

Black White Perceptions

RACE RELATIONS IN GREENSBORO

November 1980



—A report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights prepared for the information and consideration of the Commission. This report will be considered by the Commission, and the Commission will make public its reaction. In the meantime, the findings and recommendations of this report should not be attributed to the Commission but only to the North Carolina Advisory Committee.

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—A report prepared by the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

ATTRIBUTION:

The findings and recommendations contained in this report are those of the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights and, as such, are not attributable to the Commission. This report has been prepared by the State Advisory Committee for submission to the Commission, and will be considered by the Commission in formulating its recommendations to the President and Congress.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

North Carolina Advisory Committee to the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
November 1980

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Dear Commissioners:

The North Carolina Advisory Committee submits this report, **BLACK/WHITE PERCEPTIONS— Race Relations in Greensboro** as part of its responsibility to advise the Commission about civil rights problems within this State. The study was initiated by the North Carolina Advisory Committee as a result of conflicting assessments of the causes of a confrontation in Greensboro on November 3, 1979, during which 5 persons were slain at an anti-klan rally.

This report and the Advisory Committee's findings and recommendations are based on information gathered in a field investigation that included an open meeting in Greensboro on February 26, 1980. The focus of the study has been the Greensboro community's own perspective of where race relations stand today in the city that two decades ago was witness to the first of the Nation's sit-ins aimed at achieving equal treatment under the law for all persons regardless of race. It would be more accurate, perhaps, to refer to the Greensboro communities rather than to the city as a whole. Views presented to the Advisory Committee during the research and at the open meeting revealed marked differences between how Greensboro's white and black residents feel about the substantive civil rights progress that has been made in this thriving North Carolina city.

In addition to finding a city divided by position and political influence as well as by race, the Advisory Committee found a lack of meaningful communication among the various elements of the population, and no effective mechanism for establishing such communication.

The recommendations in this report are directed to the Greensboro community at large and to local elected and appointed officials. The radical and sanguine confrontation of November 3, 1979, has affected everyone living in Greensboro in some fashion. The Advisory Committee earnestly hopes that the common ordeal will act as a catalyst to bring about improved relations among the black and white citizenry. Greensboro's official soul-searching, through its ad hoc Citizens Review Committee, for the answer to the question, "Why Greensboro?" indicates a desire to improve. The city officials' cooperation with the Advisory Committee in its investigation of race relations also is a positive sign.

Although this report calls for no action by the Commissioners, we urge you to concur with our recommendations and to assist us with our follow-up monitoring of progress toward improved race relations in Greensboro, North Carolina.

Respectfully,

W.W. Finlator
Chairperson

**THE NORTH CAROLINA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE
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The North Carolina Advisory Committee is grateful to the staff of the Commission's Southern Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for its help in conducting this study of race relations in Greensboro. The study was the principal staff assignment of Edith Hammond, Equal Opportunity Specialist. Members of the study team who interviewed citizens of Greensboro, representatives of civic and political organizations, and city officials in preparation for the February 26, 1980 factfinding meeting included Richmond Doyle, Miriam Grayboff, Courtney Sicheloff and Katie Harris. Regional Attorney Clinton Fried prepared the summaries of statements made at the Greensboro meeting which comprise this report. Miriam Grayboff wrote the findings, recommendations and other portions of this report. Portia Raby, Joan Harper and Emma Allen furnished secretarial services. Staff worked under the supervision of Bobby Doctor, Regional Director, and Idalia Morales, Deputy Regional Director.

The North Carolina Advisory Committee wishes to thank the officials of the City of Greensboro for their cooperation in providing employment data and also for permitting the use of the Council Chambers for the factfinding meeting.

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In Perspective

Background

A benchmark in the evolvement of civil rights for all of this nation's citizens occurred in 1960 in Greensboro, North Carolina, when four black college students suffered personal indignities to peacefully assert their rights to be served at a Woolworth's lunchcounter. Greensboro's civil rights experiences, however, have not always been peaceful. In the long wake of disturbances following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., serious and bloody demonstrations unfolded in May 1969 at the then all-black Dudley High School and predominately black North Carolina A&T State University.¹

Violence again touched Greensboro on November 3, 1979, when five members of the Communist Worker's Party (CWP) were killed while taking part in a "Death to the Klan" rally and march in front of the predominantly black Morningside Homes housing project. Carloads of armed members of the Ku Klux Klan, accepting the CWP's challenge to appear at the rally, drove through the narrow streets of the assembly area, and were confronted by demonstrators who struck their vehicles with heavy sticks.²

Several Klansmen jumped from their vehicles, retrieved weapons from the trunks and began firing at the march participants, killing five. Twelve people were arrested. Although no uniformed police were present at the time the shooting started, within 1 minute of the shooting police were on the scene and 12 persons, who identified themselves as Klan

members, were arrested and charged with the shooting.³ All of the persons arrested resided outside of Greensboro.⁴

Four of the victims of the November 3rd shootings were buried on November 11, 1979, following a rain-soaked funeral procession which included 450 marchers. A combined protective force of police and National Guard outnumbered those in the procession by two to one.⁵

—On February 1, 1980, Greensboro commemorated the 20th anniversary of the lunchcounter sit-ins with a variety of events organized by the February One Committee of Greensboro and the A&T State University Student Government Association.⁶ The following day a major civil rights march and an anti-Klan rally were conducted in Greensboro without incident with the Police Department out in force to maintain the peace.⁷

On February 26, 1980, the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights conducted an open, fact-finding meeting to inquire into the status of race relations in the city of Greensboro. This report summarizes views presented at the meeting by persons representing a cross section of Greensboro's citizenry. The Committee examined the views in an attempt to ascertain the status of black/white relations and the extent to which the November 3rd shootings have impacted relations between the races.

While making no attempt to present a detailed account of the actual shootings or to assess responsi-

¹ For a detailed description of this episode see *Trouble in Greensboro*, a report of the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, (March 1970).

² Greensboro, North Carolina, Police Department, "An Administrative Report of the Anti-Klan Rally, November 3, 1979", November 19, 1979, (hereinafter cited as "Administrative Report of November 3, 1979").

³ *Greensboro Daily News*, November 4, 1979, p.1.

⁴ Administrative Report on November 3, 1979.

⁵ *The Miami Times*, November 15, 1979, p.6.

⁶ *Greensboro Daily News*, February 1, 1980, p.1.

⁷ *Greensboro Daily News*, February 5, 1980, p.1.

bility for what transpired on November 3, 1979, this report by the Commission's Advisory Committee of North Carolina offers suggestions—largely from Greensboro residents themselves—on how black/white relations in Greensboro might be improved.

The City

Greensboro, manufacturing and university center, and North Carolina's second largest city, has an estimated 1980 population of 166,300, of whom 52,400—31.5 percent—are non-white.⁸ The city's largest employers include jean-maker Blue Bell, textile giants Burlington and Cone Mills, and P. Lorillard cigarette manufacturers. While Greensboro's economy appears to be healthy, blacks in Greensboro rank far behind the general population in earnings.⁹

Surveys made in 1978 for the Chamber of Commerce reported that Greensboro's \$18,390 median per household effective buying income (personal income minus taxes) was more than \$4,000 above that of North Carolina and about \$2,000 higher than that of the average household in the United States.¹⁰

Twice as many black households were living below the poverty level than were white households in 1970—26.8 percent compared to 12.5 percent. Actual median earnings for all experienced persons in the Greensboro labor force was \$5,363 in 1970; for blacks it was \$3,765.¹¹

As with residents of North Carolina's first and third largest cities, Charlotte and Raleigh, the median number of years completed in school for Greensboro citizens is a high 12.2. Major universities in Greensboro include the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the predominantly black A&T University and Bennett College, in addition to the small predominately white schools, Guilford and Greensboro Colleges.

County Labor Force

At first glance the total employment picture in Guilford County looks relatively good, compared to many other counties in the United States. The total unemployment rate in the most current (1975) statistics for Guilford County is 7.1 percent. Whites,

who comprise 79.4 percent of the Guilford County labor force of 148,380 show an unemployment rate of 6.3 percent. Blacks who make up 20.5 percent of the available labor force in the County, are recorded as having an unemployment rate of 10.3 percent in the total job market.¹²

When the labor force statistics are evaluated within racial groups, the employment picture is less encouraging for minorities. Although whites comprise nearly 80 percent of the entire work force, they comprise 70 percent of those people who are unemployed, and blacks, who make up approximately 20 percent of the labor market, constitute nearly 30 percent of the unemployed.¹³

City Employment

Of 1,900 persons employed by the City of Greensboro, North Carolina, 1,159 or 61 percent are white male and 415 or 22 percent are black male. Thus men comprise 82 percent of the employees. Of the 318 female employees who make up the remaining 18 percent, 12 percent or 236 are white and 4 percent, 82 are black (See exhibit 1).

Job and Salary Levels

Not one black, male or female, who works for the city earns over \$25,000 a year. In the "officials/administrators" job category, 27 white males and 1 white female do draw such salaries. Only 3 black males are categorized as officials/administrators out of a total of 89 in this group. No black female is in the officials/administrators category in any salary range.

In the 49 decision-making positions which command yearly salaries ranging from \$16,000 to \$24,999, 46 are male—43 white and 3 black—and 3 are white female.

Among 101 "professionals" who receive \$16,000 to \$24,999 77 are white male, 8 are black male, 14 are white female and 2 are black female. In the "technical" category, the pattern is similar with 84 out of 88 in the \$16,000 to \$24,999 range being white male, 3 black males and 1 white female. The only black females in this category—2—are in the \$10,000 - \$12,999 range.

⁸ Guilford County, Planning Department, "Update, a Planning News Digest," Vol. 3, September 1972.

⁹ U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *General Social and Economic Characteristics*, North Carolina, 1970 Census of Populations, No. PC (1)-C35, pp. 282 and 303 (hereinafter cited as *Social and Economic Characteristics*).

¹⁰ Greater Greensboro Chamber of Commerce, "Here's Greensboro", 1979, p.9.

¹¹ *Social and Economic Characteristics*, pp. 89 and 93.

¹² City of Greensboro, Police Department "Affirmative Action Plan Update," October 1979, p.7.

¹³ *Social and Economic Characteristics*, p. 254.

EXHIBIT: 1**City of Greensboro, Full-Time Employees, June 30, 1979.**

FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES		TOTAL	MALE			FEMALE		
Job Categories	Annual Salary		White	Black	Other	White	Black	Other
Officials	\$10,000-12,999	1				1		
Administrators	13,000-15,999	11	9			2		
	16,000-24,999	49	43	3		3		
	25,000+	28	27			1		
	Total	89	79	3		7		
Professional	\$ 4,000- 5,999	1	1					
	10,000-12,999	6	2			4		
	13,000-15,999	42	14	6		16	6	
	16,000-24,999	101	77	8		14	2	
	25,000+	3	3					
Total	Total	153	97	14		34	8	
Technical	\$ 8,000- 9,999	7	4			3		
	10,000-12,999	65	46	3	1	13	2	
	13,000-15,999	141	123	13		5		
	16,000-24,999	88	84	3		1		
Total	Total	301	257	19	1	22	2	
Protective Service	\$ 8,000- 9,999	28	13	10		4	1	
	10,000-12,999	121	78	24		14	5	
	13,000-15,999	294	244	43		5	2	
	16,000-24,999	47	42	5				
Total	Total	490	377	82		23	8	
Para-Professional	\$ 8,000- 9,999	18	5	3		6	4	
	10,000-12,999	39	10	8		11	10	
	13,000-15,999	7	7	1		6		
	16,000-24,999	1	1					
Total	Total	65	16	12		23	14	
Office/Clerical	\$ 6,000- 7,999	21	2	1		10	8	
	8,000- 9,999	87	5	2		53	27	
	10,000-12,999	69	12	1		48	7	1
	13,000-15,999	11	4			6	1	
Total	Total	188	23	4		117	43	1
Skill Craft	\$ 8,000- 9,999	4	1			3		
	10,000-12,999	83	62	19		2		
	13,000-15,999	22	21	1				
	16,000-24,999	2	2					
Total	Total	111	86	20		5		
Service Maintenance	\$ 6,000- 7,999	85	21	59			5	
	8,000- 9,999	237	88	141	3	3	2	
	10,000-12,999	162	98	59	3	2		
	13,000-15,999	18	16	2				
16,000-24,999	1	1						
Total	Total	503	224	261	6	5	7	
Total Full-Time	Totals	1,900	1,159	415	7	236	82	1

Source: City of Greensboro Personnel Department

Only in the lower paid jobs—"office/clerical," and "paraprofessional" categories—do the black female employees show up in percentages roughly proportionate to that of the paraprofessionals.

Among persons categorized as office/clerical, 69 draw from \$10,000 to \$12,999. Of these, 12 are white male, 1 is black male; 48 are white female, and 7 are black female.

Perceptions

City Officials

E.S. Melvin, Mayor, City of Greensboro

Extending the City of Greensboro's welcome to the members of the Advisory Committee and Commission, Mayor Melvin implored the panel to develop a record that spoke the truth. The Mayor emphasized that the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi Party members who appeared in Greensboro on November 3rd were neither members of the Greensboro community, nor were they welcome (T-10-12).*

In the Mayor's opinion, the Communist Workers Party (CWP) had indicated "by word and deed" that they actively sought the confrontation on November 3rd. Melvin termed the CWP's action which precipitated the terrible events of November 3rd as "dare you-to-step-across-the-line" maneuvers (T-13). The Mayor was critical of media coverage of the events in Greensboro which drew conclusions that race relations in Greensboro were poor and that discord and ill will abounded. In Melvin's view, such reporting may have sold newspapers but did little to "further the prospects of truth and peace, especially in regard to race relations on our city of Greensboro" (T-14).

The Mayor described Greensboro as "a quiet community that allows everyone to have full rights and to express them openly and freely on all subjects" and is tolerant of the ideals, principles, beliefs, customs, traditions, and hopes and dreams of others. Greensboro did, however, eschew notions of crime and evildoing (T-15).

* Transcript of the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Open Meeting on Race Relations and Civil

Thomas Osborne, City Manager, City of Greensboro

Mr. Osborne began his remarks by saying that Greensboro was not the home of either the Klan or the Nazis. He expressed skepticism with the characterization of the CWP's November 3 rally as "assembling for a demonstration in support of civil rights" saying the CWP had promoted its demonstration as a "death to the Klan rally"(T-19). (The Advisory Committee had used such a descriptive phrase in its letter of invitation to the factfinding meeting).

Regarding Greensboro's employment and treatment of minorities, Osborne stated that Greensboro had adopted an affirmative action plan in 1976 that was "comprehensive, viable, and . . . achievable. . .," a plan to which it has since adhered (T-19). According to Osborne, the Greensboro plan had been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and that the U.S. Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management) has approved Greensboro's entire personnel operation T-19-20).

Osborne described the city's training programs as ranging from basic education, such as teaching illiterate employees to read and write, to sophisticated in-house training of top management (T-20). He told the panel that the city offers monetary inducements and work schedule arrangements to any employees who wish to take college, technical, or other training courses and seminars in their fields (T-20-21). On three occasions in recent years the

Rights Developments in Greensboro, February 26, 1979 (hereafter cited as (T-page number).

city—with the help of A&T State University and Guilford Technical Institute—has established extensive 'how to study' courses for police officers wanting to take promotional examinations. Osborne stressed that training is available to all employees without regard to race, sex, or national origin (T-21).

The city has endeavored to be innovative with regard to minority recruitment at various levels by sending teams of recruiters to predominantly minority and female colleges, armed forces discharge centers, and by direct contact with influential members of the black community. These efforts, Osborne acknowledged, have been only partially successful (T-21). According to the city's statistics, minority city employment has steadily increased since 1975 from 22.3 to 26.5 percent in 1979 which Osborne termed "well above parity in the overall city". Osborne also noted that increased minority employment occurred the same year—1974—that a pay and promotion plan was instituted. He termed the plan "unique in governmental systems" (T-22).

Osborne stressed that minorities who have entered city employment, have been promoted through the system and earn the same as all others who hold like positions. He said that as a consequence there has been no animosity created between the races or sexes among city employees. Osborne acknowledged that several complaints concerning the city's personnel practices have been filed with the EEOC, but emphasized that to date not a single charge has been sustained (T-23).

In response to Committee questioning, Osborne stated that the city's employment of minorities has a large effect on race relations (T-31). Asked to explain why, taking into account a 31 percent black population, city employment records reflect that of 89 people classified as officials or administrators there were only three black men and no black women or other minorities. Osborne stated that one of the problems was their lack of availability in the workforce. He said the city is attempting to alleviate the problems through training and recruitment, and pointed out that minorities comprise 40 percent of the paraprofessionals and 25 percent at the clerical level (T-32-24).

In Osborne's opinion race relations have improved greatly over the past several years—and even since the incident of November 3rd—but not to the extent that efforts in the area of race relations

can cease. Although relations are very good, improvement is possible (T-40).

James F. Wright, II, Executive Director, City of Greensboro Human Relations Commission

In Mr. Wright's opinion one of the most critical problems facing the city is the feeling people have of being disenfranchised and alienated; a problem that transcends race (T-42). In Wright's view, the city faces even greater challenges following the events of November 3rd, particularly in terms of being responsive to members of the working class poor and protected classes.

To make an analysis of what occurred November 3rd and study its impact on Greensboro's race relations, the Human Relations Commission established the Citizens Review Committee (CRC). The Committee's final report was to be submitted to the Human Relations Commission which, in turn, would give it to the city council (T-43).

In an answer to questions from the panel, Wright explained that the CRC was created because some members of the community felt Commission members, who are paid by the city, would not conduct an independent review of the November 3rd incident. Also the Commission's workload had increased greatly since the shootings (T-44-45). In reviewing race relations in Greensboro, Wright stated that the Commission has resolved approximately 1200 of the 1500 complaints it had received and that the majority of those complaints involved unfair treatment in employment. Wright also indicated that housing constituted a serious problem (T-47). In Wright's opinion race relations in Greensboro during the previous decade were as good as in any other North Carolina city. He remarked that minorities have increasingly moved into the mainstream, but there are still members of 11 races who require assistance (T-48-49). As an example of the city's progress, Wright cited the "New Horizons Task Force" created to study open housing and funded with \$15,000 of the city's community development funds (T-49-50).

National Civic Organizations

Dr. George Simkins, President, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Greensboro Chapter

Dr. Simkins began his remarks to the Committee by listing a series of events he felt revealed "the conditions of Greensboro's heart" (T-52). Simkins

recounted that many years ago the city, to restrict blacks from playing golf, leased its own Gillespie Park golf course to a private group for \$1. According to Dr. Simkins the State of North Carolina cooperated in this effort by imposing jail sentences on blacks who attempted to use the golf course. Only the U.S. Supreme Court and a commutation from the Governor kept these sentences from being served. In addition, 2 days before the golf course was due to be integrated pursuant to Federal court order, the clubhouse was burned leading to the course being condemned for 7 years (T-53).

Dr. Simkins then told of the city having had two swimming pools, one black and another white, and that the 2-year-old, \$250,000 white swimming pool was sold for \$85,000 to avoid integration, while at the same time Winston-Salem, 24 miles away, had 10 integrated pool facilities (T-54).

According to Simkins, when two black students began attending the previously all-white Caldwell School, the city aided the white students in transferring out of the school. Only through lengthy litigation had Greensboro become the last major city in North Carolina to integrate its schools, some 17 years after the decision (T-54).

Dr. Simkins said that blacks had been excluded from hospital facilities both as patients and physicians until Federal courts struck down discrimination in hospitals built with Federal funds (T-55).

In Simkins' opinion, Greensboro's political system serves to keep political power in the hands of wealthy whites who reside in one part of the city—the Northwest quadrant which comprises only one-third of the city's population (T-55). According to Dr. Simkins, since 1961, 90 percent of the members of the City Council have come from this northwest section (T-55). Since 1968 at least three proposals have been put forth to make the city's government more representative through various forms of district representation. While other major North Carolina cities have adopted some form of ward representation, in Greensboro all such plans have been defeated (T-55-56). Simkins noted that a new referendum, backed by the Chamber of Commerce is pending but is opposed by a majority of the City Council (T-56).

Dr. Simkins maintains that housing patterns and vestiges of past discriminatory laws have served to cause less money being spent for capital improvements and parks and recreation in the predominately black southeast quadrant of the city than in any

other section. According to Simkins, spending for recreation by quadrants for the past decade has been \$4.5 million in the northwest; \$2.8 million in the southwest; \$2.7 million in the northeast; and in the southeast, \$360,000. Based on these figures, Simkins maintained, development of recreation facilities in the southeast "has been less than equal" (T-56).

Dr. Simkins commented that Greensboro's Police Department discriminated in the recruitment, hiring, placement, transfer, promotion and discipline of blacks. Simkins also commented that the Police Department hired its first black officer in 1944 but it was not until 1966 that a black was promoted to sergeant and not until 1976 was a black promoted to the rank of lieutenant.

The picture, according to Simkins, appears even more dismal for women, as none were hired until 1953 and no female officers hold a rank above patrolman. Simkins said that women were not able to join the patrol division until 1972 (T-57).

Police promotions, in Simkins' opinion, are based largely on the subjective evaluations by supervisors who include virtually no blacks or females, thereby allowing discrimination to run "rampant." He felt no effective administrative system existed to remedy a policy which recruits blacks and females only in limited numbers and then confines them to positions with little or no promotion possibilities (T-58).

Dr. Simkins said black progress in Greensboro could be gauged in terms of "sit-ins, protest marches, boycotts, picketing, rent strikes, disruptions, threats of disruption, and Federal court suits brought by blacks in attempts to secure constitutional and civil rights." It is Simkins' opinion that the city has responded with "a pattern of intransigence and preoccupation with law and order rather than a commitment to the elimination of underlying racism" and that attitudes "have retrogressed to where we were 25 years ago" (T-59).

In response to panel questions, Dr. Simkins replied that: he perceives no difference between race relations in Greensboro before and after the events of November 3rd; progress in economics and politics has been slight; and discrimination by the city in employment and every other phase is "rampant." He characterized race relations in Greensboro as "very poor" (T-60).

George Gardner, Executive Director, North Carolina Civil Liberties Union

Mr. Gardner told the panel that the Civil Liberties Union handles many inquiries concerning police misconduct, public accommodations and student rights, but that in his 6 years as director very few complaints have been received involving the Greensboro Police Department. To his recollection, only one such complaint, involving a white woman, even proceeded to court. It is his impression that the Greensboro Police Department is more considerate of the rights of the people it deals with than most other police departments in the state. In support of this statement, Gardner noted that following the November 3rd shooting, the police arrested 14 armed and dangerous men and two members of the CWP without a single shot being fired, or a single charge of police misconduct being filed (T-62-63).

Gardner stated that his office receives very few complaints of housing discrimination and only two have gone to court. The organization does get a number of employment discrimination complaints, but refers them routinely to the EEOC or to private counsel. Gardner observed that fewer complaints are received from city employees than from Federal workers (T-63-64).

Gardner judged race relations in Greensboro to be average or better than average, but acknowledged that Greensboro was not colorblind, nor is it working toward that goal in areas not mandated by law, with city government being the exception. Gardner sees the sufferance of such nonconformist groups as the CWP in Greensboro as a measure of the city's tolerance (T-64).

In Gardner's view, the November 3rd shootings had racial implications in that special Klan hatred has always been directed toward whites who worked for equal justice with blacks and also perhaps by the feeling on the part of the Klan that they could come into a black section of town to harass demonstrators while they would not have done so in a white neighborhood (T-64).

According to Gardner, the attitude of top level government officials toward individual rights is one of expediency, as indicated by his organization's having had to go to court to end personal searches of Greensboro Coliseum patrons and by the maneuvering on the part of Mayor Jim Melvin to thwart plans for the February 3rd march (T-64-65).

Further evidence of the power structure's recalcitrance in affording racial equality is found in the

resistance to changing the form of city government from an at-large election system to a ward system, with single members elected from each district. This has been proposed on three occasions by the black leadership, but has been opposed by ruling elements of the Chamber of Commerce and the affluent white northwest quadrant of the city. The opposition which the ward system has received from the northeast and southwest section of the city, in Gardner's opinion, has been "significantly racist" (T-65).

Gardner stressed the need for city leaders to refuse to participate in racially segregated activities and to have the courage to speak out on the personal and social evils of racism (T-66).

Gardner termed the Klan the tip of an iceberg which lies under the surface of white religious and political fundamentalism. He said it was only by thawing the iceberg of racial hatred that racial justice could be achieved in Greensboro (T-66).

In response to Committee questions, Gardner stated that there is compliance with the law in Greensboro which has brought about some social changes. He added, however, "we have not had much change in the hearts of the people." He termed the city's compliance with the law as only minimal (T-66). Gardner sees no significant change in race relations since the November 3rd shootings. Gardner maintains that no all-white leadership in the city can bring about a colorblind society, or recognize the disabilities under which much of the population must labor. He concluded, "When the whistle blows at five o'clock, people go back into their segregated existences" (T-67).

Political Organizations

Nelson Johnson, Spokesperson, Communist Workers Party (CWP)

Mr. Johnson began his remarks to the Committee by stating that the meeting was being conducted "in a growing atmosphere of racial tension and anti-Communist hysteria" (T-129). He characterized the increased activity of the Klan and the Nazis prior to the Greensboro hearing as an attempt to cover up the "Daylight assassinations" which occurred in the Morningside community and to divert attention away from the real problems people are enduring (T-131). In Mr. Johnson's opinion the November 3rd "massacre" was but an extension of the bitter opposition the CWP has received over the past

several years. The November 3rd shootings were different only in their degree of blatency and the Klan and Nazi involvement (T-130-131). After eulogizing the CWP members who were killed, Johnson said that the Nazis and Klan were being used as "shock troops of capitalism" for the purpose of turning one race against the other thereby diverting the focus of attention from the real source of people's political and economic problems (T-137).

Johnson criticized the Committee for inviting the Klan and Nazis to the hearing stating that "it was abhorrent to every instinct of justice that the apostles of racism and murder are provided a forum to further spread their poison" (T-139-140).

Johnson was also critical of the police handling of the November 3rd shootings, noting that the police: gave a copy of the CWP parade permit which showed the entire parade route to a known Klan member; failed to warn CWP members that armed Klansmen and Nazis were approaching the demonstration area, and met the Klan-Nazi caravan as it entered the city but offered no protection to demonstrators. Johnson maintained further that there was no basis for confusion about the march's starting point as he had personally informed Captain Gibson of the march's point of origin and neither the Klan nor police surveillance officer had been confused. Even after the caravan was enroute to the march site, however, police reinforcements had not been called (T-140-141).

Johnson also accused the FBI and State Bureau of Investigation of following and harassing supporters and members of the CWP and witnesses to the Morningside shootings (T-144). He insisted that these two organizations and the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice pressured local ministers and groups to forego church services planned for November 18 and also interfered with the participation of black college students in the February 2nd march (T-144). Johnson charged the FBI and the Klan with having worked hand in glove (T-144).

Johnson asked the Commission to use its influence to make available the entire FBI and Community Relations Service's files concerning the November 3rd shootings and any information held by the Justice Department, as in Johnson's opinion, it is only through disclosure that the cover-up could be ended and some progress toward justice could be attained (T-146).

Responding to questioning from the Committee, Johnson stated that his group was going to continue its organizing efforts and persist in telling the truth about the November 3rd shootings. He warned that what transpired in Greensboro should not be construed as an isolated event and expressed his view that the Committee could play a valuable role in disseminating the truth (T-148-149). He reiterated his dissatisfaction with the results of the police department's own inquiry into the November 3rd shootings, stating that even if it was assumed that the police had no other motive, it would be impossible to conclude they did all they could to ensure the safety of the marchers (T-150).

Johnson was somewhat skeptical of the investigation being conducted by the City Human Relations Commission, calling it "an advisory body with no real power" (T-151). Johnson indignantly rejected the characterization of the events of November 3rd as a "shoot-out." He said the marchers had only two handguns available to them, and noted that if the Klan feared retaliation, or if they feared police intervention, the Klan would not have come into the Morningside area and stopped their vehicles to retrieve weapons from their trunks (T-154-155).

Ed Whitfield, Co-Chairman, Concerned Citizens Against the Klan

Whitfield expressed the view of his organization that the November 3rd incident and the flurry of activities and kinds of investigations conducted in its wake were very much a reflection of the "real" character of race relations in the Greensboro area. Whitfield said that the timing of the above events dramatized the fact that there is an "acute lack of political and economic power among black people here in this community," but acknowledged that Greensboro was not unique in this regard (T-116).

According to Whitfield, immediately following the November 3rd incident, the Mayor used the black vote to get elected by showing sensitivity, but once elected he heaped praise on the police department's handling of events and "consistently spat in the face of the black community relative to this incident." Whitfield illustrated his comment by citing the Mayor's rejection of a list of demands made by his organization and the passage, instead, of a resolution praising the police department's handling of the November 3rd incident and subsequent events (T-117-118).

In Whitfield's opinion, the contempt the city had shown for the black community relative to the events of November 3rd and since had served to stimulate new determination among blacks to organize so that they will be less helpless in the future, as well as to create an awareness of the need to develop black leadership (T-119-122).

Replying to Committee questions, Whitfield stated that since November 3rd, blacks have become more aware of their lack of power and this awareness has caused the black community to coalesce and fight for their own interests (T-125-126). He reiterated previous remarks to the effect that in his opinion police and city officials had complicity in the November 3rd murders either through direct involvement or stupidity in failing to provide adequate protection (T-123, 126-127).

Virgil Griffin, Grand Dragon, Invisible Empire of the National Ku Klux Klan, Mount Holly, North Carolina Chapter

Mr. Griffin prefaced his statement with criticism of the Committee's letter inviting him to speak at the open meeting because of the characterization of the November 3rd demonstration as "a civil rights march". He said that the Communist Party was assembling for a "Death to the Klan" rally and "to advocate violence to overthrow our government" (T-255).

Griffin acknowledged that there were racial problems in North Carolina but maintained whites and blacks could work them out, and that outside Communist agitators coming into Greensboro were the ones who were trying to make everyone think blacks and whites hate each other, which was not true. He described such abuse of police officers as calling them "pigs" and spitting in their faces as "attempts to bring the morals of our children down" (T-256).

Responding to a panel query for details on what the Klan was doing in Greensboro in November and since, Griffin said their plan in November had been to come and stand silently on the sidewalks on Lee Street and fly a Christian and American flag. He said they never got there because the Communist Party "attacked the Klan with sticks, beating the cars. . .shouting. . ." "Here's the scums. . .kill them. . ." and that "they [Communist Party members] fired shots at the Klan" (T-257).

Griffin responded to panel queries about his perceptions of civil rights problems or progress by

saying that the Communists were trying to turn the people against one another and by this means overthrow the government.

Asked if he maintained that the enemy is no longer the blacks, Mr. Griffin reiterated that the enemy was the Communist Party, adding, the same enemy against whom thousands of soldiers lost their lives in fighting the Viet Nam and Korea wars. He maintained that Communist Parties were all over the state, and that their plan to take over North Carolina called for attacking the Klan as a strategy for turning blacks to their side: "To get the blacks, we're [the Communist] going to attack the Ku Klux Klan" (T-259). He stated that if attacked, the Klan would fight back, maintaining that the government should have more respect for those who lost limbs and lives in Viet Nam than to permit the Communist Party to "run up and down the streets of Greensboro flying the Communist flag, rallying to overthrow our government" (T-260).

Asked if blacks were now welcome to join the Klan, the Grand Dragon replied they were not. Responding to questions from the panel about whether the history of this country's enemies included the Nazi Party in Germany, Mr. Griffin responded that "I know the United States fought for a Communist country by the name of Russia against white Christian soldiers." He said, as a member of the Ku Klux Klan, he was not there to talk for or against the Nazi Party and suggested other questions concerning that group be asked of Harold Covington. Answering questions regarding events of November 3rd, Griffin said: he was not familiar with the Morningside area, that he was not in the first or last car in the caravan but, according to the police, was in the sixth car; and that he believed there were more whites than blacks in the group assembling for the Communist Party march. Asked if the Klan had planned to bring ammunition and guns on their trip into Greensboro, he replied "no" and said he did not know how guns happened to be available on November 3rd (T-265-268).

Harold Covington, National Party Leader, National Socialist Party of America (Known as Nazi Party)

Mr. Covington prefaced his remarks by claiming an early kinship and familiarity with Greensboro, having lived in Burlington and Chapel Hill in his youth, and having used Greensboro's public library facilities. Covington informed the panel that he was

a veteran of two armies, the U.S. Army, in which he had served briefly in Vietnam, and the Rhodesian Army, and thereby had "fought communism twice in my life on the field of battle." Commenting on what he interpreted to be the Advisory Committee's purpose in conducting the Greensboro hearing—i.e., "to investigate violations of civil rights"—Covington protested that the Klan and National Socialist Parties had had their rights violated "right, left and center." He gave his account of how his group, intending to stage a peaceful counterdemonstration to the Communists, had been attacked by a mob wielding "chains, knives" and various weapons and that one (of the Communists) had pulled out a pistol and fired the first shot (T-271-272).

The Nazi leader remarked that he had personally given orders to his men not to carry guns, but said National Socialists and Klansmen, believers in the 2nd Amendment, do habitually carry firearms, and a shotgun and rifle had been in the trunk of one of the vehicles in the procession. While trapped, and under handgun fire, the vehicle occupants had retrieved the guns from the trunk to defend themselves (T-271-272).

Covington protested that the arrest of 14 men by the Greensboro police had been in violation of their rights, adding that the main reason he was appearing at the hearing was to let everyone know they would not rest until those 14 innocent men were returned to their families. He said that although they had been bending over backwards not to irritate Greensboro citizenry, that if those men who had only been defending themselves, were sent to prison, "then we intend to make Greensboro a center for National Socialist agitation" (T-275). He reminded the panel that the national headquarters of the Nazi Party is to be moved to North Carolina—probably Raleigh. If the 14 are sent to prison, he concluded, "you're going to have Nazis coming out of your ears" (T-276).

Responding to questions from the panel, Covington said he felt a responsibility to all white people, but most especially to those in his organization. He maintained that the staging of a peaceful demonstration was guaranteed under the 1st Amendment and that what had happened was a result of their having been attacked. His conscience for what had happened afterward was clear, he said, adding, "death is always tragic in war or otherwise, but they should have thought of that before they attacked us" (T-280-281). Covington said what had happened in

Greensboro proved that the races cannot get along and that integration is a costly failure (T-283).

He maintained that bringing black people here as slaves was "a horrible mistake" which should not be compounded by "trying to force them into our society," but should be corrected "by sending them back to their own land" (T-283-284).

In answer to a panel question, Covington said he did not regard Jews as white but Asiatic, and that all such unassimilable, non-whites would, under a national socialist government, be "repatriated to their countries of origin" (T-284). As for American Indians, he proposed autonomous reservations with an enforced zero population growth, and added that Indians were not a problem but Mexicans and Puerto Ricans were (T-285).

Local Groups

Ervin Brisbon, Member, Citizens Review Committee

A former resident of Morningside Homes, Mr. Brisbon told the Committee that in his opinion racism is the key element in race relations "in Greensboro, in the state, and in the country." Racism, he said, is as common as "Mom's apple pie and violence" (T-69).

According to Brisbon, the Klan is a physical manifestation of white racism (T-71). He stated that although the 1st Amendment guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, when that expression extends to racial violence and hatred as witnessed by Greensboro on November 3rd, then the right to equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, should be imposed to protect the life and livelihood of victims of the Klan. In Brisbon's view, the Klan should be outlawed (T-72).

Stressing that deficiencies in the educational system, including social promotions, serve to perpetuate inferior education, Brisbon also recounted difficulties in the state's higher education system which is underrepresented by blacks in both the student body and faculty (T-73-75).

Brisbon, in reply to Committee questions concerning race relations in Greensboro, was of the opinion that they have been "overshadowed by camouflaged tokenism and the majority of the black community is still suffering in poverty, unemployment and the seeds of racism" (T-77). According to Brisbon the communist organization has been working in the

impoverished black community "as a stepping stone to other achievement. . ." (T-78). The aim of the Communists, he said, is to get soldiers and people to follow a movement with the aim of overthrowing the capitalist system (T-79).

The Klan, in Brisbon's opinion, came to Greensboro out of its hatred for the communist organization and those who organized the black community. Describing Greensboro as being comprised of two separate societies: one white, the other black with the majority of the blacks in Greensboro suffering from the social and economic effects of racism, Brisbon summarized by saying that race relations were "real bad" (T-78).

John Erwin, Vice President, NAACP, Greensboro Chapter

Mr. Erwin told the Committee that a large number of Greensboro residents, especially those who resided in Morningside homes on November 3, 1979, have not received proper protection by the law (T-99-100). Erwin expressed his belief that the shootings could have been prevented if accurate information concerning the starting point of the parade had been disseminated and information given to the Klan had been withheld. He questioned how there could have been such a communications breakdown on November 3rd unless city leaders wanted the shootings to occur, or were indifferent to what could happen (T-100).

In Erwin's opinion, the effort exerted by Greensboro's government in trying to prevent the February 2nd march shows the true picture of civil rights and race relations in the city. Erwin said that the November 3rd incident did not cause race relations to regress, but helped bring facts to light (T-100-101). Minorities and the poor have been short-changed in redevelopment and revenue sharing funds, Erwin maintained. He criticized hiring practices as discriminatory, asserting that the office of the Clerk of the North Carolina Supreme Court employs only two blacks out of a total of eight employees and no blacks are employed by the Middle District Court (T-101).

According to Erwin, no black is head of a city department and the school system continues to discriminate against the faculty, the staff, and the students (T-101). He also commented on the strong opposition to change the form of city government to a ward system without which the possibility of full minority representation was limited (T-102).

Erwin concluded by remarking that the civil rights movement in Greensboro had deteriorated and added that any progress has always had to come through petitioning the courts (T-102-104).

Business Community

John Ellison, Jr., Executive Vice President, Ellison Company

Informing the Committee that he was a past member of Greensboro's Human Relations Commission and was a past Chair, Mr. Ellison told the Committee that in his view the November 3rd tragedy was not an outgrowth of the climate of race relations in the city, but that the incident was primarily "an isolated conflict between two extremist groups," neither with widespread following or support in either the black or white community (T-108). He expressed disappointment that so many ill-informed people had drawn the conclusion that the events of November 3rd were representative of the status of race relations in Greensboro (T-109).

Ellison noted the following factors as indications of favorable race relations in Greensboro: (1) the emergence of the black community as a powerful voting block; (2) the growth of a large, visible and affluent black middle class, as evidenced by integrated housing patterns cited in the Greensboro Human Relations Commission Housing Study; (3) the increase in black professionals, and in integrated city-sponsored athletic teams; and (4) the decline of racial incidents and tensions in city schools since the advent of busing and integration of teachers and principals (T-109-110).

Negative factors recounted by Ellison included: (1) white flight from the city to county schools, as reflected by the Community Relations Housing study and school population data; (2) the fact that the poor are still very poor and largely black; and (3) the gulf between the very poor and more visible middle class blacks is growing, and breeding resentment. Ellison also commented that the Greensboro Police Department, which had been gaining trust among blacks "on a more or less steady basis," suffered a loss of credibility subsequent to the November 3rd incident (T-110-111).

Relating to the November 3rd shootings, Ellison spoke of two areas in which the black community has questions: (1) why, when the police knew the Klan was coming to the demonstration, did they not contact and attempt to discourage the Klansmen

from appearing; and (2) why were there no police at the scene of the shooting. In addition, Ellison noted that there has been a loss of confidence in city government growing out of the city's mishandling of the February 2nd march (T-112).

Responding to questions from the Committee, Ellison said he believed the November 3rd incident has had a negative impact on race relations and that the black community's suspicion of the power structure has increased. As to the white community's perspective, Ellison said that generally the shootings were regarded as an isolated incident "created by people from outside our community." He did believe, however, that the city's handling of the February 2nd march and the use of the coliseum had created some "backlash" among whites. Ellison added that as more publicity is given to the events of November 3rd and February 2nd the more the city is going to be forced to change its position from 'stonewalling' to one of response (T-113-114).

Richard H. Bowling, Owner, Cosmos Restaurant

Mr. Bowling described himself as a product of Greensboro's formerly segregated city school system. Trained as an electrical engineer at North Carolina State University, Bowling said he had traveled all over the country and the world while with the Army and working for Western Electric. He said he had returned to Greensboro to establish his own business (T-159).

Bowling commented that the big problem in Greensboro with regard to race relations is the negative image of the black community, black people, and black business (T-160). As a consequence of this image, Bowling remarked that it was very difficult for any black business to survive. He noted for the Committee just how difficult it was to name examples of black restaurants, motels, shopping centers, and bowling alleys (T-161).

According to Bowling the lack of black businesses was due, not to the lack of black people to run them but rather, to factors which would have similar negative impact if they existed for white businesses (T-162). As an example Bowling cited the lack of a Coliseum ticket sales outlet in the black community, and the fact that no city-wide events are sponsored in the black community (T-162-163).

Replying to Committee questions, Bowling stated that much of the progress that has been made in race relations has been forced and was not genuine (T-

164). Many whites, he said, make it clear they do not want blacks in their neighborhoods. Integration has generally been a one-way street: blacks come into the white community, but whites do not enter the black community (T-165). He also noted that in the '60's the sit-in movement had had a positive effect on freedom for blacks, but at the time, a very negative influence on black businesses (T-166). In Bowling's opinion, Greensboro's race relations are locked into a historical system that is difficult to escape. Although black-white relations are good in individual instances, it is difficult to create a homogeneous community where white school children are bussed into black neighborhoods against their will and there is nothing positive which encourages whites to enter the black community (T-169).

Education and Media

Sara Herbin, President, National Black Development Institute, Greensboro Affiliate

Speaking from the perspective of an educator, Ms. Herbin expressed the belief that racism was woven into the fabric of daily living in America and Greensboro was no exception. Racism and segregation in education, she said, have become more subtle and thus more difficult to deal with (T-90).

Referring to race related problems cited in a Greensboro School Board task force report, Herbin told the panel that many black students are ignored in the classroom and are actually segregated via testing and classification practices. She said that teachers often fail to respond to black parents' requests for parent-teacher conferences and black students receive little encouragement and support from many white teachers (T-91).

Herbin maintained that teachers classify too many black students as "educable mentally retarded" while classifying most white children at the same level as "learning disabled." She reported that this practice, and the fact that a large portion of black students in Greensboro and Guilford County fail the annual competency tests, result in other segregated, remedial classes (T-91-93).

Turning to higher education, Ms. Herbin told the Committee that the percentage of black faculty members at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro is "minisule," and only one black in the English department has been given faculty status. The attitude also prevails, she said, that black studies are not academically valuable (T-94). Herbin sum-

marized by remarking that the educational system generally deprives black students of a positive self-image, and takes away their incentive to perform well, thereby creating discipline problems and causing many students to drop out and enter the ranks of the unemployed (T-95-96).

In response to Committee questions, Herbin stated that racism existed prior to November 3rd and persists still. Although the November 3rd shootings did serve to heighten the awareness of Greensboro to the problems of racism, the white power structure's response has not been adequate (T-96-97). In Ms. Herbin's opinion, education in the public school system as a whole is deteriorating, presenting even greater problems for black students (T-105-106).

Dr. Isaac Miller, President, Bennett College

Because he was serving as a member of the Citizens Review Committee, Dr. Miller limited his remarks to higher education so as not to compromise his responsibility to that group. According to Dr. Miller, who has been president of Bennett College for 14 years, Greensboro is composed of several interfacing, but not always intermeshing, peer groups and those who operate in relative comfort within their groups give little thought to civil rights or race relations (T-221).

In Miller's opinion the educational community in Greensboro is not necessarily designed to create change, but to educate so that students may become constructive agents of change (T-222). He termed race relations in the academic community both constructive and productive. Three private colleges and two state universities in Greensboro have formed the Greensboro Regional Consortium which has helped foster cross registration and intercultural development for students enrolled in member institutions. Through the Consortium, faculties of divergent social, ethnic and cultural backgrounds have the opportunity to develop constructive and respectful peer relationships (T-223).

According to Miller, Greensboro's Chamber of Commerce, corporate community, and the city government have all been supportive of the Consortium's efforts (T-223-224).

While noting the need to accomplish more, Dr. Miller expressed his belief that Greensboro's progress has been both broadening and deepening and that in many respects the city has met his personal criteria for progress in human relations: "to be heard, to be needed, to have a reasonable access and

finally, reasonable respect from and among peers" (T-224).

Responding to panel questions regarding qualifications of Bennett College graduates to assume positions in government and industry, Dr. Miller responded by stating Bennett graduates were among the most qualified in the community (T-225).

William Snider, Editor, Greensboro Daily News and the Greensboro Record

Mr. Snider, a resident of Greensboro since 1951, told the Committee that the Morningside Homes shootings should be viewed in the perspective of Greensboro's and the nation's "evolving civil rights struggle" and not an isolated incident. In Snider's opinion Greensboro is atypical of the traditional small southern town in that it has five universities and a diversified cultural and ethnic heritage (T-238).

Although he termed Greensboro conservative, Snider rated the city less so than the surrounding area and less parochial than the average American community. Greensboro citizens reflect many views, are outspoken in expressing differences and are "less amenable to controlled leadership" (T-239). In Snider's opinion, Greensboro encourages openness to new ideas and a sense of enlightenment and tolerance, is moderate in racial matters rather than liberal, and generally follows the course of courtesy and civility rather than confrontation and upheaval (T-239).

Snider informed the Committee that subsequent to the decision Greensboro embarked on the South's first token school desegregation effort in 1957. He maintained that Greensboro's status as a college community made it an obvious focal point for the lunchcounter sit-ins at Woolworth's (T-239) and the city's "progressive mystique" made the sit-ins feasible. According to Snider, after several years of peace marches, the city's public accommodations were completely open (T-240).

While acknowledging that full-scale desegregation did not occur until the early '70's, Snider said that once the city's leadership "accepted the inevitable, it achieved that goal with unparalleled grace." According to Snider the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund and four other organizations have concluded that the Greensboro desegregation process was "probably superior to that of almost any other city in the south." Greensboro's experience with the civil rights movement, has not been free from violence as

the city "was jolted by bloody riots at Dudley High and A&T University" following Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination "before its best leadership rallied" (T-240).

Snider acknowledged that the November 3rd episode "must be forever linked with Greensboro" but pointed out that "most of its principals were members of two radically oriented organizations who came here from other communities." Snider said the site of the shootings, a predominantly black housing development, had no link with the CWP, the Klan, or the Nazi Party. Although the events of November 3rd "shocked and even terrified" many in the community, Snider stated that the episode "was not racially motivated in the traditional sense." In Snider's opinion the underpinnings of the November 3rd shootings were ideological. Two mirror-image fringe groups had staged a confrontation in an area designed to generate racial turmoil. The intended objects of their exploitation, the Morningside residents, however, refused to be duped (T-241).

According to Snider the shootings polarized the city and generated fear because of their bizarre nature. He noted the city's "splendid police department" had difficulty in explaining how the media could report and film the shootings while its officers were nowhere in sight. Snider attributed the absence of the police to the department's planning "too carefully" without giving further explanation (T-242). He said the newspaper could find no evidence of collusion between the Klan and the police and, in his opinion, the national media's fragmented and sometimes biased coverage contributed to the confusion (T-242).

Snider further told the Committee that ultimately "a surge of cooperation and a resolve to heal the polarization swept the city" (T-242). He cited a Sunday afternoon interracial service at a black church and the 20th anniversary observance of the lunchcounter sit-ins on February 1st as examples of the goodwill which was exhibited (T-242-243). Snider was careful, however, to point out that "blunders" had indeed been made in Greensboro on November 3rd and thereafter. He called the violence and the violence-prone rhetoric that preceded it "reprehensible." Admitting that serious problems of prejudice and racial injustice persist in Greensboro—as in most places—he asserted that Greensboro should be included with those communities in which the "forces of racial goodwill were hard at work." In Snider's opinion the community's overall

response to the events of November 3rd have been more constructive than negative (T-243).

Questioned by the Committee, Snider asserted that the Greensboro community was diverse and complex, and that community views on what transpired on November 3rd were not distinguishable on the basis of race. He insisted that any view the Committee might have to the contrary, as an outgrowth of the hearing, could be attributed to the fact that the Committee was hearing from only a small segment of the community (T-245). Snider acknowledged that his use of the term "shoot-out" to describe the November 3rd incident might be inaccurate, but its ultimate appropriateness might not be known until after the trials of the participants are concluded (T-249).

Snider commented that it was not the presence of radical groups in Greensboro that was shocking, but rather the violence which followed their presence (T-250). Snider also revealed that his paper had almost elected not to cover the November 3rd protest march, as it was thought that it would simply be "another encounter of people throwing words at each other and perhaps of no consequence" (T-250). He reiterated that the two groups which came into the Morningside Homes had no affiliation there and "staged an event which turned out to be quite tragic" (T-251). Finally, Snider acknowledged that as a newspaperman he had responsibility in molding and shaping public opinion (T-252-253).

Lee Kinard, Director, WFMY-TV, Greensboro

Kinard told the Committee that he is the producer and host of a local daily early morning informational television program which places him in regular contact with city schools and government. Kinard stated that since his show was devised to "ensure public access to pertinent information," as well as "to enlighten the community about human relations conditions," any hint of racial unrest would be revealed through his show's programming. He characterized Greensboro as having "an affirmative degree of racial harmony" (T-230).

In response to Committee questioning, Kinard acknowledged he was not privy to a great deal of statistical data, but speaking as a professional broadcaster and a nearly 20-year Greensboro resident, he believed that the city was addressing the various issues concerning equal opportunity (T-231). Kinard declined to comment on media coverage of the events of November 3rd, but informed the Commit-

tee that it was at his insistence that his program covered the memorial sit-in at Woolworth's with interviews of the four original sit-in participants.

Kinard also told the Committee that the Greensboro city manager had appeared on his program to discuss the plans for the funeral of November 3rd shooting victims and again, prior to the February 2nd march, to discuss plans and procedures. Kinard's program also had allowed a spokesperson for the February 2nd Committee to appear and give his perspective on the march (T-234). Replying to the panel questions, Kinard stated that representatives of neither the AFL-CIO nor the NAACP had ever appeared on his show (T-235-236).

Religious Community

Rev. Aubrey McLellan, Chairman, Council on Community Unity, Greensboro Chamber of Commerce

The Reverend Aubrey McLellan expressed skepticism about those people who come into Greensboro for a short period of time, uncover all of the problems that are present, offer instant solutions, and leave the community with things unchanged (T-171). The clergyman stated that the city had a long history of facing up to human relations problems, and described Greensboro as a "beautiful city" and a "fine community" (T-171-172).

In McLellan's opinion the business community was making efforts to improve the economic status of all Greensboro citizens by affording job opportunities and more and better housing, and that the Chamber of Commerce was committed to human rights (T-173). He admitted, however, that progress was not fast enough for either blacks or whites.

McLellan responded to Committee questions by stating that as long as there are two groups of people, one black and the other white, there are going to be problems but that the city has the resources to resolve them (T-178). Acknowledging that there were areas where change was needed, he stressed that progress had been made and that the city's future was bright. McLellan doubted whether the November 3rd shootings had any effect on race relations and expressed his view that even if every person in Greensboro had a job, it would not have prevented the shootings (T-179). Asked about the racial composition of the Chamber of Commerce, McLellan replied that blacks were in the membership of the Chamber and three sat on the board of

directors. He acknowledged, however, that the Chamber had no black officers (T-180-181).

Arnold Task, Rabbi, Temple Emanuel

Rabbi Task, an appointee to the CRC, has lived in Greensboro since 1968 and described himself to the Committee "as one who is very much involved with the City of Greensboro."

He told the Committee that he is a member of the "Greensboro Dialogue", a group of approximately 40-45 clergy and laymen comprised of whites, blacks, and Native Americans, which has met regularly since November 3rd. One of this group's first activities was to conduct a service on December 2nd to express the concern felt throughout the community over what had transpired in Greensboro. In addition, the Greensboro Dialogue participated in a 24-hour prayer vigil as part of the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the sit-in movement (T-107). Task said the group would continue to maintain "an active agenda of concern" for matters relating to Greensboro's growth and development (T-198).

As further evidence of the community's efforts, Task described the Fisher Park Community Program where members of three separate houses of worship are cooperatively serving the needs of the children located in the immediate neighborhood. The three congregations include both blacks and whites from all backgrounds (T-198). Task also lauded the quality of education provided by the public school system to all children of the community (T-199).

In response to Committee questioning, Task expressed his opinion that race relations in Greensboro were good, and that persons from all areas who are inclined toward community involvement participated equally. Task added that he was active with those people who were comfortable working with people from diverse backgrounds and, hence, his own perception of race relations and interpersonal relations is "extremely good" (T-200).

Task acknowledged that he had limited personal experience with housing problems, but said that he has spoken to people who were involved in various open housing efforts and has heard no negative comments concerning opportunities. He noted with regard to voting, that although there have been many efforts to register and educate voters, the voter turnout in Greensboro, as in every other city, is not as great as it should be. In Task's opinion,

Greensboro's employment record is "very good" and both blacks and whites occupy "very significant positions" (T-202). In Task's experience with several agencies there has been no difficulty in obtaining qualified minority persons to occupy responsible positions (T-203).

Father George Kloster, Pastor, St. Pious X Church

Father Kloster told the Committee that human relations in Greensboro are not as "bright" as they have been portrayed by some, nor as "bleak" as contended by others (T-211-212). According to Kloster, in Greensboro the power structure historically has been paternalistic in dealing with its problems—as best evidenced by the debate over the ward system of government. He said although its attitude has not been as self-serving and as pronounced as in some cities, he believed the reluctance of city leadership to support a change in its governmental structure, or even to acquiesce to change, reflects an attitude that certain people know what is best for everyone. In Father Kloster's opinion this is not the proper attitude for the city. Nevertheless, in his opinion Greensboro's leadership has been more enlightened than that of other cities in which he had lived, and had made sincere attempts to address the city's problems. He maintained that communication between the various segments of the city has been good (T-212).

Generally, Father Kloster termed the quality of life in Greensboro satisfactory, though there was room for improvement (T-212). Opportunities for people to take part in the governmental process exist, he said, but some have better access than others and some are excluded either through their choice, inability, or unwillingness to take part. In Kloster's opinion, the Chamber of Commerce's leadership had become less obvious than in the past and lacks the degree of initiative it once had (T-231). Expressing his view that the city administration has lost credibility, he was specifically critical of the city's handling of the February 2nd march and the proposed parade ordinance which he termed "too stringent" (T-214).

In summary, Father Kloster stated that Greensboro's problems were similar to those found in other cities, but that overall the city does better than most places (T-214). He said, however, that Greensboro was not doing as well as in the past, and asserted that the city needs to be "more self-critical, more honest,

perhaps a little less concerned about our image, [and] more concerned about the substance of problems. . ." (T-214).

Responding to Committee questioning, Kloster blamed the lack of imaginative leadership on the business community (T-216). He told the Committee that he had not supported the February 2nd march because he felt the violent nature of the CWP was as great, if not greater, than that of the Klan (T-218).

Fred Taylor, Director, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia

In Mr. Taylor's opinion the entire Nation has had a renewed interest in race relations since the November 3rd "massacre" in Greensboro (T-81). Taylor acknowledged that law had helped advance the cause of race relations throughout the country, but laws, he said, appealed to the head but have not "pricked the conscience of white folk" (T-82).

Taylor told the Committee that when he visited Greensboro several weeks prior to the hearing he learned that Captain Hamilton, a black officer, had not been in charge of march security, as had been reported by the "white" media. In Taylor's opinion, the State Bureau of Investigation did everything within its power to "intimidate" and "frighten" people, particularly students, to discourage participation in the February 2nd march. He also cited racism as the prime factor in the difficulties the February 2nd march organizers had in obtaining insurance for the event in the Greensboro Coliseum (T-83). Taylor deemed the Mayor's declaration of a state of emergency preceding the February 2nd march, as a further attempt to "disrupt or to have a negative impact upon our minds" (T-84).

Overall, Taylor judges race relations in Greensboro to be bad and racism to be a fact of life because the issue of racism has not reached peoples' hearts (T-84).

He acknowledged, however, that Greensboro was similar to "if not a carbon copy" of other communities he has known in which 85 to 90 percent of the community live in all-white or all-black neighborhoods (T-84). Throughout the country, racism, evidenced by segregation, is the norm (T-86-87).

When asked if Greensboro reacted differently than another city would have in a crisis situation, Taylor replied, that he thought the residents acted as white folks generally do—largely out of a sense of embarrassment that they had allowed conditions to exist which were conducive to the events of Novem-

ber 3rd. He added, "the Klan did not act in isolation apart from the social climate of the community. . ." (T-85-96). Specifically, Taylor described those conditions as high black unemployment, poverty, poor housing and lack of educational opportunities (T-89). In Taylor's opinion, the police had overreacted in November and soon after in many respects but, as a result of conferences and sensitivity sessions with the February 2nd mobilization committee, acted with more restraint at the time of the February 2nd march (T-86).

Joan Maultsby, Executive Director, National Conference of Christians and Jews

After describing numerous civic activities with which she had been involved, Ms. Maultsby addressed the Committee on issues confronting the women of Greensboro. According to Ms. Maultsby, Greensboro is the only North Carolina city to support a Commission on the Status of Women. In her belief this demonstrates the city's awareness of problems facing women and its willingness to address them (T-204).

According to Ms. Maultsby, women comprise 55 percent of Greensboro's population—higher than the national percentage. The majority of black women in Greensboro, she noted, live in racially segregated neighborhoods and hold low paying positions (T-204-205). One-fourth of Greensboro's women have not completed high school and require further education and training in order to be productive; the educational needs of black women are particularly acute. Ms. Maultsby told the Committee that half the women in Greensboro work, but most occupy traditional, dead-end jobs (T-205).

Maultsby informed the Committee that the Employment Security Commission has an apprenticeship training program which is making great effort to place women in nontraditional occupations in the construction industry (T-209). Maultsby commented that black women are poorly paid even though on the average they support more people than white women do.

In Maultsby's opinion the leadership in Greensboro, though not perfect, is good and its citizens are generally aware of the problems which exist and are concerned about improving relations. She believes that Greensboro's problems are not necessarily racial but human relations problems (T-206-207).

When asked to give her perception of civil rights in Greensboro, Maultsby stated that although pain-

fully slow, progress in employment and housing is being made. In her opinion, an element of shock followed the incident of November 3rd which has made many people aware that there are problems which need to be addressed (T-208).

City Department Administrators

Edward Kitchen, Personnel Director, City of Greensboro

Mr. Kitchen stated that Greensboro believes in a progressive and comprehensive program, as it is only through the efforts of competent and motivated employees that the city can fulfill its primary function of delivering effective and efficient services to its citizens (T-25). He also commented that the city has a special obligation to ensure that groups which previously had been underrepresented in its workforce are systematically made a part of the city's human resources on a representative basis, and that a major goal of any sound affirmative action plan is the representation of minorities and women in the workforce according to their availability in the labor market (T-26).

In Kitchen's view an affirmative action program's success ultimately rests upon the employer's ability to retain and motivate its employees. If the city is to accomplish the goal of maintaining a representative workforce, the entire personnel program must be sound (T-26). Kitchen described city employment as being administered through a centralized advertising and screening process managed by the personnel department. Job vacancies are advertised on a weekly employment opportunities list which is posted in various city facilities and mailed to 88 organizations and industries in Greensboro and other areas (T-27).

The Personnel Director noted that efforts are made to reach possible sources of minority and female applicants by distributing the job vacancy list to predominately black and/or female colleges and universities, local minority churches, a number of United Way agencies, the Y.W.C.A., the Employment Security Commission, local high schools, and the NAACP (T-26-27). Regarding positions which are difficult to fill, special efforts are made including newspaper advertisements, mailings to professional organizations, and announcements in professional journals. Again, minority organizations and publications are used to solicit applicants (T-27).

The Personnel Department screens applicants against pre-established, job-related knowledge, skills and abilities; then refers them to officials in the various departments who make the final selection decision (T-27).

Kitchen emphasized that the city pays careful attention to Federal uniform guidelines which have been adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Treasury (T-27-28). Greensboro has received an Intergovernmental Personnel Act grant from the Office of Personnel Management to further develop its analysis and selection procedures in accordance with Federal guidelines (T-28).

Kitchen stated that the city was committed to developing all of its employees to their greatest potential and for many years has offered employees a wide variety of training opportunities. Training and development activities range from orientation and extensive in-house training to retirement counseling. Programs at all levels in the various organizations include courses in supervisory performance planning and appraisal, E.E.O. and affirmative action, job interviewing, and adult basic education (T-28-29). Each year, according to Kitchen, 600 employees participate in in-house training, and approximately 75 employees participate in the city's tuition reimbursement program (T-29).

The city has a written, publicized, and well-used grievance procedure. With the assistance of the city's E.E.O. coordinator and employee relations office, Kitchen told the panel many employee grievances are resolved informally prior to formal employee appeals (T-29). The personnel office also affords employee assistance through counseling in various areas including domestic problems, alcoholism, and financial difficulties (T-29-30). In addition, employees are able to give feedback to supervisory personnel via a system of employee committees (T-30).

In response to panel questioning Kitchen said that as an employer, Greensboro "needs to set an example to the rest of the community" (T-32). Acknowledging that he had lived in Greensboro for only 3 years, Kitchen expressed his opinion that race relations in Greensboro were superior to any other Eastern city he has lived in, but admitted a great deal more needed to be done. Speaking from a personnel management perspective, he remarked the city could not be an affirmative action employer

without first being a good employer in general (T-41).

Hewitt Lovelace, Director of Public Safety, City of Greensboro

Thanking the panel for the opportunity to appear, Hewitt Lovelace stated he had been in the city about 5 years and prior to that had spent 32 years in the Air Force, during which he had lived all over the United States and the world.

He said that while he did not know about race relations in Greensboro, he believed he personally had come a long way to be able to sit in a room with a man wearing a Nazi armband and with members of the Communist party espousing their doctrines. Lovelace addressed his remarks to the things that have been done by the departments he administers, primarily police and fire, to improve community relations in Greensboro. He pointed out that for the 5 years he had been with the city, Greensboro has used the district police system. The major factor for selecting this method of policing was for its neighborhood relations benefits. He said that having the same officer in the same area day in and day out allows residents to know the officer and for him to get to know them, their moods and wants (T-286-287).

Lovelace told the Committee that each district captain responsible for policing activity in his area meets on a regular basis with residents of his district as well as with staff to exchange ideas, discuss problems and achieve understanding of mutual problems (T-287). Lovelace went on to explain that the city is divided into four areas of about equal population, and said the minority percentages for each of these geographic areas, Districts 1 through 4, were 35, 90, 20 and 5 percent, respectively. He then presented data on offenses, arrests and complaints, revealing an "astounding degree of balance" in the four districts. In each district in 1979 offenses ran between 6,400 and 6,700, the number of arrests in each was about 3,100 to 3,600, and complaints ranged between 35,000 and 40,000 (T-288-289).

Although he said he could not give a minority breakdown on arrests, Lovelace maintained the data clearly reflected that no district of the city had a significantly higher arrest, offense or complaint rate. He suggested that the data indicated that equal police protection and treatment are being provided to all residents of the city (T-289).

Lovelace told the panel that police are often called to various areas of the city where large unstructured groups have gathered—some “enthusiastic,” such as at high school athletic events and graduations, and others displaying hostility—“not necessarily toward police but creating a hostile environment for police action” (T-289). He maintained that in every case the calls had been answered with a minimum of arrests, assaults on officers, property damage and without the use of force or charges of police brutality. He added that the responding officers had “defused” these incidents (T-289-290). The public safety director also told the Committee about Greensboro’s Fire Department programs which pursue community relations along several routes. He said such training programs on cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the Heimlich maneuver have been attended by persons of all races. Special emphasis is made, Lovelace reported, toward fire prevention education in public housing areas. Working with the Jaycees, the department distributed and installed about 75 fire detectors in low income homes, and homes occupied by invalids.

Saying that Chief Swing would present details on the police department’s employment patterns, the city’s Director of Public Safety finished his prepared remarks by telling the panel that through recruitment, minority make-up of the fire department was brought up to 19 percent and added: “Upward mobility efforts have resulted in one battalion chief and six captains” who are minority officers (T-291).

Director Lovelace was asked for his assessment of how what happened on November 3rd had affected the credibility of the police department in both white and black communities. He said he agreed with some of the presentors at the hearing who maintained that “there was, indeed, some polarization immediately preceding the events of November 3” (T-291). He commented that some of the “dissillusion in the credibility of the police has been created by media reports,” and that for those who have not invested the effort to look into what did occur, “It’s easy to sit back and say, ‘Ah, the cops goofed.’ I don’t think they did” (T-292).

Lovelace was asked by the Committee if he, in retrospect, would have done anything differently on November 3, 1979. He replied. . .“I would say, knowing at eleven-fifteen on Saturday morning, November 3, we would have continued on with the plan that we had. At eleven-thirty Saturday morning, obviously there would have been a number of

things that would have been done differently. I would prefer if you want to discuss those instances in detail that you address those questions to Chief Swing” (T-292-293, see appendix D).

Lovelace was asked to comment on views expressed by hearing participants that police protection would have been provided differently in a white community. He said he would prefer Chief Swing to respond, but agreed to comment. He remarked that the editor of the *Greensboro Daily News* had said that their reporters almost didn’t cover the incident and added that, after all, “this group did cross two of the districts. It started in one and was going to terminate in another.” He concluded with, “No, I don’t think it would have been different” (T-292-294).

William Swing, Chief of Police, City of Greensboro

Chief Swing introduced himself and addressed the topic he said he had been asked to speak to: patterns of employment in the police department. Swing told the panel that when he was appointed chief in 1975 the department had already been committed to a goal of increasing both minority and female representation, and that as chief he had renewed and expanded that commitment. He added that the department has also sought to increase the participation of minorities and females at all levels and in all functions. To illustrate the department’s accomplishments toward these objectives Chief Swing pointed out that in 1975 minority and female representation was 9.4 percent and 13.3 percent respectively, whereas “As of December 31, 1979 total minority representation was 16.6 and female representation 17.6” (T-296-297).

The Chief of Police said blacks on the sworn force include one captain and one lieutenant or 7.4 percent of the total personnel at this level. Four sergeants, 8.5 percent at this level and 9 squad leaders 17 percent of personnel at this point are minorities. He added that 3.8 percent of the personnel at squad leader level were females (T-297).

Over the past 3 years, Swing reported promotions of minorities have accounted for 12 of the 65 persons elevated to squad leaders; 4 of 14 raised to sergeant and 1 of the 6 officers who had become lieutenants. Chief Swing described the 1978 recruiting program carried out by a biracial, male-female team. He said institutions of higher learning with law enforcement curricula were first located and then, through on-site visits, those with the highest concentration of

minorities and/or females in enforcement courses were targeted. In addition, various predominately black neighborhoods were visited. In 1979, Chief Swing reported, appropriate technical schools as well as colleges were identified. As a result of these efforts, the department received 735 applications, 276 (or 37.6) from minority applicants and 171 from females. The department hired 72 trainees, 30.6 percent of whom were minorities and 29.2, female (T-298-299).

Swing said that after training, new employees enter the sworn force at the "Police Officer I" level, a category occupied by 26.8 percent minorities and females as of December 31, 1979 (T-299).

Swing next described some of the department's community relations programs instituted "to provide better communication channels." He said the program, introduced as part of the district policing concept, was designed to "bridge traditional gaps. . .that exist in any urban community." He pointed out that personal contacts help keep the police sensitive to opinions, needs and feelings of the citizens (T-300).

Swing told the panel that during 1979 police responded to more than 148,000 calls for service and, in addition, had made 17,676 criminal arrests and 19,178 traffic arrests—for a total of 185,000 contacts with the public. Swing informed the panel that, of the 69 complaints reported and investigated during the same period, 48 (or 70 percent) had been made by white citizens and 21 (30 percent) by black citizens. He added that 21 of the complaints had been sustained and administrative action had been taken by the department. Most of the complaints were concerned with "conduct toward the public" and 8 had been complaints of excessive use of force. Three of these 8 had come from blacks and 5 from whites. Two had been sustained (T-301).

Regarding the performance of the police on November 3, Swing assured the panel that "a great deal of planning and preparation by the police occurred prior to the rally" (T-301). He said 27 officers had been assigned to the rally and march and most had been placed in strategic locations along the march route. He stated that to avoid confrontation between marchers and police the decision had been made to maintain a "low profile" (T-301-302).

Chief Swing then gave the Committee details of the preparation for the march and the actions by officers at the outbreak of violence. He said that the Klan car caravan had arrived before the officers were to be at their assigned posts but that "even so, 11 officers did arrive within 1 minute after a surveillance officer radioed that shooting had occurred" (T-302). Swing reminded the panel that never before in the history of the city—or the state—had such a savage outbreak erupted between extremist groups. Greensboro's police chief added that he viewed such violent confrontations as threats to the safety of all citizens of the entire nation (T-303).

He responded to the Committee questions regarding authority and police responsibilities in the November 3 occurrence by stating that there had been no way to seal off the 4-mile area set for the march, nor any legal basis for stopping and searching the vehicles (T-305-312).

Regarding advancement opportunities for minorities and females, Chief Swing said that "we are not involved in a lateral entry in the department." Swing said upgrading would have to be through the ranks following continued recruitment of minority and female officers at the entry level (T-313).

In Summary

While a review of the statements summarized in this report reveals no consensus on the state of black/white relations in Greensboro, attitudes on just how good or bad these relations are do fall along racial lines. Greensboro citizens who are white emphasize the progress made. They see the Greensboro glass as more than half full. The city's citizens who are black focused on the problems that remain, perceiving the glass to be almost empty.

The white and black citizens who gave information to the Advisory Committee seemed to be telling tales of two cities. Elected officials and most businessmen concentrated for the most part on the image of Greensboro. They presented selective evidence of racial progress: lack of violence for a decade, desegregation of the schools, and social and cultural interchange at the college level.

Standing aloof from the events of November 3, 1979, city officials and members of the establishment made frequent reference to "outside agitators" and attempted to balance off the extremist groups, the KKK and the Communists, who confronted one another in the "Morningside Homes Shootout." The identification of the site with the killings, tended to imply involvement of the black residents from the housing project—although reportedly no current residents took part in the rally. The designation also seemed to insinuate that somehow "Morningside" was a remote place, not part of the Greensboro.

Concern with Substance

Minority persons who participated in the factfinding meeting appeared to be directing their remarks, through the Advisory Committee, to Greensboro

officials. They dealt for the most part with the problems which confront low income blacks in housing, education, jobs and the failures of the city to deal with the essential concerns of blacks, especially poor blacks. The unwillingness and/or inability of the public schools (albeit desegregated) to meet the needs of disadvantaged youngsters was cited. Barebones housing projects which provide only shelter, not a "neighborhood" were described. Speakers attested to the absence of community programs to make out-of-work youths employable, or provide opportunities for recreation.

A Polarized City

The dual views of Greensboro that emerged from the individual perceptions presented at the Advisory Committee meeting indicate a political polarizing—not of the extreme groups of the radical right and left which thrust their confrontation onto Greensboro last November, but of the two diverging Greensboro societies: one with economic and political power and one which possesses neither.

Most people seen as wielding authority in city government are white, while blacks are at the lower levels of employment. Perhaps this is why race and attitudes toward race loom as both cause and effect of the basic social and economic problems facing this flourishing New South city.

A Diverse Community

The Advisory Committee commends the Citizens Review Committee for its report of May 22, 1980 on the events of November 3, 1979, and their effect on race relations in Greensboro. Their acknowledge-

ment of present difficulties and suggestions for change are salient and forthright. The North Carolina Advisory Committee concurs with the findings and endorses the recommendations of the report (See Appendix A).

Coming from different ethnic and economic backgrounds, these CRC appointees have demonstrated their sensitivity to the community at large and their ability to relate to people who have not previously been reached by city officials.

In their report, the ad hoc group notes that "steps should be taken to provide more diverse representation in city government, acknowledging the socio-economic and racial differences that characterize the citizens of our community."

Finding:

The Greensboro community is comprised of many factions, separated by income, influence, education and race.

Recommendations:

Toward this ultimate goal of "diverse representation in city government" prescribed by the Citizens Review Committee, the North Carolina Advisory Committee recommends that the city administration maintain the CRC as a "civilian" adjunct to the Human Relations Commission. Such a group of persons, themselves representing a cross section of Greensboro, would be invaluable in keeping communications open between the citizenry and the administration.

The Human Relations Commission, as the Citizens Review Committee suggests, should be given investigatory powers by the Greensboro City Council so that HRC can process, as well as receive, complaints and conduct meaningful reviews of community issues and concerns.

The Greensboro city administrators, City Council and the Human Relations Commission also should seek the advice and counsel of other ad hoc citizen groups with professional backgrounds and living experience in particular areas—housing, education, employment, etc.—areas of concern to various segments of the city and to the greater community. Only through such people-to-people contact and cooperative action can the intertwined problems of economics and race be solved.

Participation in Government

The North Carolina Advisory Committee concurs with the view expressed by several presentors at the factfinding meeting that full participation by minority constituents in the political process is basic to improving human relations in the city. Adequate minority representation at all levels of government—elected and appointed office as well as the distribution of minorities throughout the city workforce—improves the ability of the administration to be responsive to the total electorate.

Greensboro's current method of electing city council members on an at-large basis, rather than from single member districts, is viewed as perpetuating the dominance of one group of upper income whites from one city sector over other groups. The gulf between persons with political power and those without and the feelings of apartness of those outside "the system" are enlarged.

A referendum for a modified single-member district system was narrowly defeated in May 1980. The heavy voter turnout from the Northwest quadrant—where most present members of the City Council reside, is credited with the defeat of the referendum. A second factor was the low voter turnout among blacks.

Finding:

Members of minority groups are not adequately represented in city government.

Recommendations:

The Advisory Committee urges the City Council to enact a resolution calling for a district election system both for nominating and voting for candidates.

The Committee believes all residents of Greensboro should avail themselves of the city's convenient voter registration and exercise their right to vote.

City Government Employment

Among city employees, white males dominate the higher paid positions. Minorities and women are concentrated in stereotypical clerical and menial jobs. A few blacks and females hold second line authority positions. The data submitted to the Committee by Greensboro officials (See Exhibit 1) reveal, more than do job titles, the disparity in pay among men and women, blacks and whites who work for the city.

The North Carolina Advisory Committee encourages the city Personnel Department to concentrate on training and development programs to advance minorities and women into higher paying positions.

On the Force

The employment pattern in the Greensboro Police Department is typical of most of the city agencies. Although the general workforce in Guilford County in 1977 was 21 percent black and 43 percent women, as of December 31, 1979, the total minority representation within the Police Department stood at 16.6 percent and female representation at 17.6. The respective percentages within the sworn personnel are 13.3 and 7.6. The figures for supervisory personnel are less favorable: only one of 13 captains, and one of 14 lieutenants, four of 47 sergeants and nine of 53 squad leaders are minority. Only 3.8 percent of the squad leaders are female and no females are above this rank.

The Committee notes that improvement has been realized in the Department's employment of minorities and females as reflected by the increase in sworn officers from 9.4 in 1975 to 13.3 percent in 1979 and an increase in sworn female officers from 2.8 to 7.6 percent.

Among the civilian personnel on the force, one out of four employees classified as "professional" is a minority person. None of the four is a woman. Of seven civilian "technicians," three are women and one is minority. Three quarters of the 51-person "office and clerical" staff are female. The 13 minorities comprise 25.5 percent in this classification. Of six "protective service" civilian employees, three are minority and one of the three is a female.

In the Police Department's *Affirmative Action Program* the underutilization of minorities and females is acknowledged in various categories and goals and timetables are set. However, the document does not indicate what steps are planned to correct the underutilization.

Finding:

The preponderance of minorities and females employed by the Greensboro Police Department are in the lowest paid categories. Blacks and women are still underrepresented among higher ranked Department personnel.

Recommendation:

The Advisory Committee recommends that the Greensboro Personnel Department and Department of Public Safety seek more creative approaches to recruitment, training and upward mobility to overcome the underrepresentation and to meet the Department's own goals and timetables. The overall objective is not merely to reach goals on a chart but to achieve a city police force that would be reflective of the populace and its interests in public safety and protection.

Conclusion

By glossing over the problems that beset a large segment of the population, Greensboro's leading citizens tend to deny responsibility for the circumstances that create them, blaming instead society as a whole for the ills. Such official inattention contributes to black residents' lack of interest in and alienation from city government.

A crisis in a community can be met in different ways: It can become an occasion for defensiveness, whereupon attitudes harden, and, ultimately, the community fractures.

It can also serve as an occasion for openness, the facing of reality and focusing upon solutions for the future. The North Carolina Advisory Committee urges Greensboro to continue on the latter course.

The North Carolina Advisory Committee believes that by acknowledging that racism does indeed exist, and then working to ameliorate its persisting vestiges, the city could break this vicious and too familiar cycle of cause and effect. Greensboro, North Carolina would thereby, demonstrate true civic leadership to the Nation.

Appendix A

REPORT OF THE CITIZENS REVIEW COMMITTEE

MAY 22, 1980

Mark K. Schott, Chairperson
Judith Behar
Ervin Brisbon
Cardes H. Brown
Jane Cochrane
Michael K. Curtis
Lloyd Green, Jr.
Isaac Miller
Arnold S. Task
Barbara Gore Washington
A. S. Webb

Preface

The Citizens Review Committee found that a very real problem of segregation and discrimination still has an effect on the lives of citizens in Greensboro. Only a recommitment by the entire community to a dialogue of unity will achieve equal opportunity for all. A view of Greensboro on the part of many citizens is still based on a parochial perception of their own neighborhoods. Only the inter-action of citizens from all neighborhoods will achieve a true sense of community in the City of Greensboro.

I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE ENVIRONMENT

Our committee was charged with analyzing the events of November 3 and the effect of those events on human and race relations in Greensboro. To analyze the effect of November 3 we first tried to take a look at our community as it existed before November 3. Our examination started with a look at the violence which broke out at Dudley High School and A & T State University in 1969 and its aftermath. While these events differed in significant respects from the events of November 3, 1979, there were also similarities. Our sources of information for conditions in 1969 included newspaper accounts, the report of the North Carolina State Advisory Commission to the United States Commission on Civil Rights entitled "Trouble in Greensboro", and reports issued by the Chamber of Commerce entitled "One Community" and "Something's Got to Give."

The basic conclusions reached by these studies were simple. In spite of legal decisions prohibiting discrimination, there remained inequities in housing and income, segregation of schools, and lack of integration in law enforcement. The studies found two separate societies, white and black, existing side by side with little contact between the two. They found a feeling of alienation in the black community and a feeling that blacks were not adequately represented by city government.

Ten years later in Greensboro before November 3 many of the problems identified by studies done in 1969 - 1970 persist. In 1980, as in 1970, Greensboro is a divided community. Housing patterns continue substantially segregated. The growth of public subsidized housing has not kept pace with the demand for such housing. The median income of those in the southeast section of the city is substantially lower than that of residents in all other sections of the community. While discrimination in employment is against the law, practical progress in terms of economic opportunities for blacks has not kept pace with legal advances.

In city government blacks continue to feel alienated and under-represented.

In education the greatest visible progress has been made since 1970. After years of litigation, the dual school system for blacks and whites in Greensboro has been effectively eliminated. Following the order of the U. S. District Court, the city government took a constructive approach in response to this decision eliminating segregation. But after integration, schools face new challenges, particularly the challenge of providing sufficient assistance to the poor and disadvantaged so they can fully participate in the benefits of the educational system.

It was in this context that the events of November 3 came about. The conditions we have noted did not cause the shootings on November 3. They did establish the environment in which the shootings and the response to the shootings occurred.

Specifically, the Communist Workers Party was making an effort to appeal to the poor, the disadvantaged, and minorities in the City of Greensboro. While the efforts of the Communist Workers Party and its predecessor, the WVO, had been made over a substantial period of time, they had met with only limited success. The Communist Workers Party had for some months prior to November 3 expressed concern with a "resurgence" of the Ku Klux Klan and had chosen the theme of "Death to the Klan" as a means of attracting public attention and support. It had picked the Morningside Homes area to begin its parade and rally on November 3. Because the area was poor and black, members of the Communist Workers Party hoped that a "Death to the Klan" rally and parade beginning there and continuing through other poor black communities would attract substantial support.

II. ANALYSIS OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO NOVEMBER 3 AND SOME SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

On November 3, 1979, five members of the Communist Workers Party were shot and killed during a confrontation with members of the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis. The guilt or innocence of those accused of crimes on November 3 depends on a detailed factual reconstruction of the events of that day. These matters are before the courts; consequently, we express no opinion on them.

A consideration of the events leading up to the confrontation on November 3 is appropriate, however. Some consideration of these events is necessary in order to analyze the response of the police and, indeed, the behavior of various participants leading up to the tragedy of November 3.

In considering the events leading up to November 3, we must be careful not to be misunderstood. Nothing in the events prior to November 3 can, by itself, excuse or justify those killings. It is not the role of this committee to consider matters which are now before the courts, but it is our role to determine how events of November 3 affect the status of race and human relations in our community.

Events Leading to November 3

Confrontations had occurred between Klan and anti-Klan groups in April, 1979, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. In July Ku Klux Klansmen staged a rally showing the motion picture, Birth of a Nation, in China Grove, North Carolina. The motion picture itself is provocative, racist propoganda. According to news reports, about sixty protestors, including members of the Communist Workers Party, marched to a community center, chanted "Kill the Klan", and seized and burned a Confederate flag belonging to the Klan. Both the Klansmen and some members of the anti-Klan group reportedly had arms. The chief of the China Grove Police Department believed that violence was narrowly averted and that only the arrival of over 100 heavily armed Sheriff, SBI and Highway Patrol law enforcement officers prevented serious violence. The China Grove confrontation occurred before the Klan rally was scheduled to begin.

After the confrontation the city government of China Grove held a special meeting and banned carrying arms on city property. The chief of the China Grove Police Department recommended this approach as a method of dealing with the two groups which had confronted each other in China Grove. He believed the police could control the groups if they were not armed.

Prior to the China Grove incident, the Workers Viewpoint Organization* had distributed leaflets urging people to "come out Sunday and fight the Klan".

After China Grove, Workers Viewpoint Organization leaflets distributed in Greensboro celebrated the "victory" over the Klan. The leaflets were provocative. One, for example, said "just a month and a half earlier, the people of China Grove, along with the Workers Viewpoint Organization chased these same scum Klansmen off the lawn of the China Grove Community Center. Armed with pipes, bottles, sticks and rifles, the people defended the China Grove community. They burned the hated symbol of the Klansmen -- their Confederate flag. After deserting their flags, these 'brave Klansmen' defended them by peeping out of the window as the flags went up in smoke." The WVO "affirm(ed) the correctness of how to fight the Klan as shown by China Grove!!!" The method in China Grove was described as the "mighty force of the militant, armed and organized fighters..."

On October 22, 1979, the Workers Viewpoint Organization prepared an "open letter to Joe Grady, Gorrell Pierce, and all KKK members and sympathizers". It described the KKK as "one of the most treacherous scum elements...". That letter said in part "you don hoods and run around with guns spreading your poison. But, as we showed in China Grove, the Klan is a bunch of cowards.... Yes, we challenge you to attend our November 3 rally in Greensboro. We publicly renew that challenge.... We are very clear on what you are doing and that you and the KKK are a bunch of two-bit cowards." The letter ended with the observation that the WVO took the Klan seriously and "we will show you no mercy." Posters for the November 3 march and conference emphasized China Grove.

On October 19, a W.V.O. member applied for a permit for a parade to start at Everitt and Carver Streets at 12:00 p.m. on November 3. According to the report issued by the Greensboro Police Department, members of the Greensboro Police Department knew that on November 1 a known Klan member secured a copy of the parade permit (as he was legally entitled to do). This information was not shared with the district commander. Much of the WVO literature was known to the police before the November 3 tragedy. This literature, apparently printed earlier, specified Windsor Center as the point of assembly at 11:00 a.m. whereas the permit designated the Everitt and Carver location as the place for the beginning of the parade at 12:00 noon. According to a member of City Council, the City had denied the use of Windsor Center to the WVO prior to November 3.

*This group subsequently changed its name to the Communist Workers Party.

On the morning of November 3, Greensboro Police had information that some Klansmen intended to attend the parade and that some had handguns. Because of information available to the police, three planning sessions were held concerning the November 3 march. Four officers of the Greensboro Police Department planned to be on the scene in order to protect the right of the anti-Klan marchers to march and to minimize potential violence. These four officers were to have been stationed in front of and behind the parade. Under the plan twenty-two tactical officers were to be close to the area but were to remain out of sight. This "low profile" approach was considered to be the best method of avoiding trouble. However, the Klan caravan arrived on the scene after the assembly time (11:00 a.m.), but before the starting time for the parade (12:00 noon), and no police officers were present.

At 11:06 a.m. the Greensboro Police Department first received information that a group of vehicles suspected to be Klansmen were parked on the ramp of I-85 and 220 heading toward Greensboro. This information was repeated again at 11:11. At about 11:14 the caravan began rolling. At 11:22 the nine or ten cars had arrived at the formation point of the parade. By 11:23 shooting had broken out. At least 17 minutes passed during which the Police Department could have dispatched cars to surround and accompany the caravan.

There was extensive media coverage of the anti-Klan rally and the shootings. The television stations and the newspapers saw the possibility of a story in the provocative press conferences held by the CWP before November 3. Not knowing what that story might be, but expecting a possible confrontation, they were present at the Windsor Center site at the time indicated in the printed literature which had been distributed at the press conferences. Once arriving there, the press representatives (TV and newspaper) were told by CWP members to go to the Everitt and Carver site. Thus the media people proceeded to station themselves prior to the arrival of the Klan caravan. With the arrival of the Klan and NSP members, the cameras were in place and ready to operate -- thereby providing a vivid record of the violent encounter.

The Conduct of the Police

The committee commends the Police Department for its efforts to plan to secure the parade. However, it is clear that several unfortunate miscalculations contributed to the violent outcome which ensued. Charges made by the CWP have suggested police conspiracy in the shootings. Nothing in our review of police conduct gives any substance to the charges. However, testimony before the committee indicates some indifference by some police officers to the welfare of the CWP and the Klan. Several observations need to be made.

First, the police themselves say had they known what they know now, their conduct would have been different.

Second, the confrontation happened earlier than the police had expected. The police had relied on intelligence that a confrontation, if it occurred, would happen at the end of the parade. The committee considers such reliance on "intelligence" questionable. As a result, some police officers were still getting sandwiches for lunch and the police were not fully on the scene. Indeed, no police were on the scene where the parade was scheduled to begin at Everitt and Carver. At the crucial time the officer in charge was away from his command post and not apprised of unfolding events. While the parade was not scheduled to begin until 12:00, a Greensboro Record article of November 2 had listed 11:00 as the starting time. A leaflet from the WVO had listed the assembly time at 11:00 a.m. at Windsor Center. Only a relatively small number of people were present at the time of the shooting.

Third, no one, including the Communist Workers Party and the police, expected the march to result in the use of deadly force. Even so, the police had prepared and planned to have a number of officers in the vicinity. All of these factors should be taken into account in weighing the performance of the police.

Fourth, it is important to note that in China Grove, like Greensboro, the confrontation began before police officers expected it to. If there is a moral in all of this, it is that confrontations of this type are likely to happen ahead of schedule. The police might have expected and planned for the same problem on November 3. Although they had prepared for the November 3 confrontation, had received copies of the WVO leaflets, and were aware of the China Grove confrontation, police officers and members of the city government did not communicate with the Chief of Police in China Grove. Such communication would have given officers a much clearer idea of the gravity of the danger faced in China Grove. Had city officials communicated with China Grove they might also have learned of China Grove's response to the problem -- to expand its ban on weapons; and they might have learned that the confrontation occurred earlier than expected.

Fifth, the Greensboro police had banned the carrying of weapons by the CWP on November 3. If Greensboro had taken steps before November 3 to ban bringing weapons to a parade or demonstration or carrying weapons on the city streets with the intent to bring them to a parade or demonstration, officers might have had reasonable suspicion or probable cause sufficient to justify them in stopping the Klan caravan which they believed was headed toward Greensboro and the rally.

Sixth, the officers could have dispatched marked police cars to accompany the Klan caravan, and the appearance of the police report

have deterred the violence which occurred. But events happened very fast, and some essential communication with reference to the Klan caravan did not reach the officers in charge promptly.

For the future, however, reflection on the events in Greensboro on November 3 can give guidance to officers and city officials facing similar problems. As the Greensboro Police recognize in retrospect, a clearly visible police presence is preferable where there is the possibility of a violent confrontation. The police need to go early and stay late, and a clear chain of command with the officer in charge receiving all communication is essential to eliminate the sort of confusion which occurred on November 3. Certainly with information that a Klan caravan of cars is about to approach a Death to the Klan Rally, police cars should be dispatched to accompany the caravan. The fact that an event occurs in a densely populated and black neighborhood is additional reason for concern. Visible presence of law enforcement officers will make it more likely that all present will obey the law.

Finally, an ordinance restricting use of arms on city streets and city property and banning taking arms to parades or possessing them on the city streets with such an intent is desirable. After the incident Greensboro passed an ordinance which banned possessing arms within 500 feet of a parade. We commend this change.

After violence occurred, the police responded quickly and professionally. Within minutes they had arrested suspects in the shooting.

Part of the response of the city and the Police Department to the problem of November 3 was issuing the police report. The report itself contains most facts which have been used to criticize the conduct of the police. The fact that the police promptly produced the information in the police report in connection with the shootings is to their credit. The Citizens Review Committee received full cooperation from the Police Department in its inquiry.

Freedom of Speech

Under our constitutional system groups like the Ku Klux Klan, Communist Workers Party and other groups are guaranteed freedom of speech. This guarantee is established not because of any belief that the groups' conclusions are correct, but because the criticisms and complaints which lead to their conclusions are items which the public is entitled to hear and consider. In Communist countries critics of the government are suppressed. In this country, freedom of speech must be carefully preserved for all. Undermining it for any, including Klansmen or Communists, erodes the freedom of all and makes the next step, suppressing freedom of speech, easier to take.

Laws protecting freedom of speech are necessarily general and neutral. As a result, decisions and actions which restrict the legitimate free speech rights of one group tend to restrict the free speech rights of all. The system of freedom of expression, in fact, made possible many of the protest marches, demonstrations, and parades which contributed to passage of civil rights legislation protecting the rights of blacks to equal opportunities for housing, public accommodations, and to vote. When the Supreme Court issued decisions in the 1960's protecting the free speech rights of blacks, it cited and relied on earlier decisions which had protected the free speech rights of racists.

Communist Workers Party

The behavior of the Communist Workers Party leading up to November 3 was irresponsible and provocative. The ideas espoused by the Ku Klux Klan are hideous and must be condemned by all people of good will; but so long as they remain within the law, Klan members have the same right to meet and express their opinions as the Communist Workers Party. Attempts by any group to intimidate others, to destroy their property, or interfere with the rights of others cannot be condoned and should be punished through appropriate legal processes.

The proper response to problems like those posed by the conflicts between the Klan and Nazis and Communist organizations is to distinguish clearly between protected speech and unprotected conduct. Violence, intimidation, interference with the legitimate rights of persons and their property are not protected speech and should be punished.

The Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis

The Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis stand for ideas of bigotry and hatred which are hideous and must be condemned. Furthermore, if Klansmen or other groups for that matter engage in acts of criminal violence, or in other crimes, they should be punished. At times, in the history of the South racist organizations like the Klan have been a powerful force with a predominant influence in politics and government. However, we believe this is no longer the case. The Klan is a fanatical remnant of a once powerful organization. We received no credible evidence that it has significant influence in city government in Greensboro, with the Greensboro Police, with the courts, or with prosecutors. This is not to say, however, that vestiges of racism do not still exist and exert an influence on political life. We found a belief among many blacks that racism, described as "the Klan mentality", exerts powerful influence on government.

Because of the Klan and Nazi history of violence, concern about their activities among citizens, both black and white, is deep and serious. For all of these reasons, and because of what occurred on November 3, law enforcement officials must act within their lawful authority in an effort to prevent illegal acts of violence.

III. THE AFTERMATH

In the aftermath of the tragic confrontation on November 3, 1979, between members of the Communist Workers Party and the KKK-Nazi coalition, all thinking citizens of Greensboro consciously or otherwise had reason to reassess their perception of the status of human and race relations in the City of Greensboro and to consider how human and race relations were affected by this incident. Clearly there can be no unanimity of opinion.

The tragedy took on an added emotional dimension which might not otherwise have existed if events had occurred in another neighborhood. This situation was due to the fact that the Ku Klux Klan was involved, that the shootings occurred in a black neighborhood, and that the police were unable to prevent them.

An objective interpretation of the testimony received by the committee indicates that human and race relations, though far from ideal prior to the November 3 incident, suffered more from the aftermath than from the event itself. The problems we find relate to the quality of the response which officials in the City of Greensboro made to the event itself. Many in Greensboro saw these responses as defensive and repressive. In any case, city officials appeared to be out of touch with an appreciable segment of the community, both black and white.

One response by the City of Greensboro to the events of November 3 was the determination on the part of city officials to restore peace and maintain obedience to the laws. Maintenance of peace and the rule of law is one of the first responsibilities of government. It is not, however, the only responsibility.

In certain respects, the response of the City of Greensboro to the events of November 3 was disappointing, reflecting a lack of awareness of the best ways of dealing with problems such as those raised by the November 3 tragedy. Instead of focusing on ways of preventing illegal acts and acts of violence, the city attempted to discourage the exercise of First Amendment rights. It seriously considered passing a city ordinance which would have made it virtually impossible for any controversial group to have held a parade in the City of Greensboro. To the great credit of the local newspapers and television stations which opposed the ordinance and to reason which finally prevailed, the ordinance in its most oppressive form was not enacted.

The city's handling of events leading up to and surrounding the February 2 anti-Klan mobilization was mixed. While the City's apprehension about the possible outcome of the February 2 Mobilization is understandable, its conduct appeared to many to be an overt effort to block the march. The City's reaction to the desire of

the February 2 marchers to use the coliseum was similar. Action by city officials at least created the impression that the city had engaged in a charade in an effort to deny marchers the use of the Greensboro Coliseum. Substantial credit should be given to the press for its investigation of the City's maneuvering in connection with the February 2 march.

The city's overriding concern with the re-establishment of peace inhibited its consideration of the effect of the incident on human and race relations in the City of Greensboro. This preoccupation contributed to the failure of city officials to perceive and understand the reaction of the black community to the event.

The consequence of the City's handling of the aftermath of the November 3 tragedy has been the creation of a negative, even distrustful attitude toward city officials. This attitude of distrust extends beyond the black and low-income community. Among many in the City of Greensboro, a feeling persists that the city lacks sensitivity and consistency in dealing with the human and civil rights of all citizens.

After the November 3 shooting, the City was out of touch with the reaction of many of its citizens to the event. While resource were available to the City through the Police Community Relations unit of the Police Department and the Human Relations Commission, the City, initially at least, appears to have made limited use of these resources.

Some of the consequences of this episode have clearly been constructive:

One result has been that the community's attention has been focused on the needs of the black community and the limited progress in achieving adequate housing, job opportunities, economic status, schooling and acceptable representation in city government.

Another constructive outcome is the formation of the Greensboro Citizens Forum. This indigenous, predominantly black group seems to have the potential for becoming a rational forum for airing issues affecting the lives and well-being of black people of Greensboro.

Greensboro Dialogue, a group of black and white clergy, was called together within a week after the incident to get clergy from white churches and black churches to talk about the issues which confront our city and plan a course of action to deal with these issues. A first step was the Union Service on December 2 voicing opposition to all violence and calling for healing within our community. Participation and attendance by a substantial portion of Greensboro's black and white citizens

reflected a desire to strengthen interpersonal relationships throughout our city. This group of clergy continues to meet on a regular basis.

Another constructive outcome is the establishment of the Citizens Review Committee and the rejuvenation of the Community Unity Council of the Chamber of Commerce, which reflect an awareness of the pervasive need to probe more deeply into the problems affecting the community and to discover how to address such problems. If anyone had the impression that all was well in Greensboro, that progress in human relations had been optimum, that concern for the poor and the persons of limited access were being adequately addressed, November 3 and its aftermath clearly dispelled this notion. ↵

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations are based on our analysis of human and race relations in the City of Greensboro. Some are essentially independent of the events of November 3. Others are a direct response to the events of November 3. We make the following recommendations.

1. The City Council should enact an ordinance prohibiting discrimination and should give the Human Relations Commission the power to go into court to seek injunctive relief in cases where the Human Relations Commission has determined discrimination exists.
2. The Human Relations Commission should be adequately staffed to monitor human and race relations and to possess the capability of in-house research and documentation.
3. Efforts should be made by the City Council and other groups in the City to encourage white participation in events planned and promoted by the City to be held in Southeast Greensboro and black participation in events held in other parts of the City. The City Council and other organizations in the City should provide leadership in an effort to break down the barriers which separate the citizens in our community.
4. The City should take steps to bring about an independent assessment of community performance in the areas of housing, employment, education, and criminal justice. Even though the problems in these areas are difficult and are national as well as local, greater local initiative needs to be taken in attempting to solve these problems.
5. The City should reaffirm its commitment to the right of all groups to exercise their First Amendment rights.
6. Steps should be taken to provide more diverse representation in City government, acknowledging the socio-economic and racial differences that characterize the citizens of our community. City Council should lead this effort.
7. The staffing and promotion practices of city management and particularly the Police Department must reach and maintain levels of minority employment at all levels of authority, as designated in the Affirmative Action Program on file with renewed and special emphasis on the recruitment and promotion of minorities and women within the ranks of sworn police officers.

8. A citizen advisory board, independent of the Police Department, should be established to provide a forum for community-police communication and to provide a forum in which advice to the police and complaints about police conduct could be considered.

9. The police-community relations division of the Police Department should be given a greater role in assessing and communicating community attitudes directly to the Chief of Police. Regular conferences with the Chief of Police should be scheduled for this purpose.

10. In cases which are likely to involve confrontations between groups like the Communist Workers Party, the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan, police presence should be visible and substantial. The safety of the groups, as well as the safety of the general citizenry, should be of primary consideration by the police.

11. Both internal and external lines of communication among law enforcement officers and agencies must be more adequately used. All intelligence information must be communicated to officers in the field. Existing inter-agency communication networks need to be more fully used by our department and by state and the other local agencies to share available information and planning particularly involving activities or events which appear to be related.

12. A state statute should be passed banning the possession, carrying or displaying of weapons (except by law enforcement personnel) within 500 feet of a parade or demonstration. The statute should also make it a crime to possess a weapon for the purpose of taking it to a parade or demonstration.

13. The City should enact an ordinance to control and restrict the carrying of weapons in parades and demonstrations, whether by participants, bystanders, or others, exclusive of law enforcement officers.

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Appendix B



U.S. Department of Justice

DSD:MDJ:bbg
DJ 144-54M-351

Washington, D.C. 20530

28 MAY 1980


Mr. Clinton Fried
U.S. Civil Rights Commission
75 Piedmont Avenue
Room 362
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Fried:

Pursuant to your request, enclosed is a copy of our recent letter to T.Z. Osborne, City Manager, Greensboro, North Carolina, regarding the culpability of members of the Greensboro Police Department stemming from the November 3, 1979 shooting incident in that city.

Sincerely,

Drew S. Days, III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

By: 
Michael D. Johnson
Attorney
Criminal Section

Appendix C

APR 29 1980

Mr. Tom Z. Osborne
City Manager
Drawer W-2
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402

Dear Mr. Osborne:

The Civil Rights Division has recently completed its review of the investigative report submitted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the internal investigation report provided by the Greensboro Police Department concerning the action of members of the Greensboro Police Department regarding the violence on November 3, 1979 during an anti-Klan demonstration in your city.

Pursuant to a request by the City Council of Greensboro, we wish to advise you that, after a careful review of the reports, we have concluded that there is no basis for liability under the federal criminal civil rights statutes on the part of any member of the Greensboro Police Department. Accordingly, we have terminated this aspect of our investigation. In doing so we want to make it clear that this decision does not address the possible federal criminal liability of other persons stemming from their involvement in this incident.

We would also like to take this opportunity to address the City Council's request that we provide a final report to them. It appears that the Council's request has engendered an expectation in the minds of some that the Civil Rights Division would provide a public report containing a detailed analysis of the decisions and actions undertaken by the Greensboro Police Department including suggestions about alternative courses of action that might be utilized if needed in the future. The nature and scope of our function and authority permit us to determine whether the particular actions or lack thereof constitute a violation of federal law and warrant prosecution. We are not authorized to comment on the wisdom of the actions taken, or to make suggestions about alternative courses of action.

We hope that this information is of assistance to you.

Sincerely,

Drew S. Days, III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

Appendix D



CITY OF GREENSBORO

NORTH CAROLINA

October 1, 1980

Mr. Bobby D. Doctor
Regional Director
United States Commission on Civil Rights
Southern Regional Office
Citizens Trust Company Bank Building
75 Piedmont Avenue, Room 362
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Doctor:

In response to your September 12, 1980, letter, I offer the following comments.

1. I read my testimony before your group to assure the accuracy and context of my statements. Additionally, I presented the recorder a written copy of the statement I read. Why then should my remarks be paraphrased?
2. My introductory remarks were not a part of the written statement. Those comments are properly recorded in the draft provided me under cover of the September 12, letter.
3. On pages 73 and 74 of the draft in reference to the question from the panel concerning any difference in actions on November 3, that answer should read

"Given the information at 1115 hours, there was no reason for any different action. Knowing what was known at 1123 hours, there could have been many changes."

Sincerely,


H. G. Lovelace, Jr.
Public Safety Director


Appendix E



CITY OF GREENSBORO

NORTH CAROLINA

October 8, 1980



Mr. Bobby D. Doctor, Regional Director
U.S. Commission On Civil Rights
Southern Regional Office
75 Piedmont Avenue, Room 362
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Doctor:

This will respond to your letter of September 12, 1980, enclosing the draft report of Greensboro Revisited, prepared by the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

As requested, I have reviewed the Advisory Committee's summary of my comments before the Advisory Committee at the meeting held on February 26 in Greensboro. That summary appears to be substantially accurate except that the last sentence in the first paragraph on page 1 of that summary should read as follows:

To illustrate the department's successes toward these objectives, Chief Swing pointed out that, as of December 31, 1979, total minority representation within the department was 16.6% and total female representation was 17.6%, and that, from January 1, 1975, to December 31, 1979, minority representation in the sworn officer ranks had increased from 9.4% to 13.3%, and female representation in the sworn officer ranks had increased from 2.8% to 7.6%.

In addition, although the Advisory Committee may have reported accurately the statements made by other persons appearing before the Committee, it appears that some of those statements contained inaccurate information about the Greensboro Police Department. For example, the Committee reports that Dr. George Simkins stated that it was not until 1976 that a black was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. In fact, a black officer was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in 1973 and to the rank of captain in 1976. It is also reported that Dr. Simkins stated that no female officers hold a rank above patrolman. In fact, four female officers have held the rank of police squad leader.

To: Mr. Doctor

Page 2

October 8, 1980

I also strongly disagree with the opinions and conclusions stated by persons appearing before the Committee alleging or implying that the Police Department acted improperly in its handling of the November 3 incident and with those statements alleging that the Department discriminates on the basis of race or sex in its employment practices.

Very truly yours,


William E. Swing
Chief of Police

WES/pd

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