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Battered Women in Hartford, Connecticut: *Six Years After*

December 1985

This followup report of the Connecticut Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights was prepared for the information and consideration of the Commission. Although the Commission approved publication of this report, its findings and recommendations are those of the Connecticut Advisory Committee and, as such, are not attributable to the Commission.

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Battered Women in Hartford, Connecticut: Six Years After

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Connecticut Advisory Committee to the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
April 1985

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Dear Commissioners:

Pursuant to its responsibility to inform the Commission about civil rights developments in Connecticut and about matters of mutual concern on which the Commission reports to the President and Congress, the Connecticut Advisory Committee submits this report on the response of police to battered women in Hartford.

The report is a follow-up to a 1979 Connecticut Advisory Committee study, which, along with other Advisory Committee reports and the papers included in the Commission's 1978 publication *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, established that police response to battered women is a critical element in providing equal protection of the laws. The report focuses on this dimension and assesses the extent to which the Hartford Police Department has implemented the specific recommendations contained in the 1979 report.

The Hartford Police Department has made considerable progress in improving its response to battered women, although some department policies and practices run counter to Advisory Committee recommendations and current thinking regarding police response. The department has instituted in-service and recruit training, and the current Chief of Police has issued guidelines outlining procedures to be followed in responding to calls by battered women. The department has also increased the number of Hispanic officers on the force and has developed an active referral capability in the form of the Crisis Intervention and Support Unit (CISU). The centerpiece of the department's policy is CISU. The absorption of this program by the Hartford Police Department reflects the commitment of the current chief to bridge the gap between law enforcement and social services. CISU clearly represents an important model for other jurisdictions.

While these developments are welcome and considered by both advocates and victims as improvements of past policies, they fall short of the Advisory Committee's previous recommendations. The current guidelines require officers to include a victim's willingness to prosecute as a factor in determining whether or not to make arrests. This provision serves to institutionalize one of the most frequently criticized aspects of police response and conflicts with evidence that more aggressive arrest policies have the greatest deterrent effect. In addition, the guidelines instruct officers to refer victims to CISU for referral and support services, but this policy undercuts the primary purpose of direct officer referral: to

place the authority of the officer squarely behind the victim. The guidelines also fail to require officers to provide victims with agency referral cards, although such information is available to officers for discretionary use.

A discouraging shortcoming of the Hartford Police Department is its refusal to comply with the state reporting law. This law, passed in 1979, requires State and local police departments and hospital emergency rooms to provide monthly figures on suspected incidents of battering. Although statewide compliance has been slow, Hartford, the capital city, is one of only three local departments (out of 92) in non-compliance.

In general, the Hartford Police Department has, in the past six years, laid the groundwork for the provision of equal protection of the laws to battered women. The Advisory Committee believes that the recommendations contained in this report, combined with the commitment of current departmental leadership and the efforts of CISU, can build on this foundation in years to come.

Respectfully,

Judith H. Holmes
Acting Chairperson
Connecticut Advisory Committee

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Introduction

From the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman . . . was found in a state of bondage to some man. . . [H]ow vast is the number of men, in any great country who are little higher than brutes, and that this never prevents them from being able, through the law of marriage, to obtain a victim. . . The vilest malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him against whom he can commit any atrocity except for killing her, and if tolerably cautious, can do that without much danger of the legal penalty.¹

In the hundred years since John Stuart Mill described the vulnerability of wives in *The Subjection of Women*, and the recent landmark decisions on behalf of battered women, society has undergone radical change. Instances of battering clearly continue, however, occasionally with devastating consequences for the batterer.

Since 1975, a number of American women charged with murdering their husbands have been acquitted in landmark decisions on grounds of self-defense or temporary insanity after claiming they had long been abused and battered wives.²

Much of the legal underpinning for the subjection of women to violence and injustice has been eliminated. In the past decade the phenomenon of battered wives has gained increasing attention and become one of the major concerns among advocates for women. Dr. Murray A. Straus, director of the Family Violence Research program at the University of New Hampshire, attributes much of the current

concern with the issue of battered women to the women's movement:

The women's movement has done much to bring the issue of wife abuse into focus. Wife abuse emerged as a problem among groups of women who began to come together to discuss women's issues in the late 1960's. It was almost an "accident" that women discovered the common problem of violence in their families. This "accidental" issue swelled as more and more women, who had believed that they were the only ones being beaten and that they "deserved" or precipitated their own victimization, discovered that there were many others with similar experiences and feelings.³

The question of whether the response of the legal system to women victims of domestic violence differed from its response to victims and perpetrators of other kinds of violent crime has been a subject of inquiry for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. In a 1978 consultation on public policy issues regarding battered women, the experts in this field consistently echoed the claim that "domestic assault cases receive singular treatment by law enforcement officials and consistently evoke responses that are not found in other cases involving assaults between strangers or acquaintances."⁴ The Commission also found in its study, *The Federal Response to Domestic Violence*, that:

¹ John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (New York, N.Y.: D. Appleton & Co., 1869), pp. 8, 63, 65.

² Murray Straus, Richard Gelles and Suzanne Steinmetz, *Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1980), p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Under the Rule of Thumb: Battered Women and the Administration of Justice* (1982), p. iv.

The physical abuse of women by their husbands or male companions constitutes a civil rights problem of overwhelming magnitude. . .⁵

In a 1982 publication, *Under the Rule of Thumb*, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that:

Despite the legal recognition of a women's right to physical safety and of the State's duty to restrain and punish her assailant through the criminal process, evidence indicates that in many jurisdictions the laws available for the protection of all people do not protect a woman involved with her assailant in a prior or existing relationship.⁶

The Connecticut Advisory Committee initiated its original study "to determine if battered women were denied equal protection of the laws," and in its 1979 report, *Battered Women in Hartford*, it found, like the Commission, that:

In spite of the increased public awareness and a growing number of "support groups" for battered women, for the most part, the major institutions of our society have done very little to reform or modify policies and procedures to meet the needs of these women.⁷

This report is a follow-up to the previous study which investigated police, prosecutorial, judicial and social service responses to battered women. However, it concentrates on the recommendations for improved police response to battered women in Hartford. While the Advisory Committee recognizes the need for improved response in other institutions, the focus on police response derives from its critical role, for:

Intervention in family disputes is a police function that is feared and disliked by those who perform it, needed but resented by those who receive it, and often grossly misunderstood by society as a whole. Yet, in a highly mobile society like ours, where the extended family is no longer available as a here-and-now resource, there remains a need for external control over runaway emotions and behaviors. Whereas families once relied on a respected relative or friend to exercise authority or contain an emotionally charged situation that threatened to escalate out of control, they now rely on the police.⁸

⁵ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The Federal Response to Domestic Violence* (1982), p. 1.

⁶ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Under the Rule of Thumb*, p. 2.

⁷ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women in Hartford* (1979), p. 1.

In conducting its follow-up study, the Advisory Committee sought to review general trends in the area of response to battered women as well as update developments in Hartford. Concern for the problem has grown, and with it a divergence of opinion has emerged among researchers, policy-makers and advocacy groups, particularly concerning police response to victims. The divergence is manifested in terms of competing definitions of the problem, measurement of its scope, and recommendations on the most appropriate police response.

The report contains a review of recent literature and developments in the area of battered women; the implementation of specific recommendations directed at the Hartford Police Department made in the Advisory Committee's 1979 report; and a detailed description of the Crisis Intervention Support Unit (CISU), currently a central feature of the Hartford Police Department's response to battered women. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the Committee and includes recommendations for future action.

In September, 1984, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence issued its *Final Report*, discussed here in conjunction with the Committee's findings and recommendations. In commending this report to the public, Detroit Chief of Police William Hart, Chair of the Task Force, wrote:

The problem of family violence has existed for generations, yet it is only recently that this phenomenon has begun to receive the attention it deserves. It is my hope that the findings and recommendations of this Task Force will serve as a catalyst to bring about solutions to the many varied aspects of family violence.⁹

We believe the Connecticut Advisory Committee's 1979 report contributed to a greater awareness of the problem of battered women. Since that time the city of Hartford has made considerable strides toward assuring equal protection of the laws to victims of this violence. The Committee hopes that the present study, like the Task Force report, can serve as a catalyst for further improvement.

⁸ Morton Bard and Harriet Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence: Policy and Practice," in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy* (1978), p. 309.

⁹ Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, *Final Report*, September, 1984, p. vi.

Overview of the Status of Battered Women

In addition to numerous publications by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and its Advisory Committees, one can cite the growing number of recent studies and commentaries on battering as an index of increasing awareness and concern with the general topic of domestic violence. The problem has also received considerable and often sensational treatment by the mass media. The public was shocked in 1984 by the depiction of the case of Francine Hughes in the television drama, "The Burning Bed." This single program, depicting a woman's continued victimization by her battering husband, has spurred even greater interest and concern from all sectors of American society. Assessing the scope of the problem remains difficult and while there is a very clear consensus among scholars, advocates, and policy makers as to the pervasiveness of battering, the phenomenon has generated a plethora of terms and meanings.

Definitions

One need only skim the current literature to find terms such as "domestic violence," "family violence," "wife beating" "wife battering," "wife abuse" and most recently "spouse abuse" (these in addition to child abuse, and elderly abuse). As suggested by these terms, they can include a range of incidents. For instance, Marjorie Fields of the

¹ Marjorie Fields, "Wife Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices" in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 20.

² Colorado Advisory Committee, *The Silent Victim: Denver's Battered Women* (1977), p. 1.

Family Law Unit of the Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation B provided the following definition to the Commission's 1978 consultation:

Wife beating, as I use it, is a pattern of physical abuse of a woman at the hand of her former husband, husband, or male companion. It consists of repeated blows with the intention of inflicting harm. It is more serious than a mere dispute and it is not a single shove or a single slap. . . .

The term battered wife, as I use it, includes any woman assaulted or threatened by a man with whom she has been intimate or to whom she is or was married.¹

In 1977 the publication of the Colorado Advisory Committee to the Commission, *The Silent Victims: Denver's Battered Women*, noted that the term "battered wife" is part of a larger phenomenon of "domestic violence" which includes "all violence within the home." The Colorado Committee described a battered wife as "a woman who received deliberate, severe, and repeated physical injury from her husband, the minimal injury being severe bruising."² Similarly, the New Jersey Advisory Committee noted in its report, *Battered Women in New Jersey*, that the term battering is used to describe "the physical injuring of one person by another of the opposite sex within a familial situation."³

Yet another definition emerges from a publication of the Center for Women Policy Studies. According

³ New Jersey Advisory Committee, *Battered Women in New Jersey* (1981), p. 2.

to that organization's "Elements and Standards for Criminal Justice Programs on Domestic Violence," domestic violence "refers to offensive or harmful physical conduct of one spouse or cohabitant or former spouse or cohabitant toward the other."⁴ A pamphlet published by the Connecticut Department of Human Resources (DHR) and the Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women defines a battered woman as one "who is physically and/or emotionally assaulted by the man to whom she is married or in some way involved."⁵ The two agencies use a somewhat more technical definition in official State documents:

Any act or threatened act of violence including the forceful detention of an individual which results or threatens to result in physical injury or psychological damage, committed by a person of any age against another person, with whom the abused person is or was related, is or was residing or is or has been involved in a continuous relationship.

Emotional assaults, or "verbal batterings" degrade and humiliate women, destroying their self-esteem.⁶ A survey conducted in 1981 by the Kentucky Commission on Women found that "this type of attack (verbal battering), was perceived by women to be far worse than physical assaults and was effective as a powerful method of coercion and control."⁷

As is suggested by this brief survey, there are more and less inclusive definitions of abuse or violence ranging from intention and degree of injury to potential psychological as well as physical harm. As another participant in the Commission's consultation noted:

The law. . . defines violence by the degree of its severity, and social scientists tend to measure violence by the degree of its acceptance. The fact that one-fifth of American adults in a Harris poll approved of slapping one's spouse on "appropriate" occasions is seen by the latter as "legitimizing" a certain amount of violence.⁸

⁴ Lisa Lerman, "Elements and Standards for Criminal Justice Programs on Domestic Violence," *Response to Family Violence and Sexual Assault*, Center for Women Policy Studies, November, 1982, p. 11.

⁵ Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women, "A Handbook About Shelters for Battered Women in Connecticut," p. 2.

⁶ Louise Howell, *A Report on Spousal Violence Against Women in Kentucky*, Kentucky Commission on Women, 1981, p. 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸ Del Martin, "Overview: Scope of the Problem" in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 3.

A team of American researchers investigating the "breadth of family violence in America" found that if one tries to define wife-beating itself in "a way it can be objectively measured. . . it becomes clear that wife-beating is a political rather than a scientific term."⁹ They also noted that:

Wife abuse and child abuse have captured public attention because of the terms themselves and because they involve terribly violent acts with damaging consequences for the victim. However, "abuse" is only one extreme end of the continuum of violence. There are many other forms and consequences of violence in the family, which, for many reasons, never are publicly identified as "abuse."¹⁰

The authors identify two forms of family violence—normal and abusive—which roughly parallel "acceptable" and "unacceptable" forms of violence. Their definition was operationalized in two indexes—"over-all violence" and "severe violence"—and was intentionally broad enough to include "acts which are not normally thought to be violent. . . [so] people begin to question the acts which traditionally they have taken for granted as necessary, useful, inevitable, or intuitive."¹¹

Researchers studying the responses to "marital violence" by physicians, clinicians and social service practitioners in Britain approached the problem of definition systematically and found several elements or "criteria" used to define the subject. These included: the use of force; presence or extent of injury; severity; frequency; intent; normality; toleration; legitimacy; and social context.¹² Although this research was able to discern these specific definitional elements in use by a large sample of practitioners, the study found that, overall, respondents "differ in what kinds of behavior they define as 'marital violence'."¹³ They also found that the severity of injury seemed to be a critical factor, noting that "the less severe the physical consequences for the victim, the less likely it is that the behavior will be included in the practitioners' definition."¹⁴ The researchers found that practitioners tend to use the term pejora-

⁹ Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, *Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1980), p. 38.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹² Borokowski, March, and Walker, *Marital Violence: The Community Response* (London: Tavistock, 1983), p. 43.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

tively, and few are inclined to use the term at all in clinical settings precisely because of its ambiguity.

The British team speculated, however, that the very ambiguity of the term "marital violence" is a reflection of its expanding use by social scientists and policy-makers. While they decry the use of so imprecise a term, they echo the American researchers when they note:

Ambiguity and imprecision might conceal the extent of disagreement about whether or not certain kinds of behavior (for example slapping and shoving) should be socially acceptable. Since the term "marital violence" seems too widely regarded as a pejorative, people who use it are likely to feel that they share a sense of moral indignation. . . .

. . . The more a type of behavior is included within a pejorative blanket term, the more it may lose its social acceptability. This is likely to be the case regardless of whether or not the behavior is normal and its practice widespread. . . . It is as if the blanket term contaminates one type of behavior previously regarded as acceptable, by linking it with another that is not.¹⁵

Hence, an analysis of definitions is no mere "academic exercise," but "developing technical language may condition thoughts and responses. . . [and] may have profound effects on people's behavior."¹⁶

Eileen P. Sweeney of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago suggests that the best descriptive term for female victims of violence is "women abuse" because:

(1) It includes women who are abused by men with whom they are living in an informal rather than legal relationship; (2) it is not limited by the legal definitions associated with the words "battery" and "assault"; and (3) it emphasizes the fact that this is a crime directed primarily against women.¹⁷

Although the 1979 Advisory Committee report did not offer a formal or operational definition of "battered women," the emergence of such a broad range of terms and meanings compels the Committee to develop such a definition for this follow-up. For the purposes of this report, the term "battered woman" refers to a *woman who seeks assistance from the police for relief of physical danger or harm originating from an adult member of her household with whom the woman shares an intimate relationship.* This operationalization emphasizes two elements

which impose severe limitations on the Committee's more general and inclusive understanding of battering.

The first limitation is the requirement that a victim seek relief from physical danger. As will be shown in the following discussion on incidence, this severely undercounts the number of women who experience even a limited definition of battering. The Committee feels constrained, however, to define the phenomenon in terms which are consistent with its mandate to investigate denials of equal protection of the law; which denials imply some form of relief-seeking. The second limitation is the concern with physical abuse. Here again the limitation is derived from the Committee's mandate, but also represents what seems to be the consensus minimal element. The definition is not limited by frequency or severity of violence, but emphasizes instead a woman's own perception that violence has reached such an unacceptable level as to warrant police involvement.

It is important to emphasize that this operational definition does not limit the range of incidents which the Advisory Committee considers to represent battering or domestic violence. There are certainly many types of behavior which are not included within the scope of this definition which are forms of violent behavior. Despite the limitations imposed, however, the definition has its more inclusive elements, as well. The term used is "battered women," and the definition is not limited to legally married persons, but includes any woman regardless of the nature of her living arrangement. Second, while the definition does not include "psychological abuse," it is not limited to instances in which an actual injury has occurred, but emphasizes a woman's perceived need for relief.

Although the Advisory Committee's definition is particularly designed for a study of police response, the recently passed "Family Violence Prevention and Services" Act could help resolve some definitional ambiguity in the future. The act includes the following:

(1) The term "family violence" means any act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful detention of an individual, which—

(A) results or threatens to result in physical injury; and

Abused Women," *New York University Review of Law and Social Change*, Spring, 1977, note 1, p. 135.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁷ Eileen Sweeney cited in "The Case for Legal Remedies for

(B) is committed by a person against another individual (including an elderly person) to whom such person is or was related by blood or marriage or otherwise legally related or with whom such person is or was lawfully residing.¹⁸

While this definition covers all forms of "family violence," it should provide the basic common ground for future discussions of battering and abuse. It specifies neither type nor degree of injury and includes as victims present and past cohabitants as well as spouses.

Incidence

Given the proliferation of terms and meanings, and the increasing awareness of the plight of battered women, just how common a problem is it? Despite an emerging consensus that it is all too common in American households, determining accurate rates of incidence is difficult.

A problem—in this case, wife-battering—becomes significant and of public importance when it can be proved that it affects millions of people. Consequently, many of us have been forced to play the numbers game in order to make the public aware that wife abuse is indeed a very serious social problem. Accurately determining the incidence of wife beating, of course, is nigh unto impossible—not only because obvious sources of statistics (police, courts, doctors, social workers, and mental health professionals) don't keep such records, but also because of differences in defining the problem.¹⁹

This "numbers game" does indeed now have many players, and in the absence of hard data, estimates of incidence are as varied as terms and definitions. The estimates fall into two categories—statistics based on survey questionnaire data and those derived from official reports.

A recent report on "Family Violence" by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) of the U.S. Department of Justice, states that:

Some data are available from professionals who work with victims of family violence at the local level. However, little of this information has been compiled at the national level. . . . The difficulty with developing national estimates on the extent of family violence from such administrative statistics is that there is a great variation among cities and states as to whether separate records are kept, who keeps them, and what they include.²⁰

¹⁸ Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (Title III of Child Abuse Amendments of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-457, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. AD. News (98 Stat. 1757 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§10401-10412).

¹⁹ Del Martin, "Overview," p. 3

²⁰ Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), "Special Report: Family Violence," U.S. Department of Justice, April, 1984, p. 2.

While survey research has produced what seem to be credible estimates, most attempts to measure battering incidence systematically generate very conservative rates.

Behind Closed Doors, a study of violence conducted in 1976 in the homes of 2,143 American "families," is the most often-cited source of survey-based estimates. The families chosen for the study were identified by a "cluster" or "area" procedure, which, according to the authors, yielded a sample "very similar to the census data for the population of the United States."²¹ The study defined family as "any couple who indicated that they were married or living together as a couple,"²² and included interviews with 960 men and 1,183 women.

The study measured spousal violence through a "Conflict Tactics Scale" which elicited information from respondents on the "means used to resolve conflicts of interests between family members."²³ This eighteen-item scale was the basis for two indexes of violence and includes three categories of family dispute resolution:

- (1) the use of verbal and non-verbal discussion and argument;
- (2) the use of verbal and non-verbal expressions of hostility, for example, insults or acts which symbolically hurt the other family members such as smashing or kicking an object; and
- (3) the use of physical force or violence.²⁴

Eight of the 18 items included in the scale constitute what the authors term an "overall violence index." The eight are: throwing something at spouse; pushing, grabbing or shoving; slapping; kicking, biting, or hitting with fist; hitting or trying to hit spouse with an object; beating; threatening with a knife or gun; and using a knife or gun. The last five items combine to create what the researchers term a "severe violence index." (The entire 18-item scale is included in the appendix.)

A surprising feature of these findings is that wife-on-husband violence exceeds husband-on-wife violence for the severe violence index. The authors indicate, however, that this finding conforms to other studies and suggest that "some revision of the

²¹ Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, *Behind Closed Doors*, p. 24.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

traditional view about female violence seems needed. . . .”²⁵ Despite the possible need for such revision, the authors also stress that “it would be a great mistake if that fact distracted us from giving first attention to wives as victims as the focus of social policy.”²⁶ They warn that husbands commit the most dangerous acts and tend to do more harm; that husbands repeat their acts more often; and that a large number of attacks by husbands are against pregnant women (“as though attacking the very symbol of biological womanhood”).²⁷ In addition, the authors emphasize that the data do not indicate how much violence by women is in self-defense. It is perhaps telling that the story of a woman who killed her husband in self-defense was the vehicle for increased public awareness rather than the established and repeated pattern of violence directed toward women and numerous deaths of wives at the hands of their husbands. Finally, the researchers stress that “women are locked into marriage to a much greater extent than men[.]. . . are bound by many economic and social constraints[.]” and they often have no alternative to putting up with beatings by their husbands.”²⁸

The same scale was used by Louis Harris in a survey of Kentucky residents conducted under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. That survey yielded the following data on the incidence of “spousal violence” in Kentucky (compared with national data reported by Straus).²⁹ The apparent validation of national rates by a statewide study suggests that at least four percent of American families experience “spousal violence.” The Bureau of Justice Statistics routinely conducts a much larger study, the National Crime Survey (NCS), to gauge rates of criminal victimization “across the country.” The survey is conducted in 60,000 households and covers about 132,000 individual household members. Although the sample is much larger than Straus’, the NCS data have their own limitations. The most significant drawback is the emphasis on crime, and the specification of types of criminal activity. The survey asks “a series of screening questions that are phrased in non-technical

language to determine whether the person has been the victim of rape, robbery, or assault.”³⁰ If a respondent replies “yes” to any such victimization, a detailed questionnaire is then administered. Among the problems identified with NCS data are the following: some victims do not consider family violence in terms of crime; the presence of a family member during the interview may inhibit full disclosure; and a general feeling of “shame or revulsion” may also inhibit disclosure.³¹

Despite these drawbacks, BJS also notes that “since the survey includes crimes not reported to the police, it permits, but does not necessarily result in, measurement of family crimes in which the police were not involved.”³² This serves as a corrective of sorts to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime data as compiled and reported in the Uniform Crime Reports, which include only cases which come to the attention of the police.

As can be seen in Table 2, NCS projections indicate that spousal violence is the most common family crime reported by the sample, with 57 percent occurring between spouses and ex-spouses.³³ While interpreting these figures for a rate of violence is difficult because of limitations in the data, it is possible to compare the incidence reported to U.S. census data. According to the 1980 census, there were 58,882,153 families in the United States.³⁴ Using NCS data, then, four percent of these families (2,355,000) experienced family violence by spouses or ex-spouses over the eight year period.

Of these crimes, 88 percent are assaults, and “about a third [of these] were aggravated, indicating use of a weapon and/or a serious injury.”³⁵ NCS also reports that 25 percent of the victims indicated they have experienced at least three incidents of violence in the six months prior to the interview.

The survey also yielded information on reporting these crimes to police. Respondents were more inclined to tell interviewers that they had reported violent crimes committed by relatives than non-relatives. As NCS notes:

However, we know that many victims of family violence report their victimization to *neither* the police nor NCS. A

²⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

²⁷ Letty Pogrebin, *Family Politics: Love and Power on an Intimate Frontier* (New York, N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 1981), p. 101.

²⁸ Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, *Behind Closed Doors*, p. 44.

²⁹ Mark Schulman, “A Survey of Spousal Violence Against Women in Kentucky,” Louis Harris and Associates, 1979.

³⁰ BJS “Special Report,” p. 3.

³¹ Ibid., p. 3.

³² Ibid., p. 3.

³³ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁴ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *General Population Characteristics: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce: 1980), Table 46.

³⁵ BJS “Special Report,” p. 3.

TABLE 1
Spousal Violence, Past 12 Months

	National	Kentucky
1. Threw something at you	3.4%	2.9%
2. Pushed, grabbed, or shoved you	9.8	8.5
3. Slapped you	4.9	4.8
4. Kicked, bit, or hit you with fist	2.7	1.4
5. Hit/trying to hit you with something	2.4	2.2
6. Beat you	1.5	1.8
7. Threatened you with a knife or gun	0.7	1.4
8. Used a knife or fired a gun	0.4	0.4
 ABUSE INDEX (items 4 through 8)	 4.0	 4.1

Source: Louis Harris & Associates, "A Survey of Spousal Violence Against Women in Kentucky," p. 59.

TABLE 2
Estimated Family Violence
(By Relationship of Offender to Victim)

	1973-1981	Yearly average (%)
Spouses or ex-spouses	2,333,000	259,000 (56.8)
Parents	263,000	29,000 (6.4)
Children	173,000	19,000 (4.2)
Brothers or sisters	351,000	39,000 (8.5)
Other relatives	988,000	110,000 (24.1)
 TOTAL BY ALL RELATIVES	 4,108,000	 456,000

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Family Violence," p. 3.

TABLE 3
Violent Victimization Not Reported to Police, by Reason

	Related offenders	Unrelated offenders
Private or personal matter	59%	23%
Fear of reprisal	13	5
Nothing could be done/lack of proof	8	19
Police would not want to be bothered	8	8
Not important enough	7	28
Reported to someone else	5	15
Did not want to get involved	1	3
Too inconvenient/time-consuming	1	3
Other reasons	18	21

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Family Violence," p. 4.

theory that could explain the higher than expected reporting rate of family violence is that victims who report family violence to NCS are more likely to have reported these events previously to the police because they have already defined such violence as criminal and thus are willing to report it to interviewers as well as to the police.³⁶ Table 3 reports NCS data on the reasons for non-reporting.

Interestingly, NCS data also seem to challenge Straus' findings about wife-to-husband violence. The survey found "that women were victims of family violence at a rate three times that of men."³⁷ Furthermore, "of all spousal violent crimes reported to NCS, 91 percent were victimizations of women by their husbands or ex-husbands who acted alone while committing the offense [and] five percent were victimization by wives or ex-wives alone."³⁸ Part of the discrepancy certainly results from definitional differences, with NCS data reflecting the more serious forms of violence. Even so, the gap between NCS estimates and Straus' projections is substantial.

The Commission on Civil Rights has reported that "legal experts believe [wife-beating] to be one of the most underreported crimes in the country."³⁹ Both Straus and NCS echo this contention and both emphasize that projections based on their survey data are low. Straus, for instance, reports that:

The pilot studies and informal evidence suggest that the true figures may be double those based on what people were willing to admit in a mass survey. . . If this is the case, then about a third of all American couples experience a violent incident every year, and about two thirds have experienced such an incident at least once in the marriage.⁴⁰

While this estimate applies to all forms of violence in the "overall violence index," Straus also places the rate of more "severe violence" in context by comparing it to rates of aggravated assault. While the National Crime Panel survey found such assaults occur at a rate of 2,597 per 100,000 persons, Straus' findings translate into comparable rates of 3,800 assaults on wives and 4,600 assaults on husbands per 100,000.

Though there are no winners in the numbers game and specific incidence rates are not available, the range of estimates indicate that there are many

losers. Even if the figures reported to researchers, interviewers or the police represent just the tip of the iceberg, that tip itself is of such magnitude to command immediate public attention. As BJS reports:

In spite of the obstacles a victim faces in acknowledging family violence, a significant amount of domestic violence is reported to NCS interviewers. . . [and] it is apparent that family violence is a significant problem, of large, and certainly ill-understood proportions. . .

In many respects, there are similarities between the development of information about family violence and about rape. Until recently, rape was a subject that was rarely discussed. Many victims were afraid to report it to the police or to mention it to anyone. As public attention has focused on the problem and programs were developed to help rape victims, many victims became more willing talk about it. Thus, it became possible to develop more accurate statistical measures. As family violence comes to be discussed and dealt with more openly, it should lead to similar improvement in the ability to measure and understand this serious problem.⁴¹

For several decades local police departments have been required to submit figures on arrests and offenses to the FBI for inclusion in the Bureau's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Unfortunately these statistics do not include information on the relationship between victim and criminal except in cases of murder. Further, while the published UCR figures report on aggravated assaults, "offense data on crimes that may be family violence, such as non-aggravated assault, are not reported to the FBI."⁴²

As can be seen from Table 4, the data available on homicide underscore the potential severity of violence between spouses. Wives are victims in 4.8 percent of the cases with over 8.0 percent of all murders reported involving spouses. It is also likely that some of the "unknown relationship" and "girl-friend/boyfriend" categories involve non-married, co-habiting women murdered in their homes.

In January 1981, the New Jersey Advisory Committee's report on battered women included a recommendation that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation should include battering among the categories listed in *The Uniform Crime Reports for the United States* and require all police departments to

³⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁹ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Under the Rule of Thumb* (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 10.

⁴⁰ Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, *Behind Closed Doors*, p. 48.

⁴¹ BJS, "Special Report," p. 5.

⁴² Ibid., p. 2.

TABLE 4
Homicides Reported to UCR

Victim's relationship to offender	Percent
Husband	3.4
Wife	4.8
Mother	0.6
Father	0.7
Daughter	1.0
Son	1.7
Brother	1.1
Sister	0.2
Other family	3.3
Acquaintances	29.7
Friend	3.4
Boyfriend	1.4
Girlfriend	1.9
Neighbor	1.6
Stranger	16.9
Unknown relationship	28.1
TOTAL	100.0

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 1982.

provide data on the incidence of battering on a regular basis."⁴³ Other groups have also called for this change, but to date the UCR does not include data on battering. To be sure, while such a change would only document cases which involved the police, it would represent a marked improvement and would complement the data generated by the BJS National Crime Survey.

The Police

During the Commission's consultation and throughout the literature, the role of police in responding to battered women assumes a central role. As Drs. Morton Bard and Harriet Connolly indicated in a paper submitted to the Commission:

Since the police are the leading edge of governmental authority with respect to the problem, their politics and practices are necessarily part of any analysis of wife battering. In cases of wife battering, a goal of police intervention is to help victims of domestic violence;

⁴³ New Jersey Advisory Committee, *Battered Women*, p. 31.

⁴⁴ Morton Bard and Harriet Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence: Policy and Practice" in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 304.

practices that do not achieve this goal should be the target of change.⁴⁴

As suggested, the police, in many if not most instances, represent society's front-line response to wife-battering. While this reliance on the police by victims of battering taps the common police creed, "to serve and protect," the complexity and inherent danger involved in such incidents create serious pressure for individual officers and departments.

The world of police work is highly regimented, precisely to facilitate service and protection to the community. Yet the rules and procedures which guide police conduct in responding to "domestic disputes" are often as vague and open-ended as definitions are plentiful for the situations they confront. The police role as "front-line" includes a normative dimension: society's general response to wife-battering has been reflected by, and institutionalized in, police procedures. Yet police officers and departments often lag behind broad normative and political changes. Hence, while researchers, policy-makers and advocates may have succeeded in drawing attention to the plight of battered women, similar enlightenment on the front-line has been slower.

The status of police has made them the subject of considerable scrutiny and the focus of substantial pressure for reform in recent years. In 1977 Fields provided the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights the following characterization of police response:

Perhaps the most serious problem for the individual who has suffered from assault is the failure of the police to respond to calls for help. The second problem is that when the police respond, their reactions exacerbate the situation.⁴⁵

As a witness at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Phoenix hearing commented:

The police officer, basically, by and large does not like answering domestic calls of that nature. . . . When he receives the call by radio. . . . [t]he two things he feels [are] probably fear, because more officers are killed in family situations than probably anything else, and the other thing is frustration.⁴⁶

According to Hartford Police Chief Bernard Sullivan, "between January 1, 1981 and August 31,

⁴⁵ Fields, "Wife Beating," p. 21.

⁴⁶ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Under the Rule of Thumb*, p. 13.

1984, a total of 159 officers have been injured while handling domestic calls for service." While this figure does not indicate the degree of injury, whether the calls involved "battered women," or the circumstance surrounding the injury, an average 3.6 injuries a month resulted from responding to domestic calls. Aside from the concerns of advocates for victims, this rate of injury seems to underscore the potential risks inherent in such situations.

Yet the Commission also noted in *Under the Rule of Thumb* that "the danger of intervening in domestic disputes, while significant, is exaggerated."⁴⁷ This observation is based on research which attempts to disaggregate data such as those provided by Chief Sullivan into more discreet categories. Whether the danger is real or exaggerated, "the fact remains that many police officers perceive the peril to be great."⁴⁸

One of the most common complaints surrounding police response to battered women has been the failure to treat battering as a crime. As suggested earlier, the pervasive societal response has been to keep such matters "behind closed doors," and police have played a significant role in accomplishing this process of containment. Officers responding to calls often treat battering incidents as no more than family or personal disputes and seek only to separate parties or de-escalate potentially violent situations. In many jurisdictions, a de facto policy of non-arrest has been effected and police discourage victims from filing charges or even refuse to make arrests.⁴⁹

Battered women are often doubly victimized by police attitudes and actions which convey a sense that women are at fault for any violence they endure:

The reluctance of police to make arrests is a common complaint of wife/victims. When a woman calls the police, it is an act of desperation. She expects immediate response and protection. At most the officer, if and when he does show up, may get the husband to leave the home for a cooling-off period. Police, of course, can only make felony arrests for "probable cause" and must witness the offense in order to make an arrest for assault and battery misdemeanors.

The onus is then on the victim to make a citizen's arrest, but she may be in a state of trauma (having just been

beaten) and incapable of making that decision or fearful of reprisal if she is the one to initiate criminal proceedings. Should she be insistent on her right to have her assailant arrested, the wife/victim is likely to be discouraged from doing so by the police.⁵⁰

With the growing awareness of battering and the publicity surrounding such violence have come demands for more forceful action by the police. Advocates and victims tend to stress the need for formal sanctions against batterers, namely arrest. As one participant in the 1978 consultation told the Commission, arrest is "society's most drastic form of behavior regulation." Because arrest is deemed a drastic measure and police have viewed battering as a social rather than a criminal problem, they have been reluctant to impose this sanction, often even in cases where obvious physical injury has occurred.

Police offer several reasons for this reluctance to arrest. The most frequent explanation for non-arrest is a perceived tendency of victims not to pursue charges. As noted in the Commission's report, *The Federal Response to Domestic Violence*:

Reasons cited in the literature for inadequate police response include the low-priority status given domestic disturbance cases, police policies and attitudes regarding involvement in intrafamily situations, "the risk of liability for false arrest," the physical dangers posed by intervention, police training that often reinforces a nonarrest policy, and complicated requirements for making an arrest.⁵¹

Whatever the cause, this tendency has been dubbed the "dropped charges syndrome" and while the belief has mixed support from limited studies comparing rates at which charges are dropped in family and stranger assaults, Marjorie Fields argues that:

Withdrawal of a complaint from a policy point of view should not be seen as a defeat. Withdrawal of the complaint may mean that a mere threat of criminal prosecution caused the man to reform, has led him to seek counseling and help, has led to perhaps a reconciliation between the parties on a more meaningful basis as two equals trying to form a better marriage, or it may mean that the time that the prosecutor has had the husband in custody has given the woman the only opportunity she has ever had to escape from an assailant who will not desist.⁵²

Bard and Connolly claim that appeals to the police are most often made "not because a crime has

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁹ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Under the Rule of Thumb*, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁰ Martin, "Overview," p. 7.

⁵¹ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The Federal Response to Domestic Violence* (1982), p. 24.

⁵² Fields, "Wife Beating," p. 24.

been committed but because one of the parties becomes afraid that things are getting out of hand." They add that "a call to the police can be seen as a constructive act, an attempt to prevent or break the escalation of violence."⁵³ They also claim that "more victims of spouse abuse do not call the police than do" (a claim which may be only slightly exaggerated, since the Kentucky survey cited above found that "in 43 percent of the cases, victims turn to no one"⁵⁴).

When cases come to police attention that do not involve assault (and in some that do), what the complainant wants is for the officers to "do something that will settle things," rather than to make an arrest.⁵⁵

The social, psychological and economic consequences of arrest are far-reaching for victims and families; and the desire to have police "do something" echoes throughout the literature on battered women. In general, the ability of police to mediate conflicts is often deemed a desirable quality. Bard and Connolly cite a finding by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence that:

[T]he yardstick for testing the application of a mature, sensitive, understanding and coolheadedness is often (once deciding that intervention is necessary) how quickly and quietly a patrolman can restore calm without having to make an arrest. This is what "good cops" are made of. This is what constitutes "good police work." This is what breeds community respect for the police.⁵⁶

In cases of wife-battering, this ethos can operate to diminish community respect, however, if officers or a department are perceived to prefer mediation over arrest.

Arrest and the application of crisis intervention techniques are the two forms of police response most often encouraged by advocates and policy-makers. Yet the two responses can be in conflict. Some advocates describe crisis intervention and mediation as "Band-aids." Georgene Noffsinger, a victim of battering and panelist at the Commission's consultation, argues that police:

⁵³ Bard and Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence," p. 305.

⁵⁴ Shulman, "A Survey of Spousal Violence," p. 48.

⁵⁵ Bard and Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence," p. 305.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁵⁷ Georgene Noffsinger, "Response of Georgene Noffsinger" in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 29.

must be encouraged to make independent decisions and arrests, when appropriate. Their role is not to patch up the family; they are not to act as mediators. It's a little late for that. That's locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen.⁵⁷

Fields encourages the continued use of mediation in response to "verbal disputes," but adds that "disapproval of violence must be expressed by police officers."⁵⁸ She adds that:

Arrests should be based on investigation on the scene and probable cause for arrest not upon predictions of whether or not victims will follow through with complaints or cooperate with prosecutors. The reality is that prior failure to cooperate with the prosecutor is not predictive of noncooperation, but rather predictive of cooperation because the husband has been given the chance to reform.⁵⁹

Bard and Connolly claim that a strict reliance on arrest unnecessarily limits the effectiveness of police to do "good police work." They emphasize the need for effective crisis intervention training and protection of police discretion at the scene. Further, they warn:

Well-intentioned reforms can be self-defeating if public policy changes rest solely on egregious case reasoning. It is our conviction that any changes mandated in police management of family disputes be based upon objective data available only through the conduct of sound research. To do otherwise may serve the purposes of advocacy well, but do unnecessary mischief in the lives of people.⁶⁰

James Bannon, former Executive Deputy Chief of Police in Detroit, Michigan, sets the following "minimal requirements of police agencies":

The basic ones are policy changes with regard to these crimes: [they] are treated like other stranger-stranger crime. That is a policy statement the police department must make.

The second is the police must accumulate the data on those incidents and make it available to other agencies, public and private.

Thirdly, they must train police officers to successfully intervene in these cases. I don't mean they are to deliver therapy. But there are ways to diffuse sensitively ongoing violent situations.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Fields, "Wife Beating," p. 23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶⁰ Bard and Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence," p. 34.

⁶¹ James Bannon, "Discussion" in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 36.

A recent "experiment" conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota, has provided some solid evidence for the debate over the viability of different police responses. The study was designed to gauge whether the form of action taken by officers responding to domestic violence calls diminished the incidence of repeat episodes. For several months Minneapolis police responding to domestic calls in two precincts systematically varied their responses to non-felony situations: "a suspect would be arrested, or sent from the scene of the assault for eight hours, or given some form of advice, which could include mediation."⁶²

The design called for a series of follow-up interviews with victims to determine whether repeat violence occurred. Although the researchers' persistent efforts to reach victims for follow-up interviews were not always successful, the results obtained from those contacted were revealing. Repeat violence occurred in only 19 percent of the cases in which arrests were made; but 37 percent of advice cases and 33 percent of those sent away reported repeat episodes. It is important to note that under Minnesota law, arrestees are detained overnight and this is different from many jurisdictions where release can be almost immediate.

The researchers also found that the effects of officers "listening" to the victim increased the effectiveness of arrest. The authors suggest that:

⁶² Lawrence Sherman and Richard Beck, "The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment," *Police Foundation Reports*, 1984, p. 3.

One interpretation of this finding is that by listening to the victim, the police "empower" her with their strength, letting the suspect know that she can influence their behavior. If police ignore the victim, the suspect may think he was arrested for arbitrary reasons unrelated to the victim and be less deterred from future violence.⁶³

While acknowledging certain limitations in their data and noting possible peculiarities of their research setting, these researchers speculate that:

It may be premature to conclude that arrest is always the best way for police to handle domestic violence or that all suspects in such situations should be arrested. . .

. . . But police officers cannot wait for further research to decide how to handle the domestic violence they face each day. They must use the best information available. This experiment provides the only scientifically controlled comparison of different methods of reducing repeat violence. And on the basis of this study alone, police should probably employ arrest in most cases of minor domestic violence.⁶⁴

It is in this context then, that the Advisory Committee has chosen to explore the current Hartford Police Department's policies in responding to calls for assistance from battered women. Though the following discussion is by no means the equivalent of a "scientifically controlled comparison," it represents an attempt to gauge how certain recommendations made six years ago by the Connecticut Advisory Committee have enhanced the access of women to equal protection under the laws.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

Battered Women in Connecticut and Hartford

Background

Many of the general issues described in Chapter 1 apply to Connecticut and Hartford, as well as the country at large. Awareness of, and concern for, the problem of battered women in Connecticut have been growing over the past decade as have attempts to address the situation.

¹ Margaret Martin interview in Hartford, Connecticut, July 18, 1984 (hereafter cited as Martin interview).

TABLE 5
State Funding for Shelter Services

Fiscal year	# of Programs	Amount
1977-78	4	\$ 75,000
1978-79	4	150,000
1979-80	8	275,000
1980-81	9	325,000
1981-82*	11	500,000
1982-83*	12	570,000
1983-84*	16	644,711
1984-85	16	770,119

* Includes Federal funds under Title XX.

Source: Connecticut Department of Human Resources, *Status Report: Shelter Services for Victims of Household Abuse*.

The Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women has been at the forefront of efforts to assist victims of battering, was extremely helpful to the Advisory Committee's previous study, and provided the Committee with a summary of developments in the intervening years. The Task Force, formed in 1976, was incorporated as a non-profit organization in 1978. Its board of directors includes representatives of thirteen shelters for battered women, and among its goals are increasing the "quality of services" available to victims and "advocacy for systemic change." According to board member Margaret Martin, Director of the United Social and Mental Health Services in Danielson, the Task Force has sought to provide training for the State Police as part of its "interpersonal relations segment."¹ Individual shelters have provided training to some local police departments.

The task force has had a significant impact in increasing the funds available to shelters, said Martin.² As can be seen from Table 5, public funding for the provision of shelter services has been growing steadily since 1977. In 1979 the legislature passed a bill which established a shelter services program within the Department of Human Resources (DHR).³ DHR is charged with distributing the funds to the Task Force. The funds appropriated by the legislature also include funding for a Task Force

² Martin interview.

³ PL 79-506.

coordinator and related expenses (training, transportation and overhead).

According to Joann Lutz, who administers the shelter services program of the Department of Human Resources, the agency developed a three-year plan which "included example service models, Department standards of service provision, verification of need, and a plan for expansion of services."⁴ The plan covered the period from January 1981 to June 1984, during which time the number of shelters grew from nine to the current level of 16 shelters across the State (a listing of shelters appears in Table 6). DHR contracts with shelters receiving State funds include the following seven performance standards:

- (1) Services available 24 hours, 365 days, with 24-hour telephone coverage.
- (2) Up to 72 hours of emergency crisis intervention services.
- (3) Up to 60 days of support services.
- (4) Services to children, including day care, education and counseling.
- (5) Resource information for victims and their families.
- (6) The development of community support systems to aid in the prevention of family crisis situations.
- (7) The development of cooperative agreements with existing social service providers to avoid duplication of services.⁵

Information obtained from shelters as part of DHR's monitoring process represents a valuable source of data on battering in Connecticut. As can be seen in Table 7, the shelter programs provide a large number of services. The table also indicates the increasing detail available on the battered population as the result of DHR's monitoring process.

Connecticut's shelters served approximately 1,000 women and 1,500 children a year between July 1982 and June 1984. In addition, shelter programs handled over 30,000 calls each year, nearly 40 percent of which were categorized as crisis calls. Although DHR cannot provide detail on the actions taken by police or the content of police response, their records do show that of the 1,062 women sheltered

in 1984, 509 (47.9 percent) had "contacted the police as a result of current battering incident." DHR data also give some idea of the pervasiveness of injury suffered by the women sheltered. According to the agency's figures, 231 of the women sheltered "received medical treatment for injuries which were the result of battering during the year preceding shelter entry."⁶

Under a law passed in 1979, the Department of Human Resources also became the repository for statistics based on police and hospital records on domestic violence incidents. The law requires that:

[P]olice officers and hospital emergency room personnel who have reasonable cause to believe that an individual has physical injury or injuries which has or have been inflicted upon her or him by such individual's spouse, whether or not such individuals are living together, or by any adult member of the household who is of the opposite sex, shall report such injuries to the Commissioner of Human Resources.⁷

According to DHR planning analyst Donna Stimpson, those persons responsible for submitting reports of domestic violence incidents to the Commissioner under this law have been slow in complying, and some are not yet submitting the required reports.⁸ She indicated that some police officials were uncertain how to interpret the phrase "reasonable cause to believe" and were therefore unwilling to require on-line officers to make such determinations.

To ease any undue burden placed on police departments or hospitals, the Department of Human Resources developed an easily kept statistical report form. The form is self-explanatory and designed to minimize time spent recording information (see appendix). In addition, since the beginning of 1984 DHR officials have attempted to assist police departments in complying with the law. Department of Human Resources officials also recognize certain difficulties which arise from language in the statute and differences between police and hospital procedures.

In the first six months of 1984, only 61 percent of the State's 173 police agencies fully complied with the reporting law (filed reports for all six months). Compliance by State Police personnel was far more lax than by local police departments. Only 9.9

⁴ Jo Ann Lutz letter to Judith Holmes, December 17, 1984.

⁵ Connecticut Department of Human Resources, "Status Report: Shelter Services for Victims of Household Abuse," January 1, 1984, p. 3.

⁶ Ibid., p.5.

⁷ PL 79-321.

⁸ Donna Stimpson interview in Hartford, Connecticut, July 18, 1984 (hereafter cited as Stimpson interview).

TABLE 6
Women Sheltered in DHR Funded Programs (FY 1984)

Facility/location (capacity)	Number of women sheltered
Community Health Center, Inc., Middletown (12)	46
Hartford Interval House (20)	240
Lower Naugatuck, Ansonia (12)	38
Meriden-Wallingford (18)	102
New Haven (20)	130
Prudence Crandall, New Britain (15)	89
United Social and Mental Health Services, Danielson (12)	37
Greater Danbury (12)	57
Southeastern Connecticut, New London (12)	73
Women's Crisis Center, Norwalk*	9
Women's Emergency Services, Sharon*	9
Women's Emergency Shelter, Waterbury (17)	139
YWCA of Greater Bridgeport (12)	57
Stamford YWCA*	32
Domestic Abuse Services, Greenwich* (7)	4
TOTAL (199)	1,062

* These programs coordinate a series of "host homes" through which victims are housed in private homes for various amounts of time as needed.
 Source: Department of Human Resources "Status Report: Shelter Services for Victims of Household Abuse."

TABLE 7
Shelter Services: FY 1983 and 1984

	FY 1983		FY 1984	
	Women	Children	Women	Children
Number of victims	1,096	1,498	1,062	1,465
Number of victims turned away	1,100	1,746	1,535	2,499
Number of victims turned away/ referred to other shelter	NOT AVAILABLE		1,033	1,605
Number of crisis calls	15,009		14,551	
Information/referral calls	20,773		18,984	
Total calls	35,782		33,535	

Source: Connecticut Department of Human Services.

percent of the State Police reporting stations complied fully, while 60.5 percent had not complied at all. Local police departments had a better record, with 55.8 percent of such agencies in full compliance for the first six months, while 36.9 percent reported for three or fewer months and 17.9 percent did not comply at all.⁹

Continued efforts by DHR staff and a series of meetings with State Police officials yielded a considerable improvement in compliance by the end of 1984. As can be seen in Table 8, the number of agencies reporting rose from 108 to 166. Of these, 79.3 percent of local and 29.6 percent of State Police agencies reported for all six months. DHR believes there is "strong indication that in the future compliance will increase with the newly adopted State Police order and the use of a computer in reporting."¹⁰ (See Appendix.)

Encouraging as these developments are, the police department of the State's largest city—Hartford—remains in total non-compliance. Hence, although the figures in Table 8 indicate a marked increase in the number of suspected incidents to nearly 500 a month, the data represent serious undercounts. According to DHR, "it is questionable that present methods of encouraging compliance will effect further change."¹¹

Emergency room (ER) compliance has been only slightly better than law enforcement agencies. For the first six months of 1984, of the 36 hospital emergency rooms required to report to DHR, only seven (19.4 percent) were in full compliance, while 18 (50 percent) filed no reports at all. Table 9 provides a comparison between the number of ER's reporting and incidents between the first and last six months of 1984.

Although there is a slight increase in the number of hospitals reporting in the second half of 1984, the rate of compliance for hospital emergency rooms is lower than that for police agencies. Even so, as the data in Table 9 show, an average of over 60 cases of abuse a month appear to warrant medical attention. If one extrapolates from the current rate of compliance (61 percent), it could be estimated that the actual number is close to 100 cases a month.

⁹ Memorandum from John Burke, "Suspected Incidents of Spouse Abuse, January-June, 1984," August 16, 1984.

¹⁰ Memorandum from John Burke, "Suspected Incidents of Spouse [Abuse], July-December, 1984," February 19, 1985.

A research team at St. Joseph's College in Hartford conducted a study of family violence in Connecticut for the Justice Planning Commission of the Office of Policy and Management during the summer of 1984. The team has defined a family as "a social group whose members share affinal or consanguinal relationships" and includes among forms of abuse considered, "physical abuse in a spousal or cohabitating relationship."¹²

Advisory Committee interviews indicate that the general awareness which had emerged in 1979 has been followed by a series of concrete actions to provide services for victims. Although much remains to be done, it is clear that the Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women, the Department of Human Resources, and the Justice Planning Commission efforts will continue to yield important improvements in services and data collection.

Despite these encouraging developments, however, there has been little formal investigation of monitoring of police performance. Preliminary interviews and correspondence conducted in 1983 by the Advisory Committee resulted in an ambiguous picture of changes in police attitudes and practices in the city of Hartford. For instance, Hartford Police Training Academy Commander Lieutenant Jesse Campbell wrote the Committee:

My personal perception as to how the issue of battered women is currently viewed is that when the problem was first taken public it had to endure the "laughing stage" in which the issue was laughed at and tossed aside. Today, the problem is viewed as real and I find that our officers are viewing the issue as a serious one and will address it accordingly. This has come about through the process of educating the public.¹³

In contrast to Campbell's assessment, Cecile Laurentis, Legal Advocate for Interval House, indicated in 1983 that the "police department does not routinely inform victims that they have a legal right to file a charge against the batterer, nor does it routinely assist battered women in filling out complaint forms." However, she added that some individual officers have been highly cooperative. Laurentis was also critical of the department's unwillingness to file reports on all battered women cases

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² St. Joseph College Child Welfare Institute, "Family Violence Research Proposal," p. 1.

¹³ Lt. Jesse Campbell letter to Judith Holmes, August 8, 1983.

TABLE 8
Suspected Incidents of Spouse Abuse Reported to DHR
By Police Agencies (July 1983 to June 1984)

Region (# of agencies)	Agencies reporting		Number of incidents		Monthly average	
	1-6/84	7-12/84	1-6/84	7-12/84	1-6/84	7-12/84
Area I (14)	9	13	702	917	117	153
Area II (20)	17	19	343	503	57	84
Area III (60)	27	59*	324	527	54	88
Area IV (39)	30	36	375	484	63	81
Area V (40)	25	39	190	399	32	67
STATE (173)	108	166	1,934	2,830	323	472

* 34 of these jurisdictions are State Police barracks which provided information for 2 or fewer months.
 Source: Connecticut Department of Human Resources.

TABLE 9
Suspected Incidents of Spouse Abuse Reported to DHR
By Hospital Emergency Rooms (July 1983 to June 1984)

Region (number)	Number of entities reporting		Number of incidents		Monthly average	
	6-12/83	1-6/84	6-12/83	1-6/84	6-12/83	1-6/84
Area I (7)	3	3	15	15	2.5	2.5
Area II (6)	4	4	68	56	11.3	9.3
Area III (5)	2	3	32	31	5.3	5.2
Area IV (11)	5	6	152	132	25.3	22.0
Area V (7)	3	2	43	59	7.2	9.8
State (36)	17	18	310	293	51.7	48.8

Source: Connecticut Department of Human Resources.

and the refusal to "classify victim-offender information on their computer."¹⁴

It is against this background information that the Advisory Committee decided to focus its followup on the specific recommendations of its previous report regarding police response to battered women. The remainder of this chapter addresses the status of each of five recommendations and concludes with a general appraisal of the current Hartford Police Department's policies toward battered women calls.

Police Response in Hartford

Guidelines

In 1979 the Connecticut Advisory Committee found that "many police officers do not... treat an assault by a man upon his wife or his female companion as a criminal act requiring an arrest." Further, "in most 'domestic disputes,' the official policy is to make an arrest only as a last resort, and frequently police officers actively discourage women from filing charges." Finally, the Committee found that "officers interviewed said they were

¹⁴ Cecile Laurenitis interview in Hartford, Connecticut, July 29, 1984 (hereafter cited as Laurenitis interview).

often unwilling to make arrests because they believed that women would not prosecute. . . [and] it is left to the discretion of the line officer at the scene of the incident to determine whether an arrest should be made."¹⁵ At the time, the Advisory Committee felt that such policies were detrimental to the rights and physical safety of victims and recommended that:

The police chief should issue new guidelines related to arrest in cases of battering requiring all officers to clearly inform a woman of her rights and options and emphasizing the police authority to make arrests when they have "probable cause" that a beating has occurred.¹⁶

In 1979 the Legal Aid Society of Hartford County and the Hartford Interval House worked with the Hartford Police Department to draft a set of guidelines, "Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Violence."¹⁷ As a result of changes in command in the Hartford Police Department, the guidelines drafted in 1979 (which appear in Figure 1), were never formally issued. It was not until January, 1984 that a set of guidelines was issued.

According to Hartford Chief of Police Bernard Sullivan, who issued the current order, the 1979 guidelines were "about what we've issued." He acknowledges, however, that his order "is not a hundred percent of what certain people wanted, but it's a hundred percent of what we felt was needed."¹⁸

In some respects the two sets of guidelines are comparable, though Sullivan's order lacks considerable detail contained in the 1979 order and several key elements have been omitted.

In terms of stated "purpose" and "policy," the two orders appear to differ only slightly. The omission of the 1979 admonition that battering "incidents should not be considered mere domestic disturbance" from the current order portends important differences in the overall import of the two documents. While the language regarding prescribed procedures for the Communications Unit/Division is identical in both sets of guidelines, the real difference between the two orders emerges in terms of actual procedures required for on-line officers (members of the Field Services Bureau).

Table 10 lists several key items either omitted from the 1979 guidelines or added to the current order. The earlier draft gave more emphasis to the victim, while the current guidelines seem designed to set limits on the responsibility of officers at the scene. Arrest has been de-emphasized in the current guidelines and the requirement for officers to provide victim assistance has been transferred to the Crisis Intervention Support Unit.

Sullivan noted that his order places emphasis on the victim's willingness to prosecute, though he also claims that "as long as she [the victim] wants the arrest made," his officers will comply within the limits of the law.¹⁹ Despite Sullivan's assurances, however, the failure to specify clearly conditions under which officers are *expected* to make arrests and the stated policy of considering willingness to cooperate in prosecution, seriously diminish the impact of the guidelines *from the point of view of the victim*. The current guidelines actually institutionalize consideration of a victim's willingness to prosecute, a factor which in 1979 was only an informal tendency on the part of some officers.

Crisis Intervention and Referral

In its 1979 report, the Advisory Committee found that "although officers are trained in crisis intervention in domestic disputes, the physical abuse of women in familial situations is not recognized and treated as a special criminal problem."²⁰ To remedy this shortcoming, the Advisory Committee suggested:

The police chief should issue a directive ordering officers to take a more active role in referring women to other agencies for assistance. The department should develop a referral card listing agencies and services for battered women and order officers to distribute the card. Officers should be briefed on and encouraged to use the information provided by the Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women.²¹

The guidelines discussed are the only response to date by the Hartford Police Department to these suggestions. Again, differences exist between the 1979 draft and the guidelines currently in force. The original draft seems to fulfill the goals of the

¹⁵ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women in Hartford, Connecticut* (1979), p. 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁷ Hartford Police Department Order, "Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Violence" (no date).

¹⁸ Bernard Sullivan interview in Hartford, Connecticut, June 20, 1984 (hereafter cited as Sullivan interview).

¹⁹ Sullivan interview.

²⁰ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women*, p. 24.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

FIGURE 1 1979 Draft Guidelines

- I. **PURPOSE:** This order consolidates and updates various policies, directives and training given in orders numbered *COOD 3-77*, *COOD 3-77a*, *FSBD 6-78* and Department Training Bulletin #9 of September 1978 regarding police response to calls for assistance by women who are the victim of a battery, assault or trespass. These incidents should not be considered mere domestic disturbances.
- II. **POLICY:**
Where an allegation is made of an assault, battery, trespass or threatening, regardless of any domestic relationship, there will be a full investigation and, if warranted, a summary arrest or warrant referral completed.
- III. **PROCEDURE:**
 - A. The Communications Unit shall classify all reports of domestic violence, potential violence, imminent threat or active trespass as call "A" or class "B" calls.
 - B. Field Services Bureau Personnel shall:
 1. Respond to and investigate complaints of women who are the victim of a Battery, Assault, Trespass or imminent threatening in an expeditious manner.
 2. If a crime is committed in the presence of the responding officer, arrest the offender.
 3. If the investigation discloses probable cause that a crime has been committed, and the offender is still on the scene, make an arrest.
 4. If the offender has left the scene and the offense consisted of violence or the potential for violence, take reasonable steps to apprehend the suspect. If the offender has been barred from the premises by a Court Order or if the victim has a signed Temporary Restraining Order from the Superior Court C.G.S. Section 46b-38) against the offender. Such orders shall indicate that the possibility of violence exists.
 - a. check suspect's residence
 - b. broadcast a general alarm over the police radio
 5. If no violence or potential violence is evident and the suspect has left, refer the complainant to General Investigations Division and provide her with Hartford Police Department Form #59.
 - a. Explain the warrant application procedure as outlined on Hartford Police Department Form number 59.
 - b. If both parties refuse to press charges or formalize their complaint advise the victim that she can obtain a warrant at a later date if she declines to sign a complaint at the scene and provide her with the necessary information to obtain such a warrant.
 - c. insure that both parties agree to a non-arrest remedy if no arrest is made.
 - d. However, in any event an arrest shall be made should the police officer feel that violence will occur, or the assault that took place resulted in serious bodily harm to the victim, or the assault occurred in the presence of the officer.
 6. Assist the victim in obtaining medical treatment upon request or apparent need including providing ambulance transportation to the nearest hospital.
 7. Remain on the scene to prevent the commission of any further crime and to insure the physical safety of the victim and any minor children present.
 8. Provide the victim with a listing of temporary emergency shelters and services including providing assistance in finding temporary placement

and escorting the victim to a shelter pick up location or other place of refuge, i.e., Hospital E.R., Police Headquarters Lobby.

9. Advise the victim of where to obtain legal assistance.

IV. "RESTRAINING ORDER"

If a person who is or has been a spouse, living partner or household member of the complainant enters or remains on premises from which he or she has been barred by a Court Order or in which he or she no longer lives as shown by a lease, deed or other documentation he or she should be subject to arrest for trespass.

V. REPORTS

Whether or not an arrest is made, the officers shall complete a report on all domestic violence incidents.

Current HPD Guidelines

- I. **PURPOSE:**
This order establishes policy and procedure to be followed by police personnel when responding to calls for assistance from persons presumed to be active or potential victims of domestic violence.
- II. **POLICY:**
Arrest and/or warrant referral processes shall be followed by responding sworn personnel in domestic situations where assault, trespass or threatening is alleged regardless of the relationship between victim and perpetrator, after probable cause has been determined to exist.
- III. **PROCEDURE:**
 - A. The Communications Division shall classify all reports of domestic violence, potential domestic violence, imminent threat, or active trespass as Class "A" or Class "B" calls.
 - B. Field Services Bureau personnel shall:
 1. Respond to and investigate complaints of persons who are victims of domestic violence.
 2. Assist the victim in obtaining medical treatment, upon request or apparent need, including notification for ambulance transportation.
 3. Consider the following factors in deciding whether to make an arrest in a domestic violence complaint:
 - a) Probable Cause
 - b) Physical Evidence
 - c) Willingness of the complainant to cooperate in the prosecution process, except where corroborative evidence indicates an assault has taken place.
 4. If the offender has left the scene and the offense consisted of violence, attempt to arrest the accused.
 5. If the victim can provide a valid court order or temporary restraining order (C.G.S. Section 46-38) against the offender, take appropriate action under 53a-107—Criminal Trespass.
 6. Refer victim to the Crisis Intervention Unit for the provision of immediate victim assistance and support services such as temporary shelter placement, accompanying victim to local hospitals and/or escorting victim to local place of refuge.
 7. If no violence or potential violence is evident and the suspect has left the scene, take appropriate steps as outlined in Order 7-3 (Procedure for Completion of Arrest Warrant Application in Misdemeanor Cases).

TABLE 10
Comparison of Procedures in 1979 Draft Guidelines
With Current Hartford Police Guidelines

III.

B.	Items omitted	Items added
	1. expeditious response	
	2. arrest for crime committed in presence of officer	
	4. specific steps to apprehend suspect who has left scene	3. consideration of physical evidence; willingness to prosecute
	5. ensure mutual agreement for non-arrest decision	
	6. assist in obtaining medical care	6. refer to crisis intervention unit for shelter, hospital or place of refuge
	7. remain on scene	
	8. provide listing of resources and transportation to "place of refuge"	
	9. advise victim on obtaining legal assistance	

Advisory Committee by calling for specific actions on the part of officers: direct responsibility for certain facets of victim assistance including provision of transportation, ensuring safety, and referrals. Under the guidelines currently in force, the officer at the scene is directed to refer victims to four civilian employees of the Hartford Police Department—the Crisis Intervention Support Unit—for “immediate victim assistance and support services.”

Because of its central role, the Crisis Intervention Support Unit will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In light of the general desire to have officers at the scene of battering incidents “do something,” it is important to discuss the actual role police themselves play in the application of crisis intervention techniques. As Bard and Connolly note:

During a crisis, personal coping mechanisms are severely taxed and people seek structure and direction. Since police officers are both realistically and symbolically the embodiments of order and stability, and because they are symbols of authority actively present when the difficulties are at

their emotional height, they may well be in the best possible position to deal with the problem. . .

The kind of immediacy in time and place that can be achieved by the police cannot be achieved by any other element in the helping system. In fact, given institutional constraints, the preventive mental health objectives of crisis intervention theory are unlikely to be realized by existing mental health operations. Ultimately, it may be more rational and indeed more economic to use the police as the system of choice for the achievement of effective crisis intervention.²²

Although police officials may object to the expectation that officers provide crisis intervention, a 1977 study determined that “71 percent of police jurisdictions in the U.S. are delivering some form of training in family crisis intervention.”²³ As suggested by Bard and Connolly, the reason for the spread of such training is the recognition that, like it or not, police are the first line of response. A victim or neighbor places a call to the police with the expectation that *they* will do something to restore order.

²² Morton Bard and Harriet Connolly, “The Police and Family Violence: Policy and Practice,” in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 309.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

Police officers are endowed by society with considerable authority and legitimacy, and their use of crisis intervention techniques has vastly more influence than persons with lesser real or perceived authority. Aside from any real immediate effect, it is clear that the police presence and demeanor can have significant impact on future developments. This is one of the lessons of the Minneapolis study which found that officers giving advice even when they also made arrests increased the deterrent effect of making the arrest. The Advisory Committee's 1979 suggestion that officers provide victims with referral cards and use information developed by the Connecticut Task Force derives from such an understanding of police authority. The suggestion was meant as a corrective to the tendency in the past for officers to use their authority to condone acts of battering or effectively "blame victims."

According to Chief Sullivan, officers do have at their disposal a victim assistance pamphlet, "If You Are A Victim of Crime in Hartford. . ." (in Spanish and English), which lists several agencies and institutions a person can turn to other than the police. The pamphlet is distributed by the officers on an irregular basis, however, and it is not designed specifically for battering incidents (though it lists a telephone number for the battered women's hotline at Interval House). Officers also have at their disposal a "black book" compiled and updated by the Crisis Intervention Support Unit (CISU) which can be used at the discretion of officers to refer victims to resources available.

According to Susan Knaut, director of CISU, some officers do use the black book of their own volition rather than deferring to CISU. Knaut and Sullivan shared a letter the department had received from a thankful new resident of Hartford who praised the performance of two officers who responded to her call. The victim indicated that in her previous residence (outside of Connecticut), she had difficulty even obtaining police response. She contrasted this with her experience in Hartford where the two officers had provided her with enough information and support to take positive actions which, she said, had led to her eventual escape from a recurring battering situation. Knaut emphasized that this letter came from a woman whose only

dealings were with the officers—she had no record of the woman in her CISU files.²⁴

Although such events occur, they are not the result of formal policy. According to Cecile Laurenitis, the police department also has at its disposal two pamphlets prepared by Interval House. She added that, based on her experience with victims, she is not sure whether officers make the pamphlets available to victims as part of their response to calls, and she suspects that not all Hartford Police Department officers are aware of the existing guidelines.²⁵

In addressing the topic of resource-referral cards for victims, Chief Sullivan observed that "a policeman just cannot do everything that everybody wants. He's out there trying to remember all these clearance codes and what have you."²⁶ Although officers may not be distributing the departmental or Interval House pamphlets, officers are, according to Sullivan, apparently distributing cards with the telephone number and address of CISU. Adds Knaut, "we have officers who are giving out cards left and right."²⁷ The number or circumstances under which cards are distributed are not, however, monitored or recorded.

To the extent that Knaut's assertion is accurate, it may betray a new, more subtle problem: overuse of referral. As Bard and Connolly note, "since it is a fairly easy and concrete task for an officer to give a citizen the name and address of somewhere to go, the referral process may be overused."²⁸ To be sure, on-line officers may be caught in a double-bind in situations where victims are ambivalent; when they refuse to seek arrest, an officer's only choice may be to make sure victims are aware of available resources by making referrals. Laurenitis noted that police do not like the "mediating role" and they spend a considerable amount of time on domestic incidents. She also emphasized, however, the need for a clearly defined, multi-faceted form of response in which the *officer's authority* is used both to make arrests and referrals.²⁹

Recording Incidence

The Advisory Committee found in 1979 that "the Hartford Police Department fails to identify and count incidents of battering." At the time, the Committee also noted that "the lack of documenta-

²⁴ Susan Knaut interview in Hartford, Connecticut, June 20, 1984 (hereafter cited as Knaut, June 20 interview).

²⁵ Laurenitis interview.

²⁶ Sullivan interview.

²⁷ Knaut interview.

²⁸ Bard and Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence," p. 314.

²⁹ Laurenitis interview.

tion makes it difficult to build a case for obtaining further funding and resources.”³⁰ The Committee suggested that:

The police department should identify and count incidents of battering by including such a category on the police report form and by computerizing the information. This information should be provided to line officers responding to “domestic” calls for their own protection.³¹

As part of its earlier study the Advisory Committee reviewed Hartford Police Department files to generate information on incidence. In the intervening years the Department has acquired computer capabilities but has not revised its procedure for tracking information. As such, although some police report data are readily recorded, crucial information is still not recorded and hence cannot be retrieved. Again, while the draft 1979 guidelines addressed this problem by requiring officers to report incidents regardless of whether arrests were made, this requirement is not included in the current order.

In response to a 1983 Advisory Committee inquiry, Chief Sullivan wrote:

The Police Department collects battering information as . . . assault[s] with a notation that it was domestic in nature. The number of part one assaults are made public periodically with no indication if the victim was a battered woman. All information is computerized and statistics are available to the public upon request, such as: for the past 18 months three percent of all the 447,523 calls for service were domestic in nature and 13 percent of all domestic calls were serious enough to require a written report. Names, addresses and arrest reports are not available. A police officer responding to a call may request information regarding prior incidents at a particular address.³²

When asked during a 1984 interview about the reporting procedures used by the department, Chief Sullivan emphasized that the police have a limited ability to serve as a repository for information. He stressed that “time spent on paperwork diminishes the field response capabilities.”³³ Even in instances where officers do file written reports, they use only a broad “domestic” category which does not include specific designations for battering.

According to Chief Sullivan, “we have to act on good faith; if it’s an obvious case of battering, nine times out of ten, it’s going to wind up with Crisis Intervention.” Sullivan also asked, “How do you

define battering; when you go to a house and the husband hit the wife and it’s never happened before? How would we code that?” According to the Chief, “we go on calls sometimes that may be coded as assault but was actually a domestic, but we don’t want to pre-code.”³⁴

As was noted in the introductory discussion, there is confusion over the definition of battering. However, it is within Chief Sullivan’s power to require officers to make some form of notation when responding to “calls for assistance from persons presumed to be active or potential victims of domestic violence.” If officers are expected to be able to interpret this instruction from the guidelines, they should certainly also be able to have the presence of mind to note the frequency with which they respond to such calls (a copy of the standard Hartford Police Department reporting form is included in the appendix).

Sullivan’s assertion that information on prior incidents at an address is available to responding officers seems to support the case for maintaining more detailed data. One could argue that a more comprehensive reporting mechanism would actually enhance the efficiency (and decrease the danger) of “field response capabilities.” According to the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence:

In one city, police had been called at least once before in 85 percent of spouse assault and homicide cases. In 50 percent of these cases police had responded five times to family violence incidents prior to the homicide.³⁵

The Department’s handling of statistics on battering is more than an internal matter, but has placed Hartford in non-compliance with the Connecticut state reporting law. When asked about the statute, Sullivan acknowledged that “we haven’t complied with that,” but added, “we’re trying to work something out.” Sullivan indicated that non-compliance was based on limited time and noted, “if we complied with what every agency wanted, we would need 500 more people processing information.”³⁶

Although Hartford may be trying to work out some form of compliance, the city’s non-compliance raises questions about its commitment to providing adequate response to battered women. As noted

³⁰ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women*, p. 25.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³² Bernard Sullivan letter to Judith Holmes, August 2, 1983.

³³ Sullivan interview.

³⁴ Sullivan interview.

³⁵ Task Force on Family Violence, *Final Report* (U.S. Attorney General, 1984), p. 19.

³⁶ Sullivan interview.

earlier in the chapter, DHR has made a number of attempts to facilitate compliance and several major Connecticut departments have recently come into compliance.

Training

Hartford Police officers were receiving some training in crisis intervention in 1979, but according to the Advisory Committee then, it was "inadequate [and] there are little or no in-service training programs to continue sensitizing officers and to combat sexism in the department."³⁷ The Committee suggested that:

The police academy should develop in-service and recruitment training programs solely on the issue of battered women. It is imperative in the development of such programs to secure the active assistance of feminist organizations and shelter groups on an ongoing basis.³⁸

Becoming a police officer in Hartford or any other major American city is a difficult and competitive process. Successful candidates undergo a rigorous and demanding period of training conducted by the Police Academy. According to Lt. Jesse Campbell, Commander of Hartford's Police Training Academy, the program offered by the Academy includes "13 hours of training in Crisis Intervention with three hours being spent on domestic violence to all pre-service recruits."³⁹

The department's 150 new officers have received 15 hours of crisis intervention training, two of which are devoted to "domestic violence." (See appendix for training agendas.) The Interval House and the Legal Aid Society also provide two hours of training on "The Battered Women Victim." Although there has never been a formal evaluation of the training, Interval House's Cecile Laurenitis indicated that the training is "well-received by the officers."⁴⁰ She added, however, that the training occurs in large classes and suggested that smaller groups would stimulate more active involvement.

The crisis intervention training block also includes a two hour "community resources panel." John Foley represents the Salvation Army in this segment but does not think the time allotted to this training is

adequate. However, he too has found that the training is well-received. He notes that even the small amount of time allotted is "important" and emphasizes that "personal contact with the recruits has positive effects."⁴¹

Elizabeth George, former staff attorney for Legal Aid's Domestic Violence Unit, also praised the training provided as an important step. She emphasizes that training remains the key to continued improvement in police response and underscores the need for some form of inservice training.⁴² This need, identified by the Advisory Committee in 1979, was also stressed by Foley and Laurenitis.⁴³

Lt. Campbell informed the Advisory Committee in 1983 that "two hours of training on domestic violence will be offered in all in-service sessions."⁴⁴ In June, 1984, Chief Sullivan reported that "every officer receives 40 hours of training every three years" and indicated that the department is developing a "block of sensitivity and crisis in-service training which all officers will receive."⁴⁵

While Sullivan was reluctant to evaluate the training provided to new recruits, he was confident that it had an effect. Indeed, a consensus did emerge from discussions with Laurenitis, Foley, and Margaret Martin from the Connecticut Task Force on Abused Women, that the response of some newer officers has improved. Each of these persons reported, however, that problems remain with some of the veteran officers.

According to Foley, the training offered was fairly routine and did not allow for more innovative techniques such as psycho-drama.⁴⁶ In fact, the three organizations presenting training do so as part of a panel before a class of cadets. Knaut indicated, however, that several innovative teaching techniques are part of the CISU segment of the academy training program.⁴⁷

Researchers in New York City developed a pilot training program which emphasized three forms of training. The current lecture-based training provided by the Hartford Police Department conforms to the first aspect of this model. The researchers note that lectures were "designed to provide theoretical understanding as well as practical techniques." To

³⁷ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women*, p. 24.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁹ Lt. Jesse Campbell letter to Judith Holmes, August 8, 1983.

⁴⁰ Laurenitis interview.

⁴¹ John Foley interview in Hartford, Connecticut, August 14, 1984 (hereafter cited as Foley interview).

⁴² Elizabeth George telephone interview, August 1984.

⁴³ Foley and Laurenitis interviews.

⁴⁴ Campbell letter, August 8, 1983.

⁴⁵ Sullivan interview.

⁴⁶ Foley interview.

⁴⁷ Susan Knaut letter to David Harris, 1984.

supplement this "how to" approach the model uses "small group discussions of case material, role playing and real-life simulations that consist of staged disputes in which officers 'intervene' (with video taping and followup critique of performance)."⁴⁸

Regardless of the content used in intensive classroom training, however, it should be "regarded as *orientative* rather than conclusive." It is designed to be preparatory "for the kind of methods to be used in the field." Bard and Connolly found that field training was "an important element" in the program which, like "other human service professions, requires an opportunity for 'learning by doing'."⁴⁹

While no such field training is offered to Hartford police officers, the Crisis Intervention Support Unit did conduct slightly more intensive training for a limited number of uniform officers including a field component in which CISU workers accompanied officers on their tours. While the purpose of CISU's "ride-alongs" was to familiarize the unit's social workers with police practices and experiences, they did create a link between trainees and trainers for future classroom work. The CISU effort represents the closest thing to field training offered by the Hartford Police Department. Knaut reports that a formal field component received objections from police union officials because it involved an "evaluative aspect of a line officer's performance by a non-supervisory officer."⁵⁰

Knaut presented "crisis intervention" segments during 40-hour in-service training programs in 1981 and 1982. These began as four hour blocks which were reduced by "mutual consent" to two hour blocks.⁵¹ After a two year hiatus CISU again provided in-service training on November 1, 1984. This training, however, was "basically limited to a refresher course on what the unit handles now that we are an official component of the Department and available to respond on a 24-hour basis."⁵² While this is more informational than practical in-service training, it does represent a step toward exposing veterans to one of the features of training offered new officers as part of their academy training.

Female and Hispanic Officers

The Connecticut Advisory Committee's review of the Hartford Police Department's files for March 1977, found 166 women victims of battering. Of these "26 or 15.7 percent were Puerto Rican."⁵³ Reviewing the make-up of the Department in 1978, the committee found 6 female and 10 Hispanic officers out of 410. In light of these findings, the Advisory Committee recommended in its 1979 report that the police department hire additional female police officers in order to increase female representation on the force and make possible the utilization of more male-female teams in domestic situations.

The Advisory Committee also recommended that the department hire additional Hispanic officers and that the agency referral card be translated into Spanish in order to facilitate communication with Spanish-speaking women.⁵⁴

Because of the absence of data, a similar profile is not available for 1984. However, the CISU caseload reported in Chapter 3 suggests that the bulk of cases are concentrated among minority and disadvantaged women. Sullivan stressed that a very large proportion of the department's calls involve minority and disadvantaged populations.

As has been noted earlier, Chief Sullivan emphasized the department's commitment to affirmative action. As Table 11 indicates, there have been some encouraging results. The figures in Table 11 show that while the department has shrunk in total personnel, its affirmative action policies have allowed for a significant increase in the number of female and Hispanic officers on the force (increases of 433 and 360 percent, respectively). On the other hand, the number of black officers has remained constant over the six years. Despite the growth, minorities are 26 percent of the police force, in a city whose population contains 54 percent minorities (20.4 percent Hispanic and 33.3 percent black).⁵⁵

According to Sullivan, the department's "ambitious affirmative action goals" are not solely designed to address the issue of battered women but reflects "a position on the whole issue of urban policing." He wants to build a "department that is responsive to the community it is serving" and has

⁴⁸ Bard and Connolly, p. 311.

⁴⁹ Bard and Connolly, p. 311.

⁵⁰ Susan Knaut comments on draft report, December 24, 1984, p. III-31 (hereafter cited as Knaut comments).

⁵¹ Knaut comments.

⁵² Susan Knaut letter to David Harris, October 22, 1984.

⁵³ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women*, p. 17.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁵ Bureau of the Census, *General Social and Economic Characteristics, Connecticut (1980)*, Table 59.

TABLE 11
Hartford Police Personnel by Race and Sex, 1978 and 1984

	1978 (%)	1984 (%)	% Change
Female	6 (1.5)	31 (8.0)	+433%
Hispanic	10 (2.5)	46* (12.0)	+360%
Black	53 (13.0)	53* (14.0)	0
Asian	0 -	0 -	-
Total personnel	410 (100)	369 (100)	-10%

* Includes both male and female.

Source: Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women in Hartford, Connecticut* and October 3, 1984 letter from Chief Sullivan.

included "a 24 hour block of sensitivity training" in the police academy curriculum.⁵⁶ Sullivan emphasized that the increase in Hispanic officers has meant that each communication shift now includes at least

one bilingual officer. There is no conscious effort to target female or Hispanic officers to particular situations. It is hoped, however, that all officers will be prepared to respond.

⁵⁶ Sullivan interview.

Crisis Intervention Support Unit

History and Purpose

One of the findings of the 1979 Advisory Committee study was that "the criminal justice system and social service agencies in the Hartford area do not provide the assistance physically abused women need."¹ The formation of the Crisis Intervention and Support Unit (CISU) as a joint pilot project of the Family Service Society and the Hartford Police Department in October, 1979 presented a unique response to this problem.

According to CISU Director Susan Knaut, the unit "took bits and pieces from other programs and tried to adapt to the special needs of Hartford, the police officers, and issues here." The program was designed to be "flexible so that it could change with the needs."² CISU was formed "to combine the knowledge, philosophies, and techniques of the traditional mental health and law enforcement professionals in an intervention program which could respond immediately to crises and then provide follow-up services as needed."³

At the time of its founding, CISU was staffed by trained social workers available to assist officers in Hartford's police district 5 (prior to consolidation). It is now a six person unit (supervisor, secretary and four line staff), serving 369 officers across the city and has become a formal part of the police department's administrative structure.

Between its formation in 1979 and formal absorption as part of the department in 1984, CISU has emerged as an effective complement to the department. According to Knaut, the unit originally encountered considerable resistance from officers. Many perceived CISU workers as outside "do-gooders" with little understanding of police procedures

or the complexities and dangers of police work. This resistance represented a serious obstacle to CISU's ability to serve either victims or officers, for, as Knaut writes, "while certain formal courtesies could be required (from officers), the decision to utilize the unit rested solely with each responding officer."⁴

Given this resistance and cynicism, one of the first tasks was "designing a training program to enable officers to use CISU." Knaut recognized that both sides had much to learn and "in the beginning (CISU) staff spent many evenings in police cruisers riding through the city to become familiar with the officers and their work."⁵ After this initial orientation, CISU sponsored a week-long training session for a group of officers and CISU staff.

Recognized experts in the crisis intervention field and educators were brought in to instruct the police and social workers to train the rest of the field officers in crisis intervention techniques, theories of crime victimization, domestic violence issues, and utilization of community resources. Officer safety in these potentially dangerous situations was stressed. The concept of the program was presented in depth during 16 hours of classroom and follow-up field training. While sensitization and education of the officers were the goals of the training it also served a more important goal—reducing resistance. The officers were each presented with suede notebooks with "Crisis Intervention Support Unit" printed across the bottom. Referral Handbooks specifically designed to fit into their back pockets were also distributed.⁶

It was critical to establish in the officers' minds that CISU was a service; another alternative available to them. An important objective was to develop understanding of, and confidence in, CISU among a core of officers whose positive experiences could then be shared with the remaining line officers. In

¹ Connecticut Advisory Committee, *Battered Women*, p. 24.

² Susan Knaut interview in Hartford, Connecticut, June 20, 1984 (hereafter cited as Knaut interview).

³ Edith Fein and Susan Knaut, "Crisis Intervention and Support Working With the Police" (unpublished paper presented at the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Toronto, Canada, April, 1984), p. 1.

⁴ Fein and Knaut, "Crisis Intervention," p. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

addition, "the crisis unit provides 20 hours of training to each recruit class covering the intervention techniques and the special needs of domestic violence and crime victims."⁷

Staff made sure never to promise what they could not deliver, and emphasized they were not there as miracle workers with magic wands. As time went on a battered woman who had called the police on several occasions ceased to need police intervention; after an elderly woman who had been repeatedly victimized was relocated to a safer neighborhood three days before her house was burned to the ground; and after staff helped relocate the family of a father who had brutally sexually assaulted his 10 year old daughter and then beaten his wife and five other children, the resistance began to fade. More officers began contacting the unit for immediate service in more types of situations.⁸

Although training is an important facet of CISU activity, the unit's principal objective is to provide support services for persons in need of more than conventional law enforcement assistance. "The program is not intended to replace police officers," writes Knaut, "but to assist them to better serve those who need safeguarding." By choosing to call CISU, officers at the scene of domestic violence incidents are "acknowledging that the incidents are of such complexity that they will be unable to devote the time and effort required to bring about a successful resolution."⁹

There are two related benefits from CISU involvement. First, it is cost-effective; "since the crisis worker is able to spend the hours needed, the victim gets more services at a cost lower than that of a police officer," enabling officers to devote more time to traditional forms of law enforcement. Second, the unit's extensive referral and followup increase the chances that "police intervention may not be needed in the future."¹⁰

Hartford has approximately 370 patrol officers. Between August 1981 and June 1982, the CISU handled referrals from 123 different officers, yielding some 346 cases. This represents a substantial increase over the previous 11 month period, when only 76 officers referred victims to the unit. Between January and August of 1984, CISU responded to 505

cases. Of these, "114 different officers were involved in . . . 198 domestic dispute referrals."¹¹ Although in absolute terms this appears to be a decline from the 1982 level, the 1984 data cover only eight months and refer specifically to domestic disputes. In assessing the trend, Knaut noted:

The fact that there was a steady increase in the number of officers referring to the CISU and that most officers over the years continued to refer once they had contact with the unit suggests that the CISU staff has been able to provide reliable and useful assistance.¹²

From this trend, Knaut concludes that CISU has "achieved the difficult task of being a civilian unit accepted by and integrated with a police department."¹³ In many respects, the absorption of CISU by the police department is evidence of its effectiveness. The incorporation of CISU and specific mention in the current guidelines are indications of what Chief Sullivan describes as the department's attempt "to establish among officers an attitude that recognizes the service as a 'quasi-police' function, not an outside service."¹⁴ Knaut indicated that the CISU caseload had increased "by 28 percent" since the guidelines were issued and Sullivan added that the "impression is the message is getting out."¹⁵

Current Status and Procedures

Hartford Police Department guidelines now require officers responding to calls from battered women to "refer victim to Crisis Intervention Unit for the provision of immediate victim assistance and support services such as temporary shelter placement, accompanying victim to local hospitals and/or escorting victim to a local place of refuge."¹⁶ Although the guidelines require officers to make referrals to CISU, many officers request assistance at the scene.

Knaut has developed two composite scenarios which capture the typical dynamics between battered women, officers and CISU workers. In the first instance, a victim herself places the call for assistance and the responding officer requests a CISU worker. According to Knaut, "The worker must determine whether she has friends or family

⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

⁹ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

¹¹ Susan Knaut letter to David Harris, October 22, 1984.

¹² Fein and Knaut, "Crisis Intervention," p. 11.

¹³ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁴ Bernard Sullivan interview in Hartford, Connecticut, June 20, 1984 (hereafter cited as Sullivan interview).

¹⁵ Knaut interview.

¹⁶ Hartford Police Department, "Domestic Violence Incidents—Police Response," January 20, 1984.

with whom she can stay or if an emergency shelter must be contacted.”¹⁷

The police officer, meanwhile, is attempting to locate the suspect and arrest him. The worker asks whether the officer has ever been called to the home previously on similar complaints. She asks the officer if there is enough evidence that a crime has been committed to warrant an immediate arrest if the suspect is located, or failing that, whether an application for an arrest warrant could be pursued. The worker must explain to the client what the charges against the suspect would be if he were arrested and whether or not it is likely he would be released on bond immediately or held overnight in jail. If bond is likely and there is no other safe place for her to go, arrangements are made for her to go to a shelter, either in the city, or if the woman is too fearful to remain in the city, anywhere in the state. Once shelter space is obtained, the CISU worker helps the woman pack her things and provides transportation to the shelter.¹⁸

Following this set of immediate responses designed to alleviate the potential for additional battering, CISU follow-up begins. This follow-up consists of advice on legal procedures surrounding application for temporary restraining orders or obtaining free legal assistance for eligible victims. CISU also contacts shelter staff to discuss the needs of clients and ensure that provisions are made for future contingencies. Victims are encouraged to contact CISU should any additional problems arise with social service agencies or the legal system. “If there are no future calls, after a few weeks, the CISU worker contacts the client and if there have been no problems the case is closed.”¹⁹

Under a second scenario the police are called, not by a victim, but by a third party. “The woman does not want her husband arrested nor is she ready to terminate the relationship.”²⁰ Under these circumstances CISU staff provide resources and referral functions, including information on available sources of counseling and shelter. Such victims are also encouraged to contact CISU directly if problems recur. Such a case is closed “in a few days.”

In many such instances the same victim will contact CISU herself; the case is reopened; the case worker discusses options available to the victim and the sequence of interaction in the first scenario takes place.²¹

In summarizing the progression of CISU involvement, Knaut writes:

Once the worker has determined the client’s immediate needs, the various options to resolve the problems are discussed. The clients then decide which alternative to pursue. The crisis worker supports the clients and advocates on their behalf with the necessary referral agencies. The worker remains available to the clients should the initial approach to resolving the problem fail and another approach needs to be taken. This process continues until the clients feel that their problems have been resolved or, in rare instances, until all resources available to the CISU have been exhausted.²²

Consistent with general principles of crisis intervention, a CISU worker functions as a repository of information. “Intervention” is primarily the assurance that victims are made aware that alternatives exist and that support will be available regardless of the decision made (even if a victim decides to do nothing at the time). It is important to emphasize that case workers offer support regardless of whether arrest occurs.

The orientation of CISU workers is to aid victims, and the follow-up activities far surpass the time available from responding officers. Although Knaut describes the unit as advocating for the victim, it seems that the bulk of such advocacy is devoted to ensuring appropriate support services after police involvement has ended. As outlined in current police procedures, officers are encouraged to call CISU after having completed their work. While Knaut’s scenarios imply that CISU workers consult with officers upon arrival at the scene, it is not clear whether a unit worker can have any impact on resolving more immediate matters. In fact, based on the scenarios and the police guidelines, it appears that the mediating aspects of crisis intervention are left primarily to the officer at the scene. Knaut did tell the Advisory Committee that CISU workers are often used “to help that victim who may be shaky”; who is wavering over whether or not to seek arrest.²³

There exists, then, a division of labor between officers and caseworkers; a division in which the police maintain responsibility for law enforcement and restoring order, and CISU workers provide access to social services. As Knaut herself writes,

¹⁷ Fein and Knaut, “Crisis Intervention,” p. 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²³ Knaut interview.

“combining the immediacy and action-oriented law enforcement response with the empathetic on-going problem solving social service approach, better serves individuals and families in crisis.”²⁴

Beyond immediate intervention or support, both police and CISU rely on other institutions for followup. If the police make an arrest, the followup is conducted by the judicial system—prosecutors and the courts. For CISU, there exists a myriad of possible resources available to provide the actual services and support to victims of battering. Hence:

The CISU’s knowledge and use of area resources, i.e., social service providers, counselors, legal aid, etc., is a particular strength in its service to clients. The commitment to being informed about which resources are best suited to particular needs has enabled the CISU to coordinate a range of services for its clients, and may be responsible for the fact that only 10 percent of its clients become active again after services are provided.²⁵

The fact that CISU does not itself provide counseling services enables it to close cases quickly. To close a case does not mean that a situation has been resolved totally and permanently, or that the client is no longer eligible for assistance. Rather, the emphasis on closing cases underscores the philosophical premise of CISU: that crisis intervention itself is a short-term measure designed to facilitate long range strategies for lasting resolution. Such a premise naturally places a high premium on “plugging into the appropriate networks” as quickly as possible. Meeting the overall goal of ending an immediate crisis does not mean that the factors which led to a particular event have been removed or remedied; rather, that the factors have been identified and the process of resolution has commenced.

CISU Caseload

As reported in Chapter 2, Chief Sullivan suggested that caseload data from CISU could be used as a rough gauge of the number of battering incidents responded to by the department. But CISU data may provide only a very rough index of the scope of battering in Hartford. Most of CISU’s caseload results from police contact, and not all police use CISU. Thus, CISU figures suffer from the same limitations outlined in Chapter 1 for data derived from police records. Since the police department seems to rely on CISU for its own data and does not

keep specific records of battered women calls, it is impossible to know what proportion of total calls these CISU data represent. (See appendix for copies of CISU forms from which data are collected.)

Both the number of officers referring to CISU and the number of cases handled by the unit have been increasing. As shown in Table 12, CISU handled 526 cases for the 11 month period from January 1983 to November 1983 (figures for December are not available). During the first eight months of 1984, the unit has responded to 505 cases. In 1983 CISU handled an average of 47.8 cases per month, while the unit averaged 63.1 cases from January to August, 1984. This represents a 32 percent increase in the average number of cases handled monthly by CISU.

Although domestic cases constitute the largest category—55 percent of all cases for the 19 months—such cases have declined as a proportion of the entire caseload. While domestic cases represented 58.9 percent of CISU’s caseload in 1983, for the first eight months of 1984 domestic cases represented only 51.9 percent of the CISU caseload. The only other category to experience a proportional (and absolute) decline were the “non-criminal” incidents handled by the unit.

Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the monthly CISU caseload for the 19 month period. According to Knaut, it is impossible to discern any meaning behind the pattern of incidence. She did note that the number of police calls rises in the summer months. The number of sexual assaults also rises. Knaut speculated that greater freedom for house-bound women during the summer could account for the relative shift between domestic and other incidents referred to CISU. Knaut was careful to emphasize, however, that a drop in the number of calls did not necessarily indicate a drop in incidence.

The data provided by CISU suggest that the increase in the number of cases handled and the use of CISU by an increasing number of officers support Knaut’s speculation on the acceptance of the unit by patrol officers. The decreasing proportion of domestic and non-criminal cases underscored this observation. The trend suggests that officers are taking advantage of CISU’s demonstrated ability to provide assistance.

The category “domestic” does not specify the type of incident or the relationship between persons involved. According to Knaut, however, the vast

²⁴ Fein and Knaut, “Crisis Intervention,” p. 10.

²⁵ Crisis Intervention Support Unit, p. 6.

TABLE 12
Cases Handled by CISU: January, 1983 to August, 1984

Type of incident	January, 1983- November, 1983		January, 1984- August, 1984		Total	
	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	No.	(%)
Domestic	310	(58.9)	262	(51.9)	572	(55.0)
Sexual assault	23	(4.0)	37	(7.3)	60	(6.0)
Elderly	38	(7.2)	40	(7.9)	78	(8.0)
Non-criminal	81	(15.4)	26	(5.1)	107	(10.4)
Crime victim	21	(3.9)	70	(13.9)	91	(8.8)
Juvenile	53	(10.1)	70	(13.9)	123	(11.6)
TOTAL	526	505	1,031			

Source: CISU monthly reports.

TABLE 13
Characteristics of CISU Clients:
January-August, 1984

Female	460	(91%)
Male	45	(9%)
Black	199	(39%)
Hispanic	145	(29%)
White	152	(30%)
Other	9	(2%)
Meet CDBG income criteria	349	(80%)
Do not meet CDBG criteria	48	(11%)
Income information unavailable	41	(9%)
Female head of household	275	(69)

Source: Crisis Intervention Support Unit, monthly reports.

majority of domestic cases involve instances of battered women. Additional data supplied by CISU and reported in Table 13 seem to substantiate Knaut's claim. Beginning in January 1984, CISU began tabulating selected data on the characteristics of its clients. The data show that the overwhelming majority of persons served are women (91 percent)


and it is safe, therefore, to assume that a similar proportion exists for domestic cases.

The additional data serve to create a picture of those women who take advantage of CISU. The bulk of CISU's cases involved minority women (68 percent): 39 percent black, and 29 percent Hispanic. The overall distribution among the cases underscores that all groups appear to be in need of crisis intervention and support. Although the figures reported here are not limited to domestic or battering cases, Knaut estimates that the distribution is similar to the battered women segment of her client population.

Because certain social services and legal aid have income restrictions, the CISU is also able to accumulate rough data on the income of its clients. The data in Table 13 suffer from several limitations. In eight cases the race of clients remained unknown and these cases have been added here to the "other" category. Further, a breakdown of income information was not available for June, 1984. As such the total figures used to calculate percentages meeting CDBG criteria and female head of household was 438 cases over seven months.

Most of the unit's clients fall below the income level used as criterion for eligibility under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs. Sketchy as these figures are, they present a picture of a clientele concentrated in the minority community. Not only are the majority of clients

**FIGURE 2:
CISU Caseload, 1983-1984**



female and heads of households, but 80 percent of them can be considered relatively disadvantaged.

Battering is not peculiar to disadvantaged or minority women in Hartford, but the CISU data indicate that the unit's services are tapped primarily by those who do not have other resources. As such, battering may be an additional manifestation of what the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has termed the "painful reality of deprivation" which pervades the lives of female heads of households.²⁶

It could also be, however, that police are more likely to call on the services of CISU for those victims whose alternatives are limited. According to Knaut, "police are encouraged to refer cases [to CISU] where victims' resources are limited and to handle the other referrals to agencies themselves."²⁷ The trend could also reflect a disinclination among more affluent sectors to call the police in the first place.

Hartford is one of the five poorest cities in the nation, with over 80 percent of the children in the city eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).²⁸ While this could account for the composition of CISU's caseload, Knaut observed that "middle and upper income victims don't call the police—period." She added that they will "put up with beatings longer. . .they will use makeup and go to parents for vacation."²⁹ Knaut also speculated that neighbors are less likely to be aware of domestic violence in the suburbs because of distance between houses.

Knaut echoed an observation made by Chief Sullivan that the Hartford Police respond to a large number of citizens in desperate need of social as well as police services. She indicated that while officers are being successfully trained to help victims handle crises, "CISU gets the multi-traumatic cases";³⁰ those in which victims have no car, no money, virtually no prospects.

While the caseload figures provide a rough index of the incidence of battering, CISU's record-keeping procedures for cases also allow the tabulation of services rendered. Table 14 reports six major service activities for the first eight months of 1984.

As is clear from these figures, the bulk of CISU activity appears to involve either personal phone contact with clients (40 percent) or with other

²⁶ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *A Growing Crisis: Disadvantaged Women and Their Children* (1983), p. 62.

²⁷ Knaut comments on draft report, December 24, 1984, p. IV-18 (hereafter cited as Knaut comments).

TABLE 14
CISU Services, January-August, 1984

Type of service		
Client phone contact	2,148	(40%)
Client office visit	213	(4%)
Client home visit	663	(12%)
Transportation	551	(10%)
Court advocacy	208	(4%)
Other agency contacts	1,533	(29%)
TOTAL	5,316	

Source: CISU monthly reports.

agencies (29 percent), confirming the role of CISU agencies (29 percent), confirming the role of CISU as an intermediary between clients and providers of services.

Assessment of CISU

The Crisis Intervention Support Unit receives consistently high marks from most people familiar with its activities, including the most active advocates for victims in Hartford. It is viewed as an innovative organization and a positive force for battered women. Prior to becoming a part of the Hartford Police Department, the Research Department of Child and Family Services requested that CISU "conduct an evaluation to provide information on direct and support services, referrals and work with the police." As part of this evaluation, CISU developed an "Evaluation Plan" which identified goals, tasks and measures. The plan identified three major goals for CISU:

1. Provision of immediate assistance and support for victims of domestic disturbances and elderly crime victims.
2. Provision and coordination of social services for elderly and domestic disturbance crime victims.

²⁸ Leonard Bernstein, "Women, Children Near 80% of Poor," *Hartford Courant*, June 21, 1984.

²⁹ Susan Knaut, telephone interview.

³⁰ Knaut telephone interview.

3. Assistance to the police department through training in "on the scene" intervention, and follow-up services.³¹

The specific tasks and measures used to evaluate CISU performance for 1981 and 1982 are reported in the appendix. They include a quantification of calls, services, interventions, staff time breakdowns and training provided police.

The results of the evaluation tended to support Knaut's general observation about the unit's cost-effectiveness. Yet such an assessment is primarily of value for managerial and organizational evaluations. A client-oriented evaluation of the unit's effectiveness will be conducted in the future, according to Knaut.

An alternative means of assessing effectiveness is feedback from agencies and persons involved with the unit. When CISU funding was threatened in 1983, several organizations provided very positive support. Wendy Kwalwasser, coordinator of Hartford Interval House, wrote in May of 1983 that Interval House had received "many referrals" from CISU and had also called on the unit for assistance in its cases.³² She encouraged the police department to provide financial support for CISU and "expand their services to 24-hour availability," and concluded that "the Crisis Intervention Unit has provided a valuable service to the Hartford community and it is important that it continue uninterrupted."³³

At the same time Shirley Pripstein, of Legal Aid's Family Law Unit, also wrote in support of CISU, citing similar interactions with CISU which had allowed "the matters in dispute have been resolved through the court system rather than in the street."³⁴

Legal Aid's letter also provided important insights into the dynamic interaction between police and CISU in terms of services. Pripstein noted that on "occasions where the police have been slow to respond to calls for assistance. . . the Crisis Intervention Unit has been able to obtain assistance."

Pripstein speculated that "without Crisis Intervention. . . the number of repeat calls involving the same individuals would be higher and that some people would fight until the death of one." In a strong conclusion, Pripstein admonished that "if a purpose of a police force is to prevent crime, including violence between friends and relatives,

then funding for the Crisis Intervention Unit should be a high priority."³⁵

These letters of support combined with the demonstrated effectiveness of the unit to convince the police department to provide a permanent home for CISU. The Advisory Committee sought assessments of the unit's performance since its incorporation and here, too, a consensus of support has emerged. To be sure, one of CISU's most ardent supporters is Chief Sullivan himself. Throughout the Advisory Committee interview with the Chief, he referred to the unit's contribution to the police capacity for responding to battered women.

Another question is whether CISU has been accepted as part of the police department or is it still perceived as a separate unit. Certain practices suggest that maintaining some appearance of separateness is intentional. Sullivan's description of CISU as a "quasi-police" unit is reflected in the fact that while the Hartford Police Department has a central facility, CISU is housed in a separate building. The location of CISU in the West End section of Hartford makes it more central and available to the population it serves than is the department's headquarters in North Meadows. This separateness may reduce the hesitation of clients to visit a police building, though according to CISU data client visits are relatively rare.

A second practice which seems designed to downplay ready identification of CISU with the police is that the unit uses an unmarked car. This practice diminishes the embarrassment which might result from the appearance of a marked car at a residence. Here too, however, it is noteworthy that visits represent 12 percent of CISU activities. Knaut notes that since CISU staff are "not sworn personnel it would be inappropriate to use a marked car." She also reports that CISU is "seeking funds to purchase. . . a station wagon which will have a department decal on the door so it will not be used for undercover purposes, and will be used solely by CISU."³⁶

The last factor which suggests an official ambivalence about how the department views CISU, is the division of labor implicit in police department guidelines. CISU workers are not trained or certified law enforcement officers. Rather, they are civilian

³¹ Fein and Knaut, "Crisis Intervention," p. 12.

³² Wendy Kwalwasser letter to Bernard Sullivan, May 6, 1983.

³³ Kwalwasser letter.

³⁴ Shirley Pripstein letter to "Whom It May Concern," May 25, 1983.

³⁵ Pripstein letter.

³⁶ Knaut comments.

employees of the police department and the practices described here are consistent with such status. The division of labor is also consistent with a conceptualization of crisis intervention as ancillary to the primary purpose of police activity.

Training is a critical element for success and, as noted above, training is an important activity of the CISU. When CISU was not a part of the police department, its training efforts were directed toward creating what Bard and Connolly describe as a general-specialist model in which "a selected group of general patrol officers process all family disturbance calls in a specified area."³⁷ The unit did extensive, multi-faceted training of a selected group of officers. Officers in turn represented a core capable of handling cases and instructing others.

Knaut indicated that her goal is in some respects to eliminate the need for CISU. This would occur if and when uniformed officers were adequately trained, equipped and predisposed to conduct the various aspects of crisis intervention currently relegated to CISU's workers and "if the 'traditional' social service agencies also change in order to meet the needs of people in crisis."³⁸ Currently, however, the division of labor between an officer's tasks and CISU's social work function seems to weaken the prospects for any such successful transfer of duties and functions.

Although there is little question that CISU provides an essential service to victims, the community and the police department, its current civilian staffing pattern could be interpreted as a form of institutional weakness for crisis intervention as a *police function*. Bard and Connolly advise, "organizational commitment to the function is made real to the patrol officer by the structure of rewards and incentives."³⁹ They also warn that:

Means have not been found to reward those with a high degree of competence in managing family crises. In fact, continuation of practices such as the insistence of officers being back in service within a specified brief period of time may actually tend to punish those officers most competent in intervention.⁴⁰

³⁷ Morton Bard and Harriet Connolly, "The Police and Family Violence: Policy and Practice" in *Battered Women: Issues of Public Policy*, p. 313.

³⁸ Knaut comments.

³⁹ Bard and Connolly, p. 315.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁴¹ Margaret Martin interview in Hartford, Connecticut, July 18, 1984.

The current Hartford Police Department procedures and policy toward CISU seem to run just such a risk. This is particularly true in light of the overwhelmingly large proportion of new officers on the force. This concentration of new officers represents a rare opportunity for instituting a system of incentives and rewards to patrol officers not influenced by previous policy, but guided by enlightened training.

Despite Chief Sullivan's effort to instill a perception among his officers that CISU fulfills a quasi-police function, the apparent confusion over CISU's status among social service and advocacy groups could lead to future problems. Although CISU's role is seen by many as providing advocacy for victims, its official designation as part of the police department could well lead to future conflicts of interest. Margaret Martin of the Task Force on Abused Women expressed concern that CISU's total reliance on the police department for funds could make the unit vulnerable to a change in departmental leadership or funding cutbacks for the department.⁴¹ On the other hand Knaut notes that CISU "became part of the department *because* our social service sponsor cut us out of their budget because we were a low priority."⁴²

John Foley, Director of Family Services at the Salvation Army, noted that while he perceives CISU as a police function, his impression is that clients make a distinction between the two. He also noted that the police themselves seem to retain an active distinction, one perpetuated somewhat by training which emphasizes that they are "cops first."⁴³

Cecile Laurenitis of Interval House was also somewhat ambivalent about the CISU's status. While she indicated that the unit's performance has complemented the shelter's efforts to assist victims, she added that if CISU were "not connected it might provide even better services to victims' own needs rather than the police or State's attorney."⁴⁴

Future Prospects

The Hartford Crisis Intervention Support Unit is a unique organization. In its brief five year history it

⁴² Knaut comments.

⁴³ John Foley interview in Hartford, Connecticut, August 14, 1984.

⁴⁴ Cecile Laurenitis interview in Hartford, Connecticut, July 25, 1984.

has aided hundreds of victims beyond the capacities available from responding police officers. The organization has grown both in size and scope of activities; has been transformed from a pilot program into an official part of the police department; has overcome initial resistance from police officers; and has become recognized as a valuable resource. Furthermore, the value of CISU is clearly affirmed by current Hartford Chief of Police Bernard Sullivan's commitment to its future.

As noted earlier, CISU Director Susan Knaut projects that the unit's ultimate success will occur when "we put ourselves out of existence." Knaut envisions that eventually the unit would become a more conventional "victim assistance program."⁴⁵ Based on CISU data which show an increase in the proportion of "crime victim" cases which comprise its caseload, it appears that Knaut may be approaching her goal sooner than expected.

While the redistribution of CISU cases among a wider range of police calls may signal broad acceptance by uniformed officers, Knaut herself has expressed concern that an increasing amount of the unit's time is being devoted to providing assistance to victims of serious non-domestic crimes. Because caseworkers conduct both field response and follow-up, a call for immediate assistance to an officer responding to a sexual assault victim will understandably take precedence over transport to a court appearance for last week's battered woman.

Knaut emphasized that CISU operates as a "bridge between the criminal justice and social services, helping people get across."⁴⁶ In a similar vein, Sullivan asserted that "I don't belong to the criminal justice system. I belong to the criminal and social justice system. I have a service agency; 70

percent of what my people do has nothing to do with arresting bad guys."⁴⁷ Indeed, Knaut noted that in responding to incidents of battering "some officers think it important to make a bad situation better."⁴⁸

Although both Sullivan and Knaut consistently pledge commitment to diminishing the cynicism and suspicion which the law enforcement and social work professions have for each other, certain structural features of CISU's operation may contribute to an institutionalization of the gulf. Despite Sullivan's obvious commitment to helping victims of battering in Hartford, he did speculate that "most instances of battered women are more of a social problem than a criminal problem."⁴⁹ While such an assessment may be accurate in terms of the problems underlying battering, it runs counter to current thinking. As is stressed in the International Chiefs of Police Training Key, when battering takes place a crime occurs, and as such, presents a criminal problem. Cecile Laurenitis, Legal Advocate of Interval House, argued that "officers can combine referral with arrest."⁵⁰

The Crisis Intervention Support Unit does not operate in a vacuum. Indeed, as part of the police department it not only relies on police cooperation but on "good faith" as well. Although factors which contribute to battering may be social, the success of CISU seems to hinge on the ability of CISU caseworkers to intervene and advocate for victims at the scenes of such crimes. Whether this can occur given the current division of labor between CISU caseworkers and uniformed officers and under the passive arrest policies outlined in current Hartford Police Department guidelines may present the most serious challenge facing the unit in the near future.

⁴⁵ Knaut interview.

⁴⁶ Knaut interview.

⁴⁷ Sullivan interview.

⁴⁸ Knaut interview.

⁴⁹ Sullivan interview.

⁵⁰ Laurenitis interview.

Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence

An important voice was added to the public concern over the status of battered women when Attorney General William French Smith appointed a "Task Force on Family Violence" in September, 1983. In a press release announcing the formation of the Task Force, the Attorney General noted:

Family violence in America is a serious and complex crime problem. The incalculable costs of these crimes in physical and emotional suffering, ruined lives and future crimes, are intolerable in our civilized society. Yet, this problem has for too long been viewed as a private matter best resolved by the parties themselves without resort to the legal system.

Although research in the area is limited, new information in this area contradicts some longstanding popular beliefs and law enforcement practices. For example, a recent study by the National Institute of Justice indicates that arrest and overnight incarceration may be the most effective intervention in domestic violence cases. Studies such as this clearly point to the need to review basic assumptions that underpin the handling of family violence cases.¹

The Advisory Committee is encouraged by the publication of the Task Force's *Final Report*, which provides a concise summary of the problem and needed remedies. Although the Task Force findings are national in scope, there are several which are relevant to Connecticut and provide a useful frame-

work for assessing the Advisory Committee's findings and recommendations.

The Task Force emphasizes that "the legal response to family violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the abusive act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser."²

Because family violence is the only crime in which the victim knows the identity of the offender, the deterrent effects of legal sanction against the offender are potentially greater than for any other crime. If family violence were always reported and if the legal system always acted on the basis of its knowledge, the deterrent effects of swift and certain legal penalties would be great.³

The Task Force laments the fact that such a "preventive effect is thwarted" because too many abusers *and* victims do not perceive these actions as crimes. Hence:

The first indispensable step in preventing family violence is to ensure that abusers and victims alike recognize that a crime is involved and that, when appropriate, the legal system will intervene on the victim's behalf.⁴

The Task Force emphasizes and encourages a two-pronged approach to the prevention and elimination of family violence. One critical feature is continued public education that family violence is a crime.

¹ U.S. Department of Justice, News Release, September 19, 1983.

² Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, *Final Report* (U.S. Department of Justice: September, 1984), p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The public must become aware of the nature of the problem and its obligations in combatting it. The work of the criminal justice agencies and victim assistance agencies is extremely important, but until there is a broad, clear signal that family violence is condemned by the community, abusers will continue to ignore the reality of their crimes and victims will continue to blame themselves.⁵

Echoing the underlying premise of Hartford's Crisis Intervention Support Unit, the Task Force stresses the importance of closing the "gap that too often separates the criminal justice system from the providers of social services."⁶ And echoing the Advisory Committee's 1979 recommendation, the Task Force also admonishes, "law enforcement officers must know where their victims can be referred for emergency aid."⁷

In addition to these general findings, the Task Force has made six specific "recommendations for law enforcement." These recommendations, detailed at length in the report, are as follows:

1. All law enforcement agencies should publish operational procedures that establish family violence as a priority response and require officers to file written reports on all incidents. In addition, the operational procedures should require officers to perform a variety of activities to assist the victim.
2. Consistent with state law, the chief executive of every law enforcement agency should establish arrest as the preferred response in cases of family violence.
3. Law enforcement officials should maintain a current file of all protection orders valid in their jurisdiction.
4. Law enforcement officers should respond without delay to calls involving violations of protection orders.
5. Forms for obtaining protection orders should be available at all police stations and sheriffs' offices.
6. When responding to disturbance calls, law enforcement officers should document violations of

⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

⁷ Ibid., p. 6.

pre-trial release conditions. The report should verify the facts and circumstances necessary for the prosecutor to request revocation of the release.⁸

Of particular concern to the Advisory Committee is the specific recommendation that:

The Uniform Crime Reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) should be revised to collect and publish data that:

- Indicate the age of the victim and the relationship to the offender for crimes of aggravated assault, simple assault, rape, sex offenses (except prostitution), and offenses against the family and children; and
- Record incidents of family violence crimes, regardless of whether an arrest is made.⁹

In discussing this recommendation, the Task Force suggests that such changes will mean that:

. . . the fact that an incident of family violence that falls under a classification which previously recorded only arrests will no longer prevent it from being collected and reported. Coupled with the information noting the relationship of the victim to the offender, incident-based reporting will provide a means to more accurately measure crimes of family violence. As a result, both law enforcement and victim services will be better able to direct their resources in responding to and providing services for victims of family violence.¹⁰

These recommendations represent a comprehensive set of actions and should be tailored to the needs and resources of specific police departments. It is essential to note that the Task Force report is not limited to law enforcement, but also includes recommendations for prosecutors and judges; victim assistance; prevention and awareness; data collection and reporting; and future research. To be sure, changes in law enforcement practices must be accompanied by changes in each of these additional areas.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

⁹ Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 84.

Summary and Recommendations

The concern for, and awareness of, the needs of battered women to receive equal protection of the laws has grown steadily over the past decade. This increased sensitivity is reflected in the media and in growing public policy debate. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and several of its Advisory Committees, as well as a number of private organizations, have contributed to these deliberations.

Summary

This follow-up report to the Advisory Committee's 1979 study has attempted to survey the various official practices and policies of the police department and to determine to what extent the Committee's recommendations for improved police response to battered women have been followed. Based on the views of representatives of several organizations which have been concerned with battered women, the consensus is that there has been marked and meaningful improvement in the response of the Hartford police. There is also little doubt that the improvement manifests strong commitment on the part of the current department leadership.

This commitment is reflected in one very fundamental area: actual response. As noted in Chapter 1, uncertainty over the very fact of obtaining police response historically has been one of the major shortcomings of police in cases of battered women. Whereas the 1979 Advisory Committee study uncovered a pattern of uneven response to calls by

victims, as John Foley commented, "response time and trust of people in the field has increased 1,000 percent"¹ in recent years.

The second historical flaw in police response to battered women involved the content of response by officers once on the scene. In the years since the Advisory Committee's initial study, a great deal has been written about what constitutes appropriate response; particularly the need for a shift from police mediation to more aggressive arrest policies and more forceful officer intervention. The demands for arrest and intervention have created a heated debate between those who view too rigid an arrest policy as detrimental to the appropriate exercise of police discretion, and those who see too heavy a reliance on mediation and referral as detrimental to the rights of victims.

The record of the Hartford Police Department in overcoming problems identified in its response to battered women in 1979, reflects this ambiguity. This is particularly true in terms of Advisory Committee recommendations in its 1979 report. Although the department has issued a set of guidelines and incorporated the Crisis Intervention Support Unit within its administrative structure, the guidelines themselves fall short of earlier drafts and institutionalize an officer's perception of victim willingness to prosecute as a legitimate factor in making a non-arrest decision.

¹ John Foley interview in Hartford, Ct., August 14, 1984.Ω

While the positive benefits of CISU are generally acknowledged, the unit's functions as specified in current guidelines diminish the intervention responsibilities of the police themselves. In 1979 the Advisory Committee encouraged the department to institute a policy of referral to social and support agencies. CISU's status as part of the department does not qualify as referral to outside agencies by officers. Though this policy often results in the immediate involvement of CISU caseworkers at the scene, the resulting division of labor between police work and social work inherent in current procedures does not satisfy the primary purpose of police referral at the scene: to lend the authority and legitimacy of the police to the victim's rights of protection from abuse.

The department's commitment to training is also somewhat ambivalent. While the academy has instituted segments on responding to battered women within its curriculum, the thoroughness of this training has been seriously questioned. Neither does the failure to provide rigorous in-service training for veteran officers reflect the department's stated commitment to providing meaningful response to battered women. The failure to provide such training could actually undercut the limited training given to recruits, for veteran officers naturally serve as role models for younger peers. The commitment of veteran officers to vigorous response is essential, therefore, to reinforce the training provided recruits at the academy.

A continuing shortcoming of the department has been its refusal to record incidents of battering. The refusal of the Hartford Police Department to comply with the requirements of State law sets an unfortunate example and creates serious doubt about the department's overall commitment to the needs of battered women.

Recommendations

The Connecticut Advisory Committee believes the following recommendations will bring us closer to providing equal protection of the laws for women who are victims of battering. They are submitted in accordance with the provisions of section 703.2 (e) of the rules and regulations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights calling upon each Advisory Committee to "initiate and forward advice and recommendations to the Commission upon matters which the State Committee has studied."

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation should revise its data collection procedures in accordance with the recommendation of the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, so that the Uniform Crime Reports will record family violence crimes, regardless of arrest.
2. The Advisory Committee endorses the recommendations of the Attorney General's Task Force regarding law enforcement conduct. The Hartford Police Department should revise its guidelines to incorporate the following "activities" based on the Task Force recommendations for officers at the scene of battering incidents:
 - Produce written reports of all incidents, regardless of whether an arrest is made.
 - Follow a more active arrest policy which requires clearly documented reasons for all non-arrest decisions in cases where physical injury has occurred.
 - Provide verbal communication to both victim and abuser (if present) of a victim's rights and possible actions on her behalf (including criminal charges and court issued protection orders).
 - When arrest is not pursued, instruct the abuser to leave the premises; or, should the victim desire to leave, remain on the scene until the victim is able to depart.
 - Advise the victim of shelter and other resources available to a victim by distributing an up-to-date referral card which includes, but is not limited to CISU; and includes the officer's name and badge number.
 - Coordinate provision of additional support services with a Crisis Intervention Support Unit caseworker.
3. The Chief of the Hartford Police Department should remove the current language from its guidelines which calls for officers to consider a victim's willingness to prosecute as a factor in making arrest decisions.
4. In order to be able to carry out the activities described above, the Hartford Police Department should provide intensive classroom and field training for both rookie and veteran officers. These sessions should be designed in consultation with police training specialists in the area of crisis intervention and domestic violence response; and regularly scheduled refresher courses should be offered.
5. Officers should be trained to treat calls by "presumed victims" as incidents of battering for purposes of reporting. A call for assistance should be

regarded as the operational definition of a battering incident. This would remove any confusion over whether a slap or otherwise seemingly "minor" dispute should be recorded.

6. The absorption of the CISU by the police department represents a unique opportunity for the Hartford Police Department to require:

- Extensive field training for a limited number of uniformed patrol officers by CISU staff, with at least two of these officers in each duty shift; and
- A distinction between battered women and "victim assistance," reflected in terms of current CISU staff availability and future staffing changes.

7. Police actions are only partly controlled by internal guidelines. In Connecticut, police are also constrained by State law.² Connecticut is one of a growing number of States which allows warrantless arrests if an officer has "probable cause that a misdemeanor or offense has occurred."³ This flexibility is included in current Hartford Police Department guidelines, but it requires consideration of a victim's willingness to prosecute. Even if this provision is removed, the effectiveness of arrest is limited. As the Task Force found:

An enforced separation of the victim and assailant is often necessary to permit the passions on all sides to subside and to take the reasonable steps necessary to end the violence and prevent future abuse. However, when an arrest is made or a misdemeanor citation is issued, the abuser is often released from custody immediately. He can return to the family without experiencing any real cooling-off

period. In fact, the arrest and brief detention may only increase the abuser's anger and hostility against family members.⁴

The Task Force therefore recommended that "States should enact legislation that permits overnight incarceration of persons arrested for incidents of family violence, in appropriate cases."⁵

The Advisory Committee recommends that the Connecticut legislature consider such legislation permitting overnight detention of batterers. Not only would this option increase the chance for a more reasonable and effective "cooling-off" period and increase the deterrent effect of arrest, but it would also eliminate the singular burden on victims to leave the domicile as the only means to de-escalate. The removal of the abuser would allow the victim to consider the range of options available in an unthreatening and unpressured atmosphere.

8. Finally, given the vagueness of the current Connecticut reporting law and the non-compliance of some cities, the Advisory Committee urges the legislature to revise the law to:

- Provide a concise and operable definition of battering for use by police departments, hospitals and social service agencies;
- Evaluate whether police and hospital emergency rooms should be covered by separate reporting requirements; and
- Specify that police departments record and report all calls which involve battering.

⁴ Task Force on Family Violence, *Final Report*, p. 105.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

² Bernard Sullivan interview in Hartford, Ct., June 20, 1984.

³ According to data compiled by the Center for Women Policy Studies, 33 states allow some form of warrantless arrest. *Response to Violence in the Family and Sexual Assault*, September/October, 1983, p. 10.

Appendix

1. Straus, *et al.*, "Conflict Tactics Scale."
2. DHR, "Statistical Report of Suspected Incidents of Spouse Abuse."
3. Connecticut State Police Special Order, "Reporting of Suspected Spousal Abuse to the Commissioner of Human Resources by State Police Personnel."
4. Hartford Police Department, "Incident Report."
5. Child and Family Services, "CISU Evaluation Plan."
6. Crisis Intervention and Support Unit, "Crisis Intake Form," "Daily Activity Log," "Phone Emergency Service Tally," and "CISU Client Log."
7. Hartford Police Training Academy, "Training Schedule for Intervention and Related Agencies."
8. Hartford Police Department, "Crime Victims and Crisis Intervention."

Conflict Tactics Scale

- a. Discussed the issue calmly
- b. Got information to back up (your/her) side of things
- c. Brought in or tried to bring in someone to help settle things
- d. Insulted or swore at the other one
- e. Sulked and/or refused to talk about it
- f. Stomped out of the room or house (or yard)
- g. Cried
- h. Did or said something to spite the other one
- i. Threatened to hit or throw something at the other one
- j. Threw or smashed or hit or kicked something
- k. Threw something at the other one
- l. Pushed, grabbed, or shoved the other one
- m. Slapped the other one
- n. Kicked, bit, or hit with a fist
- o. Hit or tried to hit with something
- p. Beat up the other one
- q. Threatened with a knife or gun
- r. Used a knife or gun
- s. Other (PROBE):

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

STATISTICAL REPORT OF SUSPECTED INCIDENTS
OF SPOUSE ABUSE

TO: Department of Human Resources
Planning Division
84 Wadsworth St.
Hartford, .06106 .

FROM: _____ Month of Report _____
 _____ Reported by _____
 _____ Location _____
 _____ Person Submitting Report _____
 _____ Title _____
 _____ Telephone Number _____

Tally of Suspected Incidents of Abuse

	Tally	Total
Abuse by Spouse: Living In The Same Household		
Not Living In The Same Household		
Uncertain		
Abuse By Other Adult Member Of The Opposite Sex Of The Same Household..		

INSTRUCTIONS: This form should be used to record both individual incidents and a monthly total of incidents. The monthly total should be returned to the Department on a single copy of the form by the 10th day of the month following the month in which the report was made.

The report is to be made by Police Officers and Hospital Emergency Room Personnel only. The "person submitting report" blank should be signed by the reporter designated by the police department or hospital administration.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DIVISION OF STATE POLICE

S.P.R.A.M.I.S. INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN 84-8
EFFECTIVE: NOVEMBER 30, 1984 - 1200 hours

REPORTING OF SPOUSAL ABUSE PROCEDURE

PURPOSE: To provide for reporting of suspected spousal abuse within the guidelines of Section 17-31L of the Connecticut General Statutes and H.Q. Special Order 98-A, Addendum No. 2.

PROCEDURE: Whenever a State Police officer or a constable responds to any incident where physical injury has been inflicted upon a person, he/she shall determine if spousal abuse has occurred. If such abuse has occurred, it shall be reported to the desk officer for inclusion on the dispatch card.

Only those dispatch cards involving spousal abuse will require the "Spousal Abuse" stamp placed on the rear in the "notes" section. The appropriate code will be entered in the box and in the blank on the dispatch entry screen.

Spousal abuse shall be reported by utilizing the following categories:

- N = No spousal abuse
- A = Abuse by spouse - offender living in same household
- B = Abuse by spouse - offender living in other household - not with spouse
- C = Abuse by spouse - offender's residence uncertain
- D = Abuse by adult member of opposite sex in same household and NOT spouse

An entry will be required for all Type 1 incidents before the dispatch card entry will be acceptable to the S.P.R.A.M.I.S. System.

Each month, Information Systems will generate a report containing spousal abuse statistical information and will send it to the following:

Department of Human Services
Planning Division
84 Wadsworth Street
Hartford, CT 06106

RECEIVED
DEC 05 1984
SPECIAL PROGRAM D

ADDENDUM NO. 2
DATED: NOVEMBER 30, 1984

DEC 27 REC'D

TO

HQ SPECIAL ORDER 98-A
DATED: AUGUST 25, 1980

REPORTING OF SUSPECTED SPOUSAL ABUSE TO COMMISSIONER
OF HUMAN RESOURCES BY STATE POLICE PERSONNEL

- PURPOSE:** To provide for reporting of suspected spousal abuse within the guidelines of Section 17-31L of the Connecticut General Statutes.
- POLICY:** All State Police officers investigating complaints in which a victim is suspected of having been physically injured by a spouse or by a member of the same household who is of the opposite sex, shall report such abuse to the Commissioner of Human Resources.
- DISCUSSION:** Section 17-31L requires that police officers and hospital emergency room personnel report statistical information to the Commissioner of Human Resources of any instances of known or suspected spousal abuse, to wit:

"Reporting of suspected spouse abuse to Commissioner of Human Resources by police personnel. Publication of statistics. Police officers and hospital emergency room personnel who have reasonable cause to believe that an individual has physical injury or injuries which has or have been inflicted upon her or him by such individual's spouse, whether or not such individuals are living together, or by any adult member of the household who is of the opposite sex, shall report such injuries to the Commissioner of Human Resources. Such report shall not name the parties involved but shall be for statistical purposes only. The Commissioner of Human Resources shall publish such statistics semiannually and shall make available such statistics to the general public."

RECEIVED
DEC 05 1984
SPECIAL PROGRAM DIV.

PROCEDURE:

Whenever a State Police officer or a constable responds to any incident where physical injury has been inflicted upon a person, he/she shall determine if spousal abuse has occurred. If such abuse has occurred, it shall be reported to the desk officer for inclusion on the dispatch card.

Spousal abuse shall be reported for all criminal investigations utilizing the following categories:

- N = No spousal abuse
- A = Abuse by spouse - offender living in same household
- B = Abuse by spouse - offender living in other household - not with spouse
- C = Abuse by spouse - offender's residence uncertain
- D = Abuse by adult member of opposite sex in same household and NOT spouse

An entry will be required for all Type 1 incidents before the dispatch card entry will be acceptable to the S.P.R.A.M.I.S. System.

Each month, Information Systems will generate a report containing spousal abuse statistical information and will send it to the following:

Department of Human Services
Planning Division
84 Wadsworth Street
Hartford, CT 06106

A copy will also be sent to the Crimes Analysis Unit.

HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT
INCIDENT REPORT

PROSECUTOR REPORT SUPPLEMENT JUVENILE REFERRAL

CASE #

DATE	DATE OF INCIDENT	TIME OF INCIDENT	DATE REPORTED	TIME REPORTED	DISTRICT	UNIT	TYPE OF INCIDENT	UCC CODE	STATUS	UCC CODE 2	
#	NUMBER	STREET NAME	APT	FLOOR	<input type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/> ON STREET		<input type="checkbox"/> RESIDENT SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/> RESIDENT MULTI	<input type="checkbox"/> NON RESIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> CITY PROPERTY	<input type="checkbox"/> ALLEY OR LBY <input type="checkbox"/> ABANDONED BLDG.	RELATED CASE 1	
DATE AND TIME OF RECOVERY		LOCATION OF RECOVERY		CONTRIBUTING FACTORS • <input type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL <input type="checkbox"/> MENTAL PROBLEM <input type="checkbox"/> DRUGS <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUING DOMESTIC		WEATHER • <input type="checkbox"/> NOT APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/> CLEAR <input type="checkbox"/> RAIN <input type="checkbox"/> ICE CONDITIONS • <input type="checkbox"/> APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/> DRY <input type="checkbox"/> SNOW <input type="checkbox"/> FOG		RELATED CASE 2			
CODE A - ACCUSED C - COMPLAINT J - JUVENILE S - SUSPECT M - MISSING V - VICTIM W - WITNESS P - PEDESTRIAN R - OWNER of M/V H - PASSENGER in M/V T - TICKETED Z - OPERATOR M/V		INTERVIEWED E - ALIAS O - OTHER L - LOCATED B - BUSINESS R - REFERRED JUVENILE		RACE W - WHITE B - BLACK CODE H - HISPANIC O - OTHER		APT - FLOOR TELEPHONE					
ARREST 1		ARREST 2		ARREST 3		ARREST 4		ARREST 5		ARREST 6	
CHARGE 1		CHARGE 2		CHARGE 3		CHARGE 4		CHARGE 5		CHARGE 6	
SEX		RACE		AGE		HEIGHT		WEIGHT		HAIR COLOR	
HAIR TYPE		COMPLEXION		DESCRIPTION/COMMENTS/DISTINCTIVE FEATURES							
FORM CODE		EVIDENCE		FOUND		LOST		RECOVERED		STOLEN	
TOWED		VEHICLE		OTHER		DAMAGED		SUSPECT VEHICLE		FORM 200 COMPLETED	
QTY		YEAR		ITEM		(BRAND MODEL)		STATE		REGISTRATION	
COLOR		SERIAL OR VIN		CHARACTERISTICS/CONDITION		EST. VALUE		CLASS			
QTY OF ENTRY		CODE		TYPE OF WEAPON - TOOLS		CODE					
SOLVABILITY FACTORS		YES		NO		UNK		INCIDENT DETAILS			
SPECT LOCATION											
SPECT NAME											
SPECT IDENTIFICATION											
NESS TO CRIME											
SPECT DESCRIPTION											
APONS DESCRIPTION											
EVIDENCE COLLECTED											
VEHICLE INFORMATION											
PROPERTY ID #/LOCATED											
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION											
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION		C.A. PROPERTY		C.A. PERSONS		<input type="checkbox"/> CRIME SUPPRESSION <input type="checkbox"/> DOG WARDEN		<input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC <input type="checkbox"/> INTELLIGENCE		INVESTIGATING OFFICER CODE ASSISTING OFFICER CODE AFFIDAVIT STATEMENT SUPERVISOR CODE Submitted and sworn to before	
PAGE		OF		PAGES							



Figure 1

Child & Family Services

CISU Evaluation Plan

Goals	Task	Measures
<p>Provision of immediate assistance and support for victims of domestic disturbances and elderly crime victims</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Phone or "on the scene" availability during or immediately following an incident involving a domestic disturbance or an elderly person. 2. Provision of personal and emotional support as well as ancillary services in the hours and days following an incident. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The number of calls requesting CISU services. 2. The number of requests for service after 5 P.M. or on weekends when other social services are not available. 3. The types of services requested (i.e., "on the scene" vs. phone) and for whom they are requested. 4. Types of services delivered. 5. The number of hours spent in direct client contact.
<p>Provision and coordination of social services for elderly and domestic disturbance crime victims.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Knowledge of area resources and appropriate referrals. 2. Cooperation/coordination with other agencies. 3. Client advocacy: bring services to clients and assisting clients in obtaining appropriate services. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of referrals from CISU to other agencies. 2. Number and type of services provided to client by type of presenting problem. 3. Number and types of advocacy services provided beyond immediate, crisis oriented assistance.
<p>Assistance to the police department through training on "on the scene" intervention, and follow-up services.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training all officers who patrol the Northern Half of Hartford in techniques of officer safety, diffusing crisis, interviewing and referring. 2. Implementation of training through continued contact and outreach to officers. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of officers who receive classroom and "ride along" training. 2. Number of police referrals to CISU. 3. Number of officers who refer to CISU. 4. Amount of time CISU personnel spend in contact with police. 5. Number of requests for "on the scene" intervention.

CRISIS UNIT INTAKE FORM

_____ Previous Involvement	CISU # _____
_____ Related Case #	HPD # _____
10-_____ Incident Code	Date: _____
	Time: _____

Complainant	Date of Birth	Significant other(s) and/or children
Address	Floor/Apt.	
Phone	Age Sex Ethnicity Citizenship	

Offenders if applicable _____

SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ___ Alcohol ___ Drugs ___ Mental ___ Weapon ___ Other

FINANCIAL STATUS

City State SSI Female Head of Household Other Assistance

Employer _____	Work phone _____
Monthly Income _____	# of Dependents _____

REFERRAL INFORMATION

Referred to:

	<u>Accepted</u>	<u>Denied Services</u>
Agency _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agency _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agency _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agency _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agency _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Case Worker _____

CRISIS INTERVENTION

Daily Activity Log

Staff Name _____

Date/Shift _____

Client Name	Date Case Opened	Client Phone Contact	Client Office Visit	Client Home Visit	Trans.	Court Contact	Other Agency	HPD

Other Activities/Comments: _____

Phone Emergency Service Tally

DATE	TIME	PROBLEM NEEDING ASSISTANCE	REFERRED TO

RECRUIT CLASS 83-1
TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR CRISIS INTERVENTION AND
COMMUNITY RELATED AGENCIES

February 1, 1983, 1-2 pm: Crisis Intervention Introduction

- A. What is a Crisis?
- B. The Police Officer's role in crisis intervention

Movie: "Someone Elses' Crisis"

Instructor: Susan Knaut

2-4 pm: Crisis Intervention - Officer Safety

- A. Officer Safety Techniques

Movie: "The Day Everything Went Wrong", the first film
in the series on Conflict Management by Harper & Rowe

Instructor: Bob Allen

February 16, 1983

8:00 am - 12:00: Specific Crisis Intervention Techniques

- 8:00 - 9:00: A. Officer Safety review
- 9:00 -12:00: B. Calming the Emotional Citizen
- C. Brief Interviewing
- D. Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration

Movie: The appropriate films in the Harper & Rowe series.

Instructors: Bob Allen and Susan Knaut

Role Playing as time allows *

March 17, 1983

1:00 - 3:00 pm: Crime Victims and the C.I.S.U.

- A. Common Victim Reactions and Needs
- B. How to use the C.I.S.U. to meet those needs

Movie: The film on referring to Community Agencies in the
Harper & Rowe series.

Instructor: Susan Knaut

March 22, 1983

1:00 - 3:00: Domestic Disputes * 2 hours

Instructors: Bob Allen and Susan Knaut

3:00 - 4:00: Red Cross Presentation

Instructor: Barbara Jones

March 23, 1983

8:00 - 9:00: The Elderly Victim

- A. The special needs of the elderly
- B. Laws and Resources

Instructor: Susan Knaut

9:00 - 10:00: Criminal Injuries Compensation

- A. Who can apply and for what.
- B. Role of Victim/Witness Advocate Superior Court

Instructor: Charles Lexius

10:00 - 12:00: Community Resources Panel

A. Brief Presentations from 4-6 Agencies i.e.

1. Salvation Army *
2. Elderly Protective Services
3. Sexual Assault Crisis Unit
4. Visiting Nurses
5. Arriba Crisis Intervention/Hispanic Health
6. InfoLine

B. Questions from the class as time allows.

Moderator: Susan Knaut

April 14, 1983

1:00 - 3:00: The Battered Woman Victim * 3 hours

A. Battered Women

Instructor: Representatives from Hartford Interval House

3:00 - 4:00: Legal Options 4

Instructor: Representative from Domestic Violence Unit from
Legal Aid

May 4, 1983

2:00 - 4:00: Recognizing Abnormal Behavior

Instructor: Susan Knaut

IN-SERVICE POLICE TRAINING - 1984

I. Up Date On CISU

- A. City employee status/Community Response Division
- B. 24 Hour Response Procedure
- C. New location, telephone and Unit #108

II. Types Of Cases

- A. Domestic - 50% of case load
- B. Juveniles - CISU v.s. Y.S.D. and D.C.Y.S.
- C. Sexual Assaults - and other felonies.
- D. Homeless and/or crazy

III. Up Date On Community Resources

- A. Legal Aid - Restraining Orders for cohabitating people,
-- waiting list and income guidelines.
- B. Bail Commissioners - Request a condition of bond be to
stay away from victim - faster and cheaper then Restraining
Orders
- C. Warrants - Victims must have a case number for misdemeanors
only. CISU can help if complaintant can't get to 10-2 or
speak/write English.
- D. Criminal Injuries Compensation - Medical expenses and loss
of wages not covered elsewhere - no welfare recipients,
victim can not be living with offender.
- E. Victim/Witness Advocate Part A - Also involved in Homicide
Support Group for victims families.
- F. Shelters

**IN-SERVICE TRAINING HARTFORD POLICE
CRIME VICTIMS AND CRISIS INTERVENTION**

I. What is a Crisis-General (1-hour break)

- A. Definition-Sudden, Arbitrary, Unpredictable**
- B. Crime Continuum**
- C. Characteristics of victims**
- D. Characteristics of officer**

**Materials: Overhead (2)
 Hand outs (2)**

II. Crime Victims

A. Elderly crime victims

- 1. Special needs of elderly/aging**
- 2. Non-criminal calls with elderly**

**Materials: Overhead (1)
 Hand outs (2)**

B. Child abuse victims

C. Domestic disputes

- 1. Spousal abuse**

**Materials: Overhead (3)
 Hand outs (2)**

- 2. Adult/child parent**
- 3. Psychiatric problems in families**

III. Crisis Intervention Techniques (2 hours)

- A. Defusing**
- B. Brief Interviewing**
- C. Mediation, negotiation, arbitration**
- D. Referral**

**Materials: Overhead (2)
 Hand outs Resource books
 Movie (2)**

IV. Crisis Intervention Support Unit (30 mins.)

V. Other Community Resources (30 mins.)