


WINTER-SPRING 1976

civil rights digest



FULL EMPLOYMENT

IN THIS ISSUE . . . we have included four articles on the subject of full employment. Discrimination against minorities and women is compounded in times of economic hardship, and the current situation is no exception. In fact, our present difficulties merely highlight what observers have long recognized—that minority unemployment in particular is consistently about twice that of whites. While some progress has been made regarding earnings of minority females relative to white females, the latter are at the same time losing ground to white males.

Our authors conclude that substantial change in the group status of minorities and women cannot occur without full employment. While affirmative action and the enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination are essential, these efforts are stymied in an atmosphere of job scarcity. Full employment, they conclude, would provide a minimum standard of living as a baseline for the fight against discrimination.

Our fifth article is a timely examination of anti-Semitism. It relates the effects of the present political atmosphere, the status of Israel, and historical anti-Semitism to the current situation of American Jews. The author's prognosis is mixed; while no resurgence of anti-Semitism has been documented, a sense of uneasiness pervades much of the Jewish community.

For more copies of the *Digest* or inclusion on our free mailing list, please write to the Editor, *Civil Rights Digest*, U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 20425.

The *Civil Rights Digest* is published quarterly by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights as part of its clearinghouse responsibilities. Funds for printing the *Digest* were approved by the Director of Bureau of the Budget on January 29, 1963. Correspondence related to the *Digest* should be addressed to Editor, *Civil Rights Digest*, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 20425.

The articles in the *Digest* do not necessarily represent Commission policy but are offered to stimulate ideas and interest on various current issues concerning civil rights.

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CREDITS: Cover—Harrod; 2, 8—Kircher & Associates; 11, 14, 17—Harrod;
18, 23—Swanson; 27— Library of Congress; 28— Washington Star News;
30, 34—Harrod; Inside Back Cover—U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is a temporary, independent, bipartisan agency established by Congress in 1957 to:

- Investigate complaints alleging denial of the right to vote by reason of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or by reason of fraudulent practices;
- Study and collect information concerning legal developments constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or in the administration of justice;
- Appraise Federal laws and policies with respect to the denial of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in the administration of justice;
- Serve as a national clearinghouse for information concerning denials of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and
- Submit reports, findings, and recommendations to the President and Congress.



The Economic Status of Minorities and Women

SOME FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS

By Lester C. Thurow

While many statistics could be used to explore the economic position of any minority group, the essential nature of a group's position can be captured in four basic statistics. First, what is the group's probability of being employed relative to the majority group? Second, given those members of the group that are employed, what is their earnings relative to that of the majority group? Third, are members of the group making a breakthrough into the high income jobs of the economy? And fourth, what is the group's level of economic welfare as measured by its average family income relative to that of the majority?


In each case it is necessary to look not just at current data but at the group's economic history. Where has it been in terms of employment and earnings opportunities? Where is it going and how fast is it progressing? Since the current recession or depression is so severe as to have a radically different impact than previous post World War II recessions, data will be presented on the progress or retrogression of groups through 1973, and then a separate analysis will look at what has been happening in the current recession.

The data on family income and ethnicity reveals only three major groups with incomes below average—blacks, Spanish heritage, and American Indians. Of the almost 100 million Americans who think of themselves as having an ethnic origin, all have incomes above those of people who do not identify with an ethnic group. Interestingly the groups with the highest average family incomes in 1972 were Russians (\$13,929), Poles (\$12,182), and Italians (\$11,646). Ethnic Americans may believe they are economically deprived, but they have on average reached to the top of the economic ladder.

Blacks Versus Whites -

Since World War II no significant change has occurred in the employment probabilities of blacks and whites. At all points in time—good or bad—black unemployment rates are approximately twice as high as those of whites. This was true prior to the civil rights and anti-poverty

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decade of the sixties, and it is true now. While the monthly data for early 1975 are not shown, exactly the same relationship has held as unemployment escalates. Month by month, black unemployment is twice that of whites.

While the current relative employment probabilities of blacks are no worse than they have been since World World II, the problem should not be minimized. Absolute rates are the highest they have been since the Great Depression for both whites and blacks. Relative to the sizes of their respective populations, two black men or women are thrown out of work for every white man or woman during a period of rising unemployment.

Analysis indicates that we are dealing with a long-run, deeply embedded, structural relationship in the economy. The rapidly escalating black unemployment rates of this recession or depression are not a temporary phenomenon. They are exactly what would have been expected given the structure of the economy. Little has changed in the past 30 years.

While there are a variety of earnings statistics on blacks and whites, the earnings of full-time, full-year workers are the best summary measure of earnings for those who have escaped the problems of unemployment. These earnings statistics completely eliminate the effect of unemployment (total or partial) and those individuals who do not seek full-time, full-year work.

The relative employment probabilities of blacks have not improved in the post World War II period, but

relative earnings have (see Table 1). Between 1955 and 1973, the earnings of black males have risen from 56 to 66 percent of white males, and earnings of black females have risen from 56 to 86 percent of white females. (Over the period under consideration, however, white females have fallen relative to white males.) While the earnings of both black males and females have improved, the relative gains of black females have been three times as large as those for males.

It is interesting to note, however, that the rate of gains for blacks was just as fast in the 1950s as it was in the 1960s. The civil rights and poverty programs of the 1960s might have been necessary to sustain the rate

TABLE 1
RELATIVE EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME
FULL-YEAR WORKERS

(Black Males to White Males and
Black Females to White Females)

Year	Males	Females
1955	56%	56%
1960	59	68
1968	61	77
1969	62	81
1970	65	83
1971	65	87
1972	65	88
1973	66	86

of increase started earlier, but they did not serve to accelerate it.

More to the current point, however, are the data since 1970 or 1971. Since 1970, little evidence exists of any advance in the relative earnings of black males, and since 1971 little evidence exists of any advance in the relative earnings of black females. These data are interesting because they antedate the current recession which started in the first quarter of 1974. While the data contain enough sampling error to warn against calling a 3-year hiatus in gains a trend, it is nonetheless disturbing. The movement of the 1960s toward greater equality in earnings seems to be broken.

One could also predict a fall in the ratio of black to white full-time, full-year earnings over the course of the current depression. Most of the progress that has been made in the past has not been made by altering the relative earnings of older workers, but by altering the earnings of individuals just entering the labor force. Thus the greatest relative gains have been made among young blacks.

As far as an employer is concerned, this type of change causes the least disruption. Young whites lose relative to young blacks, but they lose something they did not yet have. To alter the relative position of older workers, it is necessary to reshuffle existing jobs or expected promotions. In either case, white employees are aware of the fact that they lost something and are in a position to exert countervailing power.

But in a recession, the whole process is reversed because of seniority provisions (formal and informal) in hiring and firing. The youngest workers are most apt to lose their jobs, and they are the workers where the ratio of black to white earnings is most likely to be near parity. Therefore, a recession shifts the weight of those remaining fully employed toward older groups who have larger relative earnings differences.

Regardless of whether the current hiatus is or is not significant, relative earnings—especially for black males—also result from a long-run structural problem. If current rates of progress were to continue, black females would achieve parity with white females in about 10 years, but black males would not reach parity for another 75 years. Since there is no trend toward parity between white males and females, achieving parity with white females is hardly the end of the economic problem.

Looking at the jobs in the top 5 percent of the earnings distribution, some improvement has occurred in the relative position of black males. In 1960, black males were only about 9 percent as likely as white males to hold a job in the top 5 percent of the earnings distribution. By 1973, they were 19 percent as likely to hold such a job. Black females held none of the top jobs in 1960 and essentially none in 1973. The

position of white females actually deteriorated over this period, from being 6 percent as likely to hold a job at the top in 1960 to only 4 percent as likely in 1973 (see Table 2).

Black family incomes have risen and fallen relative

TABLE 2

PROBABILITY OF HOLDING A JOB IN TOP 5 PERCENT OF EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION COMPARED TO WHITE MALES

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1973</u>
Black males	9 %	19 %
Black females	0.0	0.06
White females	6	4

to white family incomes depending upon the phase of the business cycle. From 1947 to 1952, black family incomes rose from 51 percent to 57 percent of white family incomes at the peak of the Korean War; declined to 51 percent with the recession of 1957-58; rose to 64 percent under the pressures of the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement; and then once again started to fall, reaching 60 percent in 1973 (see graph).

The most recent decline was not, however, caused by the business cycle. Instead the decline has been produced by a reduction in the proportion of black families with two or more workers and an increase in the proportion of white families with two or more workers. The proportion of white families with two or more workers now exceeds that of blacks. This is a process that is apt to continue and will lead to an increasing gap in average family incomes.

Spanish Heritage Families

Extensive data over time are not available for Spanish heritage Americans, but it is possible to report on their economic position in 1969 and a few changes from 1969 to 1973. During this period, Spanish heritage families have risen from a position of economic inferiority relative to both black and white families to a position of superiority relative to black families.

In 1969 the average black family income was 63 percent of the average white family income, but the average Spanish heritage family had only 58 percent as much as the average white family. By 1973 the average black family had dropped to 60 percent of the average white family, but the average Spanish heritage family had risen to 69 percent of the average white family.

Among Spanish heritage families the most spectacular gains were made by the Cuban, Central and South American, and Spanish segment of the Spanish heritage

TABLE 3
FAMILY INCOMES OF SPANISH ORIGIN FAMILIES
RELATIVE TO WHITE FAMILY INCOMES

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1973</u>
Total	58%	69%
Mexican American	56	67
Puerto Rican	51	64
Other	65	89

families (see Table 3). Mexican Americans have, however, also made sharp gains in a rather limited period of time.

Rising relative family incomes can be caused by falling relative unemployment rates, rising relative earnings, or rising family labor force participation rates. While it is not possible to trace the sources of Spanish heritage family income gains definitely, it is possible to determine some of the causes.

In 1970, unemployment rates were similar for black and Spanish heritage workers with males showing a slightly lower rate and females a somewhat higher one. By 1974 female rates were still slightly higher, but male rates were 25 percent lower. As a result, a substantial fraction of the improvement in Spanish heritage family incomes can be attributed to falling relative unemployment rates for male Spanish heritage workers.

In addition, while female unemployment rates have not fallen relative to whites or blacks, Spanish heritage female participation rates have been rising in pace with those of whites and faster than those of blacks. In 1970 female participation rates were 9 percentage points lower for Spanish heritage females than for black females and approximately equal to those of white females. By 1974 Spanish heritage female participation rates had risen in pace with those of white females and into approximate parity with those of black females. Spanish heritage males maintained their position of parity with white males and had participation rates approximately 8 percentage points higher than that of black males.

Higher male participation rates have a greater payoff for Spanish heritage families than they do for black families, since fully employed male workers are much closer to parity with fully employed white workers. In 1969 the average full-time, full-year Spanish heritage male worker earned 80 percent as much as the corresponding white, while the average fully employed Spanish heritage female worker earned 89 percent as much as white females. Like blacks, Spanish heritage females were closer to parity with white females than Spanish heritage males were with white males, but the male gap was much smaller.

Similarly, Spanish heritage males are much more

likely to hold high earnings jobs. In 1969 a black male was only 12 percent as likely as a white male to hold a job earning \$25,000 or more per year, but a Spanish heritage male was 38 percent as likely to do so. This situation deteriorated slightly between 1969 and 1973, however, since by 1973 Spanish heritage males were only 21 percent as likely to hold a top job. Females witnessed little change, with black and Spanish heritage females half as likely as white females to hold such jobs, but with white females only 8 percent as likely to hold such jobs as white males.

As a result, the economic progress of blacks and Spanish heritage workers has been substantially different during the 1970s. The 1970s have been a period of relative economic stagnation for black Americans, but a period of rapid economic gains for Spanish heritage Americans. These gains have in turn been caused by falling relative unemployment rates for Spanish heritage males and rising relative participation rates for Spanish heritage females.

American Indians

American Indians are the smallest and poorest of all of America's ethnic groups. They are also the least well described and tracked by U.S. statistical agencies. Despite the existence of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, only the roughest estimates exist of the economic situation of American Indians. Based on reports from approximately half of all of the U.S. reservations to the Economic Development Administration, the median family income of American Indians was \$3,300 in 1969 with a range from \$1,000 on several reservations to \$15,000 on one reservation. This means that the median income of an Indian family is something on the order of one-third of that of a white family.

Given the lack of data and the range of error, no one is in a position to say whether the population of American Indians is or is not making any economic progress. Regardless of whether they are or are not making economic progress, American Indians stand in a class by themselves when it comes to suffering economic deprivation relative to the rest of the population.

Female Workers

From 1960 to 1974, unemployment rates deteriorated for both white and black females. White females went from unemployment rates 10 percent higher than those for white males to rates 40 percent higher, and black females went from unemployment rates 12 percent lower than those for black males to unemployment rates 18 percent higher. Interestingly, the earnings of fully employed females did not move in a symmetrical manner. Full-time, full-year white female earnings fell

from 61 to 56 percent of white male earnings from 1939 to 1973, while black female earnings were rising from 51 to 69 percent of fully employed black males.

As Table 2 shows, the probability of black females holding a job in the top 5 percent of the earnings distribution has improved minutely, while the probability of a white female holding a job in the top 5 percent of the earnings distribution has deteriorated. While white females are still much better off than black females, all of the relevant variables, except participation rates, are moving in the direction of lowering the relative earnings of white females.

Total white female earnings are up relative to white males and black females, but only because their participation rates rose from 31 to 45 percent from 1948 to 1974, while black female participation rates were only rising from 46 to 49 percent. Shortly, white females will probably have higher participation rates than black females.

Male participation rates have been declining for both white and black men, but white men have fallen from 87 percent to 79 percent while black men were falling from 87 percent to 73 percent from 1948 to 1974. As a result, both male and female participation rates are changing such that white income is rising relative to black income.

Minorities and the Recession

While preliminary data are available for 1974, the real impact of the current recession will not be seen until 1975 data become available. The Gross National Product peaked in the fourth quarter of 1973, but the rapid escalation in unemployment rates did not occur until the fourth quarter of 1974 and the first quarter of 1975. As a result, the effects of radically higher unemployment rates are not really visible in 1974 data.

In 1974 real family incomes declined for all groups, but somewhat surprisingly, the declines were larger for whites than for blacks or Spanish heritage families. While the median white family income was falling 4.4 percent, the median black family income was falling 3.2 percent and the median Spanish heritage family income was falling only 1.2 percent. Spanish heritage families continued to make economic progress relative to both black and white families, and black families made a small gain relative to white families.

In terms of absolute purchasing power, the average white family lost \$600 while the average black family was losing \$250 and the average Spanish heritage family was losing \$100. While the rising relative income of Spanish heritage families was spread across the country, the small gain in relative family incomes for blacks was completely concentrated in the northeast. While

white incomes were declining by 4 percent in the northeast, black incomes were rising by 2 percent. These gains were caused by rising real incomes for fully employed black females and males at the same time that fully employed white males and females were experiencing cuts in their incomes in the northeast.

The gains in the relative income position of Spanish heritage families can be traced to gains in the earnings of Spanish heritage female workers. While the incomes of white and Spanish heritage males both declined 6 percent, the income of Spanish heritage females rose 4 percent, while the white females incomes fell 1 percent.

Unemployment rates indicate that minorities and women continue to suffer from a higher probability of being unemployed, but the 1974 recession, somewhat surprisingly, hit the earnings of year-round, full-time white male workers the hardest. The real incomes of fully employed white males declined 5 percent, while the incomes of fully employed black and Spanish heritage males declined 1.5 percent.

Among females, fully employed white females experienced a cut in income of 4 percent, while fully employed black females were experiencing a 3 percent increase in income, and fully employed Spanish heritage females were experiencing a 0.5 percent increase. As a result, the increase in incomes for Spanish heritage females was almost completely concentrated among those who work part-time or part-year.

Since overtime was slashed sharply during 1974, the decline in earnings for fully employed whites must be traced to the disappearance of overtime. Evidently, other groups receive little overtime and therefore have less to lose when overtime disappears.

EEOC and the Economy

During the previous discussion of the income advances and retreats of different groups, no mention has been made of the effects of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The absence of any mention of EEOC is not meant to imply that it has had no impact on the distribution of earnings. EEOC was not mentioned because of a fundamental fact that is often overlooked. The United States has a very large economy: an economy so large that no agency the size of EEOC could be expected to have noticeable effect on aggregate data.

The Gross National Product is approaching \$1,500 billion per year. The labor force totals almost 95 million individuals, with 103 million individuals working at some point during the year. There are 55 million families and 18 million unrelated individuals. In an economy this large, it is not possible for an agency with an annual budget of \$55 million (fiscal year 1975)

to have a noticeable effect on the distribution of earnings.

The success or failure of EEOC as an institution must rest on the results that it has obtained in the cases which it entered. Economywide data point up where we have been and where we are going. They define the size of the remaining task, but they do not provide a basis for evaluation of the costs and benefits of EEOC.

The size of the remaining task does, however, raise questions about the litigation premises upon which EEOC is built. Is it possible to make the kinds of changes that EEOC was designed to accomplish, given the legal structure upon which it is based? One could argue that a legal case approach where the burden of proof is on those charging discrimination will not solve the problem. This is not to advocate that the current approach be scrapped. It clearly has an integral role to play in redressing individual economic grievances, but the current approach is too cumbersome and time consuming to cause major changes in the distribution of earnings.

If the current rate of change in the distribution of earnings is inadequate, some other mechanism must be built that can augment that now in place. The question to be addressed is not the narrow success or failure of EEOC, but the nature of a mechanism that might narrow or eliminate the earnings gaps that now exist.

The AT&T case, which involved a companywide consent decree, is an obvious improvement over the individual grievance procedure, but it does require at least the threat of going to court to make the negotiations take place. It is also easy to exaggerate the ease with which such a procedure can work. All it would take to bring this procedure to a halt is the strong opposition of one large company.

Based on our experience with antitrust cases, it is clear that one large, strongly-opposed company could tie up all of EEOC for 15 to 20 years, even if it were obvious that the company would lose in the end. Just to put the problem in perspective, many observers think that the entire Justice Department does not have enough resources to take on both IBM and AT&T at the same time in the antitrust area. Antitrust cases easily take 15 to 20 years to reach a final conclusion, and they can tie up hundreds of lawyers.

To make either the individual case approach or the companywide consent decree approach work, it is

necessary to create economic pressures that make it less likely the Government will run up against opponents that are willing to fight to the end. Something approaching full employment is probably essential to the success of EEOC, but it isn't enough. Even at full employment, the economy generates unemployment probabilities that are twice as high for blacks as for whites. If this recession is eventually cured, future recessions will occur.

Now is the time for those who are interested in EEOC's goals to push vigorously for a comprehensive guaranteed job program or a real "right to work." Employment is also the area where antidiscrimination laws have been least successful. While some progress has generally been made in terms of relative wages for those who do work, no progress has been made in closing the gap in relative employment probabilities.

While there is a lot of talk now about public service employment and even rising appropriations, it is important to understand that a comprehensive right to work program is not a large temporary public employment program. It is a permanent, open-ended public employment program where everyone who wants work gets work. Congress does not get to determine its size, but simply agrees to appropriate whatever is necessary—just as it does for farm price supports.

The program must be open-ended for a very simple reason. To the extent that the program is closed, discriminatory decisions can be made as to who gets into the program and who does not. To offset differences in employment probabilities in the private economy, public employment must stand ready to hire anyone that the private economy refuses to hire. At the moment, many public service employment programs are simply being used to hire back previously laid-off public employees. Chances are that the discriminatory quotient embedded in the current public service employment program is not significantly different from that in the rest of the economy.

On one level it is surprising that a society that stresses the value of work as much as ours is so resistant to the guaranteed job. The right to work is not only compatible with the work ethic, it is a logical concomitant of it. No logical society can define something as ethical (work) and then make it impossible to be ethical (there is no work to be had).

As in most cases of inconsistent behavior, the answer is to be found in conflicting moral principles. We also

preach the virtues of private enterprise. But private enterprise cannot guarantee the right to work. The right to work can only be guaranteed by public enterprise. If the government is to guarantee that right to work, then it must be involved in the employment of large numbers of people and as a consequence, it is going to be producing some large quantum of goods and services. To be for open-ended permanent public employment is to be for public ownership of some fraction of the means of production.

While one can argue that the Federal Government is already heavily involved in economic production, the guaranteed job would so significantly escalate the degree of involvement that it should be considered a shift in kind rather than degree. This conclusion must be faced. As John Kenneth Galbraith has noted, if one wants well-run, efficient state industries, one must believe that state industries are the first-best way to run many industries, and not the second-best way.

Similarly, if one wants a well-run guaranteed job program, one must believe that guaranteed public jobs and equal access to employment opportunities is the first priority. It is not a program designed to mop up some of the unfortunate side effects of private enterprise. Precisely the converse is true. Private enterprise has an important but subsidiary role to play in guaranteeing employment opportunities for everyone.

Given that the current recession or depression has produced a high unemployment rate that is likely to last for several years, now would seem to be the time to press for the guaranteed job for everyone. Groups are being hurt by unemployment that have not been hurt since the Great Depression. For the first time in a long time, they are being forced to realize that unemployment can be caused by factors other than laziness. Given what many believe is a high degree of economic bungling in Washington, these groups may not be hurt for another 35 years.

As a result, minority groups and those interested in their problems should push for an open-ended, permanent guaranteed job for everyone regardless of race, creed, color, sex, or age. But one must remember that from the point of view of minorities, it is absolutely vital that the program be universal and open-ended. Anything less would be unlikely to have an impact on relative earnings and employment; large scale public employment is not an adequate substitute.



THE IDEA OF FULL EMPLOYMENT

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY

By Moses Lukaczer

The idea of full employment is a modern notion reflecting the increased confidence of the people and their leaders in developed industrial countries to manage their economies. As such, it did not emerge full-blown from one individual's mind. Like most social phenomena, it is a product of history that developed and changed in accordance with the circumstances that acted upon it. It is possible to identify several sources from which the idea of full employment emerged.

First, during the devastating experience of the 1930s depression, unprecedented numbers of wage earners discovered that for considerable periods of time the system could not provide them with jobs. This experience helped produce a new attitude that is widely shared: Mass unemployment must not be repeated.

Despite the extensive and innovative efforts of the Federal Government, however, unemployment was not eliminated in the 1930s. In 1939, it remained at the relatively high level of 8-9 million. Only during World War II did unemployment substantially decrease.

Second, the war demonstrated that the system could produce

practically full employment. Because of the unprecedented demand for goods and services that the war effort engendered, enough jobs were generated to put to work almost all of those who were willing and able. Thus people realized that full employment was not simply "pie in the sky" but a realistic goal that could be achieved.

During the war, concern was widespread about the consequences of cancelling war contracts on a large scale at the end of hostilities. Attention therefore turned to a substitute for war contracts which would keep the economy operating in high gear.

These two experiences—depression and war—helped bring about a massive alteration in the expectation of people: Not only *should* mass unemployment be avoided, but it *could* be avoided by means that were at hand.

Third, the intellectual revolution in the discipline of economics produced by the English economist John Maynard Keynes, later Lord Keynes, provided an explanation for the economic stagnation of the 1930s and a course of action to overcome or prevent it. The Keynesian Revolution, as it has been called, dealt with the paradox

that although it had been possible to solve unemployment in wars—World War I and II, for example—it had not been possible to accomplish this result in peacetime. The Keynesian Revolution appeared to provide the intellectual basis for accomplishing what was widely desired, once peacetime conditions returned.

Fourth, the idea of full employment is a product of the fact that in a democratic form of government such as ours, supreme electoral power resides in a large body of citizens—all of whom are entitled to vote for representatives responsible to them and who govern for them.

Here, what has been called "the relentless logic of political democracy" is at work. The interests and needs of citizens, no matter how humble, must be considered if the reelection of the representatives is to be assured. The widely held view among the electorate that a recurrence of the mass unemployment of the 1930s would not be tolerated assured that the issue would become a political one and that the attention of political leaders would be directed to it.

Finally, support for the idea of full employment was significantly broadened and concern about achieving it considerably deepened by the legitimate postwar expectation for a better life prevalent

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among minorities in particular. This expectation resulted, in part at least, from Supreme Court decisions rendered and new laws enacted in the postwar period.

The decision of the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954 was directly applicable only to equal educational opportunity, but it also signaled the need for comparable treatment with respect to economic opportunity and a wide range of other activities. It can be said, perhaps, that the heightened expectation for a good life was as much the cause of these legal developments as it was their result.

After all, minorities and women were as deeply involved in the war effort as were whites and males. It seemed glaringly inequitable on the one hand to expect comparable sacrifices from minorities and women in wartime, and on the other to deal with these groups inequitably in peacetime.

Furthermore, inasmuch as many minority members and working women were poor, achievement of full employment in the economy was essential to their goal of a better life. That goal needed to be as accessible to them as it was to whites and white males.

The Employment Act

The Employment Act of 1946 (Public Law 304) signed by President Truman on February 20, 1946, is substantively different in a number of important respects from the original bill introduced into the Senate more than a year before, on January 22, 1945. The latter bill was entitled the *Full Employment Act of 1945*. The change of title in itself is suggestive of the emasculation that occurred during the legislative process.

For example, the original bill provided that:

All Americans able to work and

seeking to work have the right to useful, remunerative, regular, and full time employment, and it is the policy of the United States to assure the existence at all times of sufficient employment opportunities to enable all Americans . . . freely to exercise this right.

In the law that was passed in 1946, reference to a statutory right was deleted and the following language, marked by extreme tortuosity, was substituted:

. . . it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.

The foregoing language was intended, it would seem, to downplay the statutory right to full employment provided in the original bill.

The original bill had also provided that, "to the extent continuing full employment cannot otherwise be achieved, it is the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide such volume of investment and expenditure as may be needed to assure continuing full employment." This language was deleted in the bill that passed.

The first bill also provided for a

national production and employment budget to be transmitted by the President to the Congress. It would show, among other items, the estimated size of the labor force, the volume of investment, and the extent to which the estimated aggregate volume of investment and expenditure for the prospective fiscal year was less than that necessary to provide full employment.

Where a deficiency was projected, the bill would have provided that the President submit "a general program for encouraging . . . increased non-Federal investment and expenditure which will promote increased employment opportunities by private enterprise" to prevent such a deficiency to the greatest possible extent.

In the event that the full employment volume of production was still not generated, the President was to transmit to the Congress:

A general program for . . . Federal investment and expenditure by private business, consumers, State and local governments, and the Federal Government up to the level required to assure a full employment volume of production.

It was provided further that: If the . . . volume of prospective investment and expenditure . . . is more than the estimated . . . volume . . . required to assure a full employment volume of production, the President shall set forth . . . a general program for preventing inflationary economic dislocations or a program for diminishing the aggregate volume of investment and expenditure to the level required to assure a full employment level of production, or both.

The preceding language was deleted in the final version of the bill. The bill as passed merely

provided that the President state in his Economic Report to the Congress the current levels of employment, production, and purchasing power; indicate the levels needed to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power; and recommend a program including legislative action needed to meet the maximum levels. This change in language was intended to bar the use of techniques referred to in the original bill.

For and Against

The Senate considered the Full Employment Act prior to the House and passed it only after incorporating severe amendments. These amendments discouraged many of the original bill's supporters, among whom was Senator Alvin Barkley of Kentucky. Senator Barkley commented at the time that the Senate version "promised anyone needing a job the right to go out and look for one." This comment is equally applicable, if not more so, to the version of the bill passed by the House before being sent to conference.

The alteration in the terms of the original bill stemmed in large measure from the opposition of the business community and from the conservative character of the House of Representatives of that day, where much of the damage was done.

A few in the business community took exception. The Committee for Economic Development, for example, emphasized the view that the Federal Government could be an ally of a socially conscious business community. More generally, however, organizations like the National Association of Manufacturers, various Chambers of Commerce at the State and local levels, and the Committee for Constitutional Government were strongly opposed on grounds that included the following:

- Full employment is not compatible with freedom, i.e. Russia was a tyranny and had full employment;
 - Full employment would require unwarranted extension of government control over economic life;
 - If private enterprise was not able to supply the necessary number of jobs, the threat existed that the government would step in and in time might provide all employment;
 - Full employment with its implicit paternalism will kill business initiative;
 - Business confidence will be undermined because there is no assurance that the government will not seek to bring about full employment through spending and deficit financing, with the possible consequence that over the long term the budget will be unbalanced;
 - This lack of confidence by business will increase unemployment, not reduce it;
 - The forecasting that is called for in the process of reaching full employment is not feasible;
 - The announcement by the President that recession is in the offing and that government action is necessary might, in fact, bring on a recession;
 - Inflation will set in long before full employment is reached.
- Opinions not often publicly voiced, but still of significance in the formation of attitudes, were that full employment will enlarge the bargaining power of working people by encouraging a labor shortage, thereby eliminating a floating surplus of unemployed, and full employment will undercut the willingness of people to work. Some businessmen asserted that depressions should not be abolished because capitalism required a floating body of unemployed. Many business people disliked government investment and a government guarantee of the right to work.
- Organized labor, on the other

hand, supported the bill, although the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) supported it more strongly than the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The leaders of these organizations believed that labor's basic interests would be best served by a full employment economy that would allow wage increases, liberalization of the unemployment compensation system, and other goals of organized labor.

The American Farm Bureau Federation, representing commercial agriculture, was opposed, in general on the same grounds described above. The National Grange, a smaller farm organization was also opposed. However, another small farm organization, the National Farmers Union, supported the full employment bill, arguing that farmers cannot divorce themselves from the well-being of other groups in the nation; that what is good for the consumer and the worker is also good for the farmer; and that it should be a responsibility of the Federal Government to plan for the goal of a good life for all Americans.

In fact, the original of the full employment bill was heavily influenced by the ideas developed by a staff member of the National Farmers Union and subsequently adopted by the organization. These ideas dealt with the need for planning in the postwar period and the notion of a guaranteed investment by the Federal Government to take the place of war contracts in order to keep the peacetime economy humming.

Among veterans organizations, both the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars opposed the bill. The much smaller American Veterans Committee favored the bill, as did other organizations of a liberal political philosophy.

Having come this far, we need to pause for a moment in order to





obtain a better perspective of the statutory language which gives the Federal Government responsibility for full employment, often called maximum employment. By itself, language of this sort provides no assurance that full employment will be achieved or that its benefits will be enjoyed by all Americans. Unless the statute that provides the promise also provides the mechanisms and procedures needed for carrying it out, we do not have seriousness of purpose but rather an invitation to fail to fulfill expectations.

Analyzing the Law

The statute should specify the set of actions necessary to achieve the goal, the planning that will identify those actions and their timing, and the appropriate organization for carrying on the entire effort. Seriousness of purpose would necessitate creating a statutory personal *right* to be fully employed that could be tested in the courts, not merely a privilege to be fully employed if the Federal Government succeeded in producing full employment and if all those seeking work were able to obtain jobs that matched their needs.

Thus, this discussion cannot end without analyzing the requirements listed above. Some of these matters can be illustrated by reference to the experience with the Employment Act of 1946, which has been on the statute book for 31 years.

Congress declares in the Employment Act of 1946 that it is the Federal Government's continuing responsibility to promote maximum employment and conditions that afford useful employment opportunities for those able, willing, and seeking to work. One question is whether language of this sort creates a legal right for persons affected. If a person who is able, willing, and seeking to work, finds himself or herself disadvantaged

because of the lack of a useful employment opportunity, can he or she sue the government?

Students of the legislative history of the act have concluded that it does not create an individual right. The act itself does not set up a procedure, either administrative or judicial, through which an appeal could be launched by people whose rights were defined. It should be noted also that the act does not define maximum employment in quantitative terms.

Furthermore, the act lumps the unemployment into one undifferentiated mass without distinguishing any order of priority among groups for whom maximum employment opportunities shall be sought in relation to other groups. The commitment to the creation of maximum employment opportunities is general and loose at best.

If, in fact, the goal as stated is not achieved, no penalties follow because the commitment is not firm. The commitment is in the nature of, "Do your best to achieve the goal but if you don't, don't worry too much."

In other respects as well, the nature of the commitment to full employment assumed by the Federal Government on behalf of all its citizens is extraordinarily vague. Should the government press for full employment without regard to rates of pay? Should full employment be the goal without regard to equalizing the burden of unemployment between whites and minorities? Should full employment be sought without regard to the full use of the skills possessed by those working on those jobs?

How It Works

As noted above, the Employment Act of 1946 provides that the President shall transmit to the Congress an Economic Report which sets out the levels of employment, production, and purchasing power

needed, their current levels and their levels in the foreseeable future, and the program for reaching full employment, including, if necessary, changes in legislation. The act also establishes a Council of Economic Advisers of three members appointed by the President to assist in the preparation of the Economic Report.

In addition, the law establishes a Joint Economic Committee, representing both houses of Congress, comprised of 10 members of the Senate and 10 members of the House. To guide the committees of the Congress dealing with legislation relating to the Economic Report, the Joint Committee is responsible for preparing a report with findings and recommendations on each of the President's recommendations.

Two matters need to be examined at this point. It is one thing for the President to submit a report recommending what he believes needs to be done to achieve maximum employment opportunities. This step marks only the beginning of the task. It is quite another thing to see to it that all the actions that are laid out in the program are, in fact, achieved. The second by no means follows automatically from the first.

First, all Federal agencies involved are not necessarily required by law to do the President's bidding. They are congressional as well as presidential agencies. Second, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has independent authority with respect to monetary policy and, in this respect at least, is not beholden to the President.

Third, the Congress is, of course, an independent body. It must approve all measures designed to raise money or to spend it. If the views of its members are different from those of the President with respect to what should be done, action may be stymied, or the

legislation that emerges from Congress may be substantially different from that recommended by the President. Should the Congress override the President's veto, the legislation will be enforced with little enthusiasm by the executive branch.

Other unknowns are the private sector, State and local governments, and the matter of timing—the President's ability to coordinate all necessary efforts quickly and within the appropriate time frame.

Experience with the procedure outlined in the Employment Act of 1946 has revealed its shortcomings, even leaving aside the substantive question of whether any President's program is the proper one under the circumstances prevailing at the time. On the latter point, of course, a great difference of opinion has existed. Regardless, the Employment Act of 1946 has never produced maximum employment.

Enforcing the Law

Although the Employment Act has been amended since its passage in 1946, these "official" amendments have been of relatively minor importance, dealing as they do with the date of the President's Economic Report, the structure of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the name and structure of the Joint Economic Committee, etc. More basic are the changes made by unofficial amendments to the act—changes in interpretation of the act's language by officials charged with its administration.

Without any change in the statutory terms of the Employment Act of 1946, administrative interpretations have in effect changed what was held to be the statutory intent. One example is the adoption of a level of unemployment higher than 3 percent (once widely regarded as representing full employment) as consistent with the terms of maximum employment pre-

scribed in the act. The Council of Economic Advisers stated that the condition of maximum employment was approximately met in 1973 even though unemployment averaged 4.9 percent that year and did not meet the Council's own interim unemployment goal of 4 percent.

The Council's rationale is that changes have occurred in the sex and age composition of the labor force. A higher proportion of the labor force is made up of teenagers and married women aged 20 and over, and the unemployment rates of these groups have habitually been higher than other groups. These circumstances require, the

Council argues, that the goal be changed accordingly.

A second unofficial amendment is the willingness of the authorities to tolerate high unemployment on the grounds that it will slow down the rate of inflationary price rises. In fact, the authorities have been criticized for encouraging the recession as a device for quenching the fires of inflation by slowing the economy's growth.

Dr. Bertram M. Gross, professor of Urban Affairs at Hunter College, New York City, addressed this stance before the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor on October 8, 1974:



There still is a small but extremely powerful body of opinion in this country that has always favored limited recessions as a way of squeezing the water out of the system, disciplining the trade unions, or presumably cushioning the inflation. But from time to time, and particularly from 1969 to 1974, planned recession has been an official policy of the White House and the Federal Reserve Board. . . . Of course, today, even more than in 1944 and 1945, we hear the argument that additional unemployment is needed to slow down inflation. This is the general view of the White House economists and the present membership of the Federal Reserve Board.


Expanding on the opposition cited by Dr. Gross, Senator Hubert Humphrey concluded before the same subcommittee on the same date:

This law [the Employment Act of 1946] has been trampled upon. It has been ignored. Instead of maximum employment, we have had creeping unemployment and underemployment.

Instead of maximum production, we have had recession in many sectors and an actual depression in the crucial area of home building. Instead of maximum purchasing power, we have had an unprecedented inflation that has eaten into the pocketbooks and curtailed the savings of all low and middle income groups in the country. . . .

This is a violation of the law; and furthermore it is not good economics; and above all it is unbelievably bad social policy.

It is clear that in addition to an appropriate statute, the commitment to full employment by the Government must include strict adherence to the spirit and letter of the law. This task warrants the Government's immediate attention.



Full Employment and Economic Equality

One of the best arguments for a full employment policy is that it is indispensable to raising the relative economic status of racial minorities. Economists who often differ widely on matters of public policy almost uniformly agree that the employment and income position of minorities depends very heavily upon the state of the general economy, especially upon conditions affecting the intensity of demand for labor. Although full employment alone will not guarantee the rights of economic citizenship to minorities, major advancements toward racial equality are unlikely to occur in the absence of an effective full employment policy.

We will trace here some of the evidence that supports the "full employment-minority advancement" thesis, and discuss some additional measures required to assist full employment in achieving racial equality. Because of limitations in the availability of data, most of the discussion will focus on black workers. The experience of blacks, however, can probably be taken as broadly representative of the labor market experiences of other racial and ethnic minorities, especially with reference to the impact of full employment on the relative economic status of different population groups.

Economic Progress of Black Workers

Most black workers were in Southern agriculture or in unskilled nonfarm occupations prior to 1910. As a result of labor shortages during World War I, blacks migrated from the South to the North in large numbers and began to penetrate the semiskilled

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JOBS AND MINORITY PROGRESS

By Bernard E. Anderson

occupations. Between 1910 and 1930, 480,000 black men entered nonfarm jobs in the North and managed to gain a modest foothold in manufacturing, especially in the iron, steel, machinery, and motor vehicle industries.

The employment gains made by blacks in the period of strong labor demand during World War I and the 1920s were virtually wiped out by the disastrous depression of the 1930s. Blacks in manufacturing industries were especially hard hit as rising unemployment took its toll among thousands of semiskilled and unskilled workers. Similar setbacks struck blacks and other workers in the building construction industry. Many blacks lost their jobs to whites for whom a job of lower pay and status was better than no job at all. According to Robert Weaver's assessment of conditions during this period, 25 percent of the male, nonwhite labor force in nonfarm industries was unemployed in 1940, and 15 percent did not even have any of the New Deal work relief assignments. The corresponding figures for white males (16 and 11 percent, respectively) were significantly lower.

World War II and the Postwar Period

The expansion of production in defense-related industries, such as airplane manufacturing, automobiles, ships, and machinery, created numerous employment opportunities which helped pull the Nation out of the depression doldrums. The employment opportunities for blacks, however, did not improve markedly until the expansion of the Armed Forces reduced the white civilian labor force.

The number of blacks in civilian jobs increased by almost one million between 1940 and 1944, in addition to the 700,000 who entered military service. During the entire decade, expanding opportunities and the expectation of industrial employment drew nearly 1.6 million blacks out of the South and into other regions of the Nation, compared to an outmigration of about 1.5 million during the three decades between 1910 and 1940.

The war years saw blacks in large numbers move upward into semiskilled and skilled positions. The number in manufacturing rose from 479,000 to 998,000; those in trade rose from 288,000 to 617,000; and those in professional and semiprofessional occupations increased from 177,000 to 356,000. While these gains occurred, the number of black domestic servants markedly declined.

Many of the economic gains registered by blacks during World War II and the Korean War were lost between 1954 and 1960. Because of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, the pace of economic activity was too slow to prevent a steady rise in unemployment.

From a low of 2.9 percent in 1953, the unemployment rate rose to a peak of 6.8 percent in 1958, and then slipped back to 5.5 percent in both 1959 and 1960. During this period, the rate of unemployment among blacks ranged between 4.5 and 12.6 percent, and was consistently double the rate for whites.

In addition to sluggish growth, the pattern of industry employment growth during the 1950s was unfavorable to a consolidation of gains won by black workers during the previous decade. Industries such as durable goods manufacturing and construction, where large numbers of blacks were employed in well-paying jobs, grew at much lower rates than industries such as retail trade and services, where relatively fewer blacks were employed and wages were generally lower.

These and other unfavorable employment trends had a marked effect on black income. The black/white income ratio reached a peak of 56.2 percent at the height of the tight labor market associated with the Korean War. Largely as a result of sluggish growth and unfavorable labor market trends, the ratio slipped back to 55 percent in 1954 and remained at that level for the following 6 years.

Black Gains in the 1960s

The most recent evidence supporting the "full employment-minority advancement" thesis may be found in the experience of blacks between 1961 and 1969. This was a period of sustained economic growth and steadily falling unemployment rates. In each year between 1966 and 1969, the aggregate unemployment rate was below 4.0 percent, a level most economists would consider full employment. Although unemployment rates in some sectors of the labor force were quite high at this time, most labor markets were characterized by manpower shortages, and job vacancies were reasonably abundant.

The number of blacks in the civilian labor force increased by 1,151,000 during the 8-year period, with adult black women accounting for 57 percent of that number. Black employment grew by slightly more than 1.5 million, including 601,000 adult black men and 755,000 adult black women. Black unemployment fell by 400,000, concentrated among black men, and the black unemployment rate declined sharply from 12.4 to 6.4 percent.

In addition to the general gains in black labor force participation, significant upgrading occurred in the occupational status of the black labor force. The proportion of all blacks employed in white collar jobs rose from 16.1 percent to 27.9 percent with marked growth in the number of blacks in professional, technical, and clerical occupations. The proportion of

blacks employed as skilled craftsmen also increased notably while those in unskilled labor and domestic service declined sharply. Blacks registered respectable gains in some industries such as banking, insurance, and utilities, where black workers in the past had not been greeted with open arms.

All in all, the occupational and industrial advancement of the black labor force during the 1960 decade exceeded similar gains made during any previous period in the Nation's history. The median income of black families in 1970 (\$6,279) was double the level observed in 1960, and had increased from 55 to 64 percent of the median income of whites. It is unlikely that such gains would have been possible without the impetus of tight labor markets from 1965 to 1969.

Lessons from the Historical Record

The historical trends cited above provide only the broadest overview of the ebb and flow of economic opportunity available to black workers under varying conditions of demand in the labor market. The main lesson to be drawn from this record is that racial minorities tend to swim in the wake of the labor market forces that determine the utilization of white workers. Minorities comprise a reserve labor supply; their numbers in the labor force and their employment composition depends primarily on the volume and structure of labor demand. For this reason, tight labor markets and generally low unemployment rates have been a necessary condition for the relative economic progress of racial minorities.

The process of minority group advancement may also be described in terms of labor market theory. As labor markets tighten and job vacancies rise, profit maximizing employers turn increasingly to workers who are less preferred under other conditions. In an effort to meet manpower requirements when unemployment rates are low, many employers lower their hiring requirements and employ workers with lower levels of education, training, and previous work experience. This adjustment process in the past tended to benefit minority group workers.

Labor utilization patterns and wage movements within business firms have also contributed to rising black income during past periods of rapid growth. When the rate of output rises rapidly as a result of expanded demand, many firms increase the number of production workers on overtime schedules before increasing the size of their work force. Also many part-time workers who want full-time jobs are able to find them.

Rapid expansion of output in manufacturing industries generates larger percentage increases in wages for workers at the lower end of the earnings scale than those at the middle and upper levels of the wage dis-

tribution. As a result, the skilled-unskilled wage differential tends to narrow during periods of rapid growth. Although the wages of skilled workers will continue to be higher than those of lower skilled workers in absolute terms, the differential in the rate of wage adjustments improves the relative earnings position of lower skilled workers. Both the wage adjustment trends and the changing utilization patterns within firms have been major determinants of gains in the relative employment and income position of blacks during periods of low unemployment.

The Unfinished Business

Another lesson of history is that while full employment and tight labor markets have been necessary conditions for minority economic advancement, they have been far from sufficient conditions. Many minority people register significant gains in an environment of strong labor demand, while many others may still be left behind in a residue of unemployment, underemployment, and poverty. Among those who seem to be least affected by tight labor markets are black youth and inner-city residents.

The problem of black teenage unemployment is nothing short of scandalous and is a blot on the social consciousness and human values of the Nation. Black teenagers have experienced rates of unemployment of 25 percent and above throughout the past decade and had a recorded unemployment rate of 30.2 percent in 1973. Although white teenage unemployment rates are also significantly higher than those of adults, the disparities are not nearly as wide as for black teenagers.

Partly in response to widespread joblessness, black teenagers and young adults have dropped out of the labor force in alarming numbers during the past two decades (Table 1). Limited access to employment other than in dead end, menial jobs undoubtedly contributes to these trends. This development is probably influenced also by many institutional barriers to full participation in the labor market. The normal problems of young people adjusting to the world of work are compounded in the case of black teenagers by poor public education systems, employment discrimination, and limited supportive services in the community. These conditions prevail despite the otherwise positive effects of full employment.

The extraordinary nonparticipation of young blacks in the labor force makes the conventional measure of unemployment almost meaningless as a guide to the problem of joblessness in the black community. If just one-half the nonparticipants among black teenagers were added to the total unemployed as measured by the standard definition, the black teenage unemployment rate in 1974 would have been close to 60 percent instead

Table 1
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
AMONG YOUTH 16-19
1950-1974

	Labor Force Participation Rates				Unemployment Rate			
	Male		Female		Male		Female	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
1950	67.8	63.1	35.4	41.4	14.9	12.5	15.8	12.6
1955	62.0	69.9	33.0	41.0	13.8	11.2	18.4	9.6
1960	58.4	57.5	33.2	41.0	13.9	14.1	25.1	13.0
1965	53.0	55.2	30.3	39.7	23.6	13.1	32.8	14.2
1970	48.3	58.2	34.5	45.8	25.4	13.8	34.9	13.6
1971	45.7	63.5	31.7	45.7	29.7	15.3	36.1	15.4
1972	47.1	60.7	32.2	48.4	30.1	14.4	38.5	14.6
1973	47.4	62.5	34.7	50.3	28.4	12.6	34.9	13.3
1974	48.5	63.5	34.4	51.9	31.6	13.6	34.5	14.5

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, *Manpower Report of the President*, 1975.

of the reported rate of 33 percent.

The increase in nonparticipation among black adults is less than that for teenagers, but there is still evidence of greater withdrawal from the labor force since 1960 among black males 35-44 compared to whites in the same age group. This suggests the presence of large numbers of "hidden unemployed" among blacks—an issue we will discuss in greater detail below.

Subemployment

Another limitation on the positive impact of full employment is the tenacity of underemployment when the economy is at, or near, full employment. Despite the improvement in the relative position of blacks during periods when labor markets are tight, blacks are still overrepresented among those working part-time but wanting full-time jobs; those with three or more spells of unemployment during an average year; and those working full-time, all year, but still living in poverty.

In 1966 the national unemployment rate was 3.8 percent. In November of that year, however, the U.S. Department of Labor conducted a survey of unemployment in the poverty areas of 13 cities throughout the Nation and discovered unemployment rates as high as 15.6 percent. A substantial number of persons in the communities surveyed were working part-time, but wanted full-time jobs; were working full-time but earning less than \$60 per week; or were not working and not looking for work because they believed they did not have the necessary education, training, skills, or experience.

The composite measure of unemployment and income inadequacy is called "subemployment." Table 2 com-

pares the unemployment rate and the subemployment rate in the poverty areas of eight cities surveyed in 1966—a year of reasonably full employment. The bulk of residents in the selected communities were racial minorities: 70 percent were black; 10 percent, Puerto Rican; and 8 percent, Mexican American.

The inadequacy of the standard unemployment rate as a measure of labor market disparities has gained increasing attention in recent years. Because of the relatively higher rate of discouragement and the lower

Table 2
UNEMPLOYMENT AND SUBEMPLOYMENT
IN MAJOR CITIES
1966

City	Unemployment Rate	Subemployment Rate
Boston	6.9	24.2
New Orleans	10.0	45.3
New York—Harlem	8.1	28.6
E. Harlem	9.0	33.1
Bedford Stuyvesant	6.2	27.6
Philadelphia	11.0	34.2
Phoenix	13.2	41.7
St. Louis	12.9	38.9
San Antonio	8.1	47.4
San Francisco	11.1	24.6

Source: Derived from S. A. Levitan and R. Taggart *Employment and Earnings Inadequacy*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974.






Table 3
**SELECTED MEASURES OF EMPLOYMENT,
 UNEMPLOYMENT, AND SUBEMPLOYMENT
 IN METROPOLITAN AREAS**

	1968		1972	
	Black	White	Black	White
Standard Unemployment Rate	6.4	2.7	8.8	4.5
Adjusted Unemployment Rate	11.1	4.6	13.6	6.9
Subemployment Rate	29.9	10.7	28.8	13.3

Source: Derived from S. A. Levitan and R. Taggart *Employment and Earnings Inadequacy*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974.

rate of continuous work experience among blacks as compared to whites, the standard definition of unemployment is a most deceptive indicator of the status of blacks and others in metropolitan areas in 1968 and 1972 (Table 3).

Despite the strong labor demand which characterized labor market conditions in 1968, blacks had a reported unemployment rate of 6.4 percent, or two and one-third times the unemployment rate of whites. Equally important, if those not in the labor force but desiring jobs are added to the standard estimate of unemployment, the adjusted unemployment rate would have been 11.1 percent for blacks, or about 2.4 times the adjusted unemployment rate for whites.

Finally, if household heads and unrelated individuals earning less than poverty level income and persons working part-time, but desiring full-time jobs, are added to those with unstable employment, the subemployment rate can be estimated. In the "full-employment" year of 1968, one of every three blacks compared to only one of every ten whites in metropolitan areas was subemployed. This evidence provides sufficient reason to conclude that while tight labor markets undoubtedly bring numerous economic benefits to thousands of minority group workers, full employment of the type experienced in past periods of rapid growth will not eradicate economic inequality.

Prospects for Future Minority Progress

While recognizing these limitations, there is much reason to believe that a meaningful full employment policy pursued vigorously and tenaciously can, over a reasonable period of time, go far toward closing the economic gap between minorities and others in the American economy. The term "meaningful" full employment as used here means a policy that guarantees a sufficient number of job opportunities at decent wage

rates for all persons willing and able to work. A key component of such a policy would be public sector jobs through which the government would guarantee job opportunities to those not hired by the private sector.

The impact of such policy on minorities would be twofold: 1) the maintenance of strong labor demand in the private sector would accelerate the hiring and upgrading of minorities through the type of process revealed in the historical record, and 2) the commitment to public sector jobs would insure that those who remain in the pockets of high unemployment in the inner city would have an opportunity to increase their earnings through expanded job opportunities. It is quite likely that the competition between the public and private sectors for workers at the lower end of the job hierarchy would force up wages at that level and further improve the relative earnings of low skilled workers.

One might argue that the Employment Act of 1946, by requiring the Federal Government to promote "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power," imposes an obligation on the President to maintain full employment. The aim of the Employment Act, however, has been interpreted to be "high-level" employment rather than full employment. As a result, full employment has increasingly been defined as the rate of aggregate unemployment most consistent with price stability. This rate has been set at higher and higher levels by successive Presidential economic advisors ever since 1952.

The major factor contributing to the reluctance of national leaders to pursue full employment is the so-called trade-off between joblessness and inflation. According to the trade-off hypothesis, full employment is difficult to achieve in our economy because prices begin to rise at an unacceptably rapid rate before the economy reaches its capacity in the utilization of available labor resources. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, an increasing unemployment rate is not the price the Nation must pay for price stability. The trade-off hypothesis describes a historical relationship between unemployment and the rate of change in wages and prices. To project the same experience into the future implies a commitment to the institutional arrangements, power positions of economic vested interest groups, levels of investment in human capital, and relative distribution of income among productive factors existing in the past.

It is clear that if the Nation's primary commitment were to human dignity and economic quality, then traditional relationships among the major participants in the economy might be modified in ways that would eliminate the troublesome trade-off. Moreover, recent economic events characterized by simultaneously high levels of unemployment and inflation demonstrate that

the trade-off is not an immutable economic law.

Full Employment Policy for Today

The economic experience of recent years demonstrates the need for a new full employment policy that will achieve the goal of maximum job opportunities for all those willing and able to work. An effective policy must include the following ingredients:

1) A commitment to minimum unemployment as the major priority of economic policy. The main objective must be to reduce the unemployment rate to a level consistent with that which exists when individuals are moving between jobs. This means policy planners must see the Federal budget as a device for producing an economic environment in which production, output, and capital investment will be maintained at a high level. This also means monetary policy, controlled by the Federal Reserve Board, must be made consistent with the objectives of job creation in the private sector. The goal must be a maximum number of jobs at decent wages for those willing to enter the labor market.

2) A sufficient number of public service jobs must be available for persons unable to obtain employment in the private sector. Changes in the structure of the American labor force suggest that many women and youths might have difficulty being absorbed in the private sector. An expanded public service employment program, tailored to the changing composition of the work force, can help ease the adjustment process, and thereby reduce the unnecessary waste of unemployment among groups now increasing their participation in the labor force. The public service jobs must be matched by provisions for capital expansion in the public sector in order to protect wage standards and facilitate increased productivity.

3) Labor market services, such as job training, placement, counseling, and job information, must be readily available to those whose skills must be augmented to increase their employability. There must be a strong commitment to community participation in program planning and administration so that local variations in labor markets can be accommodated.

These broad guidelines will produce an environment in which the minority worker's search for employment will not be in vain. The futility of job search in the past has often led blacks and other minorities to withdraw from the labor force, or to accept menial jobs of short duration. By ensuring the availability of private and public sector jobs at nonpoverty wage levels, a new full employment policy will go far toward reducing the disproportionate minority group dependence on public assistance payments. A maximum jobs policy will create realistic market opportunities for many persons who, in the past, could expect little

income other than welfare dependency.

Although an effective full employment policy will help produce economic equality, full employment alone will be insufficient to ensure equal job opportunity. Even in the environment of strong labor demand and tight labor markets, there continues to be a residue of discrimination against minorities and women. Past experience demonstrates clearly that strong enforcement of antidiscrimination laws will be necessary to protect and enhance the opportunities for minorities to penetrate the more secure, prestigious, and well-paying jobs.

In fact, as the Nation begins to recover from the 1974-75 recession, a major question will be "who will get the jobs?" The goal of public policy should be not only to reduce the incidence of joblessness, but also to equalize the occupational status of minorities and others in the labor market. Discriminatory hiring standards, racial exclusion in promotions, sexism in job assignments, inequality in the coverage of fringe benefits, and many other features of the contemporary workplace tend to diminish the potential for minorities to take their rightful place in the hierarchy of job opportunities.

Overt and institutional discrimination have abated somewhat in recent years, but the millennium has not been reached. Despite the gains achieved by blacks during the vibrant years of the late 1960s, a review of the current occupational status of black workers will reveal their continued concentration in the lower level blue-collar and white-collar jobs. Relatively few blacks have penetrated the high wage sectors of skilled blue-collar jobs and the more lucrative positions among professionals, technicians, and sales persons. Even in an environment of full employment, affirmative action will continue to have a major role in ensuring the continued upward mobility of black and other minority workers.

The Right to Work

Much has been said in recent years about the "work ethic." Unquestionably, work has its own rewards, and the opportunity to make a productive contribution to society is the birthright of every American. That is why full employment is a policy required in the Nation today. It is ludicrous to extol the virtues of the work ethic while pursuing policies that perpetuate large-scale joblessness. The future economic gains of the black community depend very heavily on the availability of jobs at decent wages. The right to a job is the foundation for the exercise of most other rights in America. For this reason, the enactment of an effective full employment policy is the best way to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Nation's birth.

FULL EMPLOYMENT: A Women's Issue?

By Ruth Jordan

"Get the women out of the factories and there would be jobs for everyone."

The first time I heard that refrain was in 1960 when I was working on an organizing drive for the International Union of Electrical Workers in Oshkosh, Wis.

It struck me then and has ever since as the basis for the dispute over jobs and equality. The myth of the day was that we would have full employment at decent rates of pay if only the women would return to their kitchens and their families and stop competing for jobs with able-bodied family men.

At the time of the organizing campaign we were still in the depths of a national recession. The plant was 80 percent female; jobs in the area were scarce. The work was being paid at slightly over the minimum wage in an industry where the national norms were \$2 and \$3 an hour higher. The organizing team was made up of men and women who tried to convey confidence in the face of the usual stories of exploitation, fears of job loss, of near-sweatshop conditions. But, in addition, we had to deal with the attitude that things would be better if women were not taking away what were potentially "men's

jobs," working for less money, under poorer conditions.

We tried to turn the organizing drive into an education for the community. We did a case-by-case study of the women in the factory and offered a series of myth-destroying leaflets about the nature of the work force.

The women were white, many lived in nearby semirural communities and traveled long distances to their jobs. They were heads of families—divorced mothers, single women supporting aged and ill parents, young wives of students, and low-salaried workers.

The minority whose husbands worked at nearby auto plants were working for the difference between subsistence and the "American way of life." Without their wages there would have been no cars, privately owned homes, washing machines, college educations, and all the elements of our job-producing consumer market that have made us the outwardly richest, most mobile society ever to exist.

All these facts carried more weight at that time than the current legitimate and just argument that women are entitled to work simply because they want to.

The women's movement has

concentrated on that demand, focusing on the achievements of women in nontraditional jobs and encouraging women to build their identities through work.


In doing so they ignore the fact that while few public officials would dare openly oppose that drive for equality, they support a public policy that is as powerfully damaging.

Those who argue that we ought to stabilize the economy by accepting jobless levels of 7.9 percent in 1976, 7.2 percent in 1977, 6.5 percent in 1978, 5.8 percent in 1971, and 5.1 percent by 1980 are enemies of the women's movement. And those who buy the argument that we can have high unemployment and effective affirmative action at the same time are making a sad mistake.

The activists in the drive for equality for women frequently reject the idea that full employment is a woman's issue. They see it as a veiled effort to divert the attention away from affirmative action programs to what they envision will be a long-range drive for full employment. "What you are saying," one activist told me, "is to wait until everyone has a job before we demand equality."

Is it an "either-or" problem?

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It's important to view the conflict in the light of the accomplishments of the affirmative action programs and the figures on female unemployment.

In 1960, 12 percent of the women in the work force were in professional and technical jobs. In 1970 that number went up to 14 percent and in 1974 another percentage point to 15 percent—a very small gain in potentially high-paying, decisionmaking jobs.

We have concentrated on breaking down barriers against women in craft and related jobs. The Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor has conducted a number of studies on women in apprenticeship programs and substantial efforts have been made to encourage women to take training in work previously considered the exclusive domain of male workers.

Yet a look at the statistics is not

encouraging. In 1960, 1 percent of working women were employed in craft and related jobs. The figure was the same in 1970 and by 1974, with all the efforts that had been made, the figure rose only to 2 percent.

Could the reason be that despite the growing awareness among women of their right to compete for those jobs and the pressure of the law on apprenticeship programs to open these jobs to women, unemployment has barred their progress? The construction industry has been laboring under double digit unemployment for almost 2 years and currently suffers a 15.4 percent jobless rate, with 15 percent of those who are working underemployed.

It is no accident that over a third of all women continue to work in clerical jobs despite an increase in the years of schooling they have completed. The fact is that the majority of women are forced into clerical occupations in a job market which simply cannot afford their higher valued skills and has no jobs to employ their training, despite high level policy statements to the contrary.

A U.S. Government personnel officer told a group of government managers recently that they shouldn't complain about all the masters and doctoral degree candidates applying for secretarial jobs. "This is a buyers' market," he told them, "you can get the best there is for nearly nothing."

That is not the job market in which women will achieve full equality.

Current unemployment rates for women continue to be substantially higher than male unemployment figures as they have since after World War II. Reported unemployment for women stood at 7.5 percent in January 1976, and black women suffered an unemployment rate of 11 percent.

An industry-by-industry survey



of jobs in which women are the majority employees shows even more sharply the devastating effect of unemployment on women workers.

The textile and garment industries, hit by both recessionary pressures and the impact of foreign imports, show a decline of 29.4 percent in the number of jobs between 1973 and 1975. These unemployed female sewing machine operators can take little comfort in the fact that there has been an increase in the number of female jurists over the same period of time, a factor probably directly related to the success and pressures of affirmative action.

Representative Augustus F. Hawkins, cosponsor of the full employment legislation pending before Congress, told a meeting in Washington last year that full employment was both a goal and a strategy. He said:

For any of us to 'go it alone' in restoring merely our own constituencies . . . to any semblance of temporary security can only mean a sham and a short-lived recovery. . . . The experience of my own Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities taught us that in fighting for equal employment opportunities for women and minorities we could not win without full employment. . . . To be in the business of merely transferring jobs from males to females, or from whites to blacks, makes no sense at all. . . .

Some might argue that it is the thrust for affirmative action, not the drive for full employment that is the diversionary tactic. They would say that the drive for job equality helps only a small percentage of women, that the gains are not lasting, and that it promotes divisions between working people that can only help those who want a competitive labor market from which to choose the best qualified labor at the lowest possible cost.

But the facts show that full employment alone is not enough to achieve equality.

Two generations of American women have worked in both full employment and recessionary job markets since World War II. There was not much recognition of their ability to manage and make decisions until affirmative action made significant changes in the law. The women who did "men's work" in the factories during World War II did not go on to higher jobs in the industries after the war. They returned home or took lower paying jobs in deference to the returning men.

Individual law suits, the drives for leadership in unions by the Coalition of Labor Union Women, the campaign by business women for equal access to credit, have made significant changes in the climate of acceptance. Full employment and legal requirements to insure equal opportunity are partner issues.

The National Commission on International Women's Year has just debated this same question and, after rejecting a recommendation from its Committee on Women in Employment to support current legislation for full employment, endorsed a compromise wording calling on the President "to implement the Full Employment Act of 1946." In other words, the Committee accepted the principle of full employment as a women's issue because "a disproportionate share of all poor families are headed by women. . . ." and endorsed a 30-year-old measure to achieve the goal.

The Commission was walking a tightrope directly related to that intangible issue of political climate. It feels limited by what it views as the "realities" of American politics.

And it's true—those conservative realities, both economic and political, do have an impact on how we

order our priorities.

In the same way, an atmosphere of full employment, of expansiveness, of opportunity, would be a favorable atmosphere for the achievement of many other issues that women consider essential.

The demand for day care would be irresistible if every woman who wanted to work was guaranteed a job. The delivery of health care could be vastly improved in an atmosphere where everyone had access to prepaid health care plans.

Public services—education, transportation, recreation—would be greatly strengthened if city, State, and Federal government were the employer of first resort, not last resort.


Contrast the unmet needs of the Nation with the unemployed talent and energy of its people. Much could be done, if only we were organized to do it.

As cochair of the National Committee for Full Employment, Coretta Scott King recently testified about the tragedy of racism and unemployment in Atlanta, Ga.

"In several Atlanta neighborhoods," she said, "there is now the sorry spectacle of elderly men and women going from door to door literally begging for work. When a staff member of my organization told one such woman that he had no work to offer, she burst into tears and pleaded for 15 cents. She did not even have the bus fare to return home.

"What good is the legal right to sit in a restaurant," Mrs. King added, "if one cannot afford the price of its food? And what is the promise of fair employment when there is no employment?"

Is the equality of opportunity offered in today's economy merely the equal right to collect unemployment insurance and welfare? Support for full employment, affirmative action, and enforcing antidiscrimination laws can mean a clear "no" to this question.



ANALYZING ANTI-SEMITISM

Indifference Is Cause for Concern

By Lawrence Rubin

Last year, pollster Louis Harris undertook to examine the oft-heard proposition that American popular support for Israel is crumbling, and that domestic anti-Semitism might be on the rise. Reporting in the *New York Times Magazine* (April 6, 1975) the results of soundings his organization had taken, Harris revealed that support for Israel was higher than it had been immediately after the 1973 Yom Kippur War and that the level of anti-Jewish feeling in the United States remained fairly constant and relatively low.

He found, for example, that 52 percent of the American people sympathize with Israel, while only 7 percent is pro-Arab. Among leadership groups, Harris said, the level of support for Israel is even greater.

Yet Harris also discovered that American Jews consistently underestimated the pro-Israel sentiment of the American public and, in his words, "really take off into flights of fantasy . . . on the subject of anti-Semitism itself." On a list of attitudes, Jews commonly overrated the degree of hostility toward them among the general public. Harris cites the finding that 62 percent of Jews believe that non-Jews think Jews to be overly aggressive. However, his polls show that "no more than 31 per cent of the non-Jewish public believes this." In summary, Harris wrote, "The inescapable conclusion is that American Jews have somehow lost touch with the reality of where anti-Semitism really is."

This counterpoint between the generally favorable attitudes toward Israel and Jews evidenced by the broader community and the Jewish perception of these attitudes points up a pervasive sense of vulnerability that has been growing among Jews over the past few years. The community is becoming sporadically gripped by premonitions of disaster for both Israel and American Jewry. Increasingly, manifestations of insecurity and the loss of self-confidence are found in the records of Jewish communal deliberations over such problems as Israel's international isolation, the impact of the Arab boycott, the stemming of the tide of Soviet Jewish migration to Israel, and the continuing unwillingness of Israel's neighbors to normalize relations.

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The measure of this developing malaise can be observed in the official appraisals of the status of Jewish community relations. In 1972, for example, the authoritative *Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations* developed by the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council opened its discussion of anti-Semitism by declaring:

In no place and at no time in modern history have Jews as a group been more secure, attained higher status or greater affluence, than in the United States in the present generation. Jews are among the eminent in virtually all major professions, in political posts both elective and appointive, and in the judiciary; many are among the socially prominent; and the group as a whole is upwardly mobile economically. . . .

Continuing, the *Plan* attacked assertions of impeding persecution as "irresponsible and reprehensible."

Only 2 years later, however, the language that had glowingly attested to Jewish security and progress had become unadorned, even pained, as the *Plan* for 1974-1975 observed, "Anti-Semitic activities and utterances—both overt and in the guise of anti-Zionism—increased during the past year, particularly in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War."

The demythologizing of Israel's military predominance in the Middle East has been accompanied by a magnification of the perceived threat to Jewish security. This is not a mere coincidence. The centrality of Israel's existence to Jewish experience and self-definition has been manifest throughout Jewish history and constitutes the cornerstone of Zionist philosophy. Thus, a threat to the survival of Israel strikes at the core of Jewish consciousness and threatens to undermine in a profound way the relationship of Jews to the world around them. To the Jewish community, the professed goal of Israel's Arab enemies, namely, the extirpation of the Jewish state, is anti-Semitism, for the existence of Israel is crucial to the survival and continuity of Jewish consciousness.

Measuring Anti-Semitism

While it is tempting to dismiss as overreaction and group paranoia the utterances of concern emanating from within the Jewish community, to do so is to ignore the reality of contemporary anti-Semitism as it is seen, at any rate, by Jews themselves. The anti-Semitism that Harris measured is not the anti-Semitism that Jews fear. Though unfavorable stereotypes of Jews (as aggressive, acquisitive, etc.) are held, as formerly, by about 30 percent of the broader community, Jews simply do not regard this as evidence that they are no more vulnerable than before.

When Jews overestimated the level of anti-Jewish

feeling in the Nation in Harris's poll, they were possibly reacting not so much to specific attitudes and issues but rather to the general condition Jews perceive themselves in today. Obviously, this view is highly speculative. Yet a sizable body of evidence exists to support the contention that the Jewish community's uneasiness reflects its fears not of traditional anti-Semitism but of a new kind of anti-Semitism that, though more subtle, is as insidious as older, better-known varieties of anti-Jewish behavior.

In the film, *The Garden of Finzi-Continis*, the destruction of the Italian Jewish community during World War II is depicted as having taken place in an atmosphere of bureaucratic calm bordering on tropic indolence. A Jew raising a voice in protest at his evacuation is portrayed as unthinkably rude and impolite. The chilling impact of the film derives from the tension between the indifference of the bureaucrats following the prescribed procedures and what we know to have been the final outcome of this administrative action.

The film provides a useful insight into the nature of bigotry in a bureaucratic society. It suggests that at the core of bias in a mass society is not merely active hatred of another group, but rather a callous indifference to it and a willingness to disregard its vital interests. We recall, for instance, the outcry in the black community some years ago when it was suggested that the civil rights issue would benefit from a dose of "benign neglect." Blacks believed this policy of indifference to their interests masked the administration's active hostility toward black needs.

With regard to anti-Semitism, this theme has been developed by Arnold Foster and Benjamin R. Epstein in their widely-discussed book, *The New Anti-Semitism*. Foster and Epstein argue that there has been a palpable erosion of friendship for the Jews in recent years, particularly in the wake of the Six Day War of 1967. The principal characteristics of this new antipathy, they say, are an indifference and insensitivity to the rights and interests of Jews, even by thoroughly respectable individuals and institutions. Thus, whereas traditional anti-Semitism is characterized by hatred of Jews as alleged parasites, deicides, or whatever, the new anti-Semitism encompasses indifference to the civil and human rights, needs, and interests of the Jewish community.

The Foster-Epstein thesis has been vigorously debated within the Jewish community and often criticized because of the tendency of the authors to overdraw their case. They have been scolded for unreasonably widening the class of anti-Semites to include virtually all those who are critical of Israel. Indeed, they seem at times to have characterized the failure to be pro-

Israel as itself anti-Semitic. Moreover, their definition of "indifference" is not sufficiently qualified.

Earl Rabb, writing in *Commentary*, notes that there can be an indifference toward Jews that does not represent an anti-Jewish commitment as much as "a failure of commitment to the relevant principle of universal civil rights." Though the effect might be equally deleterious to Jews, this kind of indifference—as manifested, for example, in a person's willingness to support an anti-Semitic candidate with whom he or she agrees on other issues—cannot legitimately fall within the purview of anti-Semitism.

Though not without its faults, *The New Anti-Semitism* provides a useful basis for examining the nature of anti-Jewish feeling in America today. Its depiction of anti-Semitism as something beyond an active dislike of the Jews allows us to evaluate the transformation that seems to be occurring in the image of the Jewish community in America. For there are disturbing indications that the limits of good will toward Jews as a group are being approached.

Minority or Majority?

Ironically, it is the success of the Jewish community that has precipitated the de-legitimizing of its interests. Jewish upward mobility, disproportionate representation in the liberal professions, and impact in the arts are seen as evidence that Jewish interests are by definition different—and, therefore, of a lower level priority—than the interests of other, less advantaged groups in society.

Moreover, the centrality of the threat of Israel's survival to the Jewish agenda has tended to obscure the intensity with which Jews share the concern of other communities for meeting the unanswered domestic needs of the disadvantaged. As Earl Rabb has observed, "increasingly the only ethnic groups which are seen as having legitimacy in America are those which are economically deprived." Though Jews may still be perceived as a minority community, they are certainly not regarded as disadvantaged in terms of their actual accomplishments and continuing access to opportunities for advancement.

Perceived as having entered the mainstream of American life, Jews are occasionally accused of sharing in—or even being representative of—the hostility of the majority toward less advantaged groups. The black nationalist writer, Harold Cruse, in *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, a mean-spirited blueprint for a black intellectual revolt against "cultural imperialism," theorizes about the emergent Jewish domination of America's cultural heritage. By defining the Jew as the surrogate of white cultural oppression, the Cruse thesis legitimizes the position that the Jew is the particular

enemy of what black nationalists see as their liberation movement.

Such thinking has stimulated a nationalist literature suffused with vicious anti-Semitism. It is, of course, hardly surprising that some radical blacks are anti-Semitic. What is disturbing to Jews, however, is the ease and notoriety with which anti-Semitic writings can find their way into print. Furthermore, the Jewish community wonders about the indifference of the broader community to the question of anti-Semitism when it lionizes and attributes significance to the words of an individual who, as an artist, has conjured up a poetry capable of inflicting bodily injury to Jews.

There is no question that anti-Semitism reflects a minority viewpoint within the black community. All the polls indicate that blacks are no more anti-Jewish than society at large. Indeed, ample proof exists of good will toward Jews by the organizational black leadership. On matters of importance to the Jewish community, for example, the black members of Congress have shown themselves, as a group, deeply responsive to Jewish sensibilities. Despite strong, vocal support for the Arabs by some within their communities, a large majority of black congressmen and women supported aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War and backed the Jackson-Vanik amendment to ease emigration restrictions against Soviet Jews.

More recently, a prestigious group of black Americans launched Black Americans to Support Israel Committee (BASIC) whose primary purpose is to foster better relations and understanding between the black community and Israel. In addition to a majority of the members of the Congressional Black Caucus, the charter members of BASIC include Bayard Rustin, A. Phillip Randolph, Lionel Hampton, Coretta Scott King, Vernon Jordan, and Roy Wilkins. BASIC was a very active opponent of the United Nations' draft resolution equating Zionism with racism and must be given considerable credit for influencing nearly half the black African states to break away from the powerful, Arab-dominated majority and refuse to endorse that calumnious resolution.

The Role of Israel

While the identification of the Jewish community with societal forces inimical to the interests of disadvantaged minorities has been given some vocal expression, it is the identification of the Jew with Israel that has given rise to the most serious evocations of the sort of insensitivity to Jewish interests *qua* Jewish interests that was discussed above. It is apparent to the Jewish communal leadership that the intense loyalty many American Jews feel for Israel is insufficiently understood by their fellow Americans.

Whether by inability or design, the indestructable link between American Jewry and Israel is misperceived and even held up as evidence of something sinister by many Americans, including many who should know better.

In November 1974, General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was reported to have expressed amazement at the power of the so-called Jewish lobby and, in a thinly-veiled warning, described a scenario in which the people, discomfited by another Arab oil embargo, "set down the Jewish influence in this country." Finally, almost as an afterthought, Brown rediscovered the role of the Jews in world politics (it had been thought buried with the remains of Joseph Goebbels' Nazi propaganda ministry) by revealing that Jews and Jewish money owned the banks and newspapers in America. An outraged Jewish community called upon the President to determine the General's fitness to remain in office, and President Ford confronted and severely chastised the General.

While surpassing other statements in its viciousness and ignorance, the Brown remarks were only one instance of a series of vaguely discomfiting statements that had emanated from high government officials in recent memory. Former Vice President Spiro Agnew's assaults on the media and the liberal Eastern establishment was seen by many Jews as a veiled criticism of their community.

Former Attorney General William Saxbe's contribution to this cacophony was his observation that, in the past, Jews tended to be attracted to the Communist Party more than other people. Finally, the Watergate tapes revealed that President Nixon warned his family against becoming too intimate with show people since, as he put it, the arts are run by the Jews and left wingers.

In each instance, the rhetoric of the remark suggests that Jews are to be mistrusted, their interests suspected, and that there is something harmful to the general welfare by association with them. In essence, the motives of Jews *qua* Jews have been questioned, not by racists, not by discredited spokesmen for extremist organizations, but by the leaders of our Nation.

This mistrust, moreover, seems to have become more pervasive in recent years rather than less. The Daniel Yankelovich organization, for example, in a winter 1975 poll of industrial association executives, discovered that most felt that "the Jewish lobby is powerful and that this is not necessarily good for the United States." Moreover, among the chief criticisms emanating from the New Left is that Israel's American Jewish supporters are both militaristic and chauvinistic in their uncritical support of Israel. One prominent political leader of the New Left characterized the Jewish commitment to Zionism as "a blind nationalism," and

called this "the worst aspect of Jewish culture."

Indeed, underlying the extensive probing of the past few years into the nature and extent of Jewish political participation has been the question of Jewish loyalty to the United States. Palpably unsympathetic and insensitive to Jewish concerns regarding Israel, former Senator William Fulbright claimed that 70 Senators were somehow automatically responsive to Israel's needs. His remarks have been echoed more recently on the Senate floor by Senator James Abourezk, who wondered when the Senate would cease being Israel's unquestioning benefactor.

In scoring ethnic interference in foreign policy, Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield raised the ancient canard of dual loyalty by notice, "My father and mother were immigrants from Ireland, but my loyalty is not to Ireland, it is to this country—unquestioned." Yet, unendingly, the loyalty of Jews to the United States has been brought into question by the intensity of the Jewish commitment to Israel.

Israel and Anti-Semitism


As noted a historian as Dr. Arthur Hertzberg has observed the paradox occasioned by the rebirth of the State of Israel. Since the Holocaust (in which 6,000,000 million people lost their lives because of the accident of Jewish birth) revealed that the Jews could not achieve total assimilation, Israel became the focus of the survivors' dream of living as normal and secure members of the world community. Unhappily, the reestablishment of Israel, after millenia of persecution, has become the focus of a resurgence of anti-Semitism. As Dr. Hertzberg has observed, "At the center of almost all the quarrels in which Jews are involved today stand the existence of the state of Israel, the support that it draws from all the Jews of the world, and the emotions that it evokes among them."

To Jews, support for Israel is the essence of communal Jewish identity. The tension between the ashes of Auschwitz and the desert that was made to bloom in Palestine evokes an imagery of rebirth, as potent and compelling in its way as the initial birth of the Jewish people recounted in the Old Testament. Jews cannot understand how, in a pluralistic society, their commitment to Israel can be misperceived as a challenge to their basic loyalty as American citizens. Most Jews would say, laughingly, that if Israel attacked the United States, they would back the United States.

But the absurdity of the proposition is what is important to them. It is simply a false choice to ask Jews to declare an American loyalty or a Jewish one. They are elements in a single vibrant entity, namely, the emergence and assertion of a Jewish vision of

the world.

Unquestionably, Jewishness has always been relevant in matters of political choices in the United States. Largely because of historic anti-Semitism, with its accompanying dispersion and quarantine of the Jews,



DeAlford

the community developed transnational institutions embracing, among other things, a distinctive language, culture, and folklore. This history of persecution has provided Jews with a finely honed sense of insecurity and an abiding concern for the status of world Jewry.

The political choices that Jews have made in the United States have been liberal. Fear of anti-Semitism—of “it” happening here—has created consciousness within the Jewish community that it is in its self-interest to work for the development in America of a strong, secular State, one in which religious affiliation is not a test of citizenship, that stresses equal opportunity for all, and works for the betterment of the lot of all men and women.

The Jewish communal strategy has never sought to assert special Jewish interests above the interests of the broader community. Rather, it has been rooted in the belief that Jewish liberalism is not inimical to Jewish self-interest, for they converge in the vision of a just society. Jews have always believed that their security is safeguarded by the stability of the social order, and therefore they engage in politics with enthusiasm, conviction, and no reticence whatsoever.

Those who seek to cast aspersions on the political behavior of Jews are doing so either out of ignorance of the Jewish community or out of a deeper, more insidious desire to wrest from them the distinctiveness of their relationship with Israel. This latter group recalls the attitude of the medieval Inquisition that granted to Jews the same rights as others. All they had to do was to divest themselves of their Jewishness. Jews will continue acknowledging their concern for world Jewry in general and Israel in particular without shame or embarrassment, for not to do so is to deny the unique relationship of Jews everywhere to the history and ethos of the Jewish people.

The Arab Boycott

Yet the greatest threat to Jewish security in America comes not from the fulminations of radical black nationalists or from the recitation of debased canards by General Brown, but rather from indifference to discrimination against American Jews arising from the Arab boycott against Israel. Some thoughtful communal leaders claim to see evidence supporting the view that the United States government has legitimized a policy that could result in the sacrificing of the rights of Jews to the interests of the commercial community.

The Arab boycott predates the creation of the State of Israel and, in its beginnings, was designed to forestall the establishment of the Jewish state by crippling its economic base through a boycott of goods produced in Jewish Palestine. In 1951 the Arab League

intensified its economic warfare against Israel by expanding the boycott beyond its primary restriction against Israeli products to include a secondary boycott of non-Israeli firms with substantial economic involvement in Israel.

This strategy is enforced through the League's Central Boycott office in Damascus, Syria, which has compiled a list of thousands of firms (including about 1,500 American concerns) which are considered unsuitable for trade with the Arab countries by virtue of their commercial relations with Israel or, secondarily, with firms other than themselves that deal substantially with the Israelis.

Though somewhat capriciously and arbitrarily enforced, the consideration put forth by the Arab League in blacklisting a firm is whether it is “pro-Zionist.” This can mean a variety of things. In some instances, it seems to imply that a firm supports Jewish organizations or philanthropies. Alternately, it can mean that a firm has prominent Jews, identified as supporters of Israel, in top management positions.

While concerned about the impact of the boycott on Israel (and the quadrupling of oil prices, yielding significant investment dollars to the Arabs, obviously inhibits Israel's investment potential), the American Jewish community sees in the boycott a grave and unyielding challenge to the rights of American Jews to continue enjoying equality of opportunity in commercial and financial circles. Offering American commerce literally billions of investment dollars derived from Arab oil sales, the boycott threatens to coerce businessmen into looking for reasons to acquiesce in the Arab boycott and to engage in acts of discrimination against Jews as a means of avoiding potential conflict and loss of lucrative contracts with the Arabs.

The Jewish community is fearful lest the Arab boycott have a chilling effect on the willingness of businesses to risk hiring Jews for positions that might bring them in contact with potential Arab clients and customers. The Jewish community is not opposed to the return or recycling of a sizable portion of Arab petrodollars in the United States. It believes that such activity is inevitable and also would be a welcome stimulus to our economy. At the same time, Jews insist that Arab investments cannot be permitted to distort the political institutions, business practices, or foreign policy of the United States.

There is some evidence that American business has been engaging in a limited amount of discrimination against Jews as a result of Arab pressure. *Newsweek* cited the case of three Jewish engineers working in California who were dismissed when their firm signed a multimillion dollar contract with Saudi Arabia. The Investor Responsibility Research Center

reports that over two dozen of the boycott requests filed with the Department of Commerce indicate that the Arabs requested American businesses to take discriminatory action against Jews or Jewish firms. Finally, most Jewish organizations report sporadic inquiries made of them by private citizens who suspect that they are being passed over for promotion or assignment to a particular project to avoid possible misunderstanding with a new or potential Arab customer.

It is the position of the Arab League that the boycott does not discriminate against Jews, merely against "Zionists." However, considerable evidence exists to indicate that this is not the case. Congressman Henry A. Waxman of California, reporting a conversation he had with the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, noted that Faisal "made it clear that he made no distinction between the State of Israel and Jewish citizens of whatever nationality." When asked what his policy was toward Jews seeking to visit or work in Saudi Arabia, Faisal told Waxman that he regarded all Jews as friends of Israel and therefore enemies of Saudi Arabia.

Indeed, there is evidence that the Saudi government considers Jews to be among those undesirable persons who should not be granted visas to enter that country for commercial reasons. The business community does not seem to buy Arab protestations that they wish to bar only Zionists, not Jews. As the *Wall Street Journal* editorialized, the Arab blacklist "appears less to be an attempt to undermine Israel than an attempt to inject anti-Semitism into Western business practice."

Official Acquiescence . . .

While President Ford denounced the Arab boycott as "totally contrary to American tradition," there have been indications that the government has quietly acquiesced in the boycott for many years. It was reported to Senator Frank Church's Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regularly checked personnel to be assigned to Arab lands and systematically eliminated Jews, even though this practice, in the judgment of the Chief Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

One large corporation, with a multimillion dollar contract facilitated by the Department of Defense to train Saudi militiamen, initially signed a contract containing restrictive clauses designed to winnow Jews out of the project. And it is generally understood that no Jews will ever be attached to the embassy staff in Riyadh or be assigned to our country's military mission in Saudi Arabia.

The American Jewish Congress recently filed suit

against Secretary of State Kissinger and other government officials charging that they have violated the constitutional rights of American Jews by promoting programs in Saudi Arabia from which Jewish participation is barred. The complaint cites the experience of a University of Wisconsin professor who applied for, and was denied, a position within a consortium of universities to provide services as part of a joint U.S.-Saudi agreement.

The professor charges that the only reason for his exclusion from the project is his Jewish religion, ancestry, and identity. Another professor, in the same complaint, argues that he was deterred from applying for a position on a Bendix-Syanco project in Saudi Arabia because of the well-known restrictive and discriminatory policies of that government. In both instances, the American Jewish Congress claims, the United States government promoted these allegedly discriminatory projects as part of the effort to promote better relations between the Arabs and the United States.

The government views that Arab boycott as a manifestation of the persistent conflict in the Middle East. Hence, it believes that the boycott will be resolved as the larger political conflict, of which it is a part, diminishes. The government insists, however, that it does not countenance discrimination against American citizens. According to Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the government forthrightly declares its opposition to religious discrimination during every meeting with potential Arab investors. Thus, it tries to draw a distinction between the Arab boycott of Israel and discriminatory activity based on religious or ethnic grounds. The U.S. believes that the former will be only be solved within the context of an overall Middle East peace, while the latter should be dealt with through normal diplomatic relations.

The distinction that the U.S. government attempts to draw, however, cannot be maintained in practice, for the boycott against Israel necessarily involves Arab exclusion of firms that are considered "Zionist" in some way. It is apparent, therefore, that the Arab boycott incessantly involves decisions regarding the religious affiliations of individuals who are associated with companies negotiating commercial agreements with the Arabs.

It is widely believed in the Jewish community that the Department of Commerce has been consciously protecting firms that have agreed to participate in the Arab boycott. Such government action, Jews feel, infringes upon their right to be assured non-discriminatory treatment in hiring and advancement. When former Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton was resisting the release to the U.S. Congress of the names of firms complying with the Arab boycott,

he allowed the impression to be created that the government was prepared to safeguard the confidentiality of firms that may have engaged in illegal discriminatory practices against Jewish American citizens.

... and Official Resistance

In other ways, the government has been forthright in its efforts to combat boycott-induced discrimination. The Department of Commerce itself has strengthened the reporting requirements for companies that receive boycott requests, and it will no longer circulate information regarding overseas trade opportunities if these include boycott requirements. The Federal Reserve Board has issued a directive informing banks that it disapproves of their complying with the Arab boycott. In a widely-heralded move, the Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit against the Bechtel Corporation, charging that its compliance with the boycott constitutes a conspiracy "to boycott people and firms."

It has not been suggested by any responsible Jewish leader that the government has been behaving anti-Semitically or has intentionally and malevolently disregarded the interests of its Jewish citizens. Rather, the community is fearful that any slackening of official support and enforcement of America's anti-boycott policy could generate a climate, an atmosphere, a sense of governmental indifference to the interests and rights of Jews that could, under more volatile circumstances, be used to justify more direct and repressive actions. The flow of wealth and power to the Arabs is perceived as exactly the sort of development that could be the precursor of a shift in attitude toward Jews.

Thus, when Jews told Louis Harris of their fear that America would sacrifice its support of Israel to ensure the continuous flow of Arab oil, they were actually reflecting a disquietude at the potential repercussions of a growing Jewish powerlessness, especially when measured against the growth in Arab wealth. One needs to look back no further than the last session of the United Nations to find evidence of the horrifying use to which that wealth can be put.

A Sense of Caution

It is a confluence of events, many of which are insignificant when taken alone, that has stimulated a sense of caution within the Jewish community. While "traditional" anti-Semitism continues at levels to which Jews have become accustomed, the promise of continuing difficulties for Israel and Jews everywhere has darkened the horizon of Jewish future. The most frightening aspect of remarks such as those made

by General Brown is not so much the contemptible misperception of Jews, but more the threat that Jews may have to be put in their place someday.

To Jews, the past is prologue, and such sentiments chillingly evoke flame-filled images of the Holocaust. The distance from indifference to Jewish rights to hostility toward them is not very great. And anything that seems to hasten the pace from the former to the latter—even apparent government indifference to a largely hortatory, largely unenforceable statement of boycott policy—instills great fear and consternation within the Jewish community.

As noted previously, the communal strategy of the Jews has been to seek for others the same rights and opportunities it sought for itself. The Jews, though, have not been immune from the growth of ethnic consciousness over the last decade. Their interests, like those of other groups—blacks, Native Americans, Spanish surnamed, women, etc.—have come to be defined more in particularistic terms than in the past.

While the advantages of assuming responsibility for one's collective destiny are obvious, there are certain pitfalls as well, certain threats to the nature of a pluralistic, democratic society. As the various groups in our society begin to look in upon themselves more and more, the gap between them widens. Thus, the potential for misunderstanding and hostility grows, particularly in times of economic and social hardship. To some extent, one can trace Jewish apprehension about the presumed hostility of the non-Jewish community to the distancing that has taken place between Jews and non-Jews, between any one group and all other groups.

One senses that the tremors of insecurity that have rocked the Jewish community and caused a serious jump on the seismograph of Jewish vulnerability can be found among other groups as well. As Jews perceive an alarming rise in the level of anti-Semitism in the Nation, blacks undoubtedly are concerned about a resurgence of racism, while the Spanish surnamed are convinced that access to the mainstream of American society continues to be blocked by forces indifferent to their needs.

Despite the assurances of the pollsters that anti-Semitism is not a serious problem, the Jewish community is gripped by a sense of urgency and uncertainty. While we may no longer hear the rhapsodic announcement of communal progress and security of 1972, it would be an error to mistake for unrelieved tragedy the transitional nature of 1976. For there is a tension between hardship and opportunity, and the Jewish community is evolving the strategies for reestablishing the momentum toward communal progress and security within the context of the broader society. After all, these are uncertain times for everyone.

reading and viewing

COMMISSION REPORTS

Milliken v. Bradley: The Implications for Metropolitan Desegregation. Proceedings of conference held November 9, 1974, sponsored by the Commission. Issues discussed include legal, educational, housing, and economic implications and political science perspectives concerning metropolitan school desegregation. *152 pp.*

Making Public Employment a Model of Equal Opportunity. Report of proceedings of Regional Civil Rights Conference II, held in Boston, Mass., September 22-24, 1974. *58 pp.*

Women and Poverty. Female population characteristics, income, and employment in the United States and Chicago, broken down by ethnicity. Reviews effect on women of public assistance and manpower programs; child care legislation; and the plight of elderly women. (Staff paper prepared for hearing held in Chicago, June 1974). *174 pp.*


A Long Day's Journey into Light. Reviews school desegregation in Prince Georges County, Md., from 1953-54 to 1972-73. *464 pp.*

Una Mejor Oportunidad para Aprender: La Educación Bilingüe Bicultural. Spanish translation of **A Better Chance to Learn: Bilingual-Bicultural Education.** (see Digest Spring 1975) *289 pp.*

Using the Voting Rights Act. Handbook on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1970 and 1975. *42 pp.*

State Advisory Committee Reports

The Farmington Report: A Conflict of Cultures (New Mexico Advisory Committee). A study of the complex social and economic relationships between the Navajo people and the Anglo residents of Farmington and San Juan County. Covers community attitudes, the



administration of justice, health and medical services, alcohol abuse, employment, and economic development of the Navajo Reservation and its real and potential impact on the city of Farmington and San Juan County. *181 pp.*

Indian Employment in New Mexico State Government (New Mexico Advisory Committee). A followup to the Commission's **Southwest Indian Report** (1973), this report examines the employment situation for Indian people in State government. Despite new policies and programs instituted since 1972, no significant change has occurred in the total number employed, and those that are employed are concentrated in lower job levels. *80 pp.*

Toward Police/Community Detente in Jacksonville (Florida Advisory Committee). Report examines police treatment of black citizens in the city of Jacksonville and studies the sheriff's office, focusing on its hiring and promotion policies, human relations and public contact, complaint procedures, and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funding. *68 pp.*

Nebraska's Official Civil Rights Agencies (Nebraska Advisory Committee). Report examines both State and local official civil rights agencies and finds that most of the agencies, created to avoid Federal intervention rather than promote civil rights activities, face similar problems: inadequate budget, false expectations of client groups, insufficient staff, lack of adequate staff training, and limited powers. *109 pp.*

The Availability of Credit to Kansas Women (Kansas Advisory Committee). Examines the policies of establishments that grant retail and interbank credit cards and the role of credit bureaus in consumer credit. Report finds that credit bureau policies on filing women's credit histories often aid creditors in discriminating against women, particularly women who are married, divorced, or widowed. *86 pp.*

A Decade of Waiting in Cairo (Illinois Advisory Committee). Report provides an up-to-date analysis of the situation in Cairo since the Advisory Committee's open meeting in 1966 and the Commission's hearings in 1972, and documents the response of local, State, and Federal agencies to city needs. Issues examined include employment, education, housing, health, and law enforcement. *41 pp.*

Civil Rights and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974—Volume I: Livonia (Michigan Advisory Committee). Initial report on the civil rights aspects of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, focusing on the attempts of suburban Livonia to obtain funds. In three areas—citizen participation, assistance for eligible persons, and civil rights compliance—Livonia's application under the 1974 act and the process leading to its development have been deficient. Report finds that HUD lacks the necessary staff capacity to review and monitor grant programs for civil rights compliance adequately. *39 pp.*

Georgia Prisons (Georgia Advisory Committee). Examines inmate labor, health care, disciplinary procedures, legal services, education, recreation, library facilities, and inmate organizations and activities, with recommendations for change. *70 pp.*

General Revenue Sharing in St. Louis City and County (Missouri Advisory Committee). Reports on nature of expenditures, citizen participation, discrimination, and Federal involvement. Serious shortcomings are alleged by the Committee. *82 pp.*

Prisons in North Carolina (North Carolina Advisory Committee). Reviews selected North Carolina prisons, including accommodations, work, recreation, education, health, discipline, etc. Contains findings and recommendations. *62 pp.*

Civil and Human Rights in Oregon State Prisons (Oregon Advisory Committee). Reports on prisoners' rights, with recommendations concerning staff training, education and vocational programs, work, disciplinary procedures, communications, and rehabilitation. *78 pp.*

Protecting Inmate Rights: Prison Reform or Prison Replacement? (Ohio Advisory Committee). Advocates greater protection of inmate rights, replacement of most State prisons with community-based facilities, and an overhaul of the prison system's basic structure, including policy, planning, and budget matters. Separate summary available. *177 pp.*

The Six-District Plan: Integration of the Springfield, Mass. Elementary School (Massachusetts Advisory Committee). Credits the school department and public officials with making desegregation in Springfield a peaceful event, while noting that problems still remain. *50 pp.*



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