and transportation now align them with the center. Problems of urban blight, deteriorating housing stock, and overcrowding are as great in many of the inner suburban sections as in the city. And it is well to keep in mind the distinction between what technically is a suburb and what is a suburb in the popular sense.

The focus in this report is on the outer suburbs, particularly those where new housing and industrial parks have grown up since the construction of Route 128. In 1970, many of these towns have begun to lose their rural atmosphere; commercial and service industries have begun to sprout in the smaller centers; and large-scale shopping facilities at major intersections are now well established.

Many of these suburbs have recently come to accept the construction of townhouses or small-scale apartment houses, although substantial buildable land is still available. In contrast to the narrow clustered buildings at the old town centers are the institutional and commercial structures built over the past 20 years that are low-lying and sprawled over large areas. These communities have not remained entirely

3. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1967. Table 4, Massachusetts, p. 504.

devoid of industry, but they have managed to avoid other problems which plague the inner sections. A number have managed to avoid most of the large-scale, public investments which municipal services require. On the other hand, many have been continually forced to expand their school facilities.

In looking at these outer suburbs, the long history of Massachusetts settlement imposes an additional distinction. At a time when construction of highway facilities is not limited by geography, people often forget the restrictions which early transportation modes placed on suburban development. After the automobile became widely used, the population surge into the suburbs spilled over and around older and smaller industrial centers like Lynn, Waltham, and Quincy. These older towns combine the modern suburban residential patterns of the fringe area with pockets of urban blight. They were the textile and leather manufacturing centers of the 19th century. Population movement away from Boston has gone on for more than a century, and for much of the time transportation to the north was better than elsewhere. Thus, northern suburbs tend to have older housing stock and greater population density, while the focus of much new housing development is to the south and west of Boston.

With the exception of Cambridge, all of the suburban towns were about 98 percent white in 1970.⁴ The outer suburbs have fewer low-income families and more high-income families than the inner suburbs.⁵

A comparison of the housing characteristics between inner and outer suburbs and Boston shows that the housing stock is much better in the inner suburbs.⁶ The unusually high percentage of poorer housing found in the outer suburbs of the south

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4. See Table I of the Appendix for data on Boston's inner and outer suburban population in 1970.
 5. United Community Services. Some Population Characteristics in Four Areas (Boston, 1969).
 6. See Table II for comparative data on housing characteristics in Boston's suburbs.

sector may be due, in part, to sampling from older cities, such as Quincy and Braintree.

Between 1960 and 1970, white population loss occurred in some inner suburbs of all sectors except the south. Black population loss occurred in two of the north central inner suburbs and one of the north inner suburbs. Outer suburbs showed consistent white population gain and a small black population loss in seven areas.⁷ Compared to the scale of white population increases in most suburbs, black population increases were very small. In many communities, the entire change may be due to natural increases rather than immigration.

The proportional representation of blacks in all suburbs except Cambridge is extremely small. In at least 29 communities out of 88, black proportional representation has neither increased nor decreased since 1960.⁸

Racial Segregation in the Boston Metropolitan Area

Using 1960 Census data, Teuber and Teuber in their classic study, Negroes in Cities, found that for Boston's black population to achieve a pattern of residential distribution throughout the city similar to that of non-blacks, 83.9 percent would have to relocate. Using 1970 census data, relocation would involve 84.3 percent of the black population.⁹

The 1970 Boston Area Survey underscored the restriction of blacks to limited areas within the city. Clearly, the results of continued deterioration of the housing stock within the more predominantly black districts and adjacent residential areas have resulted in population redistribution within the city.

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7. See Table IV for data on population change between 1960 and 1970 in Boston's suburbs.
 8. See Table III for towns which had no change or a decrease in their black population.
 9. Karl E. Teuber and Alma F. Teuber, Negroes in Cities, (Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), p. 39, and Sorenson, Teuber, and Hollingsworth, Jr., "Indexes of Residential Segregation for 109 Cities in the United States," Studies in Racial Segregation, No. 1 (University of Wisconsin, 1974).

Housing losses in the Roxbury-South End Area have forced many blacks into Jamaica Plain, a section which has much deteriorating housing. Moderate income black families have moved into the North Dorchester area, where there is a larger supply of single-family units. There is little evidence to suggest that black isolation has significantly diminished within the city.¹⁰

What is true within the city is magnified many times when the comparison includes the suburbs. Historically, the black population was scattered throughout the cities and towns which now comprise the suburbs.¹¹ Today only the city of Cambridge approximates the proportional representation of blacks in the metropolitan area as a whole. In fact, Cambridge, which had a black population of 6.8 percent in 1970, exceeded the ratio for the metropolitan area of Boston (4.6 percent in 1970) and was substantially higher in its black representation than any of the inner suburbs. However, Chelsea, Medford, and Newton have also had small, well-established black communities dating back at least to the turn of the century. In 1970, Chelsea was 98.3 percent white. With the exception of Cambridge, minority representation in the more industrial, older suburbs is minimal. In the younger suburbs of the Route 128 area and beyond, minorities are virtually nonexistent.¹² School data indicate that within cities and towns which have appreciable numbers of blacks, their residential location is highly concentrated.¹³

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10. Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Joint Center for Urban Studies, How the People See Their City: A Report of the Boston Area Survey, 1970, pp. 75-76. (Hereinafter cited as the Boston Area Survey 1970).
 11. See Lorenzo Johnson Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England 1620-1776 (New York, 1966), Appendix C, p. 339, and Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants (Cambridge, 1959), Table XII, p. 249.
 12. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B23 Massachusetts.
 13. Department of Education, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Annual School Census.

While Boston's suburbs vary in density, income levels, and the degrees to which they contain industrial or commercial facilities, they have in common a racial homogeneity. A superficial glance at population for the suburban area can be misleading in that both the school and local censuses fail to distinguish between resident blacks, those who are located in an area as live-in domestics, or are part of the institutional or military population. The school census of 1960 for the town of Lincoln, for example, reported a student population of 7.4 percent black.¹⁴ This black student population, in fact, consisted of the children of servicemen at Bedford Air Force Base who attended separate schools from those of the nonmilitary Lincoln residents. Likewise, the Concord Reformatory exaggerated the black representation of Concord; the Fernald School and Metropolitan State Hospital exaggerated the black representation of Waltham--not in resident patients but in resident service personnel.¹⁵

Recent surveys indicated a marked increase of minority citizens in the suburbs. However, for the Boston area such trends cannot be interpreted as suggestive of less segregation. A relatively large percent increase in black population may simply reflect the fact that a town which had two black residents in 1950 had four in 1960. For suburbs such as Burlington, Sudbury, Needham, and Weston, increases must be understood in a context of total population growth for the same period ranging from 100 to 400 percent.¹⁶ When minority population increases in Boston's suburbs, it is more likely to be associated with deteriorating housing stock in the older suburbs and increased institutional or military population in the younger suburbs. There is little comfort to be found in the suburbanization of blacks under these circumstances. There is some evidence to suggest that black representation in the less dense suburbs may be decreasing rather than increasing.

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14. David L. Birch and Eugene Saenger, Jr., "The Poor in Massachusetts" in The State and the Poor, eds. Samuel H. Beer and Richard E. Barringer (Cambridge, 1970), Table 2-22, p. 50.
 15. Personnel Office Report to the Civil Rights Commission's staff by the Metropolitan State Hospital and the Fernald School.
 16. Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, Decennial Census: 1965.

Residential Segregation in Boston's History

In the early part of the 18th century, during the years of Boston's greatest involvement in the slave trade, blacks made up 2.1 percent of the total population of Massachusetts.¹⁷ In 1960 the black population of the Boston metropolitan area was 3 percent of the total population, less than a 1 percent increase over the proportional representation in 1715.¹⁸

Both the small size of the black population and the long history of a free black population in Massachusetts would seem to indicate that residential segregation would differ from the patterns of Southern or Western metropolitan areas. Such differences in racial history counted for little. The new housing, jobs, schools, and amenities of suburban life which followed the completion of Route 128 were for whites only.

The recent large immigration of blacks to the city of Boston obscures the fact that while 13 percent of the city's white population were redistributed into the suburbs from 1950 to 1960, almost none of the older black community (over 23,000 in 1940), appeared in the growth areas along Route 128.¹⁹ While it can be argued that the time scale is too short to allow blacks to approximate the white population movement into the suburbs, apparently even a century's residence in the Boston area has not been sufficient for blacks to migrate to 128's suburbs.

The almost total absence of black participation in the suburban development of the past 20 years would be disturbing had the total number of blacks in the region remained small. However, the black population was rapidly increasing. The

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17. Peter L. Bergman, The Chronological History of the Negro in America. (New York, 1969), p. 27.
 18. United Community Services, Black and White in Boston, (May 1968). (Hereinafter cited as Black and White in Boston).
 19. Ibid.

period from 1960 to 1965 saw an immigration of blacks to Boston representative of perhaps one of the largest internal population shifts in the Nation.²⁰ In Boston, the influx occurred at a time when urban renewal did not refer to establishing a new housing supply but to rebuilding Boston into the commercial center it was prior to the mid-19th¹ century. Housing renewal for the urban work force was accomplished by relocation to the suburbs. Industry followed its managerial and technical staff into the suburbs and led much of its white work force out of the city.²¹ New companies were moving to suburban locations even before the exodus of the white labor force although at that time there was a greater emphasis on highskill employment and service jobs within the city.²² The city of Boston became more independent of its resident work force and more dependent on its commuters.²³ Such shifts in job-home locations met neither the needs nor the skills of the new black residents.

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20. Marc Fried, Lorna Ferguson, Peggy Gleicher, John Havens, Patterns of Migration and Adjustment: The Boston Negro Population, (Institute of Human Sciences, Boston College, 1970), p. 7.
 21. Everett J. Burt, Jr., "Influence of Labor Supply on Location of Electronics Firms," Research Report to Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Report No. 34 (1966); and Everett J. Burt, Jr., Labor Supply Characteristics of Route 128 Firms." (1958).
 22. Boston Economic Redevelopment and Industrial Commission, Boston's Industry (March 1970), and Boston's Jobs and Land (1970).
 23. Alexander Ganz and Peter Menconeri, "The Expanding City of Boston's Economy," Working Paper EC-1 (July 1970), Boston Redevelopment Authority, p. 35. See also "Job Growth in the Suburbs, Current Change in Payroll Employment in Twelve Metropolitan Areas by Industry Group, 1959-1965," in The American Federationist (July 1967), p. 7.

Decentralization of population and industry was not a trend which arose de novo in the 1950's, nor was the decline of urban neighborhoods a phenomenon new to Boston. New production techniques required many plants to seek more space, and shifts in the residential location of the work force had been facilitated by the postwar availability of the automobile. Construction of the high-speed circumferential highway, which opened the gateway to suburban land, permitted problems of space to be solved by relocation rather than a reconstruction of the city.

The new black population did not find itself in socially neutral territory. The early history of the Boston area shows that local communities had long practiced the "warning out" of black families who had established residence, where community representatives or selectmen would confront black families whom the town believed would become public dependents and warn them to move out of town.²⁴ It was in Boston in 1849 where the "separate but equal" doctrine of school segregation was first enunciated, when the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to order the Boston public schools to accept a black child in an all-white school. Boston itself was not a major stopping point on the underground railway, and groups of black families would leave Boston for Canada in search of a better life.²⁵

After the Civil War, when the city's black population increased for a brief period, blacks continued to encounter bitter resentment from the immigrant population competing in the job market. In 1880, 17 years after the abolition of slavery in the Commonwealth, 240 blacks were deported from Boston on the basis of a statute expelling all Negroes not residents in the State.²⁶ By the 1960's, State-ordered deportation of unwanted blacks had long ended, but then the trend turned to the public removal of their housing.²⁷

24. The town of Lincoln, for example, began "warning out" black families 10 years after its incorporation as a town. See Town Records of Lincoln, Mass., 1757-1762.

25. Handlin, p. 53.

26. Bergman, p. 83.

27. Ibid., p. 102.

The exchange of race prejudice in one part of the country for race prejudice in another part occurred ironically at the height of the civil rights movement in Boston. Problems of employment, housing, and education in the black community were not unknown to the residents of the suburbs. Yet the suburban white population saw prejudice and discriminatory practices as matters extrinsic to their communities. The absence of racial minorities in the 128 belt was interpreted as something completely fortuitous. A suburban home, it was thought, was the just reward for many years of individual effort. Many suburbanites forgot that Federal assistance facilitated their move from city to suburb. They failed to comprehend that the changing patterns of metropolitan development, which they themselves were influencing, excluded the same routes for blacks.

Residential Segregation and the Federal Government

In 1959, 1961, and 1963, the United States Commission on Civil Rights issued reports on housing which noted that black Americans continued to have unequal access to existing housing resources and that the plight of racial minorities was exacerbated by the general and critical shortage of low-income housing.²⁸

These reports clearly documented the role of government, particularly at the Federal level, in denying equal opportunity in housing to substantial numbers of American citizens on the ground of race. The massive influence of the Federal Government over the housing industry in the form of direct funding to localities, Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration mortgage insurance, Federal National Mortgage Association mortgage purchases, the chartering and insurance of private financial institutions and in highway expenditures, in the 1950's and 1960's was not directed toward supplying equal housing opportunities to all the region's citizens. The cities

28. Not only was housing in low-income neighborhoods taken for renewal, but highway construction also cut into the minority housing supply. According to a fact sheet prepared by the Greater Boston Committee for the Transportation Crisis, over 500 blacks would have lost housing if plans for the inner belt had been implemented.

and towns along the 128 perimeter are most deeply indebted to the Federal Government for their suburban quality; they are also indebted to it for the preservation of their all-white character.

The Housing Act of 1949, with its goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family," was passed at a time when Route 128 was well on the way toward completion. It was not until 1957, when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was established, and not until 1958, when housing and industrial development in the 128 area was burgeoning, that public attention was focused on the exclusion of minority groups from housing assistance.

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 11063, emphasizing a national policy of equal opportunity in housing; in 1963, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported that this policy had yet to be implemented. In 1968, reports by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and the National Commission on Urban Problems both documented the fact that national policy had not been translated into meaningful action; in fact, America was quickly becoming two nations--one white, and the other black. In 1969, the report of the Urban Coalition and Urban America, Inc., stated, "The physical distance between places where blacks and whites lived did not diminish during the past year and threatens to increase with population growth. These reports were just a few emanating from government and private sources which attempted to focus public attention on the critical nature of unequal housing opportunities.

What must be kept in mind in reviewing this brief chronology is that the time span of 20 years covered a period of accelerated and almost uninterrupted growth in Boston's suburbs. However, virtually none of the new housing stock in Boston's suburbs was made available to minority citizens despite evidence of discrimination in housing. The competitive advantage of white citizens in gaining access to the new suburban housing and amenities was not moderated. The trend toward segregated housing not only continued, but continued on an unprecedented scale for this region.

Federal assistance in financing single-family home ownership, exclusionary local policies of large-lot zoning, and restrictions on multi-family dwellings changed rural towns into suburban white enclaves. Federal assistance in the form

of loans and tax benefits stimulated the demand for suburban housing and reinforced the aspirations of large segments of the population. At the same time, large-lot zoning and other restrictions raised housing costs, wasted buildable land, and increased the gap between minority urban income and the price of suburban residence. The shifting economic base of the region was encouraged by Federal and State expansion of highway facilities. The resulting loss of jobs in the city limited minority income gains and increased the social tensions within the urban core.

There is little to be gained by speculating on what might have been had the suburbs of the I-28 belt provided open housing in the early 1950's. It is clear that one of the major flaws in planning and implementing the Federal fair housing policy was in underestimating the vast persistence of discrimination. The Federal Housing Authority and other Federal agencies had neither the inclination nor the capacity to deal effectively with discriminatory housing practices. Suburban residents may argue that discrimination in the suburbs has ceased, but scant evidence exists to support this argument.

The development of suburban communities has resulted in patterns of life inappropriate to minority needs. Federal and State financial props have permitted many suburban communities to develop policies toward municipal and social services which exclude minority groups.

In the 1970's, the gap between housing costs and minority incomes continues to widen. Employment and educational opportunities which minorities badly need continue to move farther from their residential base. The magnitude and complexity of the problems caused by the absence of open housing continue to increase. Just when the general housing shortage requires major innovative change, the metropolitan area has run out of room to maneuver. The sluggish national economy has sharply curtailed housing production and hurt employment in the suburbs. All these factors have serious repercussions on the minority population in the city and on its potential mobility in the years ahead.

CHAPTER II

BOSTON'S BLACK POPULATION

Introduction

Racial minorities were a significant portion of Boston's population, numbering more than 134,000 in 1970. As indicated in the table below, blacks comprised 16.3 percent of the city population.

Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
City of Boston--Population by Race: 1970

Population by Race	SMSA (including City of Boston) ¹	City of Boston
White.....	2,602,741 ²	524,709 ³
Black.....	127,035	104,707
Indian.....	2,132	1,047
Japanese.....	2,593	645
Chinese.....	12,025	7,007
Pilipino.....	1,395	566
Other ⁴	5,781	2,390
<u>All races--Total</u>	<u>2,753,702</u>	<u>641,071</u>

¹In the New England States, SMSA's consist of towns and cities instead of counties. Each SMSA includes at least one central city and the complete title of the SMSA identifies the central city or cities.

²Includes 36,190 persons Spanish speaking background.

³Includes 17,984 persons Spanish speaking background.

⁴Other races category as used by Bureau of the Census.

Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970. Vol. I Characteristics of the Population, Part 23, Massachusetts.

It is not a coincidence that the minorities live within limited districts of the city, but in view of the many changes of the past two decades, does their residential location represent a beginning toward full participation in the life of the Boston region? Many urban theorists feel that it does. Others feel that the move to Boston brought minority groups certain absolute gains but, due to the dynamics of the metropolitan environment, resulted in a net loss. It is widely thought that the recent immigration of large numbers of blacks and Spanish speaking background citizens obscures the progress which has been made in the Boston area in reducing the effects of prejudice and discrimination. In this context, it is largely a matter of time before the effects of the immigration are dissipated and racial minorities achieve equal economic and occupational status with whites. The causes of residential segregation, according to this view, lie primarily within the minority population. Geographic mobility for minority citizens within the metropolitan area will result from their increased economic and occupational mobility and these will occur independent of residence.

At present, the geographic location of the minority population places severe constraints on its occupational and economic mobility. The factors determining both residential location and mobility lie primarily outside the minority community and the city. The relationships, however, are far from simple.

The following sections provide background information on Boston's black population, a description of some of the economic trends within the black community, and a discussion of some of the factors related to mobility. It is in these areas where misunderstandings and misconceptions have been most prevalent and where public attention to racial inequities has most often been diverted by reports of minority "progress."

Black Migration in the Boston Area

The movements of whites out of the urban center of Boston and blacks into it have followed the patterns of other major cities, except that starting with a 1940 base, the numbers were smaller and the period of greatest increase in rate came slightly later. Between 1940 and 1960, Boston's black population tripled in size, but the total black population in 1960 was still only 63,000, representing approximately 9 percent of the city's total population. Between 1960 and 1965, however,

the black population had grown to more than 100,000, comprising nearly 17 percent of the city's total inhabitants.²⁹ Blacks comprised about 3 percent of the Boston standard metropolitan statistical area in 1960. By 1965, they comprised 5 percent, remaining the same in 1970.

The changes in the size of the urban black population over a very short time span indicate pressures for housing, employment, and educational services which were to be absorbed by the city of Boston. That these pressures were not distributed throughout the city, but were largely confined within the Roxbury, South End, and North Dorchester areas, make it remarkable that the racial tensions of the 1960's were not considerably greater.³⁰

A recent study of black immigrants in Greater Boston by Marc Fried and his research assistants at the Institute of Human Sciences³¹ shows that by the late 1960's, the older, established black population in the city of Boston was well outnumbered by the influx of newcomers. Approximately 60 percent of the city's black residents had lived in Boston less than 16 years. The majority of Boston's black adults were between the ages of 25 and 45. The majority of newcomers were

29. Black and White in Boston, p. 304; and The Boston Area Survey, 1970.

30. There is evidence to suggest that the presence of a very large proportion of newcomers in the black community might have dampened rather than heightened the outbursts which took place in Boston during the latter part of the 1960's. See, for example, "The Riot Participant" in the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968 (The New York Times Edition), p. 127.

31. Marc Fried, Lorna Ferguson, Peggy Gleicher, and John Havens, "Patterns of Migration and Adjustment: The Boston Negro Population," Institute of Human Sciences, Boston College (October 1970) [Unpublished].

not only of rural background, having come directly to Boston from the South, but also young, less educated, and often, alone. The average age of immigrants was 22; more than 60 percent of these were between the ages of 16 and 25.

Most of the immigrants received little financial help on arrival in Boston, although many were able to find work almost immediately. However, the work available often consisted of the lowest paying, dead-end jobs. Those who came with better education and better skills had the greatest difficulty in finding jobs. They were predominantly strangers not only to the area but also to each other. Forty percent of the migrants who had lived in Boston between 11 and 15 years were found to be familiar only with the immediate ghetto area, and only 22 percent of those who had lived in Boston at least 10 years belonged to any organizations. For newer residents of 2 years or less, only 43 percent were acquainted with more than the local neighborhood, and only 8 percent were members of organizations. Boston's black community has been able to maintain a degree of cohesion and operate educational, employment, and social programs in spite of such adverse odds.

One of the major findings of the Fried study was that even during peak migration periods, the deprivations and lack of opportunities at the point of departure were far more important than the attractions of Boston, per se, and this finding is consistent with a large body of evidence on Negro response to economic opportunity.³² Migrants came to the area seeking work. Boston became the final destination for job contacts, usually through friends or relatives. This is an important point to consider about the motivations for relocation, in light of the many preconceptions held in a State morbidly concerned with its welfare budget. Blacks come to Massachusetts (and we may reasonably infer so do other minority groups) because conditions in their home States force them to leave. As long as the North continues to have an economic edge on the South, it will continue to receive migrants. Those who hope to prevent immigration of blacks by refusing to create a better environment for

32. Hope T. Eldridge and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Demographic Analyses and Interrelations, American Philosophical Society, 1964, Vol. III of Population Redistribution and Economic Growth, United States, 1870-1950, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, No. 61.

minorities should realize that the rate of minority immigration can only be decreased by reducing economic growth and eliminating jobs.

While the search for work is consistent with black migration patterns to other major Northern cities, Fried's study found some differences between Boston's black immigrants and those of other northern urban centers, where black immigrants are increasingly from urban areas.³³

Boston's immigrants seem to have relatively less urban experience. Fifty-five percent came directly to Boston from rural or semirural areas, and an additional 23 percent came to Boston with only one stopover between their original homes and Boston. Boston's immigrants appear significantly less educated than other nonmigrants, although in other urban areas black immigrants are more educated than the native population. The same appears to be true in terms of occupational skills. Fried's study reported, however, that Boston's immigrants had more education than the population of their original home. This was also true of migrants to other cities.

The meaning of these differences is not entirely clear. It may represent changing patterns of South to North migration, but it more likely represents Boston's general lag as a receiving point behind other cities. It does, however, point up the severe hardships faced by large numbers in the black community, and the great need for expansion of educational and social facilities.

The Fried study also included a sample of migrant and non-migrant blacks in areas outside the city, although most of those interviewed came from the more urban suburbs where 61 percent of the black population consisted of migrants. The findings reveal some cause for concern. Even for the inner suburbs, 74 percent of the blacks were found to have migrated from other northern cities or to have been born in the metropolitan area but outside the central city of Boston. As in the city, the rate of migration into suburban communities seems to have declined since 1965.

33. Charles Tilly, "Race and Migration to the American City" in The Metropolitan Enigma, ed. James Q. Wilson, (New York, 1970), pp. 150-154. Tilly provides a bibliography on "Black Migration" on p. 152.

Within a limited range, suburban blacks were found to be of higher educational and occupational attainment than urban blacks. Fried suggests that the suburban black population represents a different migrant stream from that connected to the city.

In view of the large amount of housing withdrawn from the black districts in the city over the past 20 years by urban renewal, highway construction, and deterioration, it is surprising that such a large proportion of suburban blacks were found to come from outside the Boston area and that so few came to the suburbs from Boston itself. Black suburban migration patterns appear to parallel those of white high status movers to such places as Wellesley, Weston, and Lincoln. The exception is that suburban black moves involve markedly lower income and higher density suburbs.

Nationally, blacks increased their absolute numbers in the suburbs, but proportionally lost ground, going from 4.6 percent of the suburban population in 1960 to 4.1 percent in 1966.³⁴ Together with Fried's findings, this strongly suggests that blacks are encountering more, rather than less, restriction on movement within the metropolitan area.

Historical analogies can be dangerous as a basis for public policy, and perhaps nothing illustrates this better than the power of the foreign immigrant model to shield white society from the realization that black residential segregation reinforces racial inequality. The city-to-suburb mobility pattern of Boston's mid-19th century immigrants is not being repeated by the black immigrants of the mid-20th century.

Rather than attributing Boston's urban problems to the newcomers, the possibility is that their presence in large numbers during the 1960's may have, in fact, moderated racial tension. The popular conception of migration as a factor in social disorganization and upheaval is contradicted by a large and growing body of evidence. Studies on those who participate in urban violence indicate that they are far more likely to be the better educated and better employed, native population rather than the immigrants. Charles Tilly has summarized the situation:

34. Edmund K. Faltermayer, "More Dollars and More Diplomas," in The Negro and the City (New York, 1968), p. 93.

Migrants as a group do not notably disturb the public order, their arrival does not lower the quality of the city's population, they place no extraordinary demands on public services, and they do not arrive exceptionally burdened with personal problems. These things happen to them later.³⁵

The memories of the poverty, crowding, and discrimination encountered by foreign immigrants to Boston are still vivid throughout the Boston area. It is not surprising that many people expect racial minorities to follow the precedents of the Irish, Italians, and other arrivals from overseas. The Irish immigration, for example, accounted for a major population increase within the city, but black immigration at its peak did not equal the loss of white population which was moving out and thus did not place an additional burden on city services.

The city's inability to respond to the needs of its residents cannot, in fairness, be attributed to the black migration. Nor can the extreme poverty of the racial minorities account for the inadequacy of the effort to meet their needs. Fried's data clearly shows that Boston's blacks can be compared with former immigrants only in very limited ways and that such similarities offer no basis for anticipating black assimilation on the white model.

Trends Within the Black Community

Black incomes within the city of Boston have increased between 1960 and 1970, both absolutely and relative to those of whites. Yet these changes do not necessarily indicate that blacks are moving up. All incomes have increased fairly rapidly over the past 10 years. It would be shocking if black gains had not occurred. Since Boston represents the lower end of the income scale for the metropolitan area, it would also be unfortunate if black incomes had not come closer to the average for the city. Recent studies of incomes within the city of Boston seem to suggest that most of the black gains were made prior to 1965, and after that time the relative improvement in

35. Tilly, p. 166.

income seemingly declined.³⁶

While a smaller proportion of the urban black population is now in the lowest income class (in 1960, 50 percent of black households had incomes under \$4,000; in 1965, about 40 percent were in that class), there are actually more blacks who are poor. Even if blacks continue to make income gains at the same rate as between 1960 and 1965, projections for the next decade bring black incomes up to less than 70 percent of incomes for the Boston metropolitan area.³⁷ Unquestionably, there have been increases in the proportion of blacks entering the high-income classes, but black income gains are not evenly distributed.

Whether or not blacks are leaving the low-income classes in Boston at a reasonable rate is not clear. Some factors tend to minimize black-white disparities in income: the absence of a black elderly population and the larger number of family members contributing to household incomes. Andrew Brimmer of the Federal Reserve Board has pointed out an important trend toward economic division within the black community.³⁸ While blacks with educational advantages and skills have made great gains in occupational mobility and income, those who have less education and less skills have made no gains and actually incurred some losses. While white incomes show some tendency toward a more equal distribution, black incomes show signs of becoming more unequally distributed. Blacks are gradually moving away from poverty but at a much slower rate than whites due to the much larger income deficiency. Poor whites in 1968 had a median income deficit of \$907; poor blacks had a deficit of \$1,260--38.9 percent greater.³⁹ At the same time, the numbers of poor female-heads of households are rapidly increasing.

36. Alexander Ganz and Tina Freeman, Population and Income of the City of Boston, Recent Evolution and Future Perspective, Working Paper PH-1, June 1970. Boston Redevelopment Authority, Community Renewal Program. Table 4, p. 36 and Table 5, p. 37.

37. Ibid. See also Table V of Appendix.

38. Andrew Brimmer, "Economic Progress of Negroes in the United States: the Deepening Schism," Remarks at the Founders Day Convocation, Tuskegee, Ala., Mar. 22, 1970. Available from the Federal Reserve System.

39. Ibid., p. 15.

The widening income gap within the black community, documented by Brimmer, has a number of dangerous implications for the Boston area. On the basis of Fried's data, we know that a large proportion of the Boston black population lacks the skills and education for employment mobility. The Boston area is one in which skills count most heavily and where there is a substantial decline in job opportunities for the unskilled. It is also an area with one of the highest costs of living in the Nation and one in which the thought of providing public assistance to intact families is guaranteed to offend Puritan sensibilities. Yet we know that large numbers of black male household heads were, during the best years of Boston's economy, working full time and earning less than enough to escape from poverty.⁴⁰ There is also a further danger: that the public will concentrate its attention on the small number of blacks who are visibly doing well and find their success sufficient to justify ignoring the large number who are living at or below the poverty level.

Black Mobility

Boston's black community is predominantly that of ambitious young people. More than half of Boston's urban blacks came within the past 20 years seeking better employment opportunities; more than one-fourth are the people who came in the World War II era. A maximum of 13 percent of the black population are native Bostonians.⁴¹ The latter two groups have had their aspirations thwarted by racial discrimination.

Geographic mobility and social mobility are not necessarily related, but within the metropolitan area, geographic immobility is an obvious disadvantage. One of the major components of social mobility is education, although precisely how much assistance education provides for access to better jobs and higher incomes for blacks is debatable. In the past, certain levels of educational attainment have proven to be more a luxury than a necessity for blacks when income gains did not offset the losses of staying out of the work force and in school.⁴²

40. U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sub-Employment in the Slums of Boston, (1967).

41. Fried, et al. Table I, p. 16A. See also the Boston Area Survey, 1970, Table 5.3, p. 83.

42. For an analysis of the role of education in minority income gains, see Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination (Washington, D.C., 1969).

On the other hand, within the past decade blacks with good educational backgrounds have made much progress. Fried's study of migrants and nonmigrants in Boston clearly shows that education was a necessary but not sufficient factor in gaining access to better jobs for minorities. Fried also found that access to better jobs was significantly affected by educational attainment after high school.⁴³

Most blacks live in an area where they are least likely to get a better education. Even if the Boston public schools should make substantial improvements, suburban schools continue to offer better educational opportunities. Relative to the suburban population, black children are conspicuously at a disadvantage. The problems are even more severe for children of Spanish speaking background, who have often not been included in the Boston system.⁴⁴

While the Boston School Committee bears much of the blame for the appalling conditions of many of the schools, the financing of education in the Commonwealth contributes heavily toward maintaining unequal educational opportunities. For the immediate future, blacks cannot rely on the educational system to supply a step toward equal status in the Boston metropolitan area.

Blacks have made some conspicuous shifts in job categories in recent years. Any suburban housewife can tell that there are far fewer black domestics. In clerical and sales jobs there are now many more blacks. There are also substantial increases in black managers, officials, and professionals. However, the changes in specific occupations do not represent a general movement in the direction of higher status jobs. In fact, blacks continue to be overrepresented in the lower-level job categories--service and operative classes. In these categories, black representation has actually increased from 38 percent in 1960 to 42 percent in 1969.⁴⁵

43. Fried, p. 38.

44. The Bay State Banner, Vol. VI, No. 12, Dec. 3, 1970, p. 1.

45. Brimmer, p. 7.

In Boston, the heavy concentration of blacks in the low-skill sector presents severe constraints on interoccupational mobility. The number of service jobs in the mid-levels of the occupational structure is declining. As industrial decentralization continues to reshape the city's economy, the range of employment opportunities tends to divide into high-skill and low-skill jobs.

There is, as noted by Fried, a distinct occupational disadvantage for the immigrant group. What rewards exist for the immigrant's achievement tend to be higher positions within job categories rather than movement into higher levels.

Clearly, there are more jobs and a greater range of jobs in the suburbs, although the case for emphasizing the importance of suburban jobs and de-emphasizing urban jobs for minorities is not as strong in the Boston area as it may be in other northern centers.⁴⁶ This is so, in part, because the Route 128 area has been so heavily settled by electronics and other industries requiring a high-skill labor force. Route 128 is currently undergoing some drastic changes which may ultimately reshape the area's employment structure. The suburban labor force is unlikely to shift back to the city in any numbers despite the current employment instability so that the focus of new job opportunities will remain beyond the urban center.

At the most basic level, being employed or unemployed determines social mobility. Here again, the urban prospect for minorities is disappointing. Throughout the last decade black unemployment remained roughly double that of whites. This was a great improvement over previous decades, although there is some disagreement among experts as to whether such gains can be attributed to the tightness of the labor market or to a fundamental change in the minority opportunity structure.⁴⁷

46. See, for example, John F. Kain, "Coping with Ghetto Unemployment" in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Mar. 1969, pp. 80-83. Kain argues that the creation of urban jobs for urban blacks can only delay the basic solution to urban and ghetto problems, which he emphasizes hinges on the destruction of the ghetto itself.

57. See Thurow, p. 53.

Blacks, who endured much employment hardship during Boston's economic growth years, are now experiencing skyrocketing unemployment during the present recession. Incomes of the urban minorities are obviously more sensitive to fluctuations in the general economy than that of other groups since they lack the economic cushion to carry them through bad times.

Two points are important with respect to urban employment in the last decade. First, while more blacks gained employment, more blacks experienced long-term unemployment. Between 1960 and 1969, the proportion of blacks in the category of those unable to find work for more than three consecutive months rose from 24 to 27 percent. Second, the disparity between black unemployment in the city and black unemployment in the suburbs was a full percentage point in 1969, while white unemployment differed only 0.2 percent between city and suburb.⁴⁸

Thus, the city offers not only more danger of unemployment, but also more danger of long-term unemployment. This situation offers the kind of instability which enhances the possibility of family breakdown and disorganization.

Between 1959 and 1967, the deficit below the poverty level of blacks in central cities of large metropolitan areas remained at 0.7 billion dollars; in suburban areas, the deficit declined from 0.2 billion to 0.1 billion. Suburban black incomes declined 20 percent in the lowest income category (under \$4,000) and increased in all other income categories. The number of urban blacks earning between \$4,000 and \$6,000 also decreased. (In the upper income brackets, suburban blacks increased their representation by 16 percent while urban blacks increased theirs by only 14 percent).⁴⁹

It may be, of course, that the decrease in poor suburban blacks is due to a filtering process which sends the poor back to the city. But the increase in all income categories seems to indicate the suburban population generally has improved its status.

48. Brimmer, p. 8.

49. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, Special Studies, No. 27, "Trends in Social and Economic Conditions in Metropolitan Areas," (Issued Feb. 7, 1969), p. 58.

If the black housing market were identical to the white housing market (that is, if the separate but equal doctrine could somehow be made to apply, as those who embrace the Negro-is-like-the-immigrant-yesterday theme insist),⁵⁰ then perhaps some of the disadvantages of the urban concentration could be minimized. However, one of the features of the urban scene which was present for the immigrant of yesterday is missing. Low-cost housing was created for the low-income citizens of a century ago.⁵¹ Tenements and two- and three-family houses rapidly increased. New and relatively inexpensive housing was developed in the suburbs, and public transportation systems made it accessible. This is almost the reverse of the situation faced by minorities today. Instead of having housing created in response to their needs, the housing supply is allowed to shrink; and instead of low-cost housing being created in the suburbs, largely upper-income housing is being built.

The geographic isolation of the minorities does more than prevent them from having access to the same opportunities as whites. It makes them pay for their exclusion. Within the city of Boston increases in income and rents have resulted in a Lewis Carroll phenomenon for minorities whereby it takes all the running you can do to stay in the same place. Rents in some parts of the black community have increased by 97 percent over the past decade. Black median incomes have increased by only 30 percent.⁵² As the Boston Area Survey noted, the poorest groups pay proportionately the most for rent. Income that might otherwise be put to more productive use, such as for better nutrition, must go for shelter. In Alice's match with the Queen, if you ran twice as fast, you had the hope of getting somewhere else, but for blacks in Boston, doubling income would still leave most of them at the mercy of the landlord and well out of the running for suburban housing.

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50. Irving Kristol, "The Negro Today is Like the Immigrant Yesterday," in The New York Times Magazine, Sept. 11, 1966.
51. See Sam B. Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston 1870-1900 (Cambridge, 1962).
52. Boston Area Survey, 1970, Table 3.5, p. 51 and Table 5.8, p. 86.

It is too late for the Boston area to compensate for much of the personal injury done to blacks by overt discrimination throughout the past century, but it is not too late to recognize the impact of current housing patterns on the present and future status of minorities in the metropolitan area. In doing so, white citizens, particularly those who reside in the suburbs, can afford few illusions as to the progress in race relations over the past 20 years or to the nature of the constraints on minority mobility.

Boston Black Population in 1970

It has been customary to compare Boston's black population with the white population of the city, a comparison which has technical advantages in terms of the available data but which is not entirely appropriate. Because more than four-fifths of the entire black population in the metropolitan area live within the central city, the urban sample contains demographic and socio-economic characteristics more representative of the region's black population. Studies at both the national and local level also indicate that the differences between blacks inside and outside central areas are small.

On the other hand, four-fifths of the white population of the metropolitan area resides outside the city. The one-fifth remaining in Boston proper has significantly lower income, contains fewer families and more elderly persons, has less educational attainment, and a different occupational range.⁵³ Comparisons of blacks and whites within the city, therefore, greatly underestimate the racial disparities within the region.

The city of Boston has changed markedly over the past 20 years, but the black city and the white city have evolved along different dimensions. While the white population tends to differentiate itself spatially by age, income, and occupation groupings, the black population does so only within a very limited range. Thus, aggregate data on Boston's blacks must be understood differently from that of whites.

In 1970, the 104,000 blacks who made up 16.3 percent of the city's total population comprised at least one-fourth of the city's low-income households.⁵⁴ Black median family income

53. Black and White in Boston, pp. 3-5.

54. Alexander Ganz and Tina Freeman, "Population and Income of the City of Boston, Recent Evolution and Future Perspective," Working Paper PH-1 (June 1970), Boston Redevelopment Authority, p. 22.

was roughly \$6,500, but 46 percent of Boston's black families had incomes under \$6,000; only 15 percent had incomes at or above \$10,000.⁵⁵ The average black income was about 20 percent less than the average income within the city as a whole.⁵⁶

The black population in Boston consists of a relatively large number of families with young children; only 10 percent is elderly.⁵⁷ In this respect, it is more similar to the suburban population than to the urban white population.

Many blacks lack formal education and nearly one-third have had no high school. But the percentage of blacks who are high school graduates is almost identical to that of the urban population as a whole. Black educational attainment can be compared to that of Boston's Italian residents. However, black income levels are considerably lower. Even when education and occupation levels are held constant, black incomes do not approximate those of urban whites.⁵⁸

Of the black males who are employed, about one-third are classified as operatives, one-fourth have skilled jobs, and the remainder have jobs in the service category. Only 10 percent are represented in the managerial or professional groups.⁵⁹

Estimates of unemployment in the sections of Boston where blacks are heavily concentrated, made by Action of Boston Community Development, Inc., place the rate at more than 12 percent. During the mid-1960's when unemployment in the metropolitan area as a whole was only 3.4 percent, black unemployment was 6.8 percent.⁶⁰ During the same period, subemployment, i.e., full-time jobs paying less than poverty level wages or part-time jobs held

55. Boston Area Survey, 1970, Table 5.8, p. 86.

56. Ganz and Freeman, Table F, p. 36. The comparison of Boston nonwhite incomes and metropolitan area incomes do not appear in the table but are derived from the data given.

57. Boston Area Survey, 1970, Table 5.8, p. 86.

58. Black and White in Boston, p. 77.

59. Boston Area Survey, 1970, Table 5.12, p. 90.

60. U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

in lieu of full-time employment was at 24.2 percent in black neighborhoods. This would indicate that approximately one out of every 6 or 7 blacks had serious employment problems.⁶¹

Poor housing in the city of Boston is not limited to black districts, but black neighborhoods have a higher proportion of inadequate housing stock. Blacks are predominantly renters and pay proportionately more for what they get than do most other groups. While the white elderly in the city also pay unusually large proportions of their incomes for housing, what they receive in return is more satisfactory.⁶²

The housing supply available to blacks is steadily shrinking. Between 1960 and 1970, a net housing loss in the South End area amounted to more than 40 percent of all units. In the model cities area of Roxbury the loss was at least 16 percent.⁶³ While conditions in these areas have continued to deteriorate despite renewal efforts, rent increases in the 1960's were almost double those for the metropolitan area as a whole.⁶⁴

The supply of low-income family housing, both rental and owner-occupied, continues to be too large in the suburbs to permit the general housing shortage to serve as an explanation for the urban concentration of minorities.⁶⁵

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61. Sample data for the Roxbury-South End area, which is 70 percent black, had 24.2 percent subemployment. Had the sample data been confined to blacks, the subemployment ratio might have been larger.
 62. Boston Area Survey, 1970, Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.9.
 63. Boston Redevelopment Authority, Preliminary 1960-1970 Population and Housing Unit Analysis, Table 1, based on decennial census.
 64. Boston Area Survey, 1970, Table 3.5, p. 51.
 65. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing: 1970, General Housing Characteristics, Advance Report HC(VI)-23 Massachusetts. Boston's suburbs contain at least four times as many single-family houses valued at less than \$15,000 than does the city of Boston. They also contain at least twice as many monthly rentals under \$100.

Boston's black population is faced with the combination of low incomes, disproportionately high rents, poor housing, a decline in the job market, and more young families. Other groups within the city are faced with similar problems in housing and employment, but nowhere are these problems so thoroughly combined or so extensive as in the areas of black and other racial minority concentration.

This, then, is the base from which much of the progress toward racial equality in the 1970's is measured. It is a slightly different base than that of the 1960's but no more auspicious.

CHAPTER III

ROUTE 128 AND SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

Few of Boston's suburban residents acknowledge that the suburbs themselves constitute a major part of the urban problem or that exclusionary housing and land use policies by suburban towns are significant factors in the decline of urban neighborhoods. Still fewer recognize that suburban towns act as agents of racial discrimination by enforcing exclusionary housing and fiscal policies, magnifying the disallocation of jobs and housing, and increasing the inefficiency and cost of public transportation. Perhaps least of all do suburban residents recognize that their refusal to acknowledge the extent of community interdependence results ultimately in the economic depression of minorities and the maintenance of their second-class status.

Throughout the 1960's, important national reports documenting the close relationship between suburban patterns of housing and land use and the shortage of decent housing in urban neighborhoods have been made public. Two of the most widely known are the Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems (the Douglas Report) and the Report of the President's Commission on Urban Housing (the Kaiser Report). Both have carefully documented the effects of suburban patterns on the city. The conclusions of the Douglas Report bear repeating:

What is happening in the slums and the rest of the central city cannot be separated from the kind and pace of growth in the suburbs.

The people in the slums are the symptoms of the urban problems, not the cause. They are virtually imprisoned in the slums by the white suburban noose around the inner city, a noose that says, 'Negroes and poor people not wanted.' It says this in a variety of ways, including discriminatory subdivision regulations, discriminatory fiscal and planning practices. In simple terms, what many of these practices add up to is a refusal of many localities to accept their share of housing and poor people. But the problem is more than that.

The urban problem can be described as the big city slum and as the white suburban noose but also as all the problems of growth and population shifts and sprawl and public expenses connected with them.

In the Boston area, the development of the white suburban noose, with all of its implications for the inner city and for minority groups, is closely related to the development of Route 128, and, to a lesser extent, Interstate 495.

Suburban Development in the Route 128 Area

The recent history of Boston's suburbs is tied to the history of Route 128. The road's effect on suburban growth in the 1950's was so sudden and so remarkable that it attracted attention throughout the Nation and made the fortunes of those who saw its potential.

Plans and some construction for a new Route 128 began in the 1930's. At that time, the old Route 128 went through a number of congested areas. The new road was planned, in part, to facilitate transportation around the outskirts of the city.

Originally, the new road was to be a scenic highway connecting the then rural communities near Boston. The intervention of World War II delayed construction on the road until the late 1940's. Lack of foresight characterized not only the planning of the road itself but also the response of adjacent towns to the road's existence. It was not until 1951 that

a 22-mile section going from Wakefield, on the north, to Wellesley, on the west, was completed. By that time, industrial developers were already planning the construction of the first industrial park sites along the perimeter.

The developers had already assembled land prior to the completion of the road in the Needham area. Needham initially rejected rezoning for industry. The second town approached by developers, Lexington, where Route 128 was already finished, also initially refused to permit industry.

Needham reversed its decision early in 1952, and, the construction of the first industrial park by the firm of Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes began that March. Five years later, there were at least 99 new commercial or industrial plants, mainly grouped in seven locations along 128. Seventy-seven of these plants had come from Boston, with more than half of them from within a 2 1/2-mile radius of the State House. These plants represented a loss to the city of 3,701 jobs but a net gain to the suburbs of 18,000 jobs. Including jobs in new industries or branches, the total gain to the suburbs by September 1958 was estimated at 19,000 jobs. Between 1958 and 1967, the number of companies located on 128 rose to 729 and employed 66,041 workers.⁶⁶

The magnetic attraction of industry to the road had been dimly perceived at the road's inception. It was not until 1958 that a comprehensive study of the effects of Route 128 on the industrial growth, housing, and land values of adjacent areas was undertaken by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the Massachusetts Department of Public Works and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. By the early 1960's, the existence of this high-speed circumferential had had a major impact on housing and land values--one which spread miles beyond the communities on its immediate border.⁶⁷

66. Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, Research Department, Surveys of Route 128, 1967.

67. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Economic Impact Study of Massachusetts Route 128 (Cambridge, 1958).

It should be noted that Route 128 was designed for space where land costs were low and where there would be little interference with established homesites. Between 1953 and 1961, however, certain industrial sites on the road had appreciated in value by 500 percent.⁶⁸ During the following decade, the cost of land in the more residential suburbs, such as Weston, had become so high that no new housing for the medium-price market could be built.

During the 1950's, the more affluent towns near the road responded to the possibility of immigration by enacting large-lot zoning ordinances. This had an additional effect on the already rising land values. Towns like Lincoln and Weston, threatened with a massive inrush for single-family housing on their graceful stretches of farmland, were among the first to protect themselves in this way. For other towns like Waltham, 128 answered the need for an improved tax base, and they set about zoning for industry; some towns, including Lexington, did both almost simultaneously.

Although communities accommodated the higher population densities, it became increasingly difficult to build new housing for the low- and moderate-income group without special subsidy. The magnitude of the demand for any kind of housing raised the price of older housing stock and raised rents. This created a serious problem for persons outside the labor force in older communities such as Waltham. Little if any public housing was constructed in the communities adjacent to the road during this period. In this way, persons in the lower income group were squeezed out of the more affluent towns or filtered into the older, dilapidated sections of the less affluent ones. The suburbs became increasingly homogeneous with respect to income.

Just how much the presence of industry or the existence of 128 itself enhanced the desirability of suburban residence would be difficult to establish. Undoubtedly, the population move to the suburbs would have occurred irrespective of the employment shift, and, presumably, irrespective of Route 128. How much the population movement into the suburbs affected the decision of industry to locate along 128 is also a difficult question, dependent on such factors as site costs and taxes.

68. "After the Cabots-Jerry Blakely," Fortune, Nov. 1960, p. 183.

Clearly, once Route 128 was completed, the population shift, which had already been taking place, facilitated the movement of industry. The highway opened the suburban floodgates to the white mobile class. Between 1955 and 1965, the city of Boston lost 15 percent of its white population.⁶⁹ Towns on or near Route 128 increased in population: Dedham, 24 percent; Burlington, 272.2 percent; and Sudbury, 198 percent. Some towns grew more rapidly in the earlier period of 1950-60. Wayland increased its population by 137 percent in 1960 and 65.7 percent in 1965.⁷⁰ In 1970, however, these towns had less than 1 percent black population.

With such population shifts in motion, the addition of large retail stores and service industries followed. The increased use of 128 altered suburban traffic patterns. More jobs and more competition among towns for the tax revenue were created.

The development of the 128 area in the 1950's and 1960's involved two conflicts with incompatible goals. These conflicts could be modified but not resolved at the local level. One was between residential and industrial land use requirements; the other was between the need to increase municipal services and yet hold down the costs to the homeowner.

Initially, the strategies of resisting population increase and avidly pursuing taxable commercial or industrial development were pursued separately, and according to the income of the community and its previous history of a commercial or industrial presence. But over the years, suburban towns near 128 began to pursue both strategies. Towns with heavy restrictions on residential development began to look for painless ways to absorb industry, and towns with an industrial base began to place greater restrictions on the type of housing being developed.

Towns like Northborough reduced the tax rate burden by permitting small, clean companies to reside there while other towns housed the service workers and low-wage earners whose work was essential to the community. Landlords in the lower income

69. Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, Population Movements in Massachusetts, 1955-1965.

70. Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, Town Monographs (Revised 1965).

communities, such as Hudson, used the increased demand for housing to remodel and raise rents. This pushed the lowest income people further away from jobs and redistributed the low-income workers into the low-income communities. Not only are housing problems exacerbated by this practice, but also the quest for industries with small, highly paid work forces leaves the whole region in economic imbalance.

The testimony of Daniel G. Wheeler, vice-president of Cabot, Cabot, and Forbes, reflected the paradox:

We have made...a pledge to the communities [which] we locate industry in that we will not deal in housing. The biggest threat to many of the communities that we are in is that their zoning bylaws are so antiquated that you can have housing in the industrial area, as well as industry....The concern has been that having once acquired the site and finding it a little slow to fill up with industry...we might take the path of least resistance and develop it residentially.... [We] found...[that] in order to zone--sell zoning in almost every town we are in--we had to convince the community that industrial zoning was desired on the piece of land that we owned....[W]e had to make it quite clear they wouldn't wake up 1 or 2 years later and find there was a residential development. So, that's the reason why we definitely stayed out of housing in this area.⁷¹

^{i.} Almost every community is anxious to attract some form of commercial or industrial development, without considering the population that will inevitably be brought in with it. The most vigorous organizations in these regards along Route 495 are the local industrial commissions. The least vigorous are the housing authorities. Lower income towns, as noted above, must compete with high income towns for industry, but they are at a disadvantage in the tax break and services they can afford to give.

In 1970 the product of unchecked competition for fiscal advantage was the worst possible allocation of space. Towns

71. Unless otherwise specified, all quotations are from the Advisory Committee's open meetings in Boston, Needham, and Marlborough, June 1-4, 1970.

like Waltham and Burlington whittled away their potential recreation land and open areas, while towns like Dover conspicuously and wastefully consumed more open space than was needed for several times the local population. The reliance on property tax to finance education and town services and the increased demand for housing made it more economical for low-density towns to remove land from the market entirely than to risk an increase in the number of families who could not share the tax burden. Suburban sprawl has not been simply a matter of cheesebox houses and gas stations. It has been a heavy concentration in some locations of all the less desirable industries and extravagant use of space for private residence in others. In the end, the locations of jobs and housing have become separated and the distribution of resources within the suburbs themselves unequal.

Never in the course of Route 128's early development was serious consideration given to the ramifications of one community's actions upon its neighbors or upon the suburban belt as a whole. There was no consideration of the general impact on the city of Boston nor on the social repercussions of the new job locations and new housing. Tremendous changes in population distributions were acknowledged at the time with naive amazement. The simultaneous black immigration taking place in the region was being funneled into the city. There was no provision for its absorption into the suburbs.

Route 128's history represents a social failure approaching disaster in terms of its impact on the poor and minority groups. There was an absence of social planning and a misuse of the region's physical resources. While planning was nonexistent in few towns, it was of poor quality in others. In those towns which had the time and the funds, physical planning succeeded almost too well. These towns are beautiful, although their beauty was paid for, in part, by the ugliness of others. Their gains, from the larger perspective, were the region's loss.

Recent Development in the Route 495 Area

The completion of a second circumferential highway around Boston threatens to compound the exclusionary job-housing-transportation situation for the nonwhite population not only in Boston but also in Worcester and Lowell. With some exceptions, the towns along the edge of the new Route 495 have made few if any plans for adjusting the housing supply to the advent of

industry and accelerated immigration. Some towns have recently enacted one-acre zoning, but it is not clear whether this is in response to the spill-over from 128 or in anticipation of a new deluge.

Norman Blodgett, chairman, Westborough Board of Selectman, said:

. . . [W]e did something when we knew 495 was coming to town. We did it almost 10 years ago; we rezoned the town. . . . [W]e have restrictions on our industrial building. . . . The type of industry is regulated so we don't have a lot of noise and smoke and so on. . . . I think we do have control over what's happening on 495. . . .

As far as low- and middle-income housing is concerned, we have done absolutely nothing as a town. We do have private groups in our town that are interested in this subject, and I assume that, if they thought the town needed it or it was our moral obligation, they would have brought an article forward to take care of that.

More planning was done for the 495 area than for 128. The planning efforts, funded in large part by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, were not coordinated among the many towns. The planning did not consider low-income housing nor did it include special provisions for minority citizens.

At this stage of development, only a few new industrial plants have come into the 495 area. The manufacturing already in the area consists largely of small operations with less than 50 employees. The Massachusetts Area Planning Council suggests that there may be a shortage of workers for plants locating in this area, and there is some indication that plants looking for sites on 495 would expect to draw workers from the Worcester area on the south and from the Haverhill-Lowell area on the north.

The location of the road is ideal for transport-sensitive industries, such as paper products; it is also desirable as a location for high-technology companies which would attract skilled workers from the 128 area. The road may also attract immigration from New Hampshire. Population trends in the northern area already show a gradual increase in the towns near Lowell.

The land at major intersection of 495 has already been bought by developers. Route 128, too, was initially slow to develop, but the annual growth in employment for 128 for its boom years 1965-1967, was 10.6 percent. Route 495 may well exceed that rate once initial development takes place.

Should 495 follow the pattern of 128-widely dispersed industrial sites, high-skilled employment, no public transportation, and spread of single-family homes on large lots--the cost of land and housing in the belt between the two roads will continue to rise and virtually close the area to all but upper income groups. Public transportation of inner-city workers to jobs on the 495 belt will be impossible with the exception of one or two locations where high-speed highway connections make it possible but impractical. The white suburban noose will be irrevocably fixed, and the subordination of the racial minorities will be guaranteed in the region.

Suburban Housing Patterns

By the early 1970's, the development of Boston's 128 suburbs had reached the point at which the price of housing was exceeding the grasp of most blacks by a larger margin each year. In 1968, the Massachusetts Legislative Research Council issued a report entitled "Restricting the Zoning Power to City and Town Governments," which documented the inflationary effects of large-lot zoning and excessive frontage requirements on both new and used housing in the suburbs. One developer, Robert Cass, pointed out at the 1970 Boston open meeting that:

As a developer, I know that housing gets built only when there's a profit in it, and there's obviously no profit in building housing for people who can't afford whatever housing is available. Land becomes available when there's money to acquire it. There's always more land, or certainly now there is, but zoning is almost unsurmountable....

Housing has gone almost out of everybody's reach in the last 2 or 3 years where the cost of materials has gone up 15 or 20 percent; the cost of money has gone up 80 to 90 percent. . . .I can see it going nowhere at all--backwards. I think we may look back on. . .the great housing riots of 1975.

Robert Pearmain, another developer, said:

We just sold a house for \$25,000 and I was embarrassed to ask anybody to pay \$25,000. It sold in 2 days. It's a tiny little cottage. So you see inflation going up with the tremendous rate it has. Last year and the year before, houses in the area went up 10 percent a year; the previous years it was 6 and 8 percent, much faster than the earnings of inner city people.

The purchase of a \$25,000 cottage, as mentioned by Mr. Pearmain required an annual income of approximately \$13,000 in 1970; it would have required one of \$9,000 in 1965.

The refusal to permit development of mobile home parks is one severe restriction on housing. Payments on new mobile homes in New England are well within the means of families in the eight-or ten-thousand-dollar brackets. A study of mobile homes in New England for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston suggests that they may well represent the least expensive low-cost housing available.⁷² Mobile home parks also provide immediate housing without excessive reorganization of local resources. At present, few suburban towns are considering their potential.

In some suburbs where local history and land usage have prevented a complete domination by large-lot, single-family homes, there has been increased construction of multi-family units. Some planners have described this trend as the "Europeanization of America." However, zoning restrictions (on height, for example) and a hodge-podge of building codes make the construction of multi-family units inefficient and costly. In addition, apartments tend to be scattered away from village areas, further diffusing population and services. The projected rents for new two-bedroom apartments by the Homebuilders Association set a minimum of \$215 and a maximum at well over \$300.

Public housing is one means to alleviate housing problems. In 1970, half of the 260,000 families living in substandard

72. C.S. Greenwald, "Mobile Homes in New England," New England Economic Review of Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (May/June 1970).

housing in the Commonwealth were eligible for public housing. But there were only 47,672 public housing units available in total and 6,000 vacancies per year.⁷³ Although Boston's suburbs have built half the total amount of public housing in the metropolitan area, most of these units have been erected in the older, inner suburbs. Boston itself built approximately one quarter of the units authorized for the city between 1959 and 1967.⁷⁴ Interestingly, the suburbs have not always shunned public housing when it suited their needs. Scattered housing built in the late 1940's and early 1950's for war veterans can be found in towns such as Waltham, Concord, Westborough, and Needham. Most public housing dates back to the postwar era, and very little if any public housing is under construction or anticipated, except for housing for the elderly. What little exists in the suburbs is insufficient for local needs and is as white or whiter than suburban private housing.

73. Massachusetts House 5000, Report of the Joint Committee on Urban Affairs Relative to Public Housing, Feb. 2, 1970, p. 29.

74. Ibid., p. 31.

CHAPTER IV

EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSPORTATION IN SUBURBIA

Suburban Employment Patterns

Poor coordination of industrial location and housing supply exerts a hardship on all low-income families, and selectively eliminates blacks from the region's labor force. According to estimates by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, black representation in 128-area jobs is less than 2 percent. Segregated housing patterns restrict minority participation in suburban jobs, with most new jobs located in suburbia. A comparison of payroll employment in 12 metropolitan areas, including Boston, showed an increase in suburban service jobs of 55 percent as compared to 30 percent within the city between 1959 and 1965. The increase in all other categories, except transportation and public utilities, was more than double in the suburbs what it was in the city.⁷⁵

A careful study of employment in New York, Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, conducted by the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing in 1966-67, showed that a major cause of the high level of unemployment and subemployment among minorities was the broad pattern of

75. Marvin Friedman, "The Changing Profile of the Labor Force," American Federationist (July 1967), p. 7.

housing discrimination in the suburbs combined with suburban employment growth and the loss of manufacturing jobs in the central cities.⁷⁶

A Bureau of Labor Statistics study concluded that unemployment or subemployment in the slums of Boston "is so much worse than it is in the country as a whole that any national measures of unemployment are utterly irrelevant." Some factors listed were: a shortage of unskilled jobs in or even near the slum areas; many available jobs paying below poverty level; and new plant location around the perimeter of Boston far away from the slums.⁷⁷

While new job opportunities in the suburbs are, in effect, "for whites only," the minority job supply in the city is rapidly eroding. The effects of poor coordination of housing and job supplies now extend far beyond the obvious results of job locations in segregated residential areas.

At the Boston open meeting, J. Kinney O'Rourke of the Boston Economic Development and Industrial Commission described the results of surveys of 309 Boston firms. He pointed out that 40 percent had either decided to move or were seriously considering moving, thus producing a potential loss to the city of up to 11,500 manufacturing jobs. These jobs represented 40 percent of all jobs occupied by minorities at that time, with each paying more than \$5,000 annually. The loss of higher-paying manufacturing jobs in the city of Boston (a loss of 43,500 jobs between 1947 and 1968), allows white blue-collar workers to take advantage of higher paying suburban employment. Blacks would be limited to employment in the lower paying jobs in service, finance, and retail industries available in the center city.⁷⁸ Opportunities in the city may be even more

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76. National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, The Impact of Housing Patterns on Job Opportunities (New York, 1968).
 77. U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Subemployment in the Slums of Boston (Boston, 1967).
 78. Boston Economic Development and Industrial Commission, Boston's Industry and Boston's Jobs and Land (March 1970).

restricted for the Spanish speaking minority, as employers' impatience with language is often a barrier even to low-skill jobs.

In times of economic recession white mobility declines and white competition for the lower paying jobs increases. The last-hired-first-fired principle then holds minorities at a special disadvantage.

Finally, there is a tendency for wage levels to increase as industry moves to the fringe of labor force concentration, with blacks underutilized in suburban areas. Bennett Harrison pointed out in his analysis of "Education and Earnings in 10 Urban Ghettos," this is not the same as the problem of matching low-income people to jobs.⁷⁹ Whether or not there is intent to discriminate, the result is discriminatory, and it operates to maintain lower black incomes and continue black urban concentration.

Federal and State fair employment practice laws in this context have little meaning. Equal opportunity for lower paying urban jobs is not equal opportunity; equal opportunity to suburban jobs is largely theoretical. Both the employers who buy and the industrial developers who sell suburban space are well informed on the nature of suburban population trends. Unless the heavy concentration of minorities in the urban center has escaped their attention, we must conclude that, for the most part, they are insensitive to the plight of minorities.

Few of Boston's suburban employers have made serious efforts to provide job opportunities for minorities. Among the excuses for inaction have been problems of minority recruitment and minority low skills. Herbert Fajors, manager of job training at Raytheon, noted that once a serious recruitment program has gotten underway in some companies, word-of-mouth recruitment for blacks quickly replaces the need for the company effort, just as it does for whites.

In the face of metropolitan development, equal employment opportunity cannot be the same proposition in a suburban location as it is in the urban center unless suburban employers facilitate the development of low-income housing and improve

79. Bennett Harrison, "Education and Earnings in 10 Urban Ghettos," American Economist (Spring 1970), p. 16.

transportation arrangements. While transportation efforts for urban employees were made by a number of companies in the early days of Route 128's industrial growth, these efforts were later phased out as employees rapidly moved to suburban residences.⁸⁰ In one or two cases, most notably the Waltham branch of the Polaroid Corporation, such efforts are being made with respect to minority employees.

A few employers are applying the same principles used in locating housing for professional and executive staff as for minority employees. Company programs which use realtors for finding housing for employees have proven (where they have been used) an effective means of avoiding discrimination. Bertram Cullen, a representative of the National Alliance of Businessmen, noted, however, that even the most responsible suburban employers admit their companies are not doing enough. Dr. Henry Morgan of the Polaroid Corporation, stated at the Boston open meeting that there is no coordinated pressure by suburban employers on towns to alleviate the housing situation and that companies are extremely reluctant to initiate such activities independently.

Responsible employers acknowledge that the lack of enforcement of fair employment practices laws is also responsible in part for the lethargy of many companies to provide equal access to suburban jobs and for the failures to combat underemployment of minorities. Decentralization of industry greatly complicates information gathering and enforcement of fair employment laws. Enforcement efforts on the part of both State and local government have been too weak and too limited in scope. Local governments, so quick to set aesthetic and environmental restrictions on industrial development, have taken no interest in the segregated character of the labor force.

Exclusionary employment is deeply entrenched in the suburban employment patterns. Most suburban employers have been indifferent to minority needs and have used housing and transportation problems as prepackaged excuses for their failures. Those few companies which have made considerable efforts to increase minority employment have failed to confront local obstacles,

80. Everett J. Burtt, Labor Supply Characteristics of Route 128 Firms (March 1958), p. 18. A report sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

even when, as major taxpayers, they had the power to do so. No company relocating in the suburbs has made site selection conditional on the development of an adequate supply of housing for all income classes in its employ.

Transportation

The shift in emphasis from public transportation to private vehicles has been the result of suburban growth and decentralization of housing and employment. Transportation planning by public agencies has catered largely to middle- and upper-income groups, with highway construction decreasing the supply of housing available to minority groups.⁸¹

Heavy dependence on private transportation has left the public transportation system nearly bereft of suburban support. Public transportation has provided emergency service for the majority of the region's commuters, while it has served, somewhat inadequately, a wide range of needs for the poor and the urban minorities.

One of the ironies of urban-suburban relationships for minorities is that the effects of highway construction and automobile pollution are beginning to encroach on the suburbs. Programs to improve transportation between the inner city and suburbs ignore feasible automobile subsidies for low-income minorities on the grounds that increased automobile use would contribute to pollution. In other words, minorities are asked to postpone their access to, and participation in, suburban jobs until the public transportation system can be organized to better suit white needs.

The urban-suburban transportation system has a double-edged effect: it operates to keep minorities away from the suburbs, yet at the same time penalizes them for their urban concentration.

81. Stephen Crosby, Critique of the Recommended Highway and Transit Plan: A Report of Citizens for Better Transportation (Boston: November 1969).

According to a report of the Governor's Task Force on Transportation, the most heavily subsidized patrons of the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority (MBTA) are in areas with the highest incomes. The city of Newton, with a median family income more than 1 1/2 times that of Boston, is cited as an example. In 1967, Newton's transportation deficit assessment was only 49 percent, while the city of Boston's was 115 percent.⁸² Elliott Sclar, an economist at the Cambridge Institute, and others have documented the fact that the burden of transportation costs falls on low-income communities.⁸³

Blacks not only pay disproportionately more to finance the MBTA but also bear the expenses of using other means of transportation, such as taxis to and from late-shift jobs when public transportation is not available. The use of taxis is an expensive necessity for many inner-city families. And blacks who own cars must also pay disproportionately higher insurance.

The disadvantages of the present transportation system and the alleged scarcity of privately owned vehicles by minorities are sometimes used as excuses by employers for not hiring minorities. On the other hand, the threats of increased traffic congestion and the development of additional housing is used by suburban residents to oppose low- and middle-income housing.

According to testimony before the Advisory Committee, many whites are confused by the apparent lack of initiative by many minorities to take advantage of "available" employment opportunities. E.J. Walden, general supervisor of employee relations for American Can Company in Needham, said that his company had few employees commuting from Roxbury, yet there were other employees who commuted from Maine and Rhode Island.

Without personal contacts in suburban jobs, it is unlikely that inner-city blacks will hear of jobs or consider "equal opportunity employer" advertisements sufficient proof of non-discrimination. To explore job openings by public transportation

82. Governor's Task Force on Transportation, Report to Governor Sargent, Part II (June 1970), p. 24.

83. See Elliott Sclar, The M.B.T.A.--Who Should Pay (Unpublished research paper for the Cambridge Institute).

is possible but expensive in terms of time and money. To purchase a car in good condition to travel long distances at high speeds can cost as much as \$1,500 with high insurance costs and excise taxes; and loans are not easily obtained in the black community.⁸⁴ An entry level job is likely to pay a minority employee a minimum annual salary. If he/she should start a suburban job, invest as much as one-fourth his/her annual income in transportation, and then be laid off, an inner-city resident would be considerably worse off than had he/she remained in the city. The risks involved in suburban employment are so great that relatively few can afford to take them.

The experiences of employers, such as Polaroid and Raytheon, however, indicate that if employment is reasonably secure and that the initial transportation link can be provided, either by bus or carpool, inner-city minority employees can acquire and maintain their own automobiles. According to Herbert Fajors of Raytheon, his company has provided some assistance in obtaining financing for minority employees. One or two other companies have informally subsidized car purchases and found it highly successful.

In 1968, a bus system called the 128 Express was instituted to link inner-city minorities to jobs along the route. The 128 Express was generally described in the Boston press as a failure because of insufficient ridership. Inner-city residents, however, rated it successful. Their assessment was based on an understanding of its function as an initial job contact. Bus riders usually found other means of transportation once they had steady suburban employment.

It should be emphasized that the bus service provided by the 128 Express was not, by any standard, equal opportunity in transportation. According to a report published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the scheduling prevented users from taking advantage of overtime and often made them conspicuously late on the job.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the fact that bus users

84. Peter Temple, The Commuter's Dilemma in WGBH Programs for Boston (January 1970), p. 3.

85. Carol S. Greenwald and Richard Byron, "Increasing Job Opportunities in Boston's Urban Core," New England Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Board of Boston (January/February 1969), pp. 30-40.

found and maintained jobs illustrates the importance of physical access to suburbs, an experience which cannot be duplicated by other means of communication and one which is now ruled out for the majority of blacks and Spanish speaking citizens.

The 128 Express ended as another exercise in tokenism; its support from the industries along the route was limited and tentative from the start. Of the 800 jobs in the 128 area pledged by the National Alliance of Businessmen in 1968, only 12 had been filled by 1970. One company in Needham, whose personnel manager, Fred L. Morse, testified that its segregated work force was due to inadequate transportation, refused to provide any transportation to cover the 1-mile distance between its location and the nearest 128 Express stop. One of the reasons for low interest in the 128 Express on the part of the inner-city residents was that few believed it would last. Unfortunately, such pessimistic expectations in the black community have too seldom proved wrong.

Suburban transportation patterns, as John Wofford, executive director of the Governor's Task Force on Transportation, indicated in his testimony, are as much symptomatic as causal with regard to the deeper problems of the society. According to Mr. Wofford, many innovative transportation programs already exist within a short distance from Boston. Minibus systems, taxi-credit systems, and other programs adapted to the needs of low-income groups are operating as close as Worcester.⁸⁶ There are no reasons why such programs could not have been adapted to the needs of Boston minorities except that, as in the case of suburban employment, planning failed to take such needs into account.

86. See also John Wofford, "Transportation," in The State and the Poor, eds. Samuel H. Beer and Richard E. Barringer (Cambridge, 1970).

CHAPTER V
THE SUBURBAN RESPONSE TO GROWTH
AND
TO THE NEED FOR LOW-COST HOUSING

Introduction

The result of Boston's suburban development has been increased racial isolation. Racially exclusive housing patterns have become the accepted norm in Boston's suburban rings. The white segment of society exerts monopolistic control over virtually all buildable land, with little or no consideration of minority rights or needs. Suburban industry has, for the most part, failed to confront the consequences of locating in racially segregated towns. This failure has allowed patterns of exclusion to become well entrenched in suburban employment. A dual system of transportation, one for the poor and the minorities and one for the white middle- and upper-income classes, further complicates urban-suburban relationships and perpetuates suburban exclusion.

Differential access to suburban opportunities has become so systematized with respect to the racial minorities that it now jeopardizes the prospects for racial equality throughout the region. It may be that the decade of the 1960's marked the beginning of an endless detour to achieving equal opportunity for all. And it may be that the housing crisis in the Boston area, instead of being just one more obstacle to full minority participation, will in the process of its eventual resolution bring about an indefinite postponement of racial equality.

Suburban resistance to minority inclusion has evolved from overt to covert discriminatory acts. Many suburbanites do not see racial discrimination as a factor in denying minority participation in their communities. It is helpful to review the recent history of local civil rights and fair housing groups to gain some insight into the transformation of suburban resistance.

Local Fair Housing Efforts

Local groups concerned with racial inequities formed in a number of suburban communities during the 1950's. By the late 1950's, many had joined together in a rather loosely structured federation. At first, attention was directed to the dramatic events taking place in the South, and some groups acted merely to channel funds to areas of need outside the State. Many northern whites were leaving the region to join forces with southern blacks; at the same time, many more southern blacks were coming into the Boston area and being denied suburban housing. By the end of the 1950's, local civil rights groups were beginning to appreciate the disparities at home and engaging in activities to make local citizens more aware of racial problems and to place social pressure on those who discriminated in housing sales or rentals. By the early 1960's, the League of Women Voters had committees in almost every suburban community studying and discussing problems of equal opportunity. Attention was primarily devoted to actions at the Federal and State levels and reached its peak with the passage of the Racial Imbalance Law by the Massachusetts General Court.

While many groups sponsored open housing drives and often provided "testers" to assist in the enforcement of State anti-discrimination laws, the close cooperation between urban and suburban groups which led to the passage of the Racial Imbalance Law did not apply to housing legislation. The critical need for housing absorbed the energies of groups within the city in the early part of the 1960's, but it was an academic and extrinsic issue for most suburban organizations.

By the mid-1960's, however, it was clear that the absence of any low-income housing supply and a disappearance of middle-income housing constituted a major barrier to the achievement of open housing. There could be no "fair" housing if there was no housing, and the responsibility of increasing

the local supply of low- and moderate-income housing would have to be undertaken by civil rights groups because no one else was interested. It was at this point that the attention of civil rights groups focused on local communities and local governments. However, many of these groups lost much of their cohesion and largely dissolved. The outpouring of concern after Martin Luther King's death was, for many suburbanites, the last flicker of a wavering interest.

League of Women Voters study committees in the suburbs had large memberships in the years when discussions centered on equal opportunity in employment. The membership diminished when discussions centered on local zoning and housing policies. Most fair housing committees lost their memberships entirely or reconstituted themselves as moderate-income housing committees. The residue of those organizations, however, provided a base in the suburbs of laymen and churchmen unusually well informed in the field of housing. In fact, a number of citizens' groups which confronted housing and land use issues through their devotion to resolution of civil rights problems, often usurped the roles of professionals in the fields to devote new attention to their situation. This is not to say that they were successful. Their failure was neither a result of incompetence nor an inability to effectively communicate the problem to their community or local government. This failure is interpreted in different ways by different groups, but their testimony is instructive.

Local Efforts to Develop Low-Income Housing

Reverend Sam Larson, a representative of Interfaith Housing Corporation, told the Advisory Committee and the MCAD that his group had spent years in organizing and educating the public to low-income housing concerns. The efforts have resulted in a few low-income housing units being constructed and met by a great deal of community resistance, Reverend Larsen said. He commented:

Roughly 2 1/2 years ago, I organized the Newton Foundation for Community Development in Newton. ...[That] is...under so much fire and criticism....Chances are they will not succeed in being able to build housing there under small scattered sites....

In Natick and Waltham and countless other communities where Interfaith has been working, the community was not even interested in studying the questions of economic and racial integration, much less doing anything about it....In other communities, such as Lexington, they appointed commissions years ago, and for 3 years they have been studying the question of [economic] integration....

Another witness, Reverend Norman Faramelli, said that even when a successful education campaign had been carried out, the project would be killed by the thorny question of site selection:

We have seen in Waltham and in many other places, a reduction of low- and moderate-income housing stock over the last 3 years. Low- and moderate-income housing is being removed for parking lots, for business units as well as for luxury apartments.

Reverend Faramelli said:

We made a [successful] politicizing...and educational campaign and...we [converted] the ultimate aldermen and city councillors. The aldermen in Newton were highly enthusiastic....Waltham city councillors a year ago voted 15 to 0 in favor of low- and moderate-income housing....[Where] we see the erosion of the support of the aldermen and many others [is] because we have to put the housing somewhere, and it happens to be on specific sites. All at once that negative reaction that we had in the beginning repeats itself, but this time it is not a conceptual negative reaction against poor people....[Instead, the reactions are:] We are careful and fearful of housing densities; we don't want to overcrowd our schools; why build housing here?; our green spaces are almost gone.

Another witness, Mrs. James Jones, testified that the race of some of the potential housing occupants was seldom an open issue; in fact, many persons bent over backwards to prove that they were not bigoted. She said:

Why people oppose these housing programs is extremely, complicated, but the one factor... hits me the hardest as a neighbor and associate of a lot of people who oppose it. They tried very...hard not to be bigoted in their responses. They are not against blacks; they are not against the poor. They are against the density, and the traffic, and the children. And I don't know whether to believe them or not....

They don't connect a problem that exists for other people a few miles away in the city with them to the extent they can tolerate any inconvenience at all; an overcrowded classroom for their child...a tax rise of a buck or two on a thousand. It's just too much to ask....

Another witness, Reverend Edward Blackman, saw race prejudice as a clear obstacle to the development of moderate-income housing in the suburbs:

One of the frustrating things about trying to get low- and moderate-income housing in suburban communities...is that...the race issue becomes the focus of opposition....All the images that people throw up are somehow of the large poor black family on welfare, with 700 kids running around filling up schools ...[and], most of the housing, if it is built in suburban communities, will not realistically serve black people for low- and moderate-income housing....The almost self-destructive pattern that the society is in is the willingness of people to act against what they see as a threat from black people and to deny housing...to people who are [already] involved in their own community....

Mrs. Harvey Beit, told the Advisory Committee and MCAD that changing the attitudes of suburban whites was essential but that she did not know how this goal could be achieved:

Over the past several years I have operated on the theory that a major portion of our energies should be directed toward attitude change of whites to blacks, of old to young, of middle class to lower income. Much to my dismay, nothing has

happened. We have more underdeveloped, exploited areas and people in our midst than ever before. Attitude change is somewhere over the rainbow, and I'm not willing to expend total energy in behalf of that illusive goal.

The testimony quoted above represents that of individuals and groups who repeatedly demonstrated commitment to providing decent housing for all Americans. It represents 10 years of work throughout Boston's suburbs to arouse similar commitment by others. Interfaith Housing Corporation held 193 meetings and spent more than \$19,000 to bring about some degree of community support for the construction of 250 low- and moderate-income housing units in Stoughton.

Interfaith attributes the eventual fruition of the project, not to this effort but to Interfaith's eventual assistance to the town in obtaining Federal funds for improving the local water supply. Interfaith's experiences in promoting low- and moderate-income housing have been repeated by nonprofit groups in other communities, as documented in Interfaith's report, The Suburban Noose.⁸⁷

Equal opportunity in housing in Boston's suburbs has not failed because of lack of commitment. Indeed, it has failed because the majority of white suburban residents are committed to goals incompatible with racial equality. Whether residents object to site locations for moderate-income housing because they do not want to live next to black families on welfare with "700 kids" or because they object to potential traffic congestion is irrelevant. Without community support the project does not get built and black and low-income families continue to suffer from its absence. Community leaders and public officials, if they support a plan at all, often "discover" drainage, water, and traffic problems if there is vocal opposition.

There is a double standard operating in the communities. While new housing is generally approved by town boards, any housing which might potentially be occupied by blacks must obtain approval of the community. The concept of community control, often stressed as a major need within the inner city, has been realized in the suburbs with respect to housing for

87. Interfaith Housing Corporation, The Suburban Noose (Boston, 1969).

low- and moderate-income families.

Throughout the suburbs, town committees and town boards will spend more time investigating one moderate-income housing proposal than they devote to planning the development of the town as a whole. A private developer, however, is allowed considerable latitude to develop luxury housing.

One of the reasons low- and moderate-income housing groups in suburban towns have so consistently failed is that they operate differently from private, profit-oriented developers, who are willing to comply with the double standard. The actions of local housing groups are largely determined by the costs of land production which require appeal for zoning changes to accommodate higher densities.

Private developers have sought relief from the court's which few local, moderate-income housing committees would readily use.⁸⁸ Local housing committees lack funds to acquire land to do thorough planning or carry on a protracted court case.

In the process of working toward moderate-income housing and thereby challenging the suburban status quo, local groups which retain their internal cohesiveness are often labeled do-gooders. On the other hand, groups which reach out for support tend to be informally co-opted by the local power structure so that those most interested in providing racially inclusive housing are gradually replaced by those who are interested in providing housing "suitable" for the town. In

88. Numerous examples can be cited: Kit-Mar Builders v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Concord Township, Delaware County, Penn. See especially Appeals of Concord Township to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania No. 218, Jan. 1969. National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A 2nd 597, 1965; also Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, Calif. or Kennedy Park Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, New York, No. 359, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sept. 1970.

Needham, for example, the original voluntary moderate-income housing committee was so severely weakened by the appointment of a second moderate-income housing committee that it has now become virtually inactive.

According to Sumner Fanger:

We were told at a public meeting by a public official that 'you will never get anything done in this community because of your image.'... As a result of the public image of a group of people who formed the Needham Community Development Foundation, Inc., town officials promoted another organization to produce low- and moderate-income housing....

The Anti-Snob Zoning Act, Chapter 774 of the Massachusetts General Laws

Chapter 774, the "Anti-Snob Zoning Act," was designed to facilitate the procedure for obtaining zoning changes by establishing a zoning appeals board at the State level. Its use was limited to nonprofit or limited dividend corporations and provided that towns which have 1 1/2 percent or more of the land area devoted to low- and moderate-income housing may refuse further low- or moderate-income housing development. The bill's sponsors readily indicated that its intent was to act as a catalyst to housing development rather than provide an adequate housing program.⁸⁹ The bill was passed without suburban support and went into effect in November 1969. Approximately six months later, the Department of Community Affairs established the appeals board. But at the time of the Boston open meeting, no housing had been produced or started. Testimony at the Boston open meeting indicated that housing producers were reluctant to tie up funds in a test of the law. Few appeals have gone to the board, and of those, several were withdrawn due to the costs incurred by the delay in housing production. The effect of the law, as interpreted by its supporters, is to serve notice on suburban towns that they must allow some degree of income heterogeneity in order to be considered responsible members of the metropolitan community. The effect of the law is, in fact, to stimulate suburban communities with new strategies for circumventing racial

89. "Anti-Snob Zoning Law Fails to Succeed," Boston Globe, Jan. 3, 1971, pp. 47-48.

inclusion. One of the best strategies is to build public housing for the elderly only, and this is being done throughout the metropolitan area.

Although the Anti-Snob Zoning Law has received widespread publicity, it actually represents an ineffective approach to the exclusionary character of suburban zoning and is chiefly of interest for the near-hysteria of response it provoked in suburban town boards. It has failed to facilitate the development of racially inclusive housing. Instead, it gives the towns time to plan further barriers.

Chapter 774 has operated to postpone a direct court test of Massachusetts zoning enabling act. Bernard Frieden has pointed out in his article "Toward Equality of Urban Opportunity"⁹⁰ that when State laws have operated to curtail freedom of movement, the Federal courts have ruled them unconstitutional. Paul Davidoff and Neil Gold, nationally recognized experts in planning and law, presented an argument at the open meeting that the Massachusetts zoning enabling act operates, as do those of many other States, to abridge the rights of the poor and the racial minorities. Exclusionary zoning is actively being fought in the courts elsewhere.

The behavior of State agencies raises two questions. By taking a tiptoe approach to suburban zoning, is the Department of Community Affairs encouraging the further elaboration of racially exclusive practices by local governments? And will such tactics as housing for the elderly eventually operate as effective substitutes for current exclusionary devices in the event the current zoning enabling statute is successfully challenged? The longer the State postpones decisive action in the field of zoning, the more likely the answer to both questions will be yes.

Local Government and Resistances to Low- and Moderate-Income Housing

The folly of depending on local suburban governments to voluntarily initiate an increase in a housing supply which

90. Bernard J. Frieden, "Toward Equality of Urban Opportunity," in Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 21, No. 4 (November 1965), pp. 329-330.

might be occupied by minorities was repeatedly underscored during the joint meeting of the Massachusetts Advisory Committee and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) in June 1970. Town officials representing boards of selectmen, planning boards, finance committees, industrial commissions, and housing authorities were interviewed. Of the more than 25 public officials interviewed, not one was actively promoting equal opportunity in housing or employment in his town; not one was using his leadership role to inform the community of the changing relationships in the metropolitan area. The testimony of the chairman of the board of selectmen of a suburban town is illustrative:

As far as low- and middle-income housing is concerned, we have done absolutely nothing as a town. We do have private groups in our town that are interested in this subject, and I assume that, if they thought the town needed it or it was our moral obligation, they would have brought an article forward to take care of that....

In response to a question concerning planning for increased opportunities of minorities in the town, the same official replied:

Well, if you take planning in the broad sense of the word, I suppose it should... but, as far as I know, the independent group that is associated with the churches, and they're called the civil rights committee, I believe, are the group in our town that is undertaking that sort of thinking.... [It] seemed to the rest of us, who have quite a lot of work to do anyway, that we were very happy to let someone else do the thinking on this subject.

Most of the interviewed officials expressed similar views. They relied on someone else's thinking on that subject. Some officials expressed opinions in conflict with even the principle of equal opportunity. The chairman of the board of selectmen of another town who, in addition, was a vice president of a suburban bank, was asked:

Should a minority group person have the opportunity to live in your town if he wants to?

The local official and bank officer replied:

I see no objection to that...if he can afford to pay what the landlord wants.
I see no objection to it.

The same official was asked:

Would your bank be concerned about what effect [a black's] purchase might have in the neighborhood, where your bank might also be holding a mortgage?

The official replied:

Well, yes. I think the directors of the bank would owe their thoughts to the present members of the community...I can think of several locations in town...that the answer would have to be yes because some of those houses are \$60,000 to \$80,000, [or] \$90,000....[They] would be concerned with maybe a possible reevaluation of the property that's already there.

I have made [property value] studies [of blacks moving into areas] and I have found where it made a big difference....A case down in Pennsylvania...was my personal study because my daughter and my son-in-law wanted to know what they should do about their property.

In still another town, where apparently there is no objection to a minority group member who can pay the rent, the chairman of the housing authority testified that the town had one housing project for the elderly containing 44 apartments with a waiting list of 125. He noted:

[In] checking over some of our applications... some of these are people who are being rejected from their present quarters because the housing has been sold. Now older people would not put

those people out, but the new owners want to improve their apartments and charge higher rents....Perhaps we can have rental assistance... but our plans to date on that have been so nebulous that I don't think I want to say too much at this time.

A planning board member of the same town estimated that 89 percent of the town's land area is zoned for single-family use. Yet some 300 to 560 new immigrants from the Azores and the Madeira Islands were known by housing authorities to be living in overcrowded conditions in the center of town. In explaining the opposition to low-income housing in the town, the planning board representative stated:

I think primarily the reasons given will be the low effect on the town as a whole, so far as public services are concerned....In the past 6 years, a great influx of moderate- to upper-income people...has drained our services tremendously and we're in the throes of spending tremendous amounts of money for schools and other...facilities for the town.

The town official expressed the viewpoint of a low-income community which is, in effect, swamped by metropolitan growth, ambivalent on race, unprepared for the housing needs of its own people, and desperately trying to make up for the inadequacies of its past planning. The chairman of the board of selectmen of a neighboring town presented the views of a high-income community:

I think that individual towns are perfectly capable of handling their own problems in the area of housing. To set up laws on this is contrary to all my beliefs.

In response to a question of whether Federal and State laws and programs were needed to handle their housing problems, the official said, "None," nor did he feel that his town needed Federal or State programming funds. However, when asked if his town had any grants for highway, water, or sewer development, he replied:

We have a Federal grant in connection with a new sewerage disposal plan [even though]...we don't need it....It is available and we applied for it.

This town, with no low- or moderate-income housing, at the time of the hearing was to be the site for a new 20-acre shopping development.⁹¹ Will minority group citizens have an opportunity to live and work in this town? The answer is no. Housing is in the \$30,000-and-up price range, and the only public housing available is for the elderly. Yet those public officials responsible for the shape of the town's growth feel the situation is well in hand:

Our policy toward growth in population is that we favor individual growth for the purpose of getting more taxes....Policies to increase industry...have been to zone certain areas of the town industrially and to encourage the State and Federal Government to build roads in our area...to make transportation to the rest of the world easy for industry....

Not all local officials felt the situation was well in hand with respect to population growth. The majority of those interviewed spoke of controlled growth and the need to slow development to a level the town could respond to. One town, for example, with only 10 percent of its land zoned for non-residential use, is finding it difficult to keep up with recent expansion. A representative from another town expressed a similar problem:

I think the official policy of the town...is restricted population growth. I don't think it was the intention a decade ago, when this type of zoning was [adopted]....The lot size was increased [in an] attempt to keep certain types of economic or ethnic or other groups out of town, I think it was [the intention] to slow growth down so that town services could keep up with it.

Not one of the communities represented felt it could afford to create opportunities for minorities. One community representative said:

I don't think that [our town] would go out on its own to do something all by itself to have this happen. It would be, presumably, rather

91. "The Real Estate Mart," Boston Globe, Jan. 17, 1971, p. 50A.

costly....[There are] things that, at the moment, are beyond our immediate solution or control, that stand as a barrier to doing something about it. [Such as] the lack of sewerage.

At the Boston open meeting, Paul Davidoff expressed the paradox inherent in the zoning for "controlled growth" philosophy:

The old law, if you examine municipal corporate law, was mandamus. [It] was appropriate to require [that] towns provide services. The government existed to serve the people, and in the past 10 years, facing tremendous suburban growth, we have had a perversion of that to which point people now serve governments....[They] are often permitted to come in if they can pay their own way and do not overtax services.

One of the topics foremost in the minds of town officials is open space. One official said:

I think there's a place for a town with the kind of open space that towns like Westwood and Dover and Wayland and Westwood have. We are willing to see the town accommodate any or all of the residential developments described, but we would wish... safeguards that are going to preserve what we think is unique about our town in terms of its natural beauty and open space.

When a town has substantial open space, it is not uncommon that it considers its open space unique and worthy of preservation. Not all towns believe that the preservation of open space and the creation of a low- or moderate-income housing supply are incompatible. However, the efforts of planning boards consistently deal with the former in concrete ways and deal with the latter theoretically or not at all.

While the dwindling supply of open space is a matter of common concern, the degree to which the dwindling supply of housing is recognized as a serious problem varies from community to community. When the lack of low-income housing is acknowledged, often town officials rely upon housing authorities to assess and respond to these local housing needs. Housing authorities, however, often fail to meet this responsibility. Although the Department of Community Affairs is readily

accessible by telephone, most housing authority members lack knowledge about current housing problems, current population trends, or available housing programs. For example, consider the testimony of the chairman of one housing authority. The Advisory Committee asked:

Are [you] trying to say that the only thing you have looked into is the [housing for the] elderly; you haven't looked into anything else yet?

The housing authority chairman replied:

Well, we met with the board of selectmen; we met with the town planning board.

Question:

How many units would you say...are needed of low-income and moderate-income [housing]?

Answer:

At the moment, I don't think I could tell you.

Question:

Has it been taken up at the only authority meeting to date--the concept of building family units for nonveterans?

Answer:

Not unless it comes under your zoning laws....

Question:

What I am asking is whether or not you and your fellow members of the authority have ever considered this?

Answer:

I think that mention of these things comes up at times.

Question:

Have there been any attempts by the town to participate in leased housing as opposed to construction of family units?

Answer:

I don't know anything about that.

Question:

Has there been any survey of the availability of rental units in the town to determine whether or not a leased housing program could be successfully initiated?

Answer:

I don't believe there has been any discussion about that.

Few housing authorities are the models of vacuity that this town has established, but equally few are models of efficient administration. Another housing authority chairman testified that although his town had been awarded \$100,000 for rent subsidy in August 1969, it could find no way between August 1969 and June 1970 to administer the program. By June 1970 a pilot program for rental assistance to one potential elderly tenant was in the process of being established. Testimony on behalf of the Department of Community Affairs by Deputy Commissioner MacDonald Barr, on the other hand, indicated that this town's failure to submit a rent schedule was all that was holding up the program.

The picture which emerges from lengthy discussions with the public officials of Boston's suburbs is one of conscientious public officials leading or reinforcing irresponsible public policy. Most town boards are encountering a widening gap between their abilities to plan and administer and the demands population growth has placed on local government.

From a broad perspective, suburban attempts to resist growth, to avoid the need for municipal services by failing to create them, to insulate themselves from social problems by including only certain groups, have all failed. Despite large-lot zoning, towns have grown faster than the capacity

to plan. Despite the absence of some municipal services, the desire and need for other services has raised tax rates, and despite the exclusion of certain people, social problems have multiplied.

The behavior of local town officials seems unrealistic. Their indifference to the problems of minorities and their failure to recognize and/or to educate the town to its responsibilities encourage racially exclusive housing policies. The loyalties of a selectman are to his constituency. The parochial interests which consume the attention of planning boards and finance committees at the expense of concern for the region as a whole are regrettable but not unexpected.

There can be no doubt that suburban governments have avoided responsibilities every step of the way. They have avoided the responsibilities which they could have handled. They have tolerated mediocrity when excellence was needed. Most seriously, they have used public funds to implement local policies which are in direct conflict with national and State goals. But throughout, they have been supported by the State and Federal Governments.

Role of State and Federal Governments

Suburban resistance to minority inclusion has been effective because the structure of suburban governments predisposed local officials to respond to unreasoning fears and selfish interests within the community. It has been effective because State Government has abdicated its responsibility and has taken a passive stance on housing and race issues. William White of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency described the situation with regard to housing:

I think the need for housing has been established....Everybody in the State at some point or other with any responsibility has established there is a need for housing. And I don't think we can do this [assist local communities] by saying an individual community...doesn't really know what they need. If they don't know what they need, it just points out to me they are irresponsible and they shouldn't have the responsibility of supposedly housing families that need to be housed.

State and Federal officials have consistently operated under the delusion that local officials will voluntarily subject themselves to community outrage by proposing to implement low- and moderate-income housing programs. It would be unrealistic to expect local officials to voluntarily test community attitudes on race by proposing that the town adopt an outreach program. MacDonald Barr, deputy commissioner, Department of Consumer Affairs, has expressed the view of the department: "The more belligerently it's done [getting local communities to accept low- and moderate-income housing], the more resistance you are going to meet."

Suburban resistance to low- and moderate-income housing to which State and Federal agencies take such a timid and evasive approach is, in large part, a product of their own making. The tools by which suburban committees erect barriers to exclude the poor and the minorities and the means by which suburban communities can minimize the economic impact of maintaining irresponsible growth policies are all handed down from State and Federal sources which do not extract responsible commitments to housing or to racial inclusion. Westborough gets the funds to facilitate commercial development and a sewage treatment plant. Marlborough gets planning grants and renewal assistance, not to provide low-income housing, but to stimulate its commercial district. Towns like Dover and Lincoln are encouraged to take large acreages off the market entirely for conservation purposes with no minimal program for enlarging the housing supply. What is the incentive for residents to voluntarily take on low- and moderate-income housing when they can maintain the illusion of a 19th century farming village at minimal cost to the town? Why should a town concern itself with the increased housing pressures created by its new industrial park when its municipal needs have been met by Federal and State grants? And throughout the suburbs, where suburban governments are inadequately coping with growth, why should any community voluntarily divest itself of any aspect of autonomy when it is constantly bailed out by Federal and State assistance?

The Department of Community Affairs has referred to the Anti-Snob Zoning Act as a "strong weapon and limited threat." Within a very few years most suburban communities will have been rescued from the threat by the Department of Community Affairs itself, by having received assistance to create just

enough housing for the local elderly. As long as the suburbs are supported in their pursuit of limited self-interest, they can have no incentive to respond to the needs of the region. As long as the State abjures its interest in suburban housing and land use, suburban communities will adapt their policies to meet only changing needs within the town boundaries. And as long as the State avoids its responsibility for a concerted attack on systematic racial exclusion, suburban communities will continue to avoid the responsibility to develop inclusionary programs and practices.

CHAPTER VI

SUBURBAN ATTITUDES TOWARD OPEN HOUSING

Introduction

As the population of suburban towns becomes more economically and racially homogeneous, there will be less diversity in viewpoints or goals. Local governments primarily serve problem-solving functions, and debate in a town meeting is more likely to center on means rather than on ends. Some political scientists have described the suburban population as dealing with consensual politics rather than with the politics of conflict. The fact that the goals of various interest groups often must be resolved at the State level, one step removed from the suburban constituency, tends to shelter suburban citizens from the incompatibility of their goals and values with those of others.⁹² The absence of conflict among suburban citizens has led to elaborate devices to avoid a clash

92. See, for example, Edgar Litt, The Political Culture of Massachusetts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), especially Chapter 4, "The Quest for Consensus." For further information on Massachusetts politics, see, for example, J. Joseph Hutchmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

of opinions at town meetings. This can be seen in resolving potentially controversial issues at extended neighborhood meetings.

In dealing with the State or Federal Government, suburban town officials often selectively respond to those programs which would be approved by their constituency. And where Federal or State programs are incompatible with community preferences, the programs are ignored or modified to conform to the implementation of the law or the desires of the official's constituency.

Town officials in the suburbs are, in fact, more similar to agents of special interest groups than to elective officers at other levels of government. Suburban town officials lead less than they represent. They tend to minimize differences rather than to resolve them. The nature of the suburban constituency places heavy constraints on the degree to which local officials can respond to needs which are not strictly local. In the absence of strong support for housing programs or equal opportunity programs within the community, local officials have in the past allowed the voices of fear and racial hostility to dominate.

It is not the bigots, however, who constitute the primary obstructive force against racial inclusion. It is the indifference of average citizens. Thus, housing authority chairmen are unlikely to take surveys or to investigate State and Federal programs which they have no reason to believe are strongly desired by the town. Selectmen and planning boards have little incentive to propose zoning changes other than those which will produce increased tax revenues. These internal relationships within each suburban town are factors behind an inertia which has been greatly underestimated by State and Federal agencies. This may sound like a vicious circle in which no suburban community can be expected to change its racially exclusive policies without the presence of a minority population and cannot gain a minority population without first changing its policies. However, the circle can be broken by decisive action at the State and Federal level.

Suburban Attitudes and Change

Breaking the circle of suburban exclusion is not a matter of changing racial attitudes, nor is increasing the supply of low-

and moderate-income housing a matter of changing social attitudes. Suburban attitudes are, however, indicative of the response to change in employment and housing policies. The initiative for change will, of necessity, have to come from the State and Federal Government, but merely initiating change will not be enough. Both in the planning and the administration of housing and employment programs, it is essential that racially hostile attitudes be recognized.

In this context, it is useful to review the manner in which suburban public officials and others interviewed by the MCAD interpret the absence of minorities. This provides a key to how they can be expected to behave in the future and the manner in which they are likely to absorb change.

It would be a herculean task to catalogue all the justifications and rationalizations used by Boston's suburbs for minority exclusion. Some communities, particularly those which are coming into the Boston area as a result of new high-way facilities, are most likely to deny the existence of racial disparities. For example, in response to the question, "Should there be opportunities for minority citizens to work and live in your town?" One suburban official replied, "I don't think there's any personnel board in any of the units of factories in the town that insist on your living in our town."

Suburban communities nearer to Boston seem to have more difficulty in formulating an answer. One official said, "This presents a problem for me to answer [since] the residential nature of the community is such that the opportunity for employment within our town is quite low, compared to what it would be in an industrial or more commercialized town."

Suburban Attitudes and Social Class

The response of another town official to the question of minority inclusion is of special interest because it reveals an interpretation of racial exclusion which is gaining increasing acceptance:

I think...there is no question in my mind that my kids are deprived of their education because all the kids they go to school with come from similar backgrounds--a fantastically narrow economic range....[But] I feel...that in our town, the restriction is an economic one.

I'm not saying once economic barriers are down [that] there won't be other problems....

Anyone who has \$60,000 for a house can come to our town and buy one. But unfortunately, this is not doing much for low-income families. Obviously, if a black family is low-income, we don't do much for them, but it's because [the family] doesn't have the money and for no other reason.

In communities which recognize the exclusionary impact of land use and housing policies, there is also a tendency to interpret suburban resistance to low-cost housing in purely economic terms, or, occasionally, in terms of social class antagonism. This is perhaps one of the most sophisticated means of denying or minimizing racial problems and offers an oversimplification of housing or employment issues.

Almost 25 percent of Boston's black population had incomes of more than \$10,000 in 1970. Within upper-income classes, blacks are still markedly underrepresented in Boston's suburbs. The 1970 census data for housing shows that far more low-income housing is available in the suburbs than in the city of Boston. Granting that those reporting housing value and contract rents for the suburbs may underestimate the actual market value, there is still enough lower-income housing available outside the central city so that the absence of minorities cannot be blamed on the shortage of housing.

While Boston's suburban residents may be prejudiced against the poor, it is the minority poor which suffers from discrimination. State and local governments, instead of challenging the middle class residents in suburbia on how well off they are, perpetuate the illusion that they [middle-income residents] are abused by welfare chiselers, which in the minds of many are the minority poor. The government has proffered the hope that increasing public services can somehow be met without additional sacrifices.

The belief that the private system can generate sufficient housing to assure a decent home for every American without inconveniencing the suburban residents persists. Suburban residents insist that the private system, which has been unsuccessful in meeting the housing needs of the past, will

miraculously provide an alternative to their tax contributions in the future. Bernard Frieden has pointed out that in Massachusetts "even if housing conditions were to improve at the 1960-65 rate (via the private market), it would take until sometime in the 1990's to replace all substandard units."⁹³ Thus, housing programs must look to suburbs where there is money and land for resources.

Suburban Attitudes and the Black Community

One of the most frequent rationalizations for the absence of minorities in the suburbs is that little need be done in the suburbs because blacks prefer to live in the city "with their own kind."

To place the burden on the black community has certain distinct advantages: it means that suburban policies in housing need not change because they are not discriminatory. And it means that if they do change, no effort need be made to include blacks because "they don't want to live here anyway."

In the event low- and moderate-income housing should be increased in suburban towns the concept of self-exclusion will provide a curtain to hide the rigid maintenance of discriminatory practices. The separatist movement of the late 1960's has provided support to this concept. A number of minority group spokes persons continue to stress the irrelevance of the suburbs to minority needs and goals. However, evidence suggests that many minority families would prefer to live in a suburban environment and would move to the suburbs if there were an opportunity to do so.

The Boston Urban Foundation survey of the black community in 1967 indicated about 30 percent of those surveyed were interested in finding residence in the suburbs.⁹⁴ The Boston Survey report in 1969 also reported that 37 percent of Boston's blacks would be looking for housing in the suburbs if they had to move.⁹⁵

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93. Bernard J. Frieden, "Housing: Creating the Supply," in The State and the Poor, eds. Samuel H. Beer and Richard E. Barringer (Cambridge, 1970), p. 119.
 94. Urban Research, Inc., Center City, Vol. II (1969), p. B-30. Prepared for the Boston Urban Foundation.
 95. Boston Area Survey, 1970, p. 89.

These studies indicate that many blacks do want to move out of the city and into the suburbs. The proportionate number of blacks who wish to move, regardless of location, is almost proportionate to those within the total Boston population who wish to move--one-third.⁹⁶ Only 28 percent of those blacks who wish to move would limit their house-hunting to the immediate neighborhood, and only 39 percent would limit their house-hunting to the black district and adjacent neighborhoods. In fact, 27 percent would prefer to look for housing only in the suburbs.⁹⁷ Thus, factors other than voluntary segregation account for the absence of minorities in most of the towns around Boston.

The 1964 study by the Research Center of the Florence Heller School at Brandeis University, which surveyed the response to urban renewal of some 250 middle-income black families in the Washington Park section of Roxbury, has been used by white suburbanites to support the argument of self-exclusion.⁹⁸ This study found that a small proportion of the black families interviewed moved into suburban housing and that the majority of families who moved failed to seek housing beyond the margins of the black district. Rather than reinforcing the theory of deliberate self-exclusion, however, the study clearly pointed out the obstacles to black inclusion in the suburbs and the need for outreach on the part of suburban communities. The study suggested that few black families wish to be pioneers or to take aggressive action to acquire housing in areas where they have no reason to believe they will be accepted. In addition, many were afraid of the treatment their children would receive in predominantly white schools.

96. Boston Area Survey, 1970, p. 77.

97. Ibid., p. 89.

98. Research Center, Florence Heller School at Brandeis University, for the Department of Commerce and Development, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Middle-Income Negro Family Faces Urban Renewal (1964).

The Washington Park study also showed that organized private efforts to bring urban blacks into suburban housing were found to be unsuccessful. Listings of suburban housing with Fair Housing, Incorporated, a non-profit organization with offices in Roxbury, resulted in few purchases by blacks. Other organizations had also been unsuccessful.

These failures would appear to support the theory of self-exclusion, but few of those involved in such efforts recognized the shortcomings of the real estate listings. In the case of Fair Housing, Inc., the suburban houses listed were expensive, and there were few suburban rentals available. Thus, the failure of minority citizens to clutch at the few opportunities proffered from the suburbs cannot be interpreted as self-exclusion.

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CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF STATE AGENCIES

Introduction

Minority interests have not been adequately protected as the metropolitan area has grown. Highway planners, for example, often ignore the needs of inner-city residents. Government agencies, other than those involved in transportation planning, have often operated to disenfranchise minority citizens from a voice in the development of the region as a whole.⁹⁹

Suburban resistance to minority inclusion has been tacitly supported at both the State and Federal levels. Those agencies which had no direct mandate to enforce antidiscrimination laws, often behaved as if discrimination was not, and never had been, a factor in American life. Those agencies which are specifically authorized to protect minority rights have had to operate under severe budgetary and manpower constraints. Metropolitan growth and suburban development have outrun the capacity of the

99. The descriptions of the structure and operation of the State agencies and departments included in this chapter, are based upon the League of Women Voters of Massachusetts' publication, Massachusetts Government (Revised, 1970).

various agencies to develop and implement meaningful programs.¹⁰⁰ We will focus on the State agencies in this section because the programs and agencies at the Federal level have been well documented in a number of reports.

Metropolitan Area Planning Council

The State Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) was formally established in 1964 with a membership of 42 towns to provide a vehicle for long-range coordinated planning within the region. Shortly thereafter, its membership was expanded to cover 100 cities and towns, each of which has representation on the council. Although 31 members of the council are appointed by the Governor, the suburbs have veto power over any controversial proposal.

In August 1970, legislation was passed which placed the MAPC solely under the control of its member towns. The result has been a one-way street through which the MAPC has provided research and technical services to suburban towns without any power to demand that such services are put to use for the benefit of the region as a whole. Testimony from town officials repeatedly emphasized that the MAPC was the one agency to which towns might look for better coordination of jobs and housing. On the other hand, testimony from experts in housing and planning, including William White of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, repeatedly emphasized that the MAPC with its present structure was powerless to deal with any but the blandest of issues.

The MAPC does have the ability to act as a vehicle for educating suburban towns to the direct and indirect consequences of their land use and housing practices, but to date, little emphasis has been placed on the need to consider inter-community problems from the standpoint of minorities.

100. For information on Federal agencies and programs, see the series of reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights on the Federal civil rights enforcement effort.

Department of Commerce and Development

The Department of Commerce and Development, created in 1959, has no regulatory functions but provides technical and research services, and acts as a public relations agent for the State. Until recently, the Department of Commerce and Development has shown little interest in the problems of minorities. It has, in effect, operated to facilitate the decentralization of industry and to assist suburban towns in the pursuit of tax resources without any significant effort to coordinate housing production and the location of jobs. It has not confronted industry with the obvious consequences of locating in segregated areas. It has placed greater emphasis on coordinating industrial location with physical resources rather than with human resources. Finally, it has waited for the underfunded and understaffed Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) to respond to major changes in the location of job opportunities after the fact.

The Department of Commerce and Development, under its present leadership, has the potential to be a positive force against discrimination. But it retains a legacy of timidity on racial issues and a tendency to avoid present-day problems by looking toward such far-off possibilities as the creation of "new towns" to resolve racial problems.¹⁰¹

As public relations agent for the State, the department has an obligation to inform prospective employers that equal opportunity in employment is a matter of high priority in the Commonwealth. Efforts by the MCAD to involve the department in promoting equal opportunity among prospective employers have resulted in little action.

Department of Community Affairs

The Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is one of the younger State agencies. It was created in 1968 to assist in community development and antipoverty efforts. Its division of community development administers all State-aided housing programs and three major urban renewal programs, provides technical and planning assistance, assists in relocating those displaced by public action, and provides community training for town officials and employees.

101. Department of Commerce and Development, Commerce Digest (October 1969).

Since its creation, the Department of Community Affairs' faint-hearted approach to suburban housing and planning has only contributed to the maintenance of segregated housing patterns. As noted earlier, the \$37.5 million authorized for DCA's scattered-site public housing program has never been used. Housing and renewal programs have been offered to the suburbs cafeteria-style, and the menu with respect to housing has been largely unappetizing. The limits on rental assistance are far below the market rents in suburban towns, and the funding for local administration and clerical staff is inadequate.

While the Department of Community Affairs has recognized the deficiencies of many of its housing programs and has initiated corrective legislation, it has limited itself to only those avenues which make housing more palatable to the suburbs. It has conspicuously failed to take an aggressive approach to segregated housing in the suburbs and has failed to make use of its own resources to make metropolitan development compatible with equal opportunity.

The Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs continues to procrastinate on legislative proposals to eliminate major constraints on low- and moderate-income housing developments and covers its inaction with fragmentary proposals which will effect no major change.

Housing Finance Agency

The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), originally included in the Department of Commerce and Development, was created in 1966 and is now part of the Department of Community Affairs, although it is not subject to departmental control.

MHFA is authorized to float bonds to finance privately constructed housing for low- and moderate-income families. Its bonding capacity has been increased by the legislature in spite of the reluctance of MHFA staff to take on responsibilities beyond that agency's current capacity.

Under the enabling legislation for the agency, MHFA is required to insure that a minimum of 25 percent of the units in any of its projects are for low-income citizens. MHFA also requires that tenant selection be nondiscriminatory. With the

exception of a few "turnkey" projects¹⁰² and projects in areas with a heavy low-income concentration, however, MHFA has accepted 25 percent low-income occupancy as a maximum.

MHFA loans are also tied to the existence of a demonstrable housing loss to any community. This means that MHFA assistance for private development of low- and moderate-income housing in the most exclusionary communities is close to impossible. MHFA has been reluctant to involve itself in local controversy over such problems as zoning; the agency is also ambivalent with respect to its own goals, i.e., how much an income mix it should support. Communities such as Lincoln and Dover, which have almost no low-income residents and no minority representation, are in the best position to prevent an assault on the status quo; however, communities like Cambridge, which already have a large share of the poor and the minorities, have less leverage.

Both the Department of Community Affairs and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency have often viewed the creation of any low- and moderate-income housing within the suburbs as good. However, it can and does happen that increasing the supply can also perpetuate exclusionary practices. It is a widespread assumption that simply increasing the number of housing units available within the metropolitan area can indirectly benefit minority citizens by the filter-down process. This process is thought to make the less expensive, used housing available as middle-income groups move into new housing. This theory fits the Protestant ethic, which suggests that people should work their way up to new housing. In fact, one aspect of suburban resistance to low-income housing is the objection to "just giving a man a new house." The filter-down housing process may or may not improve the housing choices available to low-income whites; there is no evidence to suggest that such a process works for blacks. Ernest Erber, a member of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, noted that the areas in which used housing become available at prices blacks can afford are the areas which have already started on a marked decline and which have separated from the locus of commercial and industrial activity.

102. "Turnkey" is a process by which local public housing authorities agree to purchase a completed project from a private developer.

Suburban communities sometimes interpret the need to increase the low- and moderate-income housing supply as "taking the pressure off the city." Defining the situation in these terms means that any sort of increase in density fulfills the suburban community's obligations to the metropolitan area. The "pressure" on the city, however, is more complex than the shortage of adequate housing. The processes which tip neighborhoods toward decline are related to the economic development of the region, the loss of residential support services, such as insurance and adequate fire and police protection, changes in transportation modes, etc. In this context, increasing the housing supply without other changes in suburban land use policies and regard for minority inclusion, can do more harm than good.

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) was created in 1946 under the name of Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Commission, the third such agency to be created in the Nation. Until the early 1950's, the Commission only had jurisdiction over discrimination in employment. In 1950, the Commission was renamed, and its responsibilities were enlarged to include discrimination in housing. While the past 20 years have seen substantial antidiscrimination legislation passed in the Commonwealth, the impact of this legislation has been disproportionate.

The MCAD has emphasized a systematic approach to discrimination in employment and housing. In August 1970 the MCAD held a public hearing on new proposed rules and regulations dealing with institutionalized discriminatory factors. As a result of these hearings, the rental housing reporting rule was adopted by the MCAD. Such rules and regulations may diminish the large number of individually filed complaints, which in 1970 totaled approximately 1,000. By statute, the MCAD has been forcibly entrapped in an endless morass of individual complaints, which it often has been unable to resolve swiftly enough to be of significant help to complainants and which have deflected its attention from dealing with matters affecting the entire minority community.

Executive Order No. 74 of 1970 now requires the Commonwealth to insure nondiscrimination in its employment and program activities. Affirmative action programs for all agencies and authorities within the Commonwealth are required, and such programs are subject to the review of the MCAD.

Summary

It has been the function of most of the State agencies described above to collaborate with, rather than confront, exclusionary practices and policies within the suburbs. Most of them have relied upon economic growth to create the optimal conditions for the resolution of metropolitan problems. While the potential offered by further metropolitan development is important to consider, it would not compensate for the detrimental effects of past injustices to racial minorities. State agencies must deal with discrimination regardless of the economic climate in the region; decisions of all State agencies should be made with an awareness of how such decisions perpetuate exclusionary practices.

Legislative changes, new programs, and new funds will be needed to create an adequate supply of housing and to coordinate development within the metropolitan area. But these changes will be of little value if they are brought about by compromising minority rights for suburban self-interest. There is much that State agencies can accomplish by taking a firm stand on racial inclusion without additional legislation or funding. The best way to place future housing programs in jeopardy is to equivocate on this issue. The questions are not whether minority citizens should live in the suburbs or be dispersed or whether court-ordered integration is a viable alternative. The questions are whether minority citizens can live in suburbs or whether the suburbs are going to perpetuate discriminatory practices with the tacit consent of State Government. The Commonwealth must commit itself to the elimination of discriminatory practices, and this fact should be clearly apparent in the decisions of each agency.

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CHAPTER VIII

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The need to end suburban land use and housing development policies which result in the exclusion of minority citizens, and the need to develop and implement an explicit, comprehensive housing policy of the Commonwealth are urgent. Fragmented, uncoordinated housing programs within the Commonwealth, particularly within the Boston metropolitan area, have not decreased residential segregation and have had a minimal effect on improving the quality of the housing available to minorities.

Some degree of local control on land use and housing is desirable, but when local governments obstruct the achievement of national goals in housing and equal opportunity, when they waste the environmental resources of the region and indirectly waste its human resources, they must cede their authority to other levels of government.

The development of a comprehensive housing policy, the reorganization of State agencies, and the creation of new State bodies, require care and deliberation, but care should not constitute delay. The Commonwealth has exceptional resources in housing and planning expertise, which have not been utilized. Most of the necessary research has been done. A number of excellent housing programs have been proposed, and policy recommendations are readily accessible from many sources. There can be no substitute for action. The need is desperate.

HOUSING

Findings:

1. Federal and State Fair Housing Laws Have Failed. There is no indication that residential segregation in the Boston metropolitan area has declined in recent years. The processes which exclude black and Spanish speaking background citizens from suburban areas and from the white residential periphery of the city seem to be operating as effectively as before, largely untouched by the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 and 20 years of the Massachusetts fair housing law.

Twenty-one years after Congress established "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family" as a national goal in the National Housing Act of 1949; the Boston area continues to confine its racial minorities in sections of the most appalling decay. Exclusionary zoning laws, the failure of low- and moderate-income housing programs, increased land costs, and inadequate public transportation have perpetuated racial segregation.

2. Inner-City Minority Groups Continue to Suffer Deprivation. The scarcity of low-income family housing within the city and the exclusionary impact of suburban large-lot zoning, restrictions of multifamily housing and other related factors have burdened the black housing market. The majority of blacks pay proportionately more for poorer quality housing than do whites. Those areas of Boston where blacks and Spanish speaking background citizens have been heavily concentrated included the largest proportion of deteriorating and dilapidated housing in the city in 1970, just as it did in 1960.

3. Suburban Public Officials Often Act to Bar Equal Opportunity. In suburban areas, public officials with narrow outlook and parochial interests control access to housing so as to exclude most black and Spanish speaking families from their communities. These officials include planning board members, selectmen, and members of housing authorities. Their loyalties are limited to the local community, and they make no effort to respond to the needs of the region. In their efforts to maximize local tax revenues and minimize municipal services, they often act in opposition to the best interests of the region as a whole.

4. Suburban Citizens Must Share the Guilt. Suburban public officials, for the most part, reflect the attitudes and prejudices of their constituencies. In an effort to maintain the status quo and preserve the "character" of their communities, local residents of suburban areas have sought to restrict the housing supply and exclude outsiders from the economic, environmental, educational, and social benefits related to land use.

5. The New England Town Structure Is A Further Obstacle To Equal Opportunity. The small size of primary governmental units in the Boston suburban band severely inhibits the development of policies to deal with the problems of the region. The narrow perspective of most local officials, the competition for economic resources, and the lack of responsibility for meeting the broad spectrum of community needs are all magnified by the multiplicity of small, independent towns. Suburban towns compete for Federal and State funds to create housing for their local elderly but fail to create low- and moderate-income family housing for fear that it would result in an influx of "outsiders." Land is zoned for industry, but when industry is lured into neighboring towns, the vacated space is not used for housing, even though the need for housing clearly exists.

These small primary units of government are today incapable of meeting such needs as waste disposal, water supply, and recreation and education for their own constituents. They are constantly being bailed out with Federal and State assistance. Yet they are in a reactionary sense well equipped to resist modifications in the housing and land use policies which would make them more responsive to the general public interest of the region.

6. State Housing Programs Vacillate On Race. Lacking a coherent housing policy which incorporates the principles of equal opportunity, the Commonwealth has developed a series of weak and fragmented housing programs which depend more on the permission of local governments for their execution than on the needs of citizens. Any initiative in housing must presently originate at the local level so that only the narrowest interests are served. Sanctions against exclusionary policies and practices of town boards are nonexistent. Local housing authorities are not adequately monitored. Generally, local officials are not actively guided or educated in the use of available housing programs.

Social and racial divisions in the metropolitan area are made more acute by the reluctance of State agencies to challenge residential segregation in the land-rich, high-income suburbs. The State has failed to develop comprehensive, racially-inclusive housing programs to deal with the rapidly deteriorating situation before a point-of-no-return is reached. The costs of creating equal opportunity in Boston's suburban housing will soon be a fiscal impossibility for the State.

7. The Federal Government Funds Exclusion. The Federal Government, using the tax money of all citizens, provided the financial support which made suburbia possible for some citizens. Without the tremendous input of Federal grants, loans, and guarantees over the last two decades, the "good life" in the suburbs would have been impossible for all except the wealthy and nearly wealthy. At the time of maximum Federal funding and rapid suburban growth, the Federal Government failed to intervene to prevent acts of overt discrimination from depriving minority citizens of suburban opportunities. Today, with overt discrimination outlawed, the Federal Government exhibits the same indifference while suburban housing and land use policies continue to effectively bar minority citizens. While Federal law now provides for privately enforced sanctions against overt discrimination, the Federal Government and the State have failed to provide sanctions against systematic exclusion by suburban communities. Current Federal policies as practiced in the suburbs assist upper income groups, at the expense of lower income groups and minorities. Housing subsidy and development programs are ill-adapted to suburban conditions and are unnecessarily dependent on local initiative.

Recommendations:

1. Publicly-Funded Support of Exclusionary Policies and Practices in Suburban Towns Should End Immediately. Suburban towns have enjoyed the benefits of Federal and State subsidies without making these benefits available to minority and low-income citizens. Henceforth, Federal and State subsidies, such as, but not limited to, urban renewal, improvement of municipal services, and the acquisition of open-space for suburban towns, should be made contingent upon demonstrable efforts on the part of the town to: (1) develop policies with respect to housing and land use which will consider the needs of all income groups and (2) establish affirmative action programs to provide housing and employment opportunities for minorities, and (3) implement outreach programs to attract minority homeseekers.

2. Local Controls on Housing Development Should Be Reformed Immediately. Unreasonable large-lot zoning, restrictions on multi-family development, height requirements, mobile home use, and any other unnecessary local constraints on the production of low- and moderate-income housing should be outlawed by statute. A uniform building code for the State should be established. Arbitrary constraints on housing development must be removed in order to permit towns to become inclusionary with respect to the income and race of potential residents.

3. A New State Planning Body With Adequate Enforcement Powers Should be Created. Orderly and sound development of metropolitan areas requires a more effective State agency. The new agency should be authorized and empowered to, among other things: (1) plan the development of metropolitan growth in a comprehensive and integrated way consistent with national equal opportunity goals; (2) coordinate industrial and commercial development with the development of adequate housing for all income and racial groups; (3) anticipate population trends and develop an early warning system for trends toward racial isolation; (4) plan the necessary local amenities to contribute towards a racially integrated society; (5) override local zoning ordinances in the interest of sound regional development; (6) facilitate the creation of land banks for future housing and recreational needs; (7) relate transportation systems to the needs of the region; and (8) enjoin communities and public and quasi-public agencies from taking action with respect to land use which would be detrimental to the region or inconsistent with sound regional development.

4. Land Should be Controlled for Orderly Development. A land transaction board, organized along regional lines, should be established as a unit of the State planning body to approve the sale of all large tracts of land over a certain minimal acreage. The board would develop guidelines for acreage, density, and use. All land transactions should fall within these guidelines. Land transaction boards would be required to keep records so that regional trends in land use could be readily obtainable.

5. The Commonwealth Should Create One or More Metropolitan Development Corporations With Broad Power to Acquire Land and Build Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in Both City and Suburbs, Free of Local Restrictions. Such a corporation should act as the major vehicle for executing a coherent State housing policy. It should go beyond providing replacement or relocation of housing and attempt to realize the goals of a decent home and a suitable living environment for all Commonwealth citizens. The corporation should have the power to purchase land or take it by condemnation, to use a combination

of State and Federal housing programs, to issue notes and bonds, and to utilize other sources of public financing. It should construct housing and assist communities and limited-profit corporations in the construction of housing in accordance with an overall State housing plan. It should create subsidiary corporations and sell and lease projects to other public corporations. Its projects should be subject to special tax abatements on real property and be free of all local land use controls. It should work closely with the bodies recommended herein.

6. Regional Housing Authorities Should be Created. These authorities should be empowered to build family, veteran, and elderly housing. Emphasis should be placed on small, economically mixed, scattered sites throughout metropolitan areas. Units should be planned with the proper balance between the need for family and elderly housing and should be made available to all without the imposition of a residence requirement.

With respect to tenant selection, regional housing authorities should be required to establish affirmative action programs, which have specific goals for each project for minority inclusion. Tenants should be adequately represented on all regional housing authorities. All proposed projects should be subject to the approval of the State planning body and should be consistent with a comprehensive plan for the metropolitan area. Authorities should also administer greatly expanded rental assistance programs on a regional basis.

7. A State Housing Financial Assistance Program Should be Created. A program similar to FHA and VA mortgage guarantee programs should be established to assist low-income families to purchase housing. The program could make long term, low-interest loans available and provide mortgage insurance for low-income families. It would provide broader limits on mortgage size and term than do existing Federal programs. It would work with current home-financing programs but would not be limited to them.

EMPLOYMENT

Findings:

1. Federal and State Fair Employment Laws Have Failed to Desegregate Suburban Employment. The segregated character of the suburban labor force has not been significantly modified over the past 20 years. Equal employment opportunity for minority group citizens in the suburbs is diminishing even more as the economic development of the suburban area moves further away from the urban border.

Both State and Federal Governments are responsible for the lack of enforcement of existing fair employment practices legislation in the suburbs. They have failed to adapt their administrative procedures and the designs of their programs to the changing shape of metropolitan growth. Too little attention has been given to the decentralization of industry and commerce into the suburban ring. The few attempts to compensate for past discrimination and to discontinue segregated suburban employment patterns have not been effective.

2. Inner-City Job Opportunities are Decreasing. Blacks and Spanish speaking background citizens are faced with a shrinkage of job opportunities near their homes. At the same time, economic and racial barriers prevent their participation in the suburban labor market where the majority of new jobs are being created.

3. Suburban Employers Have Failed to Consider the Racial Impact of Their Location Decisions. Major suburban employers have been indifferent to the consequences of the suburban location of industrial or commercial facilities for minority groups. With few exceptions, they have made little effort to compensate the minority labor force for the differential access to employment opportunities resulting from their suburban location. They have failed to make effective and concerted efforts to engage in affirmative hiring measures which would insure the employment of a significant number of minorities. Their failure to do so is more conspicuous in view of the compactness of the Boston area and its relatively small proportion of minority citizens. It would require less effort to create and maintain the link between urban residents and suburban jobs than in any other major American city.

4. Exclusionary Suburban Employment Patterns Have Been Supported by Local Governments. The policies of suburban governments and the inter-community competition for fiscal advantages are largely responsible for segregated employment patterns. The deliberate pursuit of industry and the disdain for low- and moderate-income housing by suburban governments have resulted in a serious dislocation of employment opportunities and housing. Suburban towns which establish irresponsible policies toward industrial development and the concomitant lack of an effective, coordinated plan for land use within the metropolitan region, deny minority participation in suburban jobs.
5. State Government Has Participated in the Creation of a Segregated Suburban Labor Market. By allowing local governments in the suburbs to seek their own fiscal advantage irrespective of the effects on neighboring communities or on the region as a whole, the State Government has encouraged segregated suburban labor market. While taking a passive role towards poor regional land use, the State has taken an active role in the development of highway systems which allow suburban communities to develop in a segregated manner. These highway systems facilitate the location of industries away from population centers, away from housing, and away from minority group residence.
6. Job Training Programs in Suburban Companies Have Been Insufficient and Ill-Conceived. Training programs designed to bring minority group members into the labor force and to provide skills adaptable to suburban industry are of special importance if minority citizens are to compete equally for employment. Suburban employers should not be exonerated for their failure to contribute to such programs. The failure also rests with State and Federal Governments which have not made any comprehensive and sustained efforts. Transfers or other arrangements to reduce the sensitivity of minority workers to job cutbacks due to loss of Federal contracts have been seriously omitted from most job-training programs.

Recommendations:

1. State and Federal Funds and Contracts Should be Made Contingent Upon the Recipient Community or Company's Willingness to Extend Job and Housing Opportunities to Minorities. State and Federal contracts should be coordinated and made contingent on the efforts of the town and the employer to insure that employment and housing are available to minority groups.

Towns which obstruct equal employment opportunities by refusing to accept public transportation programs or by failing to make provisions for housing which is open to all should not be eligible for State and Federal funds.

2. Jobs and Housing Should be Coordinated. The State must develop a system of data collection and dissemination designed to coordinate the development of jobs and housing, to keep track of progress and problems in desegregation, and to better inform minority citizens about the location of opportunities. The State must require suburban communities which encourage industrial or commercial development to make provisions for the housing of all employees on an equal opportunity basis.

3. Suburban Industrial Development Commission Should be Required to Coordinate Their Activities with the Interests of the Metropolitan Region as a Whole. The State Government must actively supervise and balance industrial development with good land use policy. It must actively encourage coordination within the labor markets and actively discourage local policies which impede such coordination. It should insure that the practices of industrial development commissions are consistent with these goals.

4. Employers Who Receive Federal and State Contracts Should be Required to Have Affirmative Action Programs, and Such Programs Should Include Training and Other Services. The affirmative action programs of suburban Federal and State contractors should include job-training programs for minority workers and such ancillary services as housing, transportation, and legal assistance. Uniform criteria for evaluating affirmative action programs and their implementation should be developed by State and Federal agencies.

5. Affirmative Action Programs of State Bodies Required Under Executive Order No. 74, the Governor's Code of Fair Practices, Should be Made Public and Widely Disseminated. Each State agency, department, or office covered by the Executive order, after approval of its affirmative action program by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, should notify all contractors with which the State agency, department, or office deals and take steps to insure that the practices of such contractors are consistent with affirmative action programs. State regulatory agencies and licensing boards should promulgate and enforce affirmative action and equal opportunity regulations.

TRANSPORTATION.

Findings:

1. The Manner in which Transportation Systems Have Developed Has Unfairly Burdened Minorities. The development of highway facilities and the lack of public transportation have worked to the disadvantage of minority groups. This has restricted minority knowledge of, and access to, jobs but expanded these opportunities to those white citizens who have physical access to the suburbs. Expansion of highway facilities and other related construction has diminished the low-income housing supply in center-city areas. The loss of housing to road construction in minority group neighborhoods has placed additional pressure on the housing market with no adequate program for replacement.

2. Local Communities' Transportation Policies Have Increased Minority Employment Barriers. The zeal of Federal and State Governments in providing high-speed roadways has been matched by the reluctance of suburban communities to acknowledge the need for public transportation and to deny the responsibility for meeting that need. These policies place all low-income citizens at a disadvantage. For minorities, these policies are an obstruction to initial job contacts.

3. Inadequate Transportation has Been Used as an Excuse by Suburbs for the Failure to Integrate. Despite the difficulties of providing public transportation to meet suburban industrial expansion and dispersal, the lack of transportation is often used as the justification by suburban employers as an excuse for not employing minorities, and it is used by suburban towns for not building low- and moderate-priced housing. The fact that ideal public transportation is not on the immediate horizon should not be a deterrent to the implementation of affirmative action programs using the imperfect facilities at hand.

Recommendations:

1. Inner-City Highway Construction Should be Halted Immediately. Highway or related construction which involves the demolition of housing should be indefinitely suspended. It is not clear whether further highway construction should resume even when an adequate supply of replacement housing has been constructed.

2. The State Should Develop a Comprehensive Plan to Link Inner-City Residents with Suburban Opportunities. This plan may take the form of direct subsidies for the low-income automobile ownership, special bus services, and improvement and reactivation of older transportation systems, such as train service. It must, however, provide dependable and convenient access to suburban employment opportunities. In conjunction with the Federal Government, the State must invest heavily in transportation research to develop a public transportation system which serves all income groups.

3. Suburban Opportunities Should Provide Inter- and Intra-Community Public Transit. Suburban communities must not evade the responsibilities which come with growth and must design appropriate public transportation systems, such as minibus linkups to public facilities and to major commuter lines.

4. The State Should Develop a Revenue Resource to Finance Public Transportation. The State should institute a program of taxation by means of a commuter tax, a tax on new automobiles, or a readjustment of other transportation taxes, for the specific purpose of providing adequate public transportation facilities.

TABLE I

Boston's Suburban Population--
Cities and Towns: 1970

<u>Inner Suburbs</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Blacks &</u>	<u>Outer Suburbs</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Blacks &</u>
<u>South Area</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Other Races</u>		<u>Population</u>	<u>Other Races</u>
Braintree	35,050	139	Cohasset	6,954	32
Milton	27,190	77	Duxbury	7,636	108
Quincy	87,966	475	Hanover	10,107	79
			Hingham	18,845	136
			Holbrook	11,775	278
			Hull	9,961	59
			Marshfield	15,223	192
			Norwell	7,796	62
			Pembroke	11,193	115
			Randolph	27,035	564
			Rockland	15,674	262
			Scituate	16,973	129
			Weymouth	54,610	286
 <u>Southwest Area</u>					
Brookline	58,886	1,877	Ashland	8,882	63
Dedham	26,938	93	Canton	17,100	109
Newton	91,066	1,829	Dover	4,529	27
			Framingham	64,048	1,062
			Medfield	9,821	53
			Millis	5,686	34
			Natick	31,057	443
			Needham	29,748	193
			Norfolk	4,656	239
			Norwood	30,815	111
			Sharon	12,367	298
			Walpole	18,149	163
			Wellesley	28,051	358
			Westwood	12,750	51
 <u>North Area</u>					
Beverly	38,348	277	Danvers	26,151	93
Lynn	90,294	2,828	Hamilton	6,373	25
Marblehead	21,295	64	Lynnfield	10,826	18
Nahant	4,119	39	Manchester	5,151	23
Salem	40,556	363	Middleton	4,044	21
Saugus	25,110	161	Peabody	48,080	366
Swampscott	13,578	87	Topsfield	5,225	18
			Wenham	3,849	41

TABLE I--Continued

Boston's Suburban Population--
Cities and Towns: 1970

<u>Inner Suburbs</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Population</u>	<u>Blacks &</u> <u>Other Races</u>	<u>Outer Suburbs</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Population</u>	<u>Blacks &</u> <u>Other Races</u>
<u>North Central Area</u>					
Chelsea	30,625	765	Burlington	21,980	272
Everett	42,485	625	North Reading	11,264	54
Malden	56,127	964	Reading	22,539	98
Melrose	33,180	230	Wilmington	17,102	65
Revere	43,159	93			
Stoneham	20,725	139			
Wakefield	25,402	74			
Winchester	22,269	210			
Winthrop	20,335	84			
Woburn	37,406	339			
<u>West Area</u>					
Arlington	53,524	522	Bedford	13,513	289
Belmont	28,285	319	Concord	16,148	303
Cambridge	100,361	8,953	Lexington	31,886	555
Somerville	88,779	1,391	Lincoln	7,567	325
Watertown	39,307	418	Sudbury	13,506	142
			Waltham	61,582	706
			Wayland	13,461	147
			Weston	10,870	138

Selected Cities and Towns in the Route 495 Area

<u>Worcester Area</u>			<u>Lowell Area</u>		
Northborough	9,218	39	Carlisle	2,871	25
Westborough	12,594	145	Littleton	6,380	21
Southborough	5,798	25	Acton	14,770	93
Marlborough	27,936	244	Boxborough	1,451	6
Hudson	16,084	93	Maynard	9,710	50
Stow	3,984	18			

Sources: U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B23 Massachusetts.

United Community Services, 1969 Suburban Profile Series. Inner and Outer suburbs are those designated by the United Community Services except for the West area.

TABLE II

Housing Characteristics in Boston's Suburbs: 1965

<u>Section</u>	<u>North</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>West</u> ¹	<u>Southwest</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Boston</u>
Dilapidated						
Inner	17%	19%	14%	10%	14%	26%
Outer	6%	13%	N.A.	9%	21%	
Sound						
Inner	46%	55%	47%	30%	54%	52%
Outer	45%	42%	N.A.	39%	42%	
Excellent						
Inner	37%	26%	39%	60%	32%	18%
Outer	49%	45%	N.A.	52%	37%	

1.

The West area was not divided into inner and outer suburbs, but sampled as a whole.

Sources: United Community Services, Suburban Boston, North, North Central, West, Southwest, and South Profiles (1969), and Boston City: Some Population Characteristics in Four Areas.
The ratings are based on interviewer judgements.

TABLE III

Black Population as Percentage of
Total Population: 1960 and 1970

<u>Inner Suburbs</u>	<u>Percentage Black</u>		<u>Outer Suburbs</u>	<u>Percentage Black</u>	
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>		<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
<u>South Area</u>					
Braintree	0.1	0.2	Cohasset	0.3	0.2
Milton	0.1	0.1	Duxbury	3.3	1.1
Quincy	0.1	0.1	Hanover	0.6	0.6
			Hingham	0.6	0.5
			Holbrook	1.6	1.9
			Hull	0.2	0.3
			Marshfield	1.9	0.9
			Norwell	1.0	0.6
			Pembroke	0.5	0.6
			Randolph	1.0	1.7
			Rockland	0.6	1.4
			Scituate	0.2	0.3
			Weymouth	0.2	0.3
 <u>Southwest Area</u>					
Brookline	0.3	0.8	Ashland	0.2	0.6
Dedham	0.1	0.2	Canton	0.1	0.4
Newton	0.7	1.2	Dover	0.4	0.9
			Frammingham	0.5	1.1
			Medfield	0.4	0.2
			Millis	0.0	0.2
			Natick	0.3	1.0
			Needham	0.0	0.2
			Norfolk	4.8	4.6
			Norwood	0.1	0.1
			Sharon	0.3	2.1
			Walpole	0.9	0.7
			Wellesley	0.1	0.7
			Westwood	0.0	0.1
 <u>North Area</u>					
Beverly	0.1	0.4	Danvers	0.1	0.1
Lynn	1.4	2.6	Hamilton	0.1	0.1
Marblehead	0.1	0.1	Lynnfield	0.1	0.1
Nahant	0.4	0.3	Manchester	0.1	0.3
Salem	0.3	0.5	Middleton	0.2	0.2
Saugus	0.3	0.4	Peabody	0.0	0.4
Swampscott	0.1	0.3	Topsfield	0.0	0.1
			Wenham	0.2	0.5

TABLE III--Continued

Black Population as Percentage of
Total Population: 1960 and 1970

<u>Inner Suburbs</u>	<u>Percentage Black</u>		<u>Outer Suburbs</u>	<u>Percentage Black</u>	
	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>		<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
<u>North Central Area</u>					
Chelsea	1.0	1.7	Burlington	0.3	0.6
Everett	1.5	1.3	North Reading	0.1	0.2
Malden	1.2	1.3	Reading	0.1	0.1
Medford	1.7	2.5	Wilmington	0.2	0.2
Melrose	0.1	0.2			
Revere	0.4	0.1			
Stoneham	0.2	0.2			
Wakefield	0.1	0.1			
Winchester	0.4	0.4			
Winthrop	0.2	0.2			
Woburn	0.6	0.6			
<u>West Area</u>					
Arlington	0.1	0.3	Bedford	1.4	1.1
Belmont	0.1	0.2	Concord	0.6	1.3
Cambridge	5.3	6.8	Lexington	0.3	0.9
Somerville	0.4	0.8	Lincoln	1.9	3.1
Watertown	0.1	0.4	Sudbury	0.3	0.7
			Waltham	0.2	0.7
			Wayland	0.1	0.4
			Weston	0.3	0.6
<u>Route 495 Suburbs</u>					
Acton	0.3	0.3			
Boxborough	0.1	0.3			
Carlisle	0.1	0.2			
Chelmsford	0.0	0.2			
Hudson	0.0	0.2			
Littleton	0.0	0.2			
Marlborough	0.0	0.4			
Maynard	0.0	0.2			
Northborough	0.0	0.1			
Southborough	0.1	0.2			
Stow	0.1	0.3			
Westboro	0.9	0.7			

Sources: U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B23 Massachusetts.

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B23 Massachusetts.

TABLE IV
Gains or Losses--
Total Number Population Change
1960-1970

<u>Inner Suburbs</u>	Population Change		<u>Outer Suburbs</u>	Population Change	
	White	Black		White	Black
<u>South Area</u>					
Braintree	3,704	40	Cohasset	1,104	-8
Milton	777	1	Duxbury	2,965	-69
Quincy	257	78	Hanover	4,140	30
			Hingham	3,429	8
			Holbrook	1,578	61
			Hull	2,864	19
			Marshfield	8,418	13
			Norwell	2,591	-5
			Pembroke	6,197	47
			Randolph	7,781	284
			Rockland	2,402	141
			Scituate	5,667	20
			Weymouth	6,305	31
<u>Southwest Area</u>					
Brookline	3,524	320	Ashland	1,047	37
Dedham	3,005	31	Canton	4,235	58
Newton	2,281	420	Dover	1,668	5
			Framingham	18,734	463
			Medfield	3,782	0
			Millis	1,280	9
			Natick	1,923	215
			Needham	3,836	51
			Norfolk	1,117	47
			Norwood	5,869	12
			Sharon	2,036	232
			Walpole	4,051	-5
			Wellesley	1,725	164
			Westwood	2,371	12
<u>North Area</u>					
Beverly	2,064	114	Danvers	2,605	12
Lynn	5,510	1,046	Hamilton	1,871	-1
Marblehead	2,742	18	Lynnfield	2,421	-2
Nahant	150	-4	Manchester	1,207	10
Salem	1,153	96	Middleton	311	1
Saugus	4,378	24	Peabody	47,714	170
Swampscott	233	18	Topsfield	1,863	4
			Wenham	1,021	15

TABLE IV--Continued

<u>Inner Suburbs</u>	<u>Population Change</u>		<u>Outer Suburbs</u>	<u>Population Change</u>	
	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>		<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>
<u>North Central Area</u>					
Chelsea	-3,493	188	Burlington	8,936	108
Everett	-990	-113	North Reading	2,901	9
Malden	-1,717	27	Reading	3,225	14
Medford	-1,342	514	Wilmington	4,594	16
Melrose	3,408	41			
Revere	3,156	-109			
Stoneham	2,833	8			
Wakefield	1,060	3			
Winchester	2,795	11			
Winthrop	11	4			
Woburn	6,075	37			
<u>West Area</u>					
Arlington	3,700	125	Bedford	2,733	-6
Belmont	-674	35	Concord	3,409	136
Cambridge	-9,521	1,112	Lexington	3,791	192
Somerville	-6,889	357	Lincoln	1,773	170
Watertown	-134	123	Sudbury	5,948	75
			Waltham	5,672	298
			Wayland	2,894	37
			Weston	2,515	41
<u>Route 495 Suburbs</u>					
Acton	7,472	25			
Boxborough	704	4			
Carlisle	363	4			
Chelmsford	16,166	62			
Hudson	6,329	23			
Littleton	1,246	8			
Marlborough	8,886	106			
Maynard	1,967	8			
Northborough	2,517	9			
Southborough	1,781	9			
Stow	1,397	11			
Westborough	2,950	90			

Sources: U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1960, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B23 Massachusetts.

U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B23 Massachusetts.

TABLE V

Boston
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area(SMSA)
Mean Household Income
(Dollars at 1970 Prices)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Boston SMSA(including City of Boston)</u>	<u>City of Boston</u>	
		<u>All races</u>	<u>Blacks & Other Races</u>
1950	\$ 7,982	\$ 6,929	Not available
1960	10,536	8,115	\$ 6,051
1965	12,486	9,343	7,594
1970	14,794	11,507	9,248
1975(Projected)	17,150	13,668	11,254
1980(Projected)	19,882	16,234	13,700

Mean Household Income as Percentage

<u>Year</u>	<u>City of Boston as Percentage of SMSA</u>	<u>Blacks & Other Races as Percentage of City</u>	<u>Blacks & Other Races as Percentage of SMSA</u>
1950	86.8	Not available	Not available
1960	77.0	74.6	57.4
1965	74.8	81.3	60.8
1970	77.8	80.4	62.5
1975(proj)	79.7	82.3	65.6
1980(proj)	81.7	84.4	68.9

Sources:This table has been adapted from Ganz and Freeman, Population and Income of the City of Boston, Working Paper PH-1, Table 4, p. 36. Their income estimates are based upon the U.S. Office of Business Economics personal income concept and the relation between personal income data and household data. Information on the SMSA personal income is from the Survey of Current Business, issued by the Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics. The relationship between the SMSA median household income and that of the city of Boston is derived from the Censuses of Population, 1950 and 1960 and from the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, Survey Research Program, How the People See Their City-- Boston 1969: A Report of the Boston Area Survey. For the city of Boston and the metropolitan area, Census Median Household Money Income has been adjusted to the U.S. Office of Business Economics personal income concept. The personal consumption expenditure deflator index of the National Income Series has been used to convert to constant dollars at 1970 prices.

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